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Following the end of the First World War, 
elated and distinguished statesmen represent­
ing the victorious powers gathered in Paris, 
London, and San Remo to draft terms that 
were to be imposed on their defeated enemies 
as safeguards of a hard-won peace. Of the five 
pacts that were ultimately concluded, the 
treaty with the Ottoman Empire took by far 
the longest to negotiate; for it involved not 
only the drafting of the peace terms themselves, 
but also the division that was to be made among 
the victors of vast territorial spoils. Professor 
Helmreich traces the troubled history of the 
negotiations among those nations — which 
included, for a time, the United States — that 
ultimately produced the remarkable document 
known, by virtue of the place in which it was 
signed, as the Treaty of Sevres. 
When the Paris Peace Conference convened 
there appeared to be a clear consensus among 
the Allied and Associated Powers on funda­
mental issues — exclusion of the Turk from 
Europe, establishment of international control 
over Constantinople and the Straits, liberation 
of the non-Turkish portions of "the Ottoman 
Empire, and accordance of some sort of na­
tional recognition to the newly freed peoples. 
When these matters actually came up for 
debate, however, a host of differences erupted 
as to how the policies that had won general 
acceptance were to be implemented in practice. 
What made the situation particularly unfor­
tunate was the irrepressible tendency of the 
negotiating parties to make all decisions with 
no real understanding, or even awareness, of 
the new force of nationalism that had been un­
leashed in the Near East. Instead traditional 
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PREFACE

DURING 1919 AND the first 
months of 1920, statesmen representing the victorious powers in 
World War I gathered in Paris, London, and San Remo to draft 
peace terms that were to be imposed upon their defeated enemies. 
Of the five pacts that were negotiated, the one that took the longest 
by far was the treaty with the Ottoman Empire. It involved not only 
the drafting of peace terms for Turkey but also the division of vast 
territorial spoils among the powers themselves. The negotiation of 
this Near East peace settlement, incorporated in the document known 
as the Treaty of Sevres, is the topic of this study. 
The Treaty of Sevres constituted Europe's solution to a nine­
teenth-century problem in international relations, the Eastern Ques­
tion. This book is essentially a history of the negotiations between 
the European powers (and, for a time, the United States). It has 
been constructed as a study of World War I peace-conference diplo­
macy, and is not intended to be an examination of Near Eastern 
history as such. In general, external forces and events in the Near 
East have been considered only with a view to determining the extent 
of their influence on the course of the negotiations and the reasons 
for it. All too often what emerges is a picture of an internal realpolitik 
around the negotiating table that was sadly out of touch with the 
realities of external events. Traditional imperial ambitions and na­
tional rivalries, supplemented by personal conflicts and prejudices 
on the part of the negotiators, dominated the negotiations between 
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the leaders of various Western powers as they proceeded, both glee­
fully and acrimoniously, to partition the Ottoman Empire along 
nineteenth-century imperialistic lines. 
This study had its origins in a doctoral dissertation that was pre­
sented at Harvard University in 1964. Since then the account has 
been thoroughly revised in the light of material gained from extensive 
additional archival research. Of particular import has been the wealth 
of new material made available by the opening of the British archives 
for the interwar period. Without these Foreign Office and Cabinet 
Papers, completion of this study would have been impossible. 
I have been fortunate in receiving financial aid from a number 
of sources. A Summer Stipend Fellowship from the National Endow­
ment for the Humanities enabled me to spend the summer of 1967 
in London. Smaller grants, financed by the Danforth and Ford 
Foundations and awarded by Wheaton College, allayed research 
expenses during other summer periods. Funds provided to Wheaton 
College by the Ford Foundation also allowed me to take a leave 
of absence from teaching in the fall of 1971. In addition, I have 
received extensive aid from Wheaton College in the form of typing 
and duplicating services, a sabbatical leave in the spring of 1968, 
and financial assistance from the College's Faculty Research Fund. 
It is impossible for me to acknowledge everyone to whom I am 
in debt for help during the course of my work. I would, however, 
like to thank the staffs of several institutions for their assistance 
and cooperation. In London, I am indebted to the British Museum, 
the Public Record Office, the India Office Library, and the Beaver-
brook Library. In the United States, I have an equally great obligation 
to the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Columbia 
University Library, the Yale University Library, and, in particular, 
the Harvard University Library. I am especially indebted to Miss 
Hilda Harris and the staff of the Wheaton College Library. 
Four persons have been kind enough to read all of the manuscript 
at various stages in its development, and I have benefited greatly 
from their comments and criticisms. Only in the most inadequate 
way can I express my thanks to my parents, Professor Ernst C. 
Helmreich of Bowdoin College and Dr. Louise Roberts Helmreich, 
to Professor Ernest R. May of Harvard University, and to Professor 
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Ernest J. Knapton of Wheaton College. To all of them I am also 
heavily indebted for help and encouragement in matters that extend 
far beyond anything having to do with this particular work. 
My greatest obligation, however, is to my wife, Dorothy, whose 
editorial criticisms, patience, and understanding have been a constant 
source of help and support. I must also express my thanks to my 
colleague Professor Vaino Kola, who prepared the maps, and to 
Mr. Vincent Cuccaro, who assisted me in examining the Sonnino 
papers. I am in debt as well to Mrs. Helen Durant, Mrs. Barbara 
Wilson, and Mrs. Nancy Shepardson for their typing services, and 
to Mrs. Sarah T. Millett of the Ohio State University Press for her 
editorial assistance. 
Portions of this study relating to oil rights have appeared as an 
article in Middle East Forum. They have been substantially revised 
for inclusion in the present text. Reference has been made to a 
standard gazetteer, The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World 
(New York, 1952). In cases where more than one spelling was de­
clared acceptable, the one most closely approaching that used at 
the time of the negotiations has been chosen. 
Unfortunately, a word of warning to those who would use the 
microfilmed reels of the Sonnino Papers must be included. As origi­
nally distributed by University Microfilms in 1969, the numbered 
listing of the reels in the Sonnino Papers catalog did not always 
match the actual numbering on the reels. This was rectified in the 
summer of 1971, when the reel numbers were changed so as to 
correspond with those listed in the catalog. All references in this 
book are based upon this revision, and all reels sold by University 
Microfilms since that time may be used directly if further consultation 
on matters referred to in this work is desired. However, to my 
knowledge the company has made no effort to change reel number­
ings on those sets that were sold prior to August 1971. Therefore, 
before, using any of the reels one should ascertain when they were 
purchased and, if necessary, make the appropriate corrections 
through reference to the catalog. 
Paul C. Helmreich 
Norton, Massachusetts 
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I * THE AIMS AND ATTITUDES

OF THE GREAT POWERS

w,HEN the Paris Peace Con­
ference convened on January 12, 1919, there was little real agreement 
among the Allied and Associated Powers on the specific demands 
that would be made on the defeated nations. In fact, even within 
the national delegations little concord existed as to policy or plans. 
On no question was this vagueness of policy more complete than 
that of the disposition of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Armistice of Mudros 
The armistice that had been signed with Turkey on October 30, 
1918, served only to complicate matters.1 Throughout the fall of 1918, 
the British and French had been engaged in a bitter quarrel over 
the command of the Allied fleet in the Aegean. Therefore, when 
the Turks sent General Townshend, commander of the forces cap­
tured at Kutal Imara in 1916, to Mudros with a message requesting 
that negotiations be opened, the British commander in the Aegean, 
Admiral Calthorpe, was instructed to exclude his French counterpart, 
Admiral Amet, from any part in the discussions and to proceed alone 
with the negotiation and signing of an armistice. This action by the 
British government was taken despite the fact that the Allies had 
already received peace feele.rs from the Ottoman government through 
Spanish and American sources. It was clearly an effort to assert 
British primacy in Near Eastern affairs.2 
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The negotiation of the armistice was thus a purely Anglo-Turkish 
affair. Although the majority of the terms negotiated by Calthorpe 
had been approved previously by an inter-Allied conference on 
October 7, two significant differences appeared in the final document. 
The original draft had called for the immediate evacuation of Cilicia 
by Turkish troops; the armistice terms gave Turkey the right to 
maintain any forces in the area that were necessary for the preserva­
tion of law and order. Since Cilicia was part of the area that the 
French regarded as their sphere of influence, this exclusion appeared 
to constitute a deliberate attack on French interests in the Near East. 
In addition, the original proposal had simply asserted the right of 
Allied troops to occupy important strategic points; the armistice 
added, "in the event of any situation arising which threatens the 
security of the Allies," a distinctly qualifying condition in terms of 
Turkish internal affairs, but one that opened the possibility of action 
taken to meet external threats, particularly the spread of Bolshevism 
south from Russia.3 
Since the armistice laid down no conditions for the negotiation 
of the peace treaty, the Turkish surrender was in this respect uncon­
ditional. Moreover (and this undoubtedly reflected Great Britain's 
special interest in naval affairs), though eight of the clauses dealt 
with naval matters, the armistice failed to deal precisely with such 
important issues as disarmament and the disbanding of troops, nor 
did it impose any penalties against, or call for the removal of, the 
leaders of the Young Turk party known as the Committee of Union 
and Progress.4 Failure to undertake immediately these steps added 
to the difficulties the Allies subsequently had to face in their efforts 
to enforce the final peace settlement. 
Arno Mayer, in his excellent study of external and domestic influ­
ences working on the peacemakers of World War I, has asserted 
that the Turkish armistice clauses were formulated primarily "with 
the strategic access to Russia rather than with internal order" in 
mind, the aim being to prevent the penetration of Bolshevism into 
the defeated areas.5 Although it is true that Allied control of the 
Straits did provide direct access to anti-Bolshevik forces fighting in 
the Ukraine and Caucasus, it is clear that at least the British regarded 
control of Constantinople and all ports, railroads, and wireless sys­
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terns, along with naval domination of the entire Anatolian coastline, 
as more than enough to ensure the imposing of their will upon a 
totally crushed enemy. Certainly at the time there was little concern 
over the lack of the specific clauses mentioned above. As British 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour commented to the Italian ambas­
sador to London: "Having opened the Straits, and communication 
with the Black Sea, having occupied Constantinople, and having 
reduced Turkey to absolute military impotence, the conditions left 
out of the armistice could be imposed by any of the Allies at the 
peace negotiations." 6 
Wartime Agreements and Commitments 
The circumstances surrounding the signing of the armistice inten­
sified France's distrust of British intentions in the Near East, yet 
the terms themselves failed to provide any guidelines for an ultimate 
solution. This is not to say that such guidelines did not exist. Their 
very profusion and seeming contradictions served more to complicate 
and confuse the issue than to cast any light upon it. The fate of 
the outwardly "sick" Ottoman Empire had been the source of Euro­
pean diplomatic negotiation and intrigue for much of the nineteenth 
century. It was hardly surprising that settlement of the "Eastern 
Question" had been the topic of many statements and agreements, 
both public and secret, by the Allied powers during the course of 
the war. These may be summarized briefly. 
Constantinople Agreement, March-April, 1915 
In a series of diplomatic exchanges, the British and French govern­
ments recognized Russia's right to annex Constantinople, European 
Turkey to the Enos-Midia line, the Ismid peninsula, and the islands 
of the Sea of Marmara. These claims were recognized with the 
provisos that the war should first be successfully concluded and that 
British and French "desiderata in the Ottoman Empire and else­
where" should be attained.7 
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Treaty of London, April 26, 1915 
This agreement, concluded between Italy and the Entente powers, 
served to bring Italy into the war on the Allied side. In clauses 
pertaining to the Eastern settlement, Italy was accorded sovereignty 
over the Dodecanese Islands. More important: 
In the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she [Italy] 
jought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the 
province of Adalia, . .  . If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any 
territories in Turkey in Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean 
region bordering on the Province of Adalia within the limits indicated above 
shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it.8 
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, July, 1915-March, 1916 
In a series of communications9 over a protracted period of time, 
Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in Egypt, success­
fully negotiated an Arab uprising against the Turks, equipped and 
supported by the British. The Arabs demanded recognition and 
support of Arab independence in an area stretching from Persia to 
the Mediterranean, and from the Indian Ocean to the thirty-seventh 
parallel. To this McMahon agreed, with three equally significant 
and ambiguous "modifications." 
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria 
lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo 
cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits 
demanded . . .  . 
Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggres­
sion and will recognize their inviolability . . .  . 
As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain 
is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, 
. . . subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize 
and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the 
limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein.10 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 9-16, 1916 
This agreement, ratified by an exchange of notes between Paul 
Cambon, French ambassador in London, and British Foreign Secre­
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tary Sir Edward Grey, constituted the division of spoils that had 
been envisaged in the Constantinople Agreement of 1915. Subse­
quently ratified by Russia, the agreement called for the establishment 
of an international regime in Palestine, French annexation of coastal 
Syria with an extended zone of influence in the interior, and British 
annexation of lower Mesopotamia with a similar zone of influence 
that would border on that allotted to France. Within the zones of 
influence, both states were prepared to "recognize and uphold an 
independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States." How­
ever, each nation reserved the right to be the sole provider of any 
foreign advisers requested for the area within its own zone of influ­
ence." 
Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement, August 18, 1917 
This agreement12 gave to Italy a designated area for eventual 
annexation in Asia Minor as well as a much more extensive zone 
of influence. It served to bring Italy within the scope of the earlier 
Sykes-Picot Agreement. The failure of Russia to assent to this agree­
ment, due to the events of the revolution, eventually led to a severe 
dispute between Italy and the other powers as to its legal validity. 
Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917 
A declaration on the part of the British government to the leaders 
of the World Zionist Organization stated that: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine 
of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors 
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights 
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political 
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.13 
Hogarth Message, January, 1918 
The release of the terms of the Constantinople and Sykes-Picot 
agreements by the new Bolshevik government in Russia prompted 
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the British government, in an effort to reassure the Arabs of its good 
intentions, to state that the Entente powers were fully committed 
to the concept of Arab independence. It stressed that the Balfour 
Declaration did not conflict with previous promises and would be 
implemented only inasmuch as it was "compatible with the freedom 
of the existing population both economic and political . . . . " 14 
Fourteen Points, January 8, 1918 
In President Wilson's fundamental statement of American peace 
aims, Article 12 dealt with the Ottoman Empire. 
The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured 
a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish 
rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely 
unmolested opportunity to autonomous development, and the Dardanelles 
should be permanently opened as a passage to the ships and commerce 
of all nations under international guarantees.15 
Four Principles, February 11, 1918 
These principles constituted a reiteration and further definition 
by Wilson of the right of self-determination of nations. Statements 
such as the following left little doubt as to Wilson's fundamental 
position: "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about. . . ."; 
"Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in 
the interests and for the benefit of the populations concerned. 
. . . "; "All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the 
utmost satisfaction possible . . . without introducing new or perpet­
uating old elements of discord and antagonism. . . ." l6 
Declaration to the Seven, June, 1918 
This was a statement by the British government to seven Arab 
leaders that Britain recognized the "complete and sovereign inde­
pendence of the Arabs" who inhabited territories that had been 
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independent before the war or that had been liberated from Turkish 
control by Arab forces during the course of the war. Territories 
occupied by the Allies or remaining under Turkish control would 
be handled in conformity with the "principle of the consent of the 
governed." l7 
Four Ends, July 4, 1918 
Here again, President Wilson stressed that the peace settlement 
must be based upon "the settlement of every question . . . upon 
the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people 
immediately concerned." l8 
Five Particulars, September 27, 1918 
This was the last of the great pronouncements of President Wilson, 
in which he stated, among other things, that the peace must be based 
on "impartial justice . . . between those to whom we wish to be 
just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a 
justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal 
rights of the several peoples concerned." l9 
Anglo-French Declaration, November 7, 1918 
This policy statement reiterated in the most definite terms the 
determination of the two powers to do everything possible in the 
Near East to aid the establishment of governments "deriving their 
authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous popu­
lations." The two governments specifically disclaimed any desire "to 
impose on the populations of these regions any particular institu­
tions." 20 
Taken together, all these agreements and policy statements did 
not provide any clear outline for a Near East settlement. The spirit, 
if not the letter, of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was clearly in conflict 
with the British promises to the Arabs. The withdrawal of Russia 
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from the war removed the cornerstone on which much of the sub­
sequent network of agreements had been built. The Balfour Declara­
tion promised the formation of a homeland for Jews in a territory 
with only a ten percent Jewish population. President Wilson's prom­
ise of equal justice for victor and vanquished was nowhere to be 
found in the secret treaties that partitioned both Turkish and non-
Turkish areas into spheres of influence for European states. Finally, 
the Wilsonian concept of the self-determination of nations, explicitly 
agreed to by the British and French in their joint declaration of 
November 7, 1918, would, if ultimately followed, ensure the over­
throw of many of the provisions that had been agreed to secretly 
by the statesmen of France, Great Britain, and Italy. 
Aims of the Great Powers 
Before beginning discussion of the work of the Peace Conference 
itself, it is necessary to examine briefly the political situation within 
the major countries and the attitudes of the various delegations 
toward the Ottoman Empire at the time the Peace Conference 
opened. 
Great Britain 
The British delegation, headed by Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George, arrived in Paris buoyed by an overwhelming victory at the 
polls for Lloyd George's coalition government in November, 1918. 
Although this election, the first in eight years and including eight 
million newly enfranchised voters, three-fourths of them women, 
gave Lloyd George a clear vote of public confidence, it also placed 
him in a difficult political position. For not only did this election 
signal the Labour party's withdrawal from the wartime coalition, 
it also resulted in a complete split within Liberal party ranks between 
those supporting former Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and those 
willing to follow Lloyd George in a coalition government. Although 
Asquith's group suffered a thoroughgoing defeat, to achieve it Lloyd 
George had to throw in his lot with the Conservatives; in fact, the 
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famous "coupon" letter certifying candidates supported by the gov­
ernment was issued to 364 Conservatives as opposed to only 159 
Liberals. The result was that within the victorious coalition Conserv­
atives outnumbered Liberals by two and one-half to one. The Con­
servatives generally tended to take a more vindictive attitude than 
did the Liberals toward the enemy and the peace settlements to 
be imposed, an attitude that reflected with reasonable accuracy the 
feeling of the electorate. Lloyd George may well have been aware 
of this popular attitude when he decided to run on a coalition rather 
than a party ticket. 
During the election campaign, Lloyd George had personally 
tended to take a relatively calm and moderate view of the coming 
peace negotiations, though he made little effort to control his more 
vindictive supporters or disavow their belligerent statements. Yet 
the results of the election created a situation in which he, though 
a Liberal, had to depend on support from a predominantly Conserv­
ative, and what has been described as "jingo," House of Commons.21 
In other words, Lloyd George found himself in the strange and rather 
uneasy position of heading a coalition government at a time when 
party politics had returned with a vengeance, a coalition in which, 
because his own party was a minority, he found himself as much 
prisoner as leader. It is therefore understandable that he felt at his 
back the considerable pressure of what both the press and govern­
ment understood to be right-wing popular and parliamentary demand 
for a harsh peace. Naturally, most of this vindictiveness was directed 
at Germany and to a lesser extent Austria rather than at belligerents 
such as Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Near East ques­
tions, on which Lloyd George himself tended to take a rather forceful 
anti-Turk position, played no real role in the election campaign and 
were of comparatively little concern to the general public and the 
22 press.
Despite this fact there is no question but that the Conservative-
dominated government which emerged from the election saw Bri­
tain's future in the greatness of its empire. During the last years 
of the war, the Lloyd George War Cabinet had been dominated 
by men such as Milner and Curzon who regarded a consolidated 
and powerful empire as the sine qua non of British participation 
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in the war. The election only strengthened the imperialists' position. 
Thus while public pressure for a peace that would force the defeated 
continental powers to pay the costs of the war and reconstruction 
was great, the chief aims of the government, both before and after 
the election, were the destruction of Germany's navy and the relin­
quishment of all colonies held by the defeated nations. In this pro-
imperial policy Britain was strongly supported by its overseas domin­
ions.23 
To say that complete agreement existed on Near East questions 
within the British peace delegation would be a gross oversimplifica­
tion. Yet there were certain fundamental and incontestable principles 
to which all the delegates unquestionably subscribed. Chief among 
these was the conviction that the crown jewel of the British Empire, 
India, must be protected at all costs, and that it was therefore neces­
sary to obtain in one way or another British control of the various 
land and sea routes to India. On the protection of the empire there 
could be no compromise. Thus the core of British policy was founded 
in cold reality on an imperial concept of the power struggle. 
This attitude was hardly new; it had been the basis for Britain's 
nineteenth-century policy of supporting the territorial integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire, while making sure that British influence re­
mained supreme at the Sublime Porte. Now, however, the events 
of the war had made impossible a continuation of that policy. There­
fore, new measures to ensure continued British control of the "life­
line" of the empire were in order.24 
Yet, while new ways of implementing an old policy might be called 
for, the opponent remained the same: France. For centuries France 
and Britain had been commercial and imperial rivals in the Near 
East. Now, with the threat of German imperialism gone and the 
war in Europe at an end, Britain was in no way ready to sacrifice 
its imperial supremacy in the Near East because of wartime commit­
ments to France. In fact, the likelihood of a shift in the balance 
of continental power toward French supremacy was all the more 
reason for building up the British Empire at the expense of French 
power elsewhere.25 
The demands and claims of the British delegation to the Peace 
Conference centered on three basic concepts. The first was the neces­
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sity of establishing as great a degree of British supremacy as possible 
in the Near East. Second, there was the equal necessity of reducing 
the competitive position of France to the lowest possible level. Fi­
nally, there was the belief that the traditional policy of supporting 
the government at Constantinople would no longer suffice to satisfy 
these ends. 
It was the first two of these aims that had led Britain during the 
war to insist upon the naval command of the Aegean fleet as well 
as command of a planned expedition against Constantinople. These 
were not unreasonable demands, since Britain and its dominions 
were furnishing most of the ships and troops. It was to further these 
same aims that Britain froze France out of the armistice negotiations 
and proceeded to send British troops to Constantinople immediately 
following the signing of the armistice. These measures were all 
designed to ensure that during the time when the final disposition 
of the Ottoman Empire was being made at Paris, the old tradition 
of British political domination in the Near East would be preserved.26 
However, it was the addition of the third concept to the first two 
that guided the British delegation in deciding to support the Arab 
cause at the Peace Conference. A government decision in December, 
1918, that British, rather than international or American control of 
Palestine, should be sought can be at least partly ascribed to the 
same reasoning.27 Similarly, the formation of an independent Ar­
menian state would remove control of the northern gateway to India 
from Turkey and provide a buffer against Russian expansion, and 
thus Britain enthusiastically supported this aim. 
Although the British wanted no part of an Armenian mandate, 
they were not happy over the prospect of French domination in 
the area. They also recognized that France would never consent to 
British supervision of the Straits. However, these areas, originally 
promised to Russia, obviously were not to be turned over to a Bolshe­
vik regime whose ideology preached uncompromising hostility to 
Western political systems. Even if the Bolsheviks were ultimately 
defeated, Russia had forfeited any claim to these territories by failing 
to remain in the war until its conclusion. Thus, in January, 1919, 
it became one of the basic aims of British policy to place these areas 
under the authority of the United States.28 
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It was not generosity or some sort of overwhelming feeling of 
friendship for America that prompted this attitude. Lloyd George's 
comment at the December meeting in which he and Curzon reversed 
their position supporting- an American mandate in Palestine is indic­
ative of his view of the United States when its presence might threaten 
British interests. "As regards Palestine, he had been in favour of 
entrusting that to the United States originally, but had changed his 
mind. It would involve placing an absolutely new and crude Power 
in the middle of our complicated interests in Egypt, Arabia, and 
Mesopotamia. Everyone with a complaint to make against the British 
administration would rush off to the United States, who would not 
be able to resist the temptation to meddle." 24 
However, the British recognized that by appealing to the Wilsonian 
brand of idealism, they might obtain acceptable solutions to issues 
that otherwise might be resolved in ways distinctly distasteful to them. 
The United States would help Britain avoid fulfilling its wartime 
commitments and perhaps even aid in fighting British battles at the 
negotiating table. The British also saw no long-range threat to their 
own imperial interests in the United States's acceptance of a role 
in affairs concerning Armenia and the Straits, for they were con­
vinced that America would never assume the competitive position 
of a rival such as France.30 
In short, the sources of British policy lay neither in humanitarian 
concern for rising nations and nationalities nor in international coop­
eration and lofty self-sacrifice. That these motives were present and 
in tune with certain aspects of public opinion (particularly in the 
case of Armenia) cannot be denied.31 But it is questionable whether 
general humanitarian concepts or specific concern for national or 
ethnic groups would have meant much to those in control had these 
concerns not coincided with the new tactical position taken by the 
British government in January, 1919. 
On one issue, however, there was no agreement at all. This was 
the ultimate political fate of Constantinople and the Straits. The 
War Office and the Government of India bitterly opposed forcing 
the Turks out of Constantinople. The War Office believed that such 
a step would create serious opposition among the Turks and make 
any subsequent peace treaty nearly unenforceable. The India Gov­
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ernment was opposed because of the opposition such a move would 
arouse within the large Moslem population of India. In January, 
1918, Lloyd George had indicated his support for this position. Now, 
however, backed by the Foreign Office, he adamantly insisted that 
the Turk must be totally expelled from Europe, that the "bag and 
baggage" policy of Gladstone, so recently reiterated by Lord Curzon, 
should be fulfilled.32 In this he was in accord with popular opinion, 
which was deeply influenced by a well-organized flow of anti-Moslem 
propaganda of a religious nature that poured from the pulpits and 
the press. 
Any British hopes that the United States might agree to accept 
a Straits mandate were greatly diminished upon President Wilson's 
arrival in Europe. When Lloyd George broached the question, Wil­
son immediately refused, stating that he did not wish the United 
States to become involved in territorial questions and that besides 
"it would be difficult to persuade them [the American people] that 
such a mandate was not a profit, but really a burden." 33 Ultimately, 
in a meeting of department representatives on January 30, the War 
Office reluctantly agreed to the expulsion of Turkey from Europe 
in return for a Foreign Office commitment that control of the area 
should be vested in an international commission rather than a single 
power. Given President Wilson's blunt refusal of a Straits mandate, 
this indeed seemed a logical compromise. Nonetheless, both Lloyd 
George and Balfour remained firm in their belief that an American 
mandate was the best possible solution, and they continued to ad­
vocate this both within the British delegation and at the peace Con­
ference.34 
France 
French interest in the Near East was based as much on historical 
and emotional grounds as it was on practical issues. Traditionally, 
Frenchmen saw their nation as "the great Christian power of the 
Orient; it is France that amidst the misery and ruins of Turkish 
barbarism remained the hope of the oppressed and who saved their 
future for them." 35 The aura of history and of long-standing French 
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moral, political, educational, and economic influence formed the 
foundation for French interests in the Near East. Practically speaking, 
France had invested sums totaling approximately three and a quarter 
billion francs in the Ottoman Empire.36 It is easy to understand 
French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon's statement to the Chamber 
of Deputies that France had "incontestable rights to safeguard in 
the Ottoman Empire." 37 While agreeable to the expulsion of Turkey 
from Constantinople, France was no more willing to concede British 
control of the Straits area than the British were to admit France 
to a similar position.38 
Territorially, the French claimed Syria, Cilicia, Lebanon, and 
Palestine. They based these claims not only on historical rights but 
more concretely on Allied wartime commitments. Like the British, 
they professed a willingness to revise these agreements. Unlike the 
British, they had no real interest in actually doing so. Since the only 
revision that could benefit France would be an extension of French 
authority eastward from Syria, and since in any revision the British 
would be likely to give them less rather than more, the French held 
meticulously to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, arguing that it must 
remain in force in all aspects until a new arrangement was reached. 
This had been the stated French policy for some time, and it would 
not vary appreciably during the early weeks of the Peace Confer­
39 ence.
However, there were complicating factors. The issue of preeminent 
import for France was the European settlement, so much so that 
all other concerns played a secondary role. Although France did 
not hold parliamentary elections in the fall of 1918, the political 
atmosphere in the French assembly indicated clearly a move to the 
right, which paralleled the results of the British and American elec­
tions.40 While this in one sense strengthened those favoring French 
imperial aims, it provided even greater support for those whose 
primary concern was the settlement in Europe. 
Public and parliamentary demand for terms that would perma­
nently disable Germany and assure French military and economic 
supremacy on the continent was tremendous. The war in the west 
had been fought primarily on French soil, resulting in incredible 
destruction of property and loss of life. Added to this was the desire 
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for revanche against Germany that had dominated French politics 
since the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Small wonder that in 1919 
France was obsessed with the need for the emasculation of Germany 
and the creation of future security for itself. 
As a result, Near Eastern problems necessarily occupied less time, 
energy, and concentration at the Quai d'Orsay than at the British 
Foreign Office. Paul Cambon, French ambassador in London, be­
lieved that Clemenceau was simply not interested in the Near East, 
quoting the premier as stating that it was good only "for 
storybooks." 4I Although this judgment seems overly harsh, there 
is much to indicate that Clemenceau was willing, if necessary, to 
sacrifice French interests elsewhere in order to obtain a more favor­
able European settlement.42 
Evidence to substantiate this can be found in Lloyd George's 
account of Clemenceau's visit to London in December, 1918. 
When Clemenceau came to London after the War I drove with him 
to the French Embassy through cheering crowds who acclaimed him with 
enthusiasm. After we reached the Embassy, he asked me what it was I 
specially wanted from the French. I instantly replied that I wanted Mosul 
attached to Irak, and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under British control. 
Without any hesitation he agreed.43 
Since this agreement was never recorded on paper, the question 
of whether reciprocal British concessions of some sort were part of 
the agreement was to be an issue of great debate in subsequent 
months. In June, 1920, Victor Berard defended Clemenceau in the 
French Senate by asserting that the concessions had been made partly 
to ensure British cooperation in regard to French demands for "Metz 
and Strasbourg without a plebiscite, the Saar basin, Rhine occupa­
tion, complete security, and coal without a money advance." 44 The 
truth of this allegation is hard to ascertain; certainly Clemenceau 
later maintained that the cession of Mosul had been made only in 
return for promises guaranteeing the fulfillment of French interests 
in the Near East. Nonetheless, Berard's statement in general reflected 
a position that the vast majority of Frenchmen would have supported, 
at least in the early stages of the peace negotiations. Clemenceau 
was determined that the wartime entente should be preserved at 
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all costs, and undoubtedly realized that if he wished to obtain the 
Saar Basin and some form of control in the Rhineland, a moderate, 
soft-line approach to British demands elsewhere would necessarily 
be in order.45 
Italy 
Basing their claims on the promises made in the Treaty of London 
and the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement, the Italians sought, 
above all else, the preservation of a "Mediterranean equilibrium" 
following the projected breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Aside from 
Libya, which had for all intents and purposes been a closed Italian 
preserve since the Italian-Turkish War of 1911-12, this meant that 
Italy was less concerned with obtaining specific rights and privileges 
than with the maintenance and even extension of its position as 
a Mediterranean and colonial power. Thus any extension of territorial 
influence on the part of any other power in the Near East must 
of necessity bring a concomitant extension of Italian control or 
spheres of influence. As Tommaso Tittoni put it in a speech to his 
colleagues in the Italian Senate: "If the others have nothing, we 
will demand nothing. This is not an imperialist criterion, it is only 
the criterion of distributive justice." 46 
But it was clear that "the others" were going to obtain a good 
deal, and as the Peace Conference approached, the Italians became 
increasingly alarmed over the weakness of their Near East position. 
In particular they recognized that the territory they had staked out 
for themselves in Anatolia could in no way be justified in terms 
of any of the Wilsonian principles. The British and French claims 
were in non-Turkish Arab territories that would in any case be 
separated from Turkey. This was not true for Anatolia. Moreover, 
the British and French had troops in occupation of many of the 
territories they claimed; in fact the French had even occupied some 
of the territory claimed by the Italians. Yet when Italy proposed 
to send troops to the Adana and Adalia regions, the British and 
French strongly protested that there was no legitimate reason to do 
so under the armistice terms because nothing that was happening 
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there in any way threatened the security of the Allies. Thus the 
Italians found themselves shut out from the areas they regarded as 
their legitimate share in the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, nor did 
it seem likely that any scheme of mandates or other form of super­
vision would subsequently justify their claims.47 
Not only did the Italians see their rewards jeopardized by the 
actions of the great powers, they also regarded fearfully the aspira­
tions of the Greek government. For the Greeks could claim in 
Anatolia what the Italians could not, a sizable national population 
native to the area, at least in the cities along the seacoast. Thus, 
from the Wilsonian point of view, the Greek claim was stronger, 
and the Italians recognized it. Moreover, nothing would endanger 
Italy's position in the eastern Mediterranean as much as the extension 
of Greek control to the Mediterranean littoral of Asia Minor.48 
Thus by the time the conference opened the Italians were both 
bitter and suspicious of what they regarded as the moralizing inter­
ference of the United States and the power politics of France and 
Britain. The tone of Italian dispatches indicates a belief that the 
other powers were not taking Italy and Italian claims as seriously 
as they should.49 More likely than not these suspicions were correct. 
Italy's entrance into the war had come late, and in a sense had been 
bought in hard bargaining sessions by the British and French. More­
over, the course of the war had placed Italy in a secondary military 
role, one in which it could hardly claim to have acquitted itself 
brilliantly. If the British saw their future security in the strength 
of their empire, and the French saw it in the disablement of Germany 
and the preservation of their alliance with Britain, certainly neither 
saw Italy as very important in their future plans. While recognizing 
that certain promises made in return for services would have to be 
kept, the other victorious powers seemed to evidence no real concern 
for the preservation and retention of Italy as a strong ally. Although 
one can more easily sense than prove that this attitude existed in 
January, 1919, the events of the following months and the subsequent 
growth of open hostility toward Italy on the part of the other major 
powers serves to strengthen rather than weaken the case. 
The domestic political situation in Italy also helped intensify Italian 
territorial demands at the Peace Conference. Although Prime Minis­
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ter Orlando was considered somewhat of a political moderate, in 
Italy as elsewhere, victory brought with it an upsurge of nationalism 
and chauvinism, which was reflected in a political swing to the 
conservative right. By the time the Peace Conference opened, these 
forces, led by Italian Foreign Minister Baron Sidney Sonnino, were 
firmly in control of parliament and the cabinet. They regarded the 
territorial concessions promised to Italy in the wartime agreements 
as minimal rather than maximal, ones that should be expanded now 
that Russia had been removed from the diplomatic equation. More­
over, opposition to extensive imperial claims centered in the socialist 
and liberal parties, who also sought domestic reforms that were 
bitterly opposed by the conservatives. The fact that these opposition 
groups regarded Wilson as their champion only intensified Sonnino's 
determination to gain Italy's imperial aims at the conference, for 
both he and Orlando recognized that failure to do so would create 
a severe political crisis at home.50 
United States 
Unlike the major Allied powers, the United States had never 
declared war on Turkey. Although there had been a certain amount 
of public and congressional agitation for such action, both Wilson 
and the State Department vigorously opposed these proposals. The 
reasons were several. At no time had the Ottoman government taken 
any provocative action similar to the submarine sinkings that had 
brought the United States into the war with Germany. American 
diplomatic experts were convinced that Turkey was little more than 
a tool in German hands, and a declaration of war would only serve 
to increase Germany's control over the Ottoman government. More­
over, the United States at no time contemplated any action in the 
war that would have involved it in the Near East front. A declaration 
of war would have led to the closing of several American educational 
institutions in Turkey and the confiscation of their considerable 
property. American aid to Syrians and Armenians, which amounted 
to close to a million dollars a month, would have been cut off since 
it was channeled through missionary sources in Turkey. Finally, aside 
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from religious, educational, and humanitarian concerns, America was 
thought to have no real interest in Near Eastern affairs.51 
Nonetheless, in the fall of 1917, as part of a general study of 
problems relating to the forthcoming peace settlements, a committee 
of American experts examined the problem of a peace treaty with 
Turkey. The recommendations of this "Inquiry," dated December 
22, 1917, provided President Wilson with information that he used 
as a guide in framing point twelve of the Fourteen Points. In January, 
1919, these recommendations still remained the basis of American 
policy in the Near East.52 
It is necessary to free the subject races of the Turkish Empire from 
oppression and misrule. This implies at the very least autonomy for Armenia 
and the protection of Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia by the 
civilized nations. It is necessary also to establish free intercourse through 
and across the straits. Turkey proper must be justly treated and freed from 
economic and political bondage.53 
A definite program was worked out in Paris by the American 
delegation during January, 1919. The cardinal point was the conten­
tion that all agreements or treaties that conflicted with the armistice 
terms had been abrogated because all the Allies had agreed that 
the peace treaties should be based on the Fourteen Points.54 Through­
out the peace negotiations the United States would hold to this 
position in regard to the secret treaties. This attitude was certainly 
justified when it concernedGermany,which had surrendered on the 
basis of an agreement that the final peace settlement would be based 
upon the Fourteen Points. But the extension of this interpretation 
to include a nation with which the United States was not at war 
and whose armistice terms, unilaterally negotiated by the British, 
had been those of unconditional surrender with no mention of the 
famed Wilsonian principles, appears questionable.55 In reality, the 
only possible case that could be made for including Turkey within 
the confines of the Wilsonian declarations lay in the fact that the 
powers were bound, not by any commitment to the Turkish govern­
ment, but on the one hand by the Anglo-French Declaration of 
November, 1918, and on the other by a purely inter-Allied moral 
obligation to fulfill points five and twelve of the Fourteen Points. 
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These called for adjustment of colonial claims giving "equal weight" 
to the wishes of the imperial governments and the native populations, 
and the freeing of minorities from Turkish control.56 
Popular attitude in America toward Turkey in the winter of 
1918-19 was one of intense hostility, based chiefly on religious and 
humanitarian grounds. This vindictive attitude was reflected by the 
members of the American peace delegation, and was most aptly 
summarized by the former United States minister to Turkey, Henry 
Morgenthau: "So long as the Koran makes murder a part of the 
Mohammedan religion, the Moslem must not be permitted to rule 
over Christians or Jews." 57 
On January 21, 1919, the American intelligence section of the 
Peace Conference submitted a series of recommendations concerning 
Turkey that reflected this anti-Turk position.58 The report urged the 
creation of an international state at the Straits under the supervision 
of the League of Nations. It would include the "entire littoral of 
the Straits, and of the Sea of Marmora" 59 and in Asia would incorpo­
rate Panderma and Brusa. The latter was to be included in order 
to keep a city so near the Straits from becoming the new Turkish 
capital and a center of intrigue. Large enough to have its own truck 
garden and water supply facilities, the international state would 
remain small enough to be easily administered. The actual form 
this administration would take was not discussed, and for good 
reason. It appears that there was a difference of opinion between 
Wilson and the rest of the delegation on this issue. Wilson favored 
control by a small power or a group of small powers, while the 
American Near East experts, Clive Day, Charles Seymour, and Albert 
Lybyer, inclined toward a great power, preferably Britain or the 
United States. They were in agreement with Wilson, however, that 
it was highly improbable that the United States could undertake 
such an obligation, for public opinion in America was not ready 
for such a step.60 The report also approved the formation of new 
Arab states and the creation of an Armenian state, on condition 
that they be put under a League of Nations mandatory system. Great 
Britain was specifically named as the most suitable power to ad­
minister a mandate in Palestine. 
One final point is of extreme import in considering the position 
of the American delegation to the peace conference. The congres­
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sional elections in November, 1918, had produced a Republican 
majority in both houses of Congress. This had been achieved in 
the face of strong pleas by Wilson for a Democratic victory as a 
vote of confidence in his leadership and peace program. The Repub­
licans had openly taken a hard-line position in the electoral cam­
paign, favoring total military victory and stringent peace terms. 
Moreover, the Republican victory elevated to the position of Senate 
majority leader and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, a man whose personal and 
political antipathy towards Wilson was long standing and of such 
intensity that he could write to Theodore Roosevelt in 1915, "I never 
expected to hate anyone in politics with the hatred I feel towards 
Wilson."61 So vehement had the Republican leadership been in 
refusing to support Wilson's peace program that he in turn refused 
to include any prominent Republican from either the House or 
Senate as a member of the peace delegation, a diplomatic faux pas 
of the first order. Although Wilson apparently remained convinced 
that in the long run popular and congressional opinion in the United 
States would support any settlement based upon his peace principles, 
many within his own delegation and the governments of the Allied 
powers were not so sanguine. Thus, while the Italian and French 
delegations were in tune with the domestic swing to the right at 
home and Lloyd George had made his accomodation with a similar 
development in Britain, for Wilson, though he may not have fully 
realized it, the domestic political battlelines had been drawn and 
the obvious struggle at hand bode ill for the successful completion 
of his peace program.62 
An overview of the general attitude of each of the great powers 
at the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference indicates that there 
was a fair amount of agreement on basic issues. All appeared ready 
to exclude the Turk from Europe and to establish some form of 
international control over Constantinople and the Straits, preferably 
(for all but Wilson) that of a great power. All agreed that the Arab 
portions of the Ottoman Empire should be liberated and that some 
sort of national recognition should be granted to the newly freed 
nationalities, albeit under the watchful care of the great powers. All 
four of the great powers had accepted the Balfour Declaration. 
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All were in accord with the creation of an Armenian state, and all 
recognized that this state would need a great deal of outside aid 
and advice of an economic, military, and political nature. Thus it 
would seem that the outline of a peace settlement had been formed 
and that only details were left. 
But what details! If the Straits and Constantinople were to be 
internationalized, how would this affect Constantinople's religious 
role as the seat of the caliphate? If non-Turkish elements were to 
be freed, how was this freedom to be achieved; what sort of states 
created; what degree of independence or foreign control allowed; 
and under the protective wing of which European nation would each 
area be placed? What was meant by a "national home for the Jews"? 
How were Wilson's various declarations of purpose to be reconciled 
with the secret agreements of the war years? How could one deter­
mine the wishes of the peoples of the Near East, and, if they could 
be determined at all, were their aims economically and politically 
feasible? In regard to Armenian and Zionist aspirations, was the 
doctrine of majority rule and self-determination even just? How could 
the sizeable capital investment of European nations in the Ottoman 
Empire be safeguarded, and what provision would be made in regard 
to the enormous Ottoman debt? These were only a few of the more 
easily discernible problems that remained to be settled. Thus, when 
the various questions came before the Peace Conference a host of 
differences suddenly appeared concerning the practical implementa­
tion of accepted generalities. 
New Friction in Paris 
In Paris, friction between the powers quickly developed, chiefly 
over such problems as the German Treaty and the League of Nations 
(toward which all of the powers except the United States took a 
rather cool view). Even seemingly minor irritants, such as French 
indignation at the acceptance of English as one of the diplomatic 
languages of the conference, played a surprisingly important role 
in the development of antagonistic attitudes.63 
Discord over Near Eastern affairs quickly appeared as well. The 
British and the Italians were annoyed by the blatantly pro-French 
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stand of the Allied commander in chief in European Turkey, General 
Franchet d'Esperey.64 The Italians, vexed by the French occupation 
of Mersina and Adana in Cilicia and furious at British unwillingness 
to allow similar Italian action in the area promised them in Adalia, 
began laying plans for unilateral action in the near future.65 A deci­
sion to take over control of Turkish coastal trade produced a minor 
quarrel between France and Italy over supervision of the port of 
Smyrna, with the Italians at least temporarily winning the upper 
hand.66 The British agreed to Greek requests for aid in repatriating 
their nationals to Asia Minor and asked France and Italy to join 
in sending a commission to investigate the situation. This they did 
with the greatest reluctance; the Italians in particular were opposed, 
since any Greek repatriation to Asia Minor could only strengthen 
Greek claims to that area.67 
Both France and Italy were anxious to enter into secret negotiations 
with Britain on Near Eastern affairs. The overtures were bluntly 
refused. The British stated that they were in complete accord with 
President Wilson's spirit of open diplomacy, that with the Peace 
Conference at hand the time was hardly propitious for secret talks, 
and that the United States must be present at any further discussions 
on these matters.68 This high-minded spirit was probably dictated 
by the consideration that separate discussions with either the French 
or Italians would of necessity have as a basis the wartime agreements, 
and the British, now in nearly total military control of the Near 
East, were far less enthusiastic about fulfilling these commitments 
than were the French or the Italians.69 
Personal animosities also made their appearance in Paris. Clemen­
ceau quickly came to the conclusion that Wilson was "too soft". 
Wilson, in turn, evidenced an almost instantaneous dislike of Orlando 
and Sonnino at the time of their first meeting in December, 1918, 
a feeling that Sonnino clearly reciprocated. Only Lloyd George 
seemed able to remain relatively clear of this clash of personalities.70 
The League and the Mandate System 
Despite all the tensions, large and small, it did appear as if the 
basic lines of a Near East settlement were fairly well established, 
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and therefore the powers at first approached the problem with rela­
tive unconcern. The question of what areas should be taken from 
Turkey and what form of government they should have dominated 
the first few meetings of the Council of Ten.71 For some time it 
had generally been accepted that a form of mandate rather than 
actual annexation of these territories by European states would be 
used. Wilson had been determined that the mandates should be 
placed under the authority of the League of Nations.72 But the first 
concrete plan came from another source. On December 16, 1918, 
Jan Smuts, delegate from South Africa, asked that the League of 
Nations be given the right to dispose of the territories of the defunct 
empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. He recommended 
that they be placed under the mandatory control of a single power 
that would be responsible to the League of Nations for its actions. 
Annexation would be forbidden, and the mandatory power would 
be required to follow an open-door policy in terms of economic 
development and trade. Eventually the mandated areas would be­
come independent.73 This suggestion proved acceptable to President 
Wilson. 
No attempt will be made here to record the long and sometimes 
acrimonious discussions concerning the organization of the mandates 
and the areas to be included. Ultimately, the plan for mandating 
the territories of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires was 
dropped in favor of recognizing the governments of the various 
independent states that had already been formed in these areas. 
Though the principle was accepted in regard to the Ottoman Empire 
and the German African colonies, neither the number and size of 
these mandates nor the powers to whom they would go were desig­
nated.74 
No disagreement arose over the areas that should be completely 
severed from the Ottoman Empire; a British request that Kurdistan 
be added to the draft resolution that named Armenia, Syria, Mesopo­
tamia, Palestine, and Arabia was readily accepted.75 The naming of 
these areas was done "without prejudice to the settlement of other 
parts of the Turkish Empire." 76 Mandates were to be divided into 
three types, A, B, and C, based upon the extent of their economic 
and political development. Those formed from territory formerly 
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belonging to the Ottoman Empire were to be placed in the A group, 
since they had "reached a stage of development where,their existence 
as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to 
the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory 
power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes 
of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selec­
tion of a mandatory power." 77 
The addition of Kurdistan to the list of territories to be taken 
from Turkey was indicative of a recent British policy decision. Ever 
since the previous summer the idea of an independent Kurdish state 
under British supervision had been under consideration. This would 
prevent Turkey from retaining control of the territorial gap between 
Armenia and Mesopotamia. Moreover, it would give the British a 
firmer hold on the Mosul vilayet, which was ethnically half Kurd, 
as well as provide a buffer zone for that oil-rich province. Arnold 
Wilson, acting civil commissioner for Mesopotamia, recounts in his 
memoirs that by January of 1919, local government through tribal 
chieftains had been initiated under British guidance. "We were 
charged with the foundation of an independent Southern Kurdish 
state under British auspices." 78 However, Wilson believed that the 
only solution lay in Kurdistan's incorporation into Mesopotamia as 
an autonomous province. 
The decision to install League of Nations mandates in the Near 
East was one that can be attributed chiefly to President Wilson and 
the American delegation, and it was an achievement of great magni­
tude. It constituted an enormous step forward, not so much because 
the territories that were to be separated from the Ottoman Empire 
were named, for this had never been a great source of discussion 
or conflict, but rather because by accepting the mandatory principle 
and by placing the mandates under the authority and supervision 
of the League of Nations, some of the provisions of the wartime 
agreements, particularly the Sykes-Picot Agreement, were automat­
ically superseded. These agreements had called for open annexation 
of certain areas by France and Britain. Under a mandate system 
this could not occur. 
It is easy to see why this shift was welcomed by the British, for 
they saw in it a means of gaining unfettered jurisdiction over Palestine 
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as well as a possible way out of the moral dilemma that they faced 
due to conflicting French and Arab claims. Moreover, it did much 
to bolster the British claims in subsequent talks that none of the 
Sykes-Picot terms were valid any longer. Harder to understand is 
the fact that Clemenceau did not raise his voice in at least nominal 
protest against a scheme that deprived France of its annexationist 
ambitions in Syria, especially when he had to face the opposition 
of the French colonial office, which favored a policy of direct annex­
ation.79 Yet even here an explanation can be found. 
Under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the four interior 
cities of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo and all of eastern 
Syria were to be under Arab control and subject only to a vaguely 
defined French sphere of influence. Now, under the mandate system, 
the French could contend that Syria should be treated as a whole 
and France should have the League mandate and the right of oc­
cupation for it. In other words, in return for giving up a provision 
that allowed the annexation of a limited area, the French could now 
insist on a single mandate over a much larger territory.80 
Having settled the general principles on which the future formation 
of mandates would be based, the Council of Ten turned to the 
temporary occupation and administration of the Ottoman Empire 
until such time as the final treaty terms were worked out. The 
question was raised by Orlando, who was anxious that Italy should 
occupy some territory. Three possible alternatives were proposed 
by Lloyd George: 
They could leave things as they were—leave the mandatories to be settled 
by the League of Nations and the occupation to go on exactly as at the 
present moment—or they could have a provisional mandate, leaving the 
definite final thing to be settled by the League of Nations; or they could 
now say they were the League of Nations and settle the business finally.8' 
Lloyd George advocated deciding once and for all, as a settlement 
at any time would be made by the same powers and perhaps even 
by the same people. Moreover, he stated that it was impossible for 
the British to support indefinitely the 1,084,000 British and imperial 
troops then in the Turkish Empire while waiting for a settlement 
that seemed very far away. Britain must have relief, and a permanent 
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designation of mandates seemed the best and quickest way to achieve 
this. 
Such a solution raised immediate problems for Wilson, for the 
creation of the mandates system greatly complicated America's posi­
tion vis a vis the Near East settlement. Despite the well-founded 
reservations regarding American participation in the mandatory sys­
tem that he had expressed to Lloyd George in December, Wilson 
recognized that it was next to impossible for him to be the chief 
instigator and supporter of the scheme and at the same time refuse 
to participate in it.82 Moreover, he regarded the successful imple­
mentation of the mandate system as necessary in order to provide 
the League of Nations with an important, concrete task from the 
moment of its inception. Yet, there was no way that he could guaran­
tee that America would accept a mandate, for such a decision rested 
exclusively with the Senate, which was dominated by a hostile Re­
publican party led by his arch-foe, Henry Cabot Lodge. 
Therefore Wilson vehemently opposed Lloyd George's proposal 
for an immediate assignment of mandates. Determined to avoid any 
undermining of the functions of the League, he had from the begin­
ning of the discussion accepted the whole mandates plan "subject 
to re-consideration when the full scheme of the League of Nations 
was drawn up." 83 This policy was particularly necessary if the United 
States was to take a mandate in the Near East. America had never 
declared war on the Ottoman Empire and therefore could assume 
a role in Near Eastern affairs only on the basis of League of Nations 
membership. Therefore, he made it clear that if an immediate deci­
sion were to be made, political and legal reasons would make it 
impossible for him to accept any mandate for the United States. 
He therefore suggested redividing the territory between the great 
powers in order to obtain a temporary but more equitable division 
of occupation responsibilities. Final decisions relating to permanent 
mandates would be taken at a later date. This recommendation was 
accepted and the question was referred to the military representatives 
of the Allied and Associated Powers to determine the best method 
of deciding the equitable distribution of occupying forces.84 
The report of the military representatives was submitted to the 
Council of Ten on February 5. It was discussed briefly on February 
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10 and placed on the agenda for the following day. The report 
recommended that British troops occupy Palestine and Mesopotamia 
and that the Italians be allowed to occupy the Caucasus region and 
the area around Konia. Syria (with the exception of Cilicia and 
Palestine), including the Adana, Aleppo, Horns, Damascus railroad, 
should be occupied by French troops. If subsequently it were found 
that an occupation of Armenia and Kurdistan was needed and the 
United States was willing, American troops might be despatched 
to these areas.85 
However, the discussion scheduled for February 11 never took 
place, nor was any decision as to a redistribution of territories reached 
until the fall of 1919. Interestingly, the reasons for this delay rested 
partly in the acceptance of the mandates scheme itself. The larger 
Syria now eyed by France as a future mandate included territories 
that Britain had promised the Arabs. Recognizing the importance 
of de facto control, the British particularly .feared French military 
occupation of the area, however temporary it might be in theory, 
before an agreement acceptable to the Arabs and safeguarding their 
own interests was reached. Therefore, on the morning of February 
11, Lord Milner met with Clemenceau and laid the matter on the 
line. 
[He] made it clear that we did not want Syria, and that we had not the 
slightest objection to France being there, but that we were anxious about 
the peace if the French rushed to occupy it at once. What we want­
ed . .  . was an arrangement which both the French and the Arabs could 
accept, and it was impossible for us to move our troops until that had 
been arranged. . . . Meanwhile, the question is to be taken off the Agenda 
today.86 
Two days later Philip Kerr informed Lloyd George that "the 
question of altering the military occupation is blocked. Milner has 
made that clear to Clemenceau and the U.S.A. are determined to 
support us on this." 87 Kerr noted that this meant that the Syrian 
question would therefore be postponed unless Milner could arrange 
an agreement between Feisal and Clemenceau. This would probably 
be possible only if the French would be content with Lebanon, which 
was unlikely. Nonetheless Kerr felt that "the French realize that 
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we are not trying to get them out of Syria, and that the Arab difficulty 
is a genuine one not fomented by us." 88 Thus the British, who had 
originally asked for relief from the burdens of military occupation, 
had taken the initiative in suspending the negotiations aimed at 
providing exactly that relief. 
Nonetheless, despite Anglo-French differences over Syria, in Jan­
uary of 1919 the Eastern Question, so long a source of strife among 
the European powers, appeared on the verge of a quick and easy 
solution. Moreover, the mandates plan offered a formula that would 
still allow the European states, which had eyed the riches of the 
Ottoman Empire for over a century, to gratify their desires. That 
there were problems remaining to be solved was apparent to all, 
but none of them seemed of great magnitude or capable of providing 
any lasting controversy or discord. 
Turkey's provinces were gone; her allies were crushed; and, except for 
her champions among the Indian Muslims, she was friendless even in the 
camp of Islam. Constantinople was held by the victors, Turkey was encircled 
by enemies. Like wolves about the camp fire the Powers were prowling 
at the threshold with hungry eyes, for Turkey by nature is rich, and imperi­
alism is greedy.89 
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II * THE CLAIMS OF THE NEAR

EASTERN DELEGATIONS

I JANUARY of 1919, Paris was 
swarming with delegations from all over the world, each pleading 
its special cause. The members of these delegations flooded the 
Entente representatives with literature and statistics backing their 
claims, and pressed their views on anyone who would listen. Isaiah 
Bowman brilliantly described these lobbying techniques: 
Each of the national delegations . . . had its own bagful of statistical 
and cartographical tricks. When statistics failed, use was made of maps 
in color. It would take a huge monograph to contain an analysis of all 
the types of map forgeries that the war and the peace conference called 
forth. A new instrument was discovered . . . the map language. A map 
was as good as a brilliant poster, and just being a map made it respectable, 
authentic. A perverted map was a life-line to many a foundering argument.1 
The Near East provided its share of these lobbying groups. Greek, 
Armenian, Syrian, and Zionist delegations were active in Paris. It 
was in response to the claims submitted by these delegates during 
the first two months of the Peace Conference that increasing signs 
of real discord appeared among the great powers over a Near East 
settlement. 
Greek Claims 
The most formidable of the petitioning groups at the Peace Con­
ference was the Greek delegation, headed by Prime Minister Eleuthe­
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rios Venizelos. Greece had remained neutral throughout the early 
stages of the war, entering only in June, 1917, as a result of an 
antiroyalist rebellion. This successful attack on the monarchy had 
been led by Venizelos and supported, both diplomatically and mili­
tarily, by France and Britain.2 The overwhelmingly favorable impres­
sion created by Venizelos at the Paris Conference cannot be overem­
phasized. Even those delegates who bitterly opposed his claims pro­
fessed great personal admiration and liking for the man. Without 
question, the Allied leaders at Paris felt a heavy debt of personal 
gratitude to Venizelos for his efforts in behalf of the Allied cause 
during the war—much more obligation, certainly, than they felt to 
Greece. Perhaps Harold Nicolson best expressed the almost bewil­
dered adulation that seemed to grip the Peace Conference when 
he wrote to his father, "I cannot tell you the position that Venizelos 
has here! He and Lenin are the only two really great men in 
Europe." 3 
Large-scale pretensions as to Greece's future role in the Near East 
had been evidenced by Venizelos long before the end of the war, 
and he reiterated them prior to the convening of the Peace Confer­
ence and in personal appearances before the Council of Ten.4 These 
may be summarized as follows. 
1. Northern Epirus was claimed on the grounds that it had a 
population of 120,000 Greeks and 80,000 Albanians. "Greece main­
tains that this mixed population ought necessarily to be allotted to 
her, for it would be contrary to all equity that a majority with a 
higher civilization should have to submit to a minority with an 
inferior civilization." 5 Venizelos maintained that even though the 
Greeks in the area spoke Albanian, their loyalty was to Greece, 
as exemplified by the thousands who had joined Greek military forces 
during the war. 
2. Venizelos also asserted Greece's right to Thrace, which, with 
Constantinople, had a Greek population of 730,822, the majority 
concentrated in eastern Thrace. Venizelos admitted that the Turkish 
population of western Thrace far surpassed that of Greeks and 
Bulgarians combined, but he maintained that the Turks would prefer 
Greek to Bulgarian rule if it were impossible for Turkey to govern 
the territory. Pointing out that Bulgaria had fought on the side of 
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the Central Powers, he claimed that it sought "to play the part in 
the Balkan peninsula that Prussia played on the vast European 
stage." 6 He added that the only reason he had been willing to give 
Thrace to Bulgaria after the first Balkan war was that he had en­
visioned the creation of a Balkan confederation of Christian states, 
and had wanted Bulgarian cooperation in this scheme. Even this 
had not satisfied Bulgaria. Now he no longer had such hopeful 
illusions concerning this treacherous state. Nevertheless, he was will­
ing to grant Bulgaria special rights in an international commercial 
outlet either at Kavalla or Salonika, although in reality Bulgaria 
was a continental country with no need for any outlet other than 
those it already had on the Black Sea.7 
3. In Western Asia Minor, Venizelos asked for the islands off 
the coast, part of the vilayet of Brusa, and all of the vilayet of Aidin 
with the exception of the sanjak of Denizli. The center of this area 
was the allegedly all-Greek city of Smyrna. He claimed that these 
territories had a population of 1,188,359 Greeks and 1,042,050 
Mohammedans, and he advanced statistics and data to prove that 
the area was not only ethnically but also climatically and geo­
graphically related to an Aegean, and hence Greek, culture and 
civilization, rather than to the Asiatic hinterland. 
4. Venizelos also maintained Greece's right to the island of Cyprus. 
The British had offered the island to King Constantine in 1915 as 
an inducement to enter the war; and Venizelos evidently assumed 
that despite Greece's failure to join in the hostilities at that time, 
he would have little difficulty in obtaining this territory from Great 
Britain. 
In the case of Constantinople and the isolated Greek towns of 
Trebizond and Adana, Venizelos, though maintaining Greece's right 
to these areas, advanced no claim to them. He asked only that the 
Turks be deprived of control of all three, expressing his support 
for international administration of Constantinople and the Straits, 
while suggesting that the other two towns be included in the new 
Armenian state. This apparent magnaminity probably was carefully 
calculated to arouse the sympathies and gain the support of the 
leaders of the big powers. No one would have been willing to grant 
Greece sole control of the Straits in any case, and all were committed 
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to the formation of a separate Armenia. Thus, Venizelos was in reality 
conceding nothing, and he could point out that relinquishing these 
claims should serve to strengthen Greek pretensions to all of Thrace. 
The Greek claims presented obvious difficulties. Clearly they were 
in direct conflict with the Treaty of London, which had given Italy 
the right to annex Rhodes and the Dodecanese. They were also at 
cross purposes with the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement, which 
had given territory in Anatolia, including Smyrna, to Italy as its 
share in the partitioning of Turkey. The acquisition of all the territory 
sought by Greece would automatically make it the dominant power 
in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. It is hardly surprising 
that the initial reaction of the great powers to these demands was 
either noncommital or distinctly hostile. 
The French government was most careful to take a neutral position 
regarding the Greek claims. At no point did Greek ambitions conflict 
directly with French aims. Moreover, there was little love lost be­
tween France and Italy, which was also claiming the Smyrna area, 
and the French probably welcomed a counterbalancing claim. Totally 
preoccupied with the attempt to achieve its claims against Germany, 
France undoubtedly saw no point in committing itself on a matter 
in which it had no direct interest, especially as by doing so it might 
unwittingly antagonize either Britain or the United States, upon 
whose support France depended for fulfillment of its continental 
ambitions. 
As for the United States delegation, Nicolson gained the impres­
sion from his discussions with Day, Seymour, and Lybyer that it 
was unalterably opposed to giving western Thrace to Greece, vague 
as to the fate of eastern Thrace, but favorable to a Greek zone at 
Smyrna.8 So far as Thrace was concerned, this impression was basi­
cally true. The report of the intelligence section of the American 
delegation said: 
No change is recommended in the northern frontier of Greece. The claims 
of the Greeks to the territory along the whole northern coast of the Aegean 
is [sic] inadmissable because they would block Bulgaria from direct access 
to the Aegean for the sake of a shallow fringe of Greeks along the shore.9 
Instead, the report recommended that the boundaries of 1913 should 
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be retained with a possible extension in favor of Bulgaria to the 
Enos-Midia line. 
A difference of opinion, however, existed within the American 
delegation over Greece's Asia Minor claims. While asking that Italy 
turn over Rhodes and the Dodecanese to Greece, the intelligence 
section opposed the recognition of Greek claims in Asia Minor. 
The possession of the Dodecanese puts Greek people, Greek ships and 
Greek merchants at the very doors of the new state. To give her a foothold 
upon the mainland would be to invite immediate trouble. Greece would 
press her claims for more territory; Turkey would feel that her new bounda­
ries were run so as to give her a great handicap at the very start.10 
Moreover, Smyrna was the chief commercial outlet for all the Ana­
tolian uplands, and therefore a necessary part of Anatolia as a whole. 
This position was in direct conflict with the view that Seymour, 
Lybyer, and Day had expressed to Nicolson. 
The Italians understandably were disturbed by the Greek propos­
als, especially since Italy had been promised the same territory as 
Asia Minor by the Allies. Both the Greeks and the Italians recognized 
that something would have to give way, and it was with this in mind 
that Venizelos met with Sonnino in Rome in December, 1918, and 
proposed the negotiation of a provisional agreement regarding the 
Dodecanese and northern Epirus. Sonnino, however, refused, prefer­
ring to keep his hands free for the bargaining he was certain would 
take place at the Peace Conference. However, as the Greeks mounted 
an ever intensifying campaign for fulfillment of their claims, the 
Italian attitude changed. Taking the initiative, the Italian ambassador 
in Paris, Count Lelio Bonin Longare, discussed the matter on January 
5 with the Greek minister in Paris, Athos Romanos, and with Veni­
zelos on January 6. It appeared, Bonin Longare reported to Rome, 
that the Greeks were willing to recognize Italian claims of any type 
in Asia Minor so long as Smyrna was left to them. Venizelos had 
said to him that Greece did not wish to press its legitimate claims 
from Adalia to the Black Sea, for this would mean becoming an 
instrument of French and British policy. An Italian-Greek accord 
would do much to bring about Greece's ultimate aim, which was 
to be independent of everyone. Also, Venizelos had assured him 
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that Greece had no desire to be a great Mediterranean power. On 
the basis of these interviews, Bonin Longare was convinced that 
Italian concession of the Dodecanese and Smyrna to Greece would 
bring about the desired agreement. He suggested that such an agree­
ment would prevent the Greeks from forming a united front with 
the Yugoslavs regarding claims in the Adriatic." 
Not everyone was as optimistic as Bonin Longare. Romano Anez­
zana, Italian ambassador to Greece, took a rather negative view of 
such a settlement. Although he admitted that the city of Smyrna 
was Greek, he pointed out that the vilayet of Aidin was not and 
that it was next to impossible to separate the two. Should the Greek 
claim to Smyrna be recognized by the Peace Conference, it would 
inevitably lead to conflict over the surrounding areas. It was therefore 
imperative that Italy immediately stake out a claim in fact, as well 
as in theory, in Asia Minor. An agreement with Greece, Anezzana 
stated, would serve no useful purpose.12 
Nevertheless, negotiations continued. On January 19, Sonnino 
called upon Venizelos and suggested that Italy might accede to 
limited Greek claims in the Dodecanese and Smyrna in return for 
the cession of most of northern Epirus to Albania. Despite Italian 
desires for strictest secrecy, Venizelos quickly communicated this 
proposal to the British. Nicolson, one of several who were told, 
believed that Greece would be able to get both areas at the Peace 
Conference without giving up anything. He therefore advised a friend 
of Venizelos, Gerald Talbot, to tell Venizelos not to make any agree­
ment, but rather to take "grateful note" of Sonnino's concession 
and promise to submit the Albanian question to the Council of Ten.13 
Subsequently, Venizelos discovered that the Italians were willing 
to discuss in detail only the territory Italy would receive in Epirus. 
Unable to accept an agreement that would provide detailed terms 
on one side but only general promises of support on the other, 
Venizelos broke off the conversations. Despite continued Italian 
protestations of good intentions, the talks were not resumed. Veni­
zelos, undoubtedly recognizing the developing hostility to Italy at 
Paris over Italian claims to Fiume, decided that more could be gained 
at the Peace Conference than from treating directly with Italy.14 
Thus the attempt to reach an Italian-Greek understanding came 
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to naught. The Italians, unaware of Britain's knowledge of the nego­
tiations, immediately reverted to demands based upon the secret 
treaties, a policy they would continue to follow from then on as 
far as Asia Minor was concerned. Coupled with this was a total 
opposition to Greek claims for anything, anywhere. 
British reaction to the Greek demands was surprisingly hostile. 
Both the Foreign Office and the War Office General Staff had 
considerable reservations and submitted critical reports on this sub­
ject. Although both departments supported the creation of an inter­
national zone at Constantinople and the Straits, as well as the cession 
of eastern Thrace to Greece, they took sharp exception to Greek 
claims to western Thrace. The Foreign Office report stated: 
. . . The claim to Western Thrace should be resisted strongly, since there 
are few Greeks in Western Thrace, . . . while the assignment of the corri­
dor [to Eastern Thrace] would cut off Bulgaria territorially from the Ae­
15 gean.
What was in effect being suggested was that eastern Thrace should 
become a Greek "island," to be reached only by sea. 
Moreover, both reports were agreed that the recognition of this 
limited claim should be conditional upon Greece's renunciation of 
its Anatolian claims, claims that the War Office report termed "eth­
nologically indefensible."16 At the same time the General Staff 
pointed out that Italian claims to the area were even less defensible 
and that in a struggle between the Greeks and the Italians in Asia 
Minor, the Greeks "could count on British, French and Russian 
sympathy." 17 In any case, the Turks had shown themselves unfit 
to govern or develop the area. Therefore, the General Staff suggested 
"some kind of autonomy under international guarantee, and that 
the civil rights of Greek minorities in Turkish districts shall be 
protected." 18 Stressing the strategic importance of Cyprus, the report 
stated that although Greek control was acceptable, once Britain gave 
it up there would always be the danger that it might fall under 
the control of a stronger power. Presumably, this was a not-so-veiled 
reference to Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean. 
Despite these adverse reports, at the end of January the British 
peace delegation decided to support the Greek claims in Asia Minor. 
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Nicolson, a third secretary of the Foreign Office and a member of 
the British delegation, had been assigned to study and report on 
Venizelos's claims. On January 27, he noted in his diary: "I take 
the line that North Epirus justified, except for Karitza. Thrace, both 
East and West justified. Asia Minor justified, but not with the whole 
of the Aidin vilayet and the Meander [Menderes] valley." 19 This 
was a stand quite different from that taken in the Foreign Office 
and War Office reports. 
On January 31, the day after the British delegation had agreed 
to support the expulsion of Turkey from Constantinople, the delega­
tion decided, upon the recommendation of Sir Eyre Crowe, assistant 
under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, to accept Nicolson's rec­
ommendation relative to a Greek zone in Asia Minor. This was done 
in the face of vehement opposition from the military and also from 
Lord Hardinge, permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs and 
Crowe's superior, who wished the area to be left in Turkish hands.20 
Although Nicolson attributes the ultimate decision to Crowe, one 
somehow senses a stronger hand behind the scenes, perhaps that 
of Lloyd George. Seeing that Crowe's own superior opposed giving 
Smyrna to the Greeks, certainly some very high support was needed 
to bring the delegation to such a swift and radical change in policy, 
especially in the face of the recommendations of both the War Office 
and Foreign Office reports. Lloyd George, an open and avowed 
Grecophile, explicitly indicates in his memoirs his strong, personal 
support of Greek claims from the very beginning.21 In any case, from 
this time on, despite considerable dissension within its own ranks, 
the British delegation was to be the chief supporter of Venizelos's 
claims at the Peace Conference.22 
Perhaps partly responsible for this change in British attitude was 
the fact that the Greek delegation made it very clear that the future 
of Venizelos's government at home depended on his success in 
obtaining the areas that he had promised to the Greek people. Since 
Venizelos had long been recognized as a friend of the Allies, and 
particularly of Great Britain, his fall from power would in no way 
help British interests or influence in the area.23 
More important, however, was the fact that support of Greek 
claims made good sense in terms of the underlying principles of 
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traditional British Near Eastern policy. The chief object of this policy 
had always been twofold: to prevent the predominance of any other 
great power in the Near East; and to secure the ascendance of Great 
Britain in that area, preferably through indirect rather than direct 
control. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, by supporting 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Britain had successfully carried 
out this policy. Now, with the Ottoman Empire at an end and what 
was left of the Turkish state seemingly weak and impotent, it made 
good sense to cultivate the friendship and support the growth of 
a state that could serve both as a commercial counterpart to French 
commerce in the Levant and as a naval and territorial counterweight 
to Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean. The dominance of Britain 
in the Near East would be secured even more thoroughly than in 
the days of the Turkish Empire, but it would be done through the 
new techniques of friendship with Greece and guidance of the Arab 
states. 
On February 4, immediately following Venizelos's appearance 
before the Council of Ten, Lloyd George proposed the creation of 
a committee of experts to examine and recommend on the Greek 
claims.24 Realizing that both Italy and the United States were opposed 
to many of the demands, Lloyd George may well have believed 
that his plan would be more likely to succeed if it could be thoroughly 
presented and discussed in a lower echelon rather than put directly 
to the Council of Ten. The proposal met with a favorable reception, 
and all discussion of the Greek claims was postponed until the report 
of the committee was received. 
Armenian Claims 
Nowhere had the great powers made firmer commitments and 
nowhere were they less eager to become involved directly than in 
Armenia. Prior to the Peace Conference, all had stated publicly their 
support for the creation of an autonomous Armenian state, and the 
British and Americans had even drafted specific territorial propos­
als.25 However, the problem was complicated by the fact that in no 
area did the Armenians constitute a distinct majority of the popula­
tion, and their total in any sizeable state would run as low as 30-35 
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percent. Hatred between Turk and Armenian ran deep, and any 
suggestion that Turkish territory should be taken to form a separate 
Armenia brought sharp opposition from all non-Armenian elements. 
Thus, when French detachments consisting mainly of Armenian 
troops were landed at Mersina following the armistice, Turkish reac­
tion was swift. On January 4, a Times Constantinople dispatch stated 
that "individual Turks have openly acknowledged that their intention 
is to deal a final blow at the Armenians and to consummate the 
Turkish policy of exterminating that unfortunate race." 26 Throughout 
January, dispatch after dispatch chronicled an increasingly defiant 
attitude in the interior of Anatolia. United States Commissioner at 
Constantinople Lewis Heck reported that some officials guilty of 
the worst atrocities had not been removed from their posts. The 
"Moslem population is as arrogant as ever, not realizing defeat, 
because of lack of show of force by Allies." 27 Turkish officers were 
reported engaged in black-market profiteering. Armenians returning 
to their former homes met with Turkish opposition, both military 
and local. Their rights to the lands they had formerly owned were 
denied. Having nowhere to go, they concentrated in the cities, totally 
dependent on the aid that the Americans were providing.28 
In the area, Turkish military forces refused to evacuate the territory 
and disband. By promising land to both Armenians and Georgians, 
they provoked fights between these two elements. Only the dispatch 
of British troops brought an end to Turkish occupation and estab­
lished an uneasy peace.29 
So great was the disorder and so lacking was Allied authority 
and control in the interior, that Heck felt constrained as early as 
January 4 to send a warning note to Paris. 
If an independent Armenia is to be established, official announcement 
should be kept in abeyance until either firm Allied Military Control is 
established in Asia Minor, or until a large number of persons guilty of 
previous massacres have been placed under arrest in order to show to the 
Turkish population the danger of indulgence in further massacres.30 
Initially, two Armenian delegations appeared at the Peace Confer­
ence. The one officially recognized by the Allies was the Armenian 
National delegation, headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha, representing 
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the Turkish Armenians and the Armenian colonies in the various 
nations of the world. The other delegation, with Avetis Aharonian 
at its head, represented the Republic of Armenia, which had been 
proclaimed in May, 1918, as a result of the collapse of the Russian 
Empire. The two leaders could not tolerate one another, and it was 
only after the head of the Armenian Church intervened and ordered 
them to cooperate that the two delegations joined and formed a 
single, if rather disunified, group.31 
In addition to these two main delegations, there were some forty 
independent Armenian delegations from various nations at the Peace 
Conference. The result was that the lobbying was intense. 
They held conferences and meetings at which hundreds of journalists, 
writers, singers, professors, senators, and ex-ministers, made long speeches 
in support of the Armenian cause. The Armenian delegates followed Wilson, 
Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, reminding them every minute of the debt 
they owed Armenia. Their importunity annoyed everyone, and they began 
to lose friends. . . . Loris-Melikov. . . writes that when the conference 
opened Armenia had the wholehearted sympathy of everybody at Paris 
[but] . . . the excessive demands and the tone in which they were made 
finally drove most people to dislike them. . . . [They] were bound to 
antagonize those whom it was their purpose to win over.32 
These demands, as presented to the Council of Ten, were for an 
immense Armenian state that would touch upon the Mediterranean, 
Black, and Caspian Seas. It would include the Republic of Armenia 
and the seven Turkish vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Diarbekr, Kharput, 
Sivas, Erzerum, and Trebizond except for those areas south of the 
Tigris and west of the Ordu-Sivas line. All of Cilicia, including 
Alexandretta, was also demanded.33 
Although admitting that Armenians did not constitute a popular 
majority in the area claimed, the delegation laid the blame directly 
on Turkish atrocities before and during the war. Armenia had "pro­
portionately paid in this war a heavier tribute to death than any 
other belligerent nation," with losses estimated as exceeding 1,000,000 
out of a worldwide "nation" of 4,500,000 persons.34 Besides, once 
the state was established, all Armenians then in Russia and America 
would return, and within a few years the Armenians would have 
a popular majority. 
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Statistics also were presented to show the industriousness and 
economic worth of the Armenians. It was claimed that before the 
war Armenians, though only 10 percent of the population, had con­
trolled more than 35 percent of the total commerce of the Ottoman 
Empire. But that was not all; of the 2,000,000 Armenians resident 
within the empire in 1914, 85 percent had been farmers and small 
craftsmen.35 It would seem, according to the delegation, that not only 
had the Armenians been all things to all men but had been so at 
all times. 
The claim to Cilicia was based on the geographical argument that 
it was part of the Armenian plateau. Moreover, since the Armenians 
maintained that they were religiously and culturally Westerners it 
followed naturally that they should have an outlet on the Mediter­
ranean. Assuming that the territory would be taken from Turkey, 
the delegation clinched its argument by pointing out that only 300 
to 400 Syrians had fought for the Allies, while about 5,000 Armenians 
had fought with the Allied forces in Palestine.36 
The powers showed a great reluctance to make any specific com­
mitment on the Armenian question. Although pledged to the general 
concept of an Armenian state, neither Britain, France, or Italy had 
any desire to become too directly involved in the actual creation 
and support of this state. It was obvious that an Armenian state, 
whatever its territorial boundaries, would require a great deal of 
political supervision and military and economic aid. To support it 
too openly would undoubtedly alienate not only the Turks but the 
whole Moslem population of the Near East. Thus, the Armenian 
mandate promised to be a very expensive headache with little or 
no material or strategic benefits to recompense the mandatory power. 
Moreover, acceptance of the Armenian mandate by Britain, France, 
or Italy would upset the agreed-upon partition of the Ottoman Em­
pire.37 
The easiest solution, therefore, seemed to be for America to take 
on those areas originally promised to Russia, and the Allies eagerly 
sought an American commitment to undertake the Armenian man­
date. Nor was this any longer the faint hope it had seemed the 
previous December when Wilson had rejected Lloyd George's sug­
gestion that the United States take a mandate for Constantinople. 
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With the acceptance of the plan for a mandate system under the 
supervision of the League of Nations, Wilson had warmed percep­
tively to the idea of American participation. On January 30, he 
commented in a meeting of the Council of Ten that though the 
American public would be "most disinclined" to accept a mandate, 
"he himself had succeeded in getting the people of America to do 
many things, and he might succeed in getting them to accept this 
burden also." 38 Later that same day he returned to the subject again, 
this time stating that although it would take a good deal of time 
and persuasion on his part to convince the American people to 
assume a mandate, he was "disinclined to see her [the United States] 
shirk any burden or duty." 39 
Certainly many members of the American delegation openly 
confirmed American willingness to undertake mandates and in partic­
ular an Armenian one. American missionary and humanitarian con­
cern for the Armenians was of a recognized and long-standing nature, 
and it seemed logical that if any mandate were to receive popular 
support at home it would be one supporting the creation of an 
eventually independent Armenian state. The assumption among 
almost all Americans connected with the Peace Conference was that, 
like it or not, America would have to participate in making the 
mandatory system work.40 
Thus, when Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson's most 
trusted advisor and the man who replaced Wilson as chief American 
delegate when Wilson returned to the United States for the adjourn­
ment of Congress, was questioned privately on March 7 by Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau about America's acceptance of Armenian 
and Constantinople mandates, he had no compunctions about reply­
ing in the affirmative. "I thought the United States would be willing 
when the proposal was bought before them," he cabled to Wilson 
in his account of the meeting.41 
Although a statement of this nature could hardly be regarded as 
binding, Wilson did nothing subsequently to disavow House's state­
ment concerning Armenia. That this assurance was welcomed by 
the British and French is unquestionable. Both saw it as a golden 
opportunity to fulfill pledges and at the same time pass the respon­
sibility on to someone else. That they regarded the question of the 
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Armenian mandate as settled from that time forward is evidenced 
by the fact that serious consideration of a possible alternative only 
commenced close to a year later, when it became apparent beyond 
all doubt that the United States would refuse to undertake the man­
date. 
Arab Claims: Syria 
The Arab territories were of great concern to France and Great 
Britain, but not to the other powers. The United States's interest 
was limited to a vague desire to ensure a degree of political self-
determination for the native population, while Franco-British claims 
were used by Italy as a guide to the extent and type of demands 
it could make in Anatolia and Albania. 
France and Britain differed sharply concerning the disposition of 
the Arab lands. As a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French 
regarded Syria, including Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo, as 
rightfully theirs to control, either directly through annexation or 
indirectly as part of a political and economic sphere of influence 
in the guise of a League mandate.42 To the British, however, this 
agreement no longer seemed desirable. In 1916, at a time when a 
traditional imperial partition of the Ottoman Empire between Russia, 
France, and Britain had been accepted British policy, the agreement 
had seemed both logical and necessary. In 1919, the collapse of 
Russia, plus the complete British military domination of wartime 
campaigns and postwar occupation in the Near East, put the situation 
in a new light. The British, now anxious to consolidate their preemi­
nent position through friendship with the Arabs, were reluctant to 
evacuate Syria until they were sure that their claims to Palestine 
and those of the Arabs to control Damascus, Horns, Hama, and 
Aleppo would be recognized. So opposed were the British to any 
real French control in the Near East that some of the members 
of the British peace delegation openly advocated United States ad­
ministration of the coastal areas of Syria.43 The Sykes-Picot Agree­
ment, originally formulated to prevent postwar Franco-British rivalry 
in the Near East, now seemed more likely to create than to dispel 
friction between the two powers. 
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Pursuing this policy of Arab friendship, Lloyd George proposed 
to the Council of Ten the recognition of the Hedjaz delegation and 
obtained, over French objections, two seats at the Peace Conference 
for the kingdom of the Hedjaz instead of one. The British openly 
supported the pretensions of the Arab leader Emir Feisal, brought 
him and his delegation to France on an English battleship, and paid 
all expenses incurred by the Hedjaz delegation while in Paris.44 
There is much to indicate that Feisal's reception in Paris was not 
as warm as he had hoped it would be. The French made little effort 
to conceal their hostility.45 Much more upsetting to Feisal was the 
rather constrained and noncommital attitude taken by President 
Wilson when they met privately prior to Feisal's appearance before 
the Council of Ten.46 Considering Wilson's oft-expressed disapproval 
of the existing Allied secret commitments concerning the Near East, 
and his equally publicized dislike for authoritarian, hereditary rulers, 
this attitude was hardly surprising. Although Wilson supported the 
concept of self-determination, it is unlikely that he regarded Feisal 
as the representative of popular will. In fact, the general American 
policy position regarding the claims of the Husseini family was 
anything but enthusiastic. Without referring to Feisal, the United 
States intelligence report clearly stated that the Husseini family 
should be allowed to rule only those who wished to be under its 
control. The report advocated a separate Syria and Mesopotamia, 
both under mandates, and an independent Arabia.47 
It was in this semihostile, questioning atmosphere that Feisal 
presented his claims. The handsome Arab in his distinctive dress 
created a favorable impression in Paris, although he never com­
manded the sympathy that was felt for Venizelos. Representing 
himself as the spokesman for Arab unification, he demanded inde­
pendence for all territories south of the Alexandretta line. He justified 
his claim on the basis of natural frontiers that formed a unit "socially 
and economically." 48 Moreover, all its inhabitants spoke the same 
language, were of the same religion, and over 99 percent were of 
Semitic stock. The Arabs had fought valiantly in the Allied cause, 
losing some 20,000 men. "At the end of the war the Allies promised 
them independence. The Allies had now won the war, and the 
Arabic-speaking peoples thought themselves entitled to indepen­
dence and worthy of it." 49 
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While emphasizing his own personal desire for Arab unity under 
a single mandate, Feisal admitted that this was impossible at that 
time because of temporary social and economic differences. He 
recognized the desire of some people in Lebanon for French protec­
tion, and was willing to see Lebanon independent, asking only that 
it not be bound so closely to a foreign nation that future admittance 
into an Arab confederation would be impossible. He conceded that 
the Syrians did not favor membership in an Arab confederation but 
rather sought independent status, free of any foreign control. They 
were willing to pay for the outside technical aid they admittedly 
would need, and they should be free to choose the country from 
which it came. He suggested that an international board of inquiry 
should be sent to Syria to determine the exact wishes of the popula­
tion. A separate state under some form of political guidance would 
be bestfor Mesopotamia, whereas the Hedjaz should be an independent 
state organized along tribal lines. As for Palestine, the worldwide 
tensions and interests involved there were unique, and he was willing 
to accept the trusteeship of a European power in that area.50 
In sum, Feisal indicated Arab willingness to accept economic ties 
with the West, but not exploitation or political subservience. Yet 
the final goal of Arab unity remained. 
In our opinion, if our independence be conceded and our local compe­
tence established, the natural influence of race, language and interest will 
soon draw us together into one people; but for this the Great Powers will 
have to insure us open internal frontiers, common railroads and telegraphs 
and uniform systems of education. To achieve this they must lay aside 
the thought of individual profits, and of their old jealousies. In a word, 
we ask you not to force your whole civilization upon us, but to help us 
pick out what serves us from your experience. In return we can offer you 
little but gratitude.51 
During the course of Feisal's appearance before the Council of 
Ten, French Foreign Minister Pichon went to great lengths to point 
out that a small French artillery group had fought with the Arab 
forces. Although Pichon was understandably anxious to stress any 
French military action in the Near East, in doing so he hurt his 
own cause, for he also succeeded in calling attention to how small 
that token contribution had been in comparison to British and Arab 
efforts.52 
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The Hedjaz delegation was not the only one in Paris concerned 
with Syrian affairs. On February 13, the Council heard Dr. Howard 
Bliss, president of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut. He sup­
ported Feisal's plea that a commission of inquiry be sent to Syria, 
for he maintained that censorship there was preventing freedom of 
expression. This allegation irritated the British, who were in control 
in Syria, and terms such as "national honor" were used somewhat 
heatedly by Lloyd George and Lord Milner. On further questioning, 
it turned out that the actual censorship was being carried out by 
French military authorities who were under the direct authority of 
General Allenby, and therefore, Dr. Bliss assumed, were acting with 
Allenby's approval. This little discussion left neither the British nor 
the French very happy and provided an opening for an argument 
over British censorship in Syria, an issue that ultimately would be 
the chief obstacle to sending the commission that Dr. Bliss so eagerly 
advocated.53 
Following Dr. Bliss, a statement in direct opposition to Feisal's 
was presented by the chairman of the Central Syrian Committee, 
Chekri Ganem.54 This committee was composed of men who pur­
ported to represent each of the main religious groups in Syria-
Moslem, Greek Orthodox, Hebrew, Greek Melchite, and Maron­
ite—and also claimed to represent more than a million Syrians around 
the globe. Maintaining that despite similarities in language and 
religion the Syrian was really not an Arab, and that Arab conquerors 
had long since been absorbed into a superior Syrian civilization, 
Mr. Ganem argued that any Syrian state must of necessity be com­
pletely separate from the other Arabic-speaking countries. Unlike 
the Arabs, the Syrians were politically mature enough to recognize 
that they were not ready to govern themselves completely and that 
foreign help and supervision, both political and economic, would 
be needed to combat the poverty and ignorance of the masses. In 
determining which country should supply this aid, it would be dan­
gerous to consult the people because of the religious, emotional, 
and political chaos resulting from the war. Rather, the choice should 
fall on that country which before the war would have been their 
unanimous, or nearly unanimous, selection. That country was France. 
Citing the age-old traditions tying Syria and France together, Mr. 
Ganem emphasized the geographical closeness and the affinities of 
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temperament and culture between the two peoples; as an example, 
French was the Syrian's "second mother tongue." The educational 
system in Syria was entirely French, except for the American Uni­
versity at Beirut. France could conciliate Christian and Moslem 
elements because it had twenty to twenty-five million Moslem sub­
jects and traditionally had been the protector of Christianity in the 
Near East. Finally, Ganem stated that France lacked any imperialist 
faction, and therefore its role in Syria would be purely that of a 
"guide or arbitrator." In conclusion, he noted that his committee 
had made this statement because it believed that the French would 
be too bashful to come into Syria unless they were urged. 
This report merits close attention, for Mr. Ganem, who had ap­
parently been away from Syria for thirty-five years and was now 
reportedly a French citizen, had offered the official French view 
in its entirety, and his statement constitutes the best single summary 
of French attitudes and claims to Syria.55 Moreover, by having this 
come from a Syrian, the French had laid the groundwork for a claim, 
which they subsequently advanced, that Syrian pro-British manifes­
tations occurred only because the British were the military force 
in occupation. This French position regarding British military oc­
cupation and censorship in Syria would reach its climax with the 
refusal of France to participate in a commission of investigation. 
Ganem, however, had failed to mention one of the chief elements 
motivating France's drive for territory in the Near East. This was 
the ephemeral image of French overseas imperial power that had 
been a part of France's historical tradition for centuries. In the 
sixteenth century France had been the first Western nation to es­
tablish commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, and its com­
mercial interests had grown steadily throughout the empire over the 
centuries. By the outbreak of World War I France's influence not 
only predominated both politically and culturally in the Syrian area, 
but its economic investments throughout the Ottoman Empire ex­
ceeded those of any other power. Even the majority of the bonds 
of the renowned Ottoman Debt were in French hands. Having lost 
one empire to the British in the eighteenth century, the French 
government was not anxious to lose control of the African and Near 
Eastern territories that had come under its direct or indirect influence 
during the wave of imperialism in the last years of the nineteenth 
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century. Though the European settlement and continental security 
remained the government's primary concern in 1919, it should not 
be thought that the traditional concept of a Mediterranean and 
African empire had lost its political or popular appeal.56 
To round out the claims from this area, the Council of Ten heard 
the statement of Daoud Bey Mammon, president of the Great Ad­
ministrative Council of Mount Lebanon. He asked for an indepen­
dent state of Lebanon under French guidance, but was willing to 
consider a loose type of federal union with Syria, if Syria were also 
under French supervision. His request was seconded by a Druse 
and a Moslem delegate.57 
The conflicting claims of the various delegations seemed to warrant 
an investigation, and on February 18, United States Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing formally proposed the sending of an inter-
Allied commission of inquiry to Syria. The Council of Ten, however, 
postponed the question without any discussion.58 Although the rea­
sons are not definitely known, a good idea may be obtained from 
a discussion eight days later between the American Commissioners 
Plenipotentiary and Dr. Bliss. At that time Lansing assured Bliss 
that if Britain would support it he would try again to have a commis­
sion sent, even though it had been "refused by Pichon under orders 
from Clemenceau." However he warned that "no decision was immi­
nent." 59 
Thus, by the end of February signs of imminent friction were 
plainly visible. However, a month would pass before it broke out 
into the open. 
Zionist Claims: Palestine 
The problem of Palestine was great in itself. The British view 
was that Palestine, separated from Syria, should be a British mandate, 
should not be under international administration, and above all, for 
strategic reasons should not fall into the hands of France or Italy.60 
This, of course, was not at all in accordance with the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. In fact, Palestine was one of the chief reasons for British 
anxiety to get clear of the secret commitments. The British govern­
ment was therefore quite pleased when the American intelligence 
report specifically recommended a British mandate in Palestine.61 
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France, despite Clemenceau's December promises to Lloyd George, 
still offically maintained its claim for the inclusion of Palestine in 
a greater Syria or the creation of an international administration 
for the area.62 
The Zionist leaders at the Peace Conference were intent on cashing 
in the pledges regarding a Jewish national home that the major 
powers had made when they subscribed to the Balfour Declaration. 
Recognizing France as their greatest potential foe, the Zionist leaders 
attempted to isolate the French before the Peace Conference began 
by reaching agreements with both Italy and the Arabs. In return 
for Italian support of Jewish and British claims in Palestine, the 
Zionists offered their support for an Italian mandate in Armenia 
and assured the Italians that the British would internationalize the 
Holy Places and include French and Italians in the administration.63 
The Italian reaction was completely noncommittal. Actually, Italy 
had been offered little. Zionist support would be of little meaning 
in deciding Anatolian issues, whereas French acquiescence would 
be of great value. Moreover, Italy's chief territorial ambitions lay 
in central and southern Anatolia rather than in Armenia. 
Much more important and much more successful were the Arab-
Zionist negotiations, which early in January resulted in a written 
agreement between Feisal and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, leader of the 
Zionist movement.64 Feisal recognized both the separation of Pales­
tine from Syria and the Zionist program for immigration. In return, 
Weizmann guaranteed the political, civil, and religious rights and 
freedom of the Moslem population of Palestine and promised help 
in the planning and development of economic resources in the whole 
Near East area, Jewish or Arab. Any and all matters of dispute were 
to be referred to the British government for arbitration.65 
This agreement constituted a master stroke of diplomacy for both 
sides. The agreement did much to relieve British and American fears 
regarding the compatibility of the two groups, fears that had been 
the greatest obstacle to the furtherance of the Zionist cause. By 
negotiating with Feisal, Weizmann had granted him recognition as 
the leader of the Arab world and as the responsible Arab negotiator 
in Syrian affairs. Certainly this could only strengthen Feisal's position 
in his conflict with France.66 In addition, Feisal's acceptance of a 
separate Palestinian state removed the last source of friction between 
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him and the British. However, Feisal stipulated that he would not 
be bound by the terms of the agreement unless all his other claims 
in the Near East were fully achieved at the Peace Conference. Al­
though this condition should have raised doubts as to the long-range 
worth of the agreement, the document nevertheless served to enhance 
the reputation of both negotiators as responsible statesmen. At the 
same time, by so openly supporting British wishes in the matter, 
both Feisal and Weizmann had placed Great Britain under even 
more of an obligation to them and their causes. 
Thus, by the time Weizmann appeared before the Council of Ten 
to present formally the Zionist claims, the attitudes of the great 
powers and the lines of conflict were already clearly drawn. In 
presenting his claims. Weizmann sought to justify the Zionist demand 
for a Jewish national home in Palestine by the following arguments. 
1. Palestine was the historic home of the Jewish people, Their 
culture had originated there, and they had been driven from Palestine 
by force. 
2. Palestine would provide a needed outlet for surplus Jewish 
population, especially from eastern Europe. 
3. Palestine would be the base of another diverse civilization and 
would serve as a focal point and source of inspiration to Jews all 
over the world. 
4. The land in Palestine needed redemption, The Jews had already 
invested huge sums there and possessed the people, energy, and 
money to complete the project. 
5. Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, Japan, Greece, 
Serbia, China, and Siam had recognized these historic rights by virtue 
of their approval of the Balfour Declaration. Therefore, Weizmann 
asked that Great Britain be given a separate mandate for Palestine 
under the auspices of the League of Nations.67 
In the questioning that followed, Lansing asked Weizmann if the 
term Jewish national home meant "an autonomous Jewish Govern­
ment." Weizmann firmly replied in the negative: 
The Zionist organization did not want an autonomous Jewish Govern­
ment, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory Power, an 
administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to 
send into Palestine 70 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Association would 
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require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where 
Hebrew would be taught, and in that way to build up gradually a nationality 
which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British 
nation British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they 
would be ripe to establish such Government as would answer to the state 
of the development of the country and to their ideals.68 
It would seem that Weizmann's ultimate aim was unquestionably 
the creation of just the autonomous Jewish state that he was so 
thoroughly disclaiming. 
With the appearance of the Zionist delegation before the Council 
of Ten, the presentation of formal claims by delegations concerned 
with Near Eastern affairs came to a close. Some of the major stum­
bling blocks to a Near Eastern settlement were involved in the claims 
set forth by these delegations. Greek, Armenian, and Syrian claims 
would be among the basic issues to which the negotiators would 
return again and again in subsequent months. It was clear that though 
the Council of Ten had thought it necessary to hear these petitions, 
little action was contemplated for the immediate future except possi­
bly on Greek claims. The complexity of the problems and the inter­
connection of claims and aspirations, both on the part of the lobbying 
delegations and the great powers themselves, made it impossible 
to settle one issue conclusively before agreement was reached on 
the others. Negotiation and compromise on a quid pro quo basis 
would be necessary in order to reach a final settlement. 
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Ill * THE DISPATCH OF A COMMISSION

OF INQUIRY TO THE NEAR EAST

WHEN President Wilson re­
turned to Paris on March 14, after a month's absence, Lloyd George 
proposed that the heads of state of the four major powers should 
meet together privately to discuss the German treaty.1 From that 
time on the Council of Four supplanted the Council of Ten, which 
continued to meet irregularly, as the decision-making body of the 
Peace Conference. The meetings were conducted in the strictest 
secrecy, so much so that for many sessions no secretary was present, 
the only other person attending being an interpreter, Paul Mantoux. 
Thus the fundamental policies of the conference were worked out 
in an atmosphere of privacy as thorough and complete as could 
be achieved. 
Decision to Send a Commission of Inquiry 
Despite the primary concern with Germany, the first recorded 
session of the Council of Four was devoted almost entirely to Syrian 
affairs. During the month since the last of the Syrian delegations 
had been heard, Franco-British discord on this issue had increased 
considerably. France, though recognizing the rights of the Arabs to 
a limited degree of local autonomy, insisted that the entire territory 
allotted to French influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement should 
become a single French mandate. Clemenceau steadfastly refused 
to meet with Feisal or to recognize him as having any legitimate 
 65 DISPATCH OF COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO THE NEAR EAST
concern in Syrian affairs.2 Britain clearly indicated that it entertained 
no direct ambitions in Syria, but was equally firm in supporting 
the demands of the Arab delegation and the rights of the Arabs 
to a "free choice of the Power whose assistance they desire." 3 Al­
though the British were willing to end their military occupation of 
Syria and turn it over to the French, they maintained that this would 
be impossible until some agreement was reached directly between 
Feisal and Clemenceau. Therefore, they exerted constant pressure 
upon Clemenceau to treat directly with the Arab prince.4 
At a meeting with Lloyd George on March 10, Clemenceau insisted 
on French control of all Syria. Lloyd George countered with a plan 
that had been conceived by the British ambassador to France, Lord 
Milner. It called for a French administrative mandate over the coastal 
area, leaving a narrow corridor to the sea for an interior autonomous 
Arab state governed by Feisal in which France would have the role 
of economic advisor. The French refused even to consider such a 
proposal, for as Lord Milner observed, "What they have been looking 
for, despite their own Sykes-Picot Agreement, is the virtual ownership 
of Syria." 5 Two days later Lloyd George remarked that war was 
inevitable if the French demands for all of Syria continued.6 
In this rather strained atmosphere the Council of Four began 
discussion of the problem on March 20. In a long introductory 
statement, French Foreign Minister Pichon declared that during the 
past month Britain had twice proposed plans whereby there would 
be "a great limitation of the territory to come under French influ­
ence." 7 
These plans would be absolutely indefensible in the Chamber. It was enough 
for the Chamber to know that the Government were in negotiation with 
Great Britain for the handing over of Mosul to create a movement that 
had resulted in a proposal in the Budget Committee for a diminution of 
credit in Syria. This . . . represented a real movement of public opinion. 
French opinion would not admit that France could be even partly excluded 
after the sacrifices she had made in the War, even if she had not been 
able to play a great part in the Syrian campaign.8 
Pichon demanded that the whole of Syria should be treated as a 
unit, and that France should be put in charge of the League of 
Nations mandate for the area. 
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In reply, Lloyd George asserted that Britain had no interest in 
Syria; rather, "It was a question between France and an agreement 
which we had signed with King Hussein." 9 He did not intend to 
see the League of Nations used to get around that agreement. Britain 
had done the fighting in Syria and intended to see its commitments 
to the Arabs fulfilled. Pichon, obviously irritated, retorted that France 
had never had any agreement with the Arabs. Although he admitted 
that France and Britain had agreed to the formation of an Arab 
state or a confederation of states that would include the areas of 
Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo, he argued that at no time 
had France made any commitment to accept Hussein or his family 
as the rulers of the Arab state. What the French obviously envisaged 
was an interior province, possibly with a limited amount of local 
autonomy under French supervision but constituting a single political 
and economic unit with coastal Syria rather than with other Arab 
areas outside the French sphere of political and economic control. 
At this point President Wilson intervened. Although "he was not 
indifferent to the understanding which had been reached between 
the British and French governments, and was interested to know 
about the undertakings of King Hussein, . . . the point of view 
of the United States of America was . . . indifferent to the claims 
of both Great Britain and France over peoples unless those peoples 
wanted them." 10 He had been informed that Arab public opinion 
was opposed to French occupation of Damascus and Aleppo. There­
fore, he suggested the sending of an inter-Allied commission to Syria 
and perhaps beyond to "elucidate the state of opinion and the soil 
to be worked on by any mandatory." " 
Neither Clemenceau, Lloyd George, or Orlando could refuse to 
accept a proposition put this way without openly rejecting the basic 
principles under which the Peace Conference purported to operate. 
They therefore agreed to the formation of the commission, and it 
was decided, at Clemenceau's suggestion, that the investigation 
should include Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia as well. Wilson 
undertook to draft a set of instructions for the commission, which 
were subsequently approved by the Council of Four on March 25.l2 
American desire to send an investigating commission was un­
doubtedly enhanced by the fact that there was reason to believe 
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the results would be such as to strengthen America's hand in nego­
tiating a Near East settlement. During the latter part of January, 
Feisal, though remaining a thoroughgoing Anglophile, had adopted 
an equally enthusiastic attitude toward the United States, calling 
America "the most powerful protector of the freedom of man." 13On 
February 13, he told William Yale, an American expert attached 
to the Division of Western Asia, that he favored a United States 
mandate in Syria, because America was the "most disinterested 
Power," but that "he did not dare to say so openly as he received 
no encouragement from America." l4 When news of the Council of 
Four's decision to send an investigatory commission reached him, 
Feisal was beside himself with delight and immediately wrote Wilson 
thanking him for giving the Arabs the chance to express "their own 
purposes and ideals for their national future." l5 Subsequently, Feisal 
bluntly asked House whether America would consider taking a man­
date in Syria, to which House in effect replied, "No comment." 16 
This reply was misleading, for there is no indication that America 
ever seriously considered assuming such a mandate. Wilson was 
highly averse to any American involvement in a mandate that might 
bring charges at home of national profiteering at the expense of 
others. A Straits mandate could conceivably be seen not only as 
legitimate punishment of the enemy but also as control over an 
international waterway analogous to that already exercised by the 
United States in Panama. An Armenian mandate could possibly be 
justified as a mission of mercy to the persecuted and downtrodden. 
But acceptance of a Syrian mandate could all too easily be construed 
as acceptance of a share in the victor's spoils. Nevertheless, it must 
have been apparent to all concerned that a vote in favor of an 
American mandate by the Syrian population (and this was considered 
a distinct possibility) would greatly increase America's influence in 
determining a final settlement as well as provide definite impetus 
for the promulgation of Wilsonian principles in the Near East.17 
French and British Attempts to Reverse the Decision 
It is evident that neither the British nor French statesmen, despite 
their initial support of Wilson's proposal, were in the least bit happy 
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about it. They feared, with some reason, that the investigation might 
prove embarrassing. Clemenceau, in accepting, complained about 
the British occupation of Syria and Feisal's pro-British attitudes, 
which he indicated would make a fair investigation very difficult. 
He also commented rather sourly that "he had made every effort 
to bring himself to agree with the principles propounded by President 
Wilson, but something must be said for the historical claims and 
for the efforts that nations had made in different regions." l8 Balfour, 
in turn, objected that the investigation would delay a peace with 
Turkey. Moreover, Feisal's preference for an American mandate in 
Syria was well known, and the British obviously did not relish the 
thought that similar attitudes might well appear in areas such as 
Mesopotamia. Lloyd George even commented that "he supposed 
that if the evidence were so overwhelming that, for example, the 
British Empire was ruled out of Mesopotamia, they would be free 
to consider whether they could take a mandate elsewhere in Tur­
key." 19 The British also were acutely aware that in Palestine the 
"existing population" would oppose strongly any large-scale Jewish 
immigration. Balfour noted in a memorandum to the British delega­
tion that the "task of countries which, like England and America, 
are anxious to promote Zionism will be greatly embarrassed." 20 
Thus, despite bitter attacks in the French press regarding Britain's 
support of Feisal21 and Clemenceau's adamant insistence that there 
was only one possible Syrian solution, Lloyd George was willing 
to enter into private negotiations with the French in an effort to 
prevent the outside interference of an investigatory commission. On 
March 25, a group of British and French experts met informally 
to consider the Syrian question. "There was general recogni­
tion . . . that the effect of sending an international commission to 
Syria would be to unsettle the country, to make it appear that the 
Conference had been unable to reach any decision and to open the 
door to intrigues and manifestations of all kinds." n It was recognized 
that the whole affair had come about because of British and French 
inability to reach a settlement, particularly French failure to come 
to an agreement with Feisal. The experts, therefore, worked out a 
settlement to which they thought Feisal would agree, and the French 
experts promised to bring this to the attention of the French govern­
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ment. The plan called for the installation of Feisal as ruler of all 
Syria, the creation of a Syrian National Assembly, and French man­
datory control of the same type that Britain exercised in Egypt or 
over the native states in India.23 
The favorable results of this meeting were probably responsible 
for an attempt by Lloyd George, on March 27, to convince Wilson 
that the commission should not be sent. He maintained that it would 
only stir up trouble and that the Arabs would never confide in 
strangers. Wilson, however, was of the opinion that merely sending 
the commission would make a very favorable impression and that 
by specifically limiting the commission's duties it could accomplish 
its mission quickly and efficiently. Clemenceau, using a tactic of 
seeming to give something when he really was not, agreed with 
Wilson that the commission's work should be done speedily, thereby 
purposely giving Wilson the impression that the French supported 
sending it. Then in the same breath, making the best use of this 
rare moment of Franco-American cordiality, he queried, "Now, what 
about the left bank of the Rhine?" (a matter very dear to his heart).24 
The British and French made their combined opposition to the 
commission clear to Wilson on April 11. In response to Wilson's 
inquiry concerning the delay in naming the French and British 
delegates to the commission, Lloyd George and Clemenceau re­
sponded that it was necessary first for them to reach a preliminary 
agreement on the territories to be mandated, in order to have propo­
sitions that the people might accept. This, of course, was not the 
purpose of the commission, as Wilson immediately pointed out; it 
was intended simply to sound out popular sentiment. Nevertheless, 
he reluctantly agreed to the Franco-British plea for further discus­
sions. To emphasize Franco-British unity, Lloyd George declared 
"that he had no interest in this question [of a Syrian mandate] and 
that he desired to tell Feisal that he must not count on a disagreement 
between France and England." 25 
One week later the American delegation came into possession of 
a "secret" French document "accidentally" left by an official of the 
Quai d'Orsay at the headquarters of the American Near East experts. 
This memorandum indicated that the French were not going to 
participate in the commission under any circumstances and that 
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Britain would probably join them in their refusal if a Franco-British 
agreement on Syria could be reached. On April 18 the American 
Commissioners Plenipotentiary decided to give up the idea of the 
commission altogether.26 Thus it appeared that the Franco-British 
policy was going to be successful. 
Britain's determination to avoid a break with France over Syria 
became even more apparent on April 25. At that time Wilson bitterly 
complained that in discussing the Syrian mandate, Britain and France 
were settling League of Nations' business between them. This 
prompted Lloyd George to state: "For us, the friendship of France 
is worth ten Syrias." 27 Britain, he went on, would "absolutely not 
accept a mandate in Syria." 28 Wilson was left in a bad position, 
for he had to admit that the last outcome he wanted was an American 
mandate there. This seemed to leave only France. To escape such 
a conclusion, Wilson almost deliberately tried to provoke an ar­
gument by suggesting a single mandatory for all the Arab states, 
to which Lloyd George calmly remarked that they had never been 
united before, and then changed the subject. 
Negotiations Between Feisal and Clemenceau 
Meanwhile, efforts to bring Feisal and Clemenceau together for 
discussions based on the plan devised by the British and French 
experts on March 25 seemed to be meeting with exceptional success. 
Once Clemenceau was prevailed upon to meet with Feisal, negotia­
tions proceeded quite rapidly. Although the details of the conver­
sations are not available, it appears that an agreement was reached 
on April 13, for four days later Clemenceau sent Feisal a draft letter 
confirming their discussion. In it he stated that France 
recognized the right of Syria to independence in the form of a federation 
of autonomous local communities corresponding to the traditions and wishes 
of their populations. 
France is prepared to give material and moral assistance to this eman­
cipation of Syria. 
Your highness Feisal recognized that France is the Power qualified to 
give Syria the assistance of the various advisors.29 
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On April 22, at a meeting of the Council of Four, Clemenceau gave 
a copy of the letter to Lloyd George and said that Feisal had replied 
that "he was satisfied."30 
An agreement thus had been reached on the basis of terms quite 
similar to those agreed on informally by the British and French 
on March 25—or had it? Copies of the correspondence between Feisal 
and Clemenceau were given to the British shortly thereafter. The 
letter from Feisal, written on April 20, proved to be a very noncom­
mittal dispatch, proclaiming Syrian friendship for France and thank­
ing Clemenceau for being the first to suggest the sending of an 
inter-Allied commission to Syria. (Feisal certainly knew better; he 
was either diplomatically telling a lie, or outwardly accepting one 
that had been told him.) The dispatch ended by stating that the 
conversations with Clemenceau "have convinced me of the need 
there is for us to come to a complete understanding on the points 
that interest us." 31 No reference was made to the specific proposals 
mentioned in Clemenceau's letter, nor was there any confirmation 
of Clemenceau's assurance to Lloyd George that Feisal "was satis­
fied." It was also learned that before sending the relatively mild 
letter described above, Feisal had submitted an earlier one in which 
he stated what Syria wanted and what it was willing to concede 
to France. This letter had been rejected out of hand by the French. 
Still further factors were involved. T. E. Lawrence, who was both 
confidant and adviser to Feisal and who had been present at the 
April 13 meeting with Clemenceau, stated explicitly on three separate 
occasions that no agreement had been concluded.32 Thus, on May 
8, when French Ambassador to London Paul Cambon commented 
to Curzon that the Feisal-Clemenceau conversations had been 
"thoroughly satisfactory" and that Feisal would welcome French 
troops, Curzon politely refused to believe him and suggested that 
Cambon examine the documents.33 Cambon, who had never seen 
the correspondence, thereupon investigated, and on May 26 gave 
to Curzon what constituted the first official French recognition that 
indeed no such agreement had ever been reached. 
It appeared that there had been a proposal to make an exchange of 
letters between M. Clemenceau and Feisal, but the former was only willing 
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to write on the clear understanding that Feisal's reply to his letter would 
be of a satisfactory character. A draft letter from M. Clemenceau was 
communicated to Feisal on the 17th of April with a request to communicate 
the answer which it was proposed to return. When Feisal's draft reply 
was received its terms were not considered to be satisfactory, and therefore 
M. Clemenceau's letter was never sent to him.34 
Thus it turned out that the letter that Clemenceau had given to 
Lloyd George in the Council of Four meeting of April 22, had been 
nothing more than a draft, to which a satisfactory reply had not 
been received. 
It is clear that no formal agreement had been reached between 
Feisal and Clemenceau. Then on what basis had Clemenceau stated 
that an arrangement did exist? The answer lies in the fact that a 
verbal agreement had indeed been achieved. Feisal told General 
Gilbert Clayton on May 20, that "on the advice of Lawrence he 
had agreed verbally with Clemenceau to use his efforts with the 
people to secure a French mandate for Syria on the understanding 
that France recognized Syrian independence." 35 In telling the Coun­
cil of Four that an agreement had been attained, Clemenceau was 
undoubtedly relying on these verbal assurances, but there was no 
justification for his statement that Feisal's reply to his letter indicated 
acquiescence to, or satisfaction with, any definite terms regarding 
Syria. 
Why, then, had Clemenceau led the Council of Four to believe 
that Feisal had accepted the French terms? Though there is no clear 
answer, it seems likely that two factors were involved. Clemenceau 
probably assumed that Feisal had told the British of his oral commit­
ments. Considering the closeness of Feisal's relations with Britain 
this assumption would be warranted. Undoubtedly, Clemenceau 
thought that Britain, knowing about the verbal promises and more 
anxious than France for an Arab-French agreement, would choose 
to overlook the vagueness of Feisal's written reply.36 Moreover, 
Franco-British acceptance of Clemenceau's letter to Feisal as consti­
tuting an agreement might force Feisal to honor his oral commit­
ments. If not, Clemenceau at any time could repudiate the letters 
as drafts that had never been formally exchanged, an action, due 
to subsequent Anglo-French discord, that he was quite willing to 
take by the end of May. 
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Anglo-French Differences over Syria 
Clemenceau also probably hoped that news of an agreement with 
Feisal would convince the United States that a commission was no 
longer necessary. Immediately after announcing the agreement to 
the Council of Four on April 22, he inquired as to the fate of the 
commission. Positive that Britain would join him in opposing it, 
Clemenceau sustained a tremendous shock when Lloyd George, 
rather than Wilson, blandly stated that he thought the Commission 
of Inquiry should proceed at once.37 The next day the Times made 
public the news that Britain had appointed Sir Henry McMahon 
and Commander David Hogarth as its official representatives on 
the commission. The Americans, who a few days before had been 
ready to give up the whole idea of a Syrian investigation, were 
delighted, and took up the cause with renewed vigor.38 
This seemingly sudden British reluctance to give up the idea of 
a commission stemmed from the fact that British-French efforts to 
reach an agreement on the boundaries of the mandated territories 
were not meeting with success. In fact, as early as April 12, Lloyd 
George was indicating privately that negotiations between Pichon 
and himself had broken down completely and that he was determined 
that the commission should go, and soon.39 The argument centered 
on the old question of the theoretically temporary zones of military 
occupation. Whereas the British were willing to agree provisionally 
to a French mandate over all of Syria,40 they maintained that only 
the area that both nations accepted as part of a future French man­
date should be turned over to French occupation troops. Recognizing 
the old saying about possession being nine-tenths of the law, Britain 
refused to relinquish a strip of land along the southern boundary 
of Syria over which it wished to build a railroad connecting Mosul 
and Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean. Although the French were 
willing to allow the British to build the railroad, they refused to 
modify the southern boundary of Syria so as to place this area within 
the British mandated territory and maintained instead that they 
should be allowed to occupy the territory originally assigned to them 
in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 
This dispute finally broke out into the open on May 21, when 
President Wilson, tired of waiting, announced that his commissioners 
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would leave on May 26, and Lloyd George stated that the British 
commissioners would do the same. Clemenceau, however, main­
tained that he could not send his delegates because promises made 
to him to work out differences first had not been kept. He would 
allow French representatives to go only when French troops had 
replaced the British as the occupying force in all of Syria. In effect, 
Clemenceau refused to recognize that any sampling of public opinion 
made while British troops were in sole occupation of Syria could 
be accurate. His attitude generally implied that the British would 
not withdraw because they would lose their means of influencing 
the population through intimidation, and he angrily charged the 
British with failure to honor the territorial promises made in 1916.41 
In return, Lloyd George vehemently asserted that the French 
seemed more than willing to invoke the original map of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement when it was to their benefit to do so, but refused 
to accept the provisions of the same agreement that called for an 
independent Arab zone in the interior with French influence limited 
to that requested by the native government. As far as the southern 
boundary question was concerned, it was impossible that a rail line 
whose only purpose was to connect areas under British influence 
with the Mediterranean should be controlled by France. Either 
France could accept the British map or the status quo could be 
maintained until the report of the investigatory committee became 
available. Britain pledged itself to accept this report even if the 
Americans went alone, for Lloyd George could not send delegates 
if the French did not.42 
It is clear that Lloyd George was not talking here about delineating 
temporary zones of military occupation but was instead insisting on 
French acceptance of new Syrian boundary lines as the price for 
Britain's withdrawal of troops from Syria, lines that would guarantee 
that the proposed railroad would fall under British control. This 
Clemenceau refused to do, and he indicated that since no agreement 
could be reached for the replacement of British troops by French, 
he would not allow his commissioners to proceed to the Near East. 
However, he indicated a willingness to accept under protest the 
occupation status quo for the time being. He promised to make no 
attempt to send French troops into Syria as that would produce too 
much friction. But he added bitterly, "I will say this to you frankly, 
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that I will not continue to associate myself with you in this part 
of the world if mutual engagements are not held to." 43 How serious 
Clemenceau finally had become on this issue can be seen from his 
statement to Cambon a few days later that if he did not get the 
backing of the French Chambers on his demand that France occupy 
all Syria, he would resign from the government.44 The American 
delegation, headed by Charles Crane and Henry King, proceeded 
to the Near East alone.45 
An examination of the policies of the three powers most involved 
in the Arab question during the early months of the Peace Conference 
leads to the conclusion that all were reasonably consistent in their 
attitudes and policies. In the course of the negotiations, however, 
Great Britain, much more than the other two, emerged as master 
of the situation at all times. Certainly, Lloyd George was highly 
successful in putting the American proposal for a commission of 
inquiry to effective use for British ends. 
American policy was outwardly consistent. Basing his stand on 
disinterest in any American gain plus refusal to recognize any of 
the secret treaties, Wilson insisted on the right of Arab self-deter­
mination and pressed for an international commission of inquiry. 
He no doubt felt that the price he had to pay for French and British 
participation in such a commission was to assent, however reluctantly, 
to Anglo-French attempts to reach a separate territorial agreement 
dividing up the area. Apparently he did not realize that such an 
agreement would render meaningless any information the commis­
sion might secure. 
The position of the French was equally straightforward. They 
demanded a single mandate for all Syria, which they defined terri­
torially in terms of the area allotted to French control or influence 
in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement (less Mosul). They insisted that 
Britain remove its troops from this territory immediately and that 
France be allowed to occupy all of it, pending the final decision 
on mandates and boundaries. Until this was accomplished, they 
refused to have anything to do with the Commission of Inquiry. 
French opposition to a commission was based on a number of 
factors. Foremost was the belief that their claims in Syria were solidly 
founded, both in terms of past influence and investment and in terms 
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of Allied wartime agreements. Thus they argued that all information 
necessary for making a decision regarding mandates was available 
in Paris; there was no need for a commission to make an on-the-spot 
inquiry. Moreover, Clemenceau vehemently maintained that no fair 
investigation could be made as long as British troops remained in 
occupation of Syria. In this view he was somewhat justified, if the 
example of action by Sir Arnold Wilson in Mesopotamia is an 
accurate indicator. In January, 1919, Wilson ordered a poll of native 
opinion regarding future British rule, stipulating that it be done 
"when opinion is favourable" and that the "right" answers should 
be sure to be obtained!46 Yet there is little to indicate that French 
occupation would have created a situation any more favorable to 
a truly open and free expression of public opinion in Syria. Probably 
Clemenceau recognized that anti-French feeling in Syria was so great 
that only if the French were there to "control" the investigation 
would there be any chance that a return favorable to France might 
be achieved.47 Finally, there is evidence that Clemenceau was under 
a good deal of pressure at home not to give in any further on Syria. 
The French Chamber had shown itself to be particularly sensitive 
on this matter. On April 25, Clemenceau told the Council of Four 
in an almost pleading fashion, "I would like it better if this commis­
sion didn't leave until the Germans get here. That would enable 
me to do it more easily." 48 
In an effort to obtain British support in opposing the commission, 
Clemenceau, much against his will, agreed to enter into negotiations 
with Feisal and succeeded in reaching a fairly definite oral agree­
ment. Having taken Lloyd George at his word that Britain had no 
interest in Syria and that the only question remaining to be settled 
was between France and Feisal, Clemenceau was understandably 
perturbed when Lloyd George, who a week and a half earlier had 
tried to persuade Wilson not to send a commission, greeted the 
announcement of Clemenceau's agreement with Feisal by stating 
that the commission should proceed as planned. 
This seeming shift in British policy was really no shift at all. The 
British used their willingness to oppose the Commission of Inquiry 
as a lure to achieve two concessions, rather than one, from the French. 
What Clemenceau failed to realize was that the British were con­
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cerned not only about a Franco-Arab agreement. They were equally 
anxious that a permanent delineation of spheres of influence (man­
dates) should be agreed on before Britain turned over any territory 
to French military occupation. Although technically the argument 
concerned temporary military occupation, the tone of the conver­
sations indicated that both sides recognized that in reality the tempo­
rary lines of occupation were intended to become permanent. The 
British in particular took this view, and as long as it appeared that 
there was some chance for a Franco-British agreement on this issue, 
Lloyd George was willing to support France in opposing a commis­
sion. Thus he made common cause with Clemenceau in the Council 
of Four and delayed for nearly two weeks the public announcement 
of the British commissioners who had been selected. However, when 
the Anglo-French discussions bogged down, as they apparently had 
by the third week in April, the British tune changed. Britain was 
in no way ready to renounce the commission or evacuate Syria just 
because Clemenceau claimed that he had reached an agreement with 
Feisal. Nor would the British have been willing to do so had the 
agreement been written and formal rather than oral and suspect. 
Concern for Arab claims remained secondary to Britain's primary 
objectives, which was to secure its own imperial position and limit 
France's role in the Near East as much as possible. 
The French were unwilling to join the Commission of Inquiry 
unless France had military control of the territory it claimed. Britain 
was unwilling to oppose sending the commission unless France rec­
ognized Britain's right to the territory it wanted. Since both claimed 
the same area along the Syrian-Palestinian border, no agreement 
could be reached, and the attempt to provide a concerted front 
opposing the commission fell through.49 
There is no indication that Britain relished the thought of a com­
mission of inquiry. The British would have been pleased to avoid 
it, for they recognized the possibility of results that would be unfavor­
able to Britain in both Mesopotamia and Palestine. At the same 
same time, the British realized that although the commission might 
find anti-British sentiment in almost any area, anti-French feeling 
in the same area would be a good deal greater. The British were 
convinced that, given a choice, any Arab population, outside of the 
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Lebanese, would prefer a British to a French mandate; though the 
people might well choose the United States over either, Wilson had 
firmly renounced any active American role in the Arab world. There­
fore, although the results of the commission's investigation might 
be somewhat embarrassing to British sensibilities, in comparison to 
France, Britain had little to lose. The findings that the British ex­
pected from the commission could only serve in the long run to 
force France toward an agreement on British terms. 
Lloyd George's decision not to send the British delegates unques­
tionably was meant as a conciliatory gesture to the French, one the 
British could well afford. The purposes for which Britain supported 
the commission could be achieved as well or even better by the 
American delegates alone, for reports that put France at the bottom 
of a popularity poll would look better if a British delegation had 
not been involved. 
One minor point should be made in passing. Although Lloyd 
George was correct in accusing Clemenceau of citing the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement only when it suited him, he was equally guilty of using 
the same tactic. Lloyd George had no compunctions about demand­
ing alterations concerning Palestine and Mosul, yet his sporadic 
insistence that France should have only advisory rights in the area 
of the four cities was a condition based solely upon the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. It is correct to assume, however, that Lloyd George, 
unlike Clemenceau, would have been glad to be rid of the whole 
agreement.50 
Italy played no real role in the complex negotiations surrounding 
the creation of the commission. From the beginning the Italians had 
not been happy with the whole idea, for they recognized, as Sonnino 
put it privately, that "no population of Turkey or Asia shows itself 
favorable to Italian assistance, nor seeks it." 51 Sonnino did advise 
the Italian high commissioner in Constantinople to see if Italian 
agents could round up petitions from important citizens in Anatolia 
asking for Italian assistance, a technique that he asserted would be 
followed in other areas by the British and French. Though Orlando 
originally had agreed to participate in the work of the commission, 
it was undoubtedly with some relief that he used the failure of the 
French and British to send commissioners as justification for a deci­
sion to follow suit.52 
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By the time Wilson left Paris in June, 1919, Anglo-French hostility 
over Syria was manifest. Yet, despite the apparent deadlock, the 
situation was not nearly as serious as it appeared to be. To all intents 
and purposes the British had abandoned their original support of 
a separate Arab state in the interior of Syria and had implicitly 
agreed to the concept of a single French mandate for all Syria. It 
is true they still hoped that this could be achieved through a voluntary 
agreement between Feisal and the French, for in this way, both 
the British commitment to the Arabs and the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
could be fulfilled. The French, however, recognized that Feisal 
hardly would be the tractable native ruler they desired for Syria. 
Wilson had admitted that the United States could not take a 
mandate in Syria. No one, not even the Italians, ever thought of 
giving Syria to Italy or to a small, disinterested nation. Lloyd George 
repeatedly told the Council of Four that Britain would not take a 
Syrian mandate under any circumstances, and by the end of May 
he had instructed British officials in the Near East to convey the 
same information to Feisal.53 Thus, the real decision as to French 
domination in Syria had been made. Although Lloyd George and 
Wilson had stated that they would abide by the decision of the 
Commission of Inquiry, the general allocation of mandates had 
actually been decided before the commission ever left Paris. Georges 
Picot told Feisal that the commission's findings "would carry no 
weight at all at the Conference." 54 Despite British and American 
protestations to the contrary, he was basically correct. 
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IV * THE COMMITTEE ON GREEK AFFAIRS

AND THE OCCUPATION OF SMYRNA

orN FEBRUARY 12, the Com­
mittee on Greek and Albanian Affairs (generally referred to as the 
Greek Committee), which had been established a week before by 
the Council of Ten, began consideration of Greek claims. The ques­
tion was made extremely difficult by the fact that reliable population 
statistics did not exist. Turkish persecution of Greeks in the Ottoman 
Empire during, the war had altered the balance of population in 
favor of the Turks in many former Greek areas. Acceptance of the 
changes would seem to condone the atrocities committed, yet failure 
to recognize them would make it difficult to achieve a realistic and 
workable solution applicable to the future. Also, in many areas 
economic and ethnic considerations were not in harmony. 
Any settlement of Greek claims automatically posed the problem 
of the validity of the 1915 and 1917 agreements between France, 
Britain, and Italy. Italy, of course, maintained that both of these 
were binding and that therefore the committee had no real right 
to discuss the question of Asia Minor because it had already been 
settled. France and Britain flatly stated that Russia's failure to sign 
the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement of 1917, as had been stipu­
lated, released them from any commitment to it. This was the docu­
ment that had defined the boundaries of Italy's sphere of influence 
in Asia Minor. The 1915 Treaty of London, which Britain and France 
did recognize, provided only that Italy would receive "a just share 
of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia,"1 as 
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compensation for French and British gains in the Near East. The 
United States refused to recognize either agreement "unless, by 
chance, they happen to contain certain provisions which we consider 
to be just and proper, in accordance with our declared principles."2 
The Report of the Greek Committee 
The conflict over the secret treaties proved insoluble and the final 
report of the committee to the Council of Ten reflected the division 
among the powers.3 Britain and France for the most part accepted 
the Greek position; the United States took a more reserved stand; 
Italy bitterly opposed the majority of the Greek claims. 
Northern Epirus 
Britain and France were prepared to recognize Greek demands 
in northern Epirus, not because of the legitimacy of Greek eth­
nological claims, but rather for strategic reasons relating to control 
of transportation routes.4 The United States was willing to grant to 
Greece only those areas which were economically dependent on it. 
Italy argued that the whole area was predominantly Moslem and 
Albanian, that many of those who were Christians were Albanian 
in national sentiment, and that therefore no part of the country should 
go to Greece. 
The underlying assumption in this dispute was the well-recognized 
fact that geographical factors would inevitably bring Albania within 
an Italian sphere of influence, whether it was officially designated 
as such or not. The result was, as Nicolson put it, that Albania had 
the "terribly bad luck . .  . to get her frontiers cut down merely 
because none of us trust Italy in the Balkans."5 
Aegean Islands 
All four powers agreed that, with the exception of the Dodecanese, 
the Aegean islands should be returned to Greece. The United States 
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also advocated Greek control of the Dodecanese, but the other three 
powers maintained that these islands had been in Italian hands before 
the outbreak of the war, had also been promised to Italy in the 
Treaty of London, and therefore should play no part in the peace 
settlement. 
Thrace 
The four nations agreed to accept in principle the cession of 
western Thrace to Greece; all but Italy were also agreed on the 
boundaries. Although the majority population in western Thrace was 
Turkish, it was apparent that Turks did not count, and the committee 
maintained that "the ethnic claims of Greece are . .  . superior to 
those of Bulgaria." 6 
Noting with approval Greece's declared willingness to grant Bul­
garia commercial access to the Aegean, the American, French, and 
British members of the committee also agreed in principle that 
eastern Thrace should go to Greece. The Italians differed sharply. 
They felt that a corridor to the Aegean together with the port of 
Dedeagatch should be left to Bulgaria and that eastern Thrace, which 
would then be separated from western Thrace, should become part 
of the Constantinople zone that was to be placed under an interna­
tional administration. The Italians pointed out that Dedeagatch was 
a predominantly Bulgarian city and that the people of Adrianople 
had also expressed their opposition to Greek military occupation. 
However correct these observations may have been, the population 
of eastern Thrace was predominantly Greek. To put it in the interna­
tional zone would only have compounded the ethnological error 
made in giving western Thrace, with its Turkish population, to 
Greece. 
Asia Minor 
Britain and France accepted the Greek claims in the north and 
east but opposed the demand for the Menderes River valley in the 
south. With this reservation, they were ready to allow Greece to 
86 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
annex "the ports of Smyrna and Aivali, with a certain dependent 
region." 7 This position was based on British and French belief that 
Turkey would be placed under a mandate, and therefore it could 
not be expected that "a compact and civilized community such as 
that of the Hellenic colonies on the western seaboard of Asia 
Minor . . . [should be placed] under such tutelage."8 
The United States was completely opposed to detaching these 
districts from Turkey. The committee report gave the reasons: 
The American Delegation cannot accept the figures presented by the 
Greek government as to the Turkish population. Their own information 
leads them to place the Turkish population at a figure which puts the 
Greeks in a decided minority in every sandjak of the area claimed by 
Greece except in the Sandjak of Smyrna itself. . . . 
They are also of the opinion that from an economic point of view it 
will be inequitable to separate the coastal districts of western Asia Minor 
from the central Anatolian plateau, and so to sever what remains of the 
Turkish Empire from its most natural exits to the sea.9 
The Italians submitted a separate statement concerning Greek 
claims in Asia Minor. They maintained that the committee had no 
business discussing these claims as they could not be separated from 
discussion of the general settlement in Anatolia. Moreover, since 
much of the territory claimed by the Greeks had been apportioned 
to Italy in the 1915 and 1917 agreements, "it would appear that 
a preliminary exchange of views between the Allies ought to take 
place before coming to a decision on the merits of the Greek 
claims."10 As a result, the Italians failed to make any formal recom­
mendations, either positive or negative, on the Greek claims in Asia 
Minor. 
Rejection of the Report 
The Greek Committee's report came before the full Central Terri­
torial Committee almost immediately. Whereas the British and 
French advocated acceptance of the report, the American delegate, 
Dr. Sidney Mezes, joined the Italian delegate in arguing that until 
the Supreme Council made a definite decision regarding the future 
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of the Turkish state, no decision on Greek claims could be made." 
Since at that time the possibility of an American mandate for the 
Constantinople zone, and even perhaps for all of Turkey,12 was under 
consideration, it is understandable that Mezes was reluctant to agree 
to concessions in Thrace and Asia Minor that might hamper the 
administration of these mandates. Certainly this did not indicate 
that American and Italian views on Asia Minor were identical. Al­
though their stands in the report of the Greek Committee were 
similar, American opposition stemmed basically from a reluctance 
to see the territory in Greek hands and was in no way coupled with 
any support for Italian ambitions. 
The report was neither accepted nor rejected; instead action was 
deferred in the hope that coordination of the differing viewpoints 
could be obtained. Nicolson records that the Council of Ten was 
insistent that the Greek Committee should reach an agreement.13 
Moreover, shortly before the committee had submitted its report, 
the Council of Ten had instructed all committees to draw up draft 
articles implementing their recommendations and to submit them 
with their reports. This order had come too late to be complied 
with in the initial report; now the Greek Committee was faced with 
this task.14 
United States Capitulation on Greek Claims 
Since it was obvious that Italy would not alter its position, the 
solution of the problem of Greek claims became a question of 
achieving some sort of rapprochement between the British and 
French on the one hand and the Americans on the other. This 
accomplished, a united and forceful front could be presented to the 
Italians. On March 15, Nicolson submitted a memorandum to Sir 
Eyre Crowe in which he outlined a possible compromise solution 
in which Greece would undertake mandates for the disputed terri­
tories in northern Epirus and Asia Minor, with the exception of 
the sanjak of Smyrna, which would be annexed directly. Even the 
Americans, Nicolson argued, recognized that the Greeks held an 
absolute popular majority in the Smyrna sanjak and so could not 
oppose its reunification with Greece. Subsequently, on the basis of 
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instructions from Balfour, Hardinge asked Nicolson to undertake 
personal negotiations with Mezes, who as early as March 16 had 
evidenced great eagerness to reconcile all differences.15 Nicolson's 
diary gives an account of these negotiations: 
March 24, . .  . Go down and see Mezes, who is a titular head of their 
delegation. We agree about Asia Minor—a semicircle from Aivali to the 
north of Scala Nova. That is something. . . . 
March 25, . .  . Continue my discussion with Mezes. Deal with Northern 
Epirus. I suggest autonomy under League of Nations, with mandate for 
Greece. This frightens him considerably. . . . 
March 26, Work out in detail scheme for partition of Turkey. . . . 
March 27, Work out scheme for an autonomous Epirus. Venize­
los . . . says that Col. House has hinted to him that the United States 
will accept the Franco-British line in Asia Minor. He was pleased. . . . 
March 28, With Arnold Toynbee to the American Delegation. We discuss 
the future of Turkey. We agree upon a frontier for the future Armenian 
State. We also finally agree on a joint line for the Greek Zone in Asia 
Minor, subject to some alteration if Italy is given a mandate in the same 
regions. As regards the Constantinople zone, we want to bring the Turks 
down to the Marmora at Panderma, but the Yanks want to exclude them 
completely.16 
This agreement was never specifically considered by the Greek 
Committee. Instead, the Central Territorial Committee formally 
approved the original report, with the addition of draft boundary 
articles for the Bulgarian peace treaty, and submitted it to the Council 
of Ten on March 30. However, the covering report of the Central 
Territorial Committee indicated, though not openly, the change that 
had actually taken place. In it the American delegate Mezes con­
tented himself with a single reservation to the effect that he believed 
the Central Committee could not "consider itself authorized to make 
recommendations on the subject of Greek claims" in either Europe 
or Asia Minor, "for this would be to make assumptions regarding 
the Turkish State, whereas, by its decision of March 11, the Supreme 
Council has reserved the question of the formation of that State." 17 
This reservation pointedly took no notice of the position of the 
American delegates on the Greek Committee, who had totally op­
posed the recognition of Greek claims in Asia Minor. Instead, it 
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left the door open for American acceptance of these claims should 
its delegates to the Council of Ten so desire. It also indicated that, 
depending on what happened to Constantinople and the Straits, the 
United States might well repudiate its previous acceptance in the 
Greek Committee of Greece's claim to eastern and western Thrace.18 
That the Greek Committee's report was not officially altered was 
apparently due initially to consideration for the opinion of William 
Westermann, the American expert on Asia Minor and a member 
of the Greek Committee. Westermann, who remained vehemently 
opposed to granting Greek claims in Asia Minor, was asked by Mezes 
if he wanted the committee's report changed to conform to the new 
American policy. Westermann replied negatively, stating that he 
would prefer to have the report stand and be subsequently overrid­
den. Mezes readily agreed.19 From a tactical point of view, this 
procedure also made good sense. The Anglo-American agreement 
had been negotiated without Italian knowledge and had been 
achieved through private negotiations outside the formal structure 
of the Peace Conference. Moreover, it impinged directly on Italian 
claims. Since the Council of Ten would not be bound in any case 
to observe the recommendations of the Greek Committee, there was 
little sense in making public an agreement that would result in 
indignant and justified Italian charges regarding secret diplomacy 
and failure to negotiate fairly the question of Italian claims. More­
over, until agreement on the disposition of European Turkey, the 
Straits, and the rest of Asia Minor had been obtained, it was in 
the interest of all three concurring parties not to appear to be forcing 
a fait accompli upon the Italians. 
An agreement that brought the United States into line with Britain 
and France regarding Greek claims in Asia Minor had nevertheless 
been attained. Behind this fact lie a good many questions, all leading 
to the crucial one: Why did the United States's position regarding 
Asia Minor change so suddenly and so completely within the course 
of a few days? 
Was it because the American delegates on the Greek Committee, 
Day and Westermann, were the only Americans who opposed the 
Greek claims?20 This was hardly the case. The intelligence report 
of January 21 had opposed any Greek zone in Asia Minor.21 On 
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March 4, during a discussion among the American Commissioners 
Plenipotentiary, both Lansing and Bliss agreed that America's "gen­
eral view was that no Hinterland can properly be separated from 
the Coast." 22 On March 7, Miller told Mezes that he was "wholly 
opposed to the Greek claims." 23 In a report written two days later, 
Mezes expressed his own doubts as to the economic and ethnological 
justification of the Greek demands. He recommended instead that 
"a guarantee to this area of generous autonomy within Turkey, with 
the direct appeal to the Court of the League, might well best meet 
the needs of the population, if not the very natural ambitions of 
Greece." 24 Finally, on March 12, the American commissioner at 
Constantinople, Lewis Heck, warned against giving Smyrna to the 
Greeks.25 
What, then, prompted the American change? On the day that the 
Nicolson-Mezes discussions began, Mezes sent a message to Colonel 
House which indicated that in return for agreeing to the Greek claims 
for the Dodecanese, the Smyrna region, and the Enos-Midia line 
northwest of the Straits, he was demanding the acceptance of the 
American line in northern Epirus, which would give Greece some, 
but not all, of the territory it claimed.26 This would indicate that 
Mezes envisioned a compromise, however unequal it might be. He 
did not achieve it. The most to which Nicolson would agree was 
Nicolson's own scheme for an autonomous northern Epirus under 
a Greek mandate, a solution that remained unacceptable to the 
Americans long after the agreement on Asia Minor had become 
an established fact.27 
Actually, Mezes' scheme was not so much a compromise plan as 
it was an attempt to salvage at least one of the recommendations 
of the American delegates on the Greek Committee. The basic 
decision to accept the British and French position regarding Greek 
claims in Asia Minor was imposed on Mezes rather than taken by 
him. On March 25, Westermann, a long-time opponent of Greek 
claims, wrote to Mezes: 
The impression which I gained from our conversation last evening was 
that the American commissioners, either President Wilson and Colonel 
House or Colonel House alone, had accepted the British-French proposal 
to grant to the Greeks a certain district in Asia Minor about Smyrna. Neither 
 91 COMMITTEE ON GREEK AFFAIRS AND OCCUPATION OF SMYRNA
the name of President Wilson nor that of Colonel House was definitely 
mentioned; but the phrase "higherups" used in the conversation seems 
to justify me in the conclusion. 
This decision overrides the stand taken by the American delegates on 
the Commission upon the Greek claims. The reasons for the reversal of 
our decision, as I gained it from our conversation were: (1) the necessities 
of the international political situation; and (2) the obvious one that there 
are distinctly two sides to the question of the Greek claims in Asia Minor 
and that the members of our commission believed more strongly in the 
Greek side than I did.28 
This contention that the decision had been taken by "higherups" 
would seem to be substantiated by the fact that Mezes had tended 
personally to side with the anti-Greek faction. His sudden eagerness 
to reach a settlement so opposed to his own views coincided closely 
with Wilson's resumption of personal control of the negotiations upon 
his return to Paris on March 14. Two days later Wilson sent a rather 
cryptic note to Mezes. 
I have gone over these articles twice and find that I have nothing essential 
to suggest. I hope that they may be ready for final consideration by the 
"Four" as soon as Mr. Lloyd George returns. He has had a special interest 
in this matter.29 
It seems likely, though not certain, that the subject of this com­
munication was the question of Greek claims in Asia Minor. Cer­
tainly Lloyd George had always been the strongest proponent of 
Greek claims in this area. Since the report of the Greek Committee 
was then under discussion in the Central Territorial Committee, it 
is logical to assume that Mezes had sought Wilson's comments re­
garding the proposals. It would hardly seem coincidental that on 
the same day Wilson sent him this note Mezes suddenly evidenced 
a strong desire to reconcile the differences reflected in the report.30 
Moreover, Lloyd George states in his memoirs that Wilson per­
sonally 
overruled the recommendation of his representative on the Commission 
and fell in with the proposals of the British and French experts as to the 
best settlement of the Greek demands. He was through the whole of our 
discussion a stout advocate of the Greek claim to Smyrna.31 
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Subsequently, when the Supreme Council began discussion of the 
future of Anatolia, it would be Wilson who proposed "to unite to 
Greece in full sovereignty Smyrna and the surrounding district, as 
proposed in the report of the Greek Commission (as subsequently 
modified by agreement between the British and American ex­
perts . . . ), and in addition to give Greece a mandate over the 
larger area claimed by M. Venizelos."32 
It is highly unlikely that Colonel House had anything to do with 
this decision. During Wilson's absence from Paris, House had secretly 
committed the United States to accept mandates in Turkey. On 
March 1 Sir Maurice Hankey wrote Lloyd George, "Colonel House 
has told me privately that America would take a Mandate in Turkey 
and I rather gathered that they would like to take one for Armenia 
and Constantinople, although they have not committed themselves."33 
House, Hankey related, had gone on to say that though he could 
not openly undertake to accept a mandate, "he could work on a 
private understanding that they could do so." 34 On March 7, it 
appears House told Lloyd George and Clemenceau in a private 
conversation that the United States would assume "some sort of 
general supervision over Anatolia." 35 This being the case, it was 
only logical for the American delegation to follow the policy origi­
nally recommended by the intelligence section that Greek claims 
in Asia Minor should be opposed.36 House did not inform Wilson 
that he had taken this stand. In his cable to Wilson on March 7, 
he mentioned only the mandates for Armenia and Constantinople, 
stating that he had said he thought the United States "would be 
willing."37 However, in his diary he also noted: "We decided many 
other things that I did not put in my cable because too much explana­
tion would have been needed." 38 
Wilson undoubtedly learned what House had done as soon as 
he returned to Paris, and this probably was one of the factors that 
led to a sudden cooling of relations between Wilson and House. 
Having a much more realistic approach than House as to the possi­
bility of America's accepting any mandates at all, Wilson certainly 
realized that America could not accept one in Anatolian Turkey. 
The city of Smyrna was unquestionably Greek, and there were 
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indications that Venizelos would be willing to accept any additional 
territory as a League mandate rather than annexing it directly.39 
Moreover, reports were being received ever more frequently telling 
of Turkish plans against the Greeks or reciting tales of atrocities 
already committed.40 These reports must have played a role in in­
fluencing a person with such high moral convictions as those repeat­
edly expressed by Wilson. 
Wilson's attitude also may well have been affected by the problems 
of the European settlement. Although the Adriatic crisis had not 
reached the proportions it was later to assume, it was already of 
sizable scope and import. Wilson's attitude toward Italy already was 
not the most cordial, and there were repeated reports of Italian troop 
landings along the southern coast of Anatolia. He must have recog­
nized that if Greece did not get the territory, Italy probably would. 
The biggest issue in the Council of Four immediately after Wilson 
returned was the question of reparations. Wilson continually urged 
a more moderate attitude toward Germany, and it was at about 
this time that Lloyd George began to associate himself decisively 
with the American position.41 In return, Wilson may well have been 
willing to take a more favorable view toward the British position 
on Greek claims. It is interesting to note that the French, with whom 
both Wilson and Lloyd George were becoming increasingly annoyed, 
did not share in the discussions that led to the United States's adop­
tion of the British viewpoint on Greek claims. Equally interesting 
is the fact that opposition within the British delegation to Greek 
claims in Asia Minor remained strong, led by the military and the 
India Office and supported by many within the diplomatic section. 
In fact, so great was the opposition that Robert Vansittart noted 
on April 8 that he had not seen the name of anyone well acquainted 
with the Near East who thought Smyrna should go to Greece.42 Thus, 
Nicolson's willingness to substitute a Greek mandate for direct annex­
ation of all but the Sandjak of Smyrna may well have been motivated 
as much by dissension within the British government as by a desire 
to conciliate the Americans. In any case, the minority view prevailed, 
championed chiefly by Nicolson, Crowe, and, above all, Lloyd 
George. 
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Greek Occupation of Smyrna 
The Italian Threat in Asia Minor 
The decision of the Council of Ten to form the Committee on 
Greek and Albanian Affairs prompted Italy to continue its efforts 
to reach a separate agreement with Greece.43 However, it soon be­
came obvious that the breach between the two nations was complete. 
Venizelos complained bitterly to the Peace Conference concerning 
Italian actions everywhere from Albania to Adalia. He claimed that 
in Bulgaria the Italians had formed an Italo-Bulgarian league, that 
they were preventing any Greek contact with the inhabitants of the 
Dodecanese, were subsidizing the Turkish press, and were encour­
aging the Turks in Smyrna to oppose a Greek occupation by force 
of arms.44 
As the Peace Conference wore on, the Italians became more and 
more disturbed over the fact that they still had not been allowed 
to occupy the area in Anatolia promised them in the secret treaties. 
As tension among the Allies over Italy's claim to Fiume became 
increasingly severe, the Italians became ever more convinced that 
the other powers, in collusion with Greece, were determined to limit 
Italy's actions in Anatolia as much as possible. By the beginning 
of May, Sonnino was commenting bitterly that Italy was unlikely 
to obtain any real settlement of its territorial aspirations because 
of the ill-feeling among the powers.45 The result was Italian initiatives 
in two directions. 
Starting in mid-March, Italian troops landed periodically at Adalia 
for the purpose of "maintaining order," but always reembarked. 
These spot landings and withdrawals continued throughout April, 
and by May 5, the Italians had troops on a more or less permanent 
basis at both Adalia and Marmaris. It was obvious that the Italians 
were on the verge of occupying the territory they regarded as being 
rightfully theirs.46 
At the same time, the Italian high commissioner in Constantinople, 
Count Carlo Sforza, began actively to solicit Turkish friendship and 
support. Sforza was convinced that a partition of Anatolia would 
be disastrous for Italian economic interests there, since a fragmented 
 95 COMMITTEE ON GREEK AFFAIRS AND OCCUPATION OF SMYRNA
Turkey would assure the predominance of British and French influ­
ence in the Near East. Therefore, with what he assumed was the 
tacit consent of the Italian Foreign Office, Sforza consistently posed 
as a friend to the Turkish government, and he sought to minimize 
the negative impact of Italy's territorial occupation by successfully 
urging Rome that the number of occupying troops be kept small. 
He was aided in his policy by Turkish recognition that the alternative 
to an Italian sphere of influence would all too likely be an extensive 
one for Turkey's archenemy Greece. Thus, while physically staking 
out their territorial claims in order to strengthen Italy's position at 
the negotiating table, the Italians also sought to win Turkish sympathy 
by indicating Italy's willingness to oppose an even harsher set­
tlement.47 
Decision for Greek Occupation 
The intransigence of the Italian delegation over Italy's right to 
Fiume led President Wilson to issue a public statement on April 
23 that was designed to rally pro-Wilsonian elements in Italy. His 
hope was that these groups could in turn exert domestic political 
pressure on the government for a more moderate attitude regarding 
Italy's territorial claims. The result, however, was the withdrawal 
of the Italian delegation from the Peace Conference on April 24, 
and Orlando's return to Rome where he met with overwhelming 
support from all segments of the population.48 Clemenceau, Lloyd 
George, and Wilson continued to meet in Paris, and as it became 
evident that the Italians were not going to return to Paris immedi­
ately, the anti-Italian attitude of the three leaders reached ever-
greater heights. On May 2, events took a sudden and dramatic turn. 
Incensed by the fact that Italy had sent several ships to Smyrna, 
Wilson offered to do likewise. "If I do it, it should bring results—and 
far be it from me to want this to be war. But the attitude of Italy 
is undoubtedly aggressive; she is creating a menace to peace, even 
in the middle of a conference of Peace." 49 In reply, Lloyd George 
stated that Venizelos had requested the sending of an Allied ship 
to Smyrna, and added that he thought all three nations should be 
represented. This was quickly agreed to, causing Clemenceau to 
remark, "What a beginning for the League of Nations! " 50 
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Three days later, on May 5, anti-Italian sentiment among the Big 
Three reached fever pitch. Wilson wrathfully recounted tales of 
Italian atrocities on Rhodes, while Lloyd George expounded on 
Italy's "grand plan of action in the Eastern Mediterranean." 51 Refer­
ring to the Italian occupation of Marmaris and Adalia, he expressed 
the fear that the other Allies might soon find Italy occupying half 
of Anatolia. He thought it might be well to reconsider the old plan 
for redistributing the temporary forces of occupation in the Ottoman 
Empire. As part of this they could allow Greek forces to occupy 
Smyrna, "since their compatriots were actually being massacred at 
the present time and there was no one to help them." 52 
Since the Italians had announced that they would return to the 
Peace Conference for the presentation of the draft treaty to the 
Germans on May 7, it was imperative that any formal decision 
involving Greek occupation of Smyrna should be made quickly. 
Therefore, the following day Lloyd George reiterated his proposal 
and suggested that Greece send two or three divisions to the area 
but that they should be retained on shipboard and be allowed to 
land only if there were "a menace of trouble or massacres." 53 Wil­
son, however, asked "why they should not be landed at once? The 
men did not keep in good condition on board ship." 54 Both Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau were in accord. When Clemenceau asked 
if Italy should be warned, Lloyd George brusquely replied, "Not 
in my opinion." 55 With these few words the decision was made. 
The Landing at Smyrna 
After the return of the Italians to the Peace Conference, discussion 
concerning the Smyrna landing continued only at sessions of the 
Big Three from which the Italians were absent. The negotiations 
were carried on in the utmost secrecy, so much so that the members 
of the American delegation, with the exception of General Bliss, 
knew nothing about the plan. The whole process of dispatching Greek 
troops to Smyrna provides one of the most striking examples of the 
lack of communication within the American delegation and Wilson's 
tendency to "go it alone." 
The first step was to consult Venizelos. Naturally he was delighted 
with the proposal and stated that he could send two divisions that 
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were then in Macedonia, one of which was ready to go. It was decided 
that British Admiral Calthorpe should be in command of the Allied 
ships and the landing procedure. This, it was hoped, would intimidate 
the commander of the Italian ships then anchored in the harbor 
at Smyrna. It was also decided that the Turks should hand over 
the forts to an initial landing party composed entirely of French 
troops, which would in turn be relieved by Greek forces. This would 
avoid the "mixing up of nationalities," 56 and thus give the Italians 
less of an excuse for taking any action. Also, there would be less 
chance of an outbreak of Turkish-Greek hostilities if the French 
acted as intermediaries in the transfer of the forts. 
The biggest problem was that of devising a system by which Italy 
and Turkey could be warned of the impending action early enough 
to prevent a sudden, overt reaction on the part of their troops on 
the scene. At the same time it was necessary to delay the news long 
enough to ensure the acceptance of the scheme as a fait accompli.57 
Wilson in particular was opposed to informing them before the last 
possible minute, stating that it was "important to keep all this busi­
ness as secret as possible." 58 The Greek troops were due to arrive 
on the morning of May 14. It was decided that the Italian repre­
sentatives in Paris would be informed on the afternoon of May 12, 
and that Constantinople would be told thirty-six hours in advance 
that Smyrna must be turned over to the Greeks, though the actual 
time of the landing would be given the Turks only twelve hours 
before it occurred. 
On May 11, all plans had to be changed. The news had leaked 
out at Constantinople, apparently from an English source. Wilson 
and Venizelos were ready to land first and then make an agreement 
with the Italians before the Greeks took over. However, Clemenceau 
opposed this, and Balfour backed him up. "We may be forced to 
a conflict, but unless you desire to provoke it yourself, do what M. 
Clemenceau asks, speak first to the Italians." 59 Therefore, it was 
decided to postpone the landing for twenty-four hours. Italy would 
be told that while the Italians were away from the Peace Conference, 
news of disturbances at Smyrna had made it necessary to decide 
to occupy it, but that Italy was welcome to join Britain and France 
in providing detachments for the initial landing.60 
The following day Orlando was informed of the proposed landing. 
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The Turks were firing on the Greeks, Lloyd George stated, and 
it was only logical to send Greek troops to protect Greeks. Although 
Orlando protested that the British, French, and Italian detachments 
should remain in order to give the occupation an international char­
acter, he gave in upon receiving assurances that "the landing was 
without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of Smyrna in the Treaty 
of Peace." 6I 
The landing took place on May 15. The French, British, and Italian 
contingents met with no opposition, but when the Greek troops 
landed in order to take over, rioting and violence broke out.62 Sub­
sequent investigation would show that there had been no real danger 
of violence at Smyrna prior to the landing. The disturbances that 
occurred at the time of the landing and those which followed were 
products of the landing itself, for the Greek officers in charge made 
little effort to keep either their troops or local Greek civilians from 
acts of violence against the Turkish residents of Smyrna.63 
Italian and Turkish Reaction to the Landing 
Public opinion in Italy regarded the Greek occupation of Smyrna 
with outrage and bitterness. Official reaction was swift. Two days 
after the landing took place, the Italians, without consulting any 
of the other powers, landed troops at Scalanuova and established 
control over the customs house there. Subsequently, they claimed 
that this and other landings were necessary because the security of 
the area was in jeopardy.64 A. H. Lybyer's scornful comment that 
the "only security menace was of their own future hold upon that 
neighborhood," best summarizes the attitude of the other powers.65 
Apparently it never occurred to them that this might hold equally 
well for the Greek occupation of Smyrna. 
The initial reaction in Constantinople was a conviction that the 
Allies intended to partition all of Anatolia and leave nothing to 
Turkey.66 In the interior, a small anti-Greek movement appeared, 
led by a Turkish general Mustapha Kemal. The disarmament of 
the Turkish army, which had been proceeding quietly under British 
supervision, stopped; the Turks seized all the ammunition dumps 
in which they had been discarding their weapons, and British officers 
were driven out of the interior. Though the Turks subsequently 
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protested mildly against the Italian occupations, they also sought 
Italian help, both militarily and diplomatically, in opposing Greek 
territorial ambitions.67 
The dispatch of Greek troops to Smyrna was by far the most 
important single decision concerning the Near East taken during 
the first six months of the Peace Conference. It was criticized by 
many at the time and by almost everyone in later years.68 Both the 
British War Office and Foreign Office offered "serious warning and 
protests" prior to the landing.69 This may indicate why Lloyd George 
would have been content initially to leave the Greek troops on 
shipboard in the harbor. Winston Churchill commented later, "I 
cannot understand to this day how these eminent statesmen in Paris, 
Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Venizelos, whose wisdom 
and prudence and address had raised them under the severest tests 
so much above their fellows, could have been betrayed into so rash 
and fatal a step." 70 A partial, though biased, answer was provided 
by A. H. Lybyer two years after the Peace Conference. 
The pleasant insinuating ways of Venizelos more and more obscured 
the facts that his position even in Greece rested upon Allied bayonets, 
and that the people were not the heroes and philosophers of classic lore, 
but a modern group of very mixed descent, given to trading and shipping, 
inept in administration, cruel and dishonest on occasion to an equality 
with Byzantinized Turks, and no more civilized all things considered, than 
the neighbors and enemies whom they despised and belittled.71 
Two false arguments, both seeking to justify the Greek occupation, 
have been advanced. It has been maintained that the decision was 
taken at a time when the Greek occupation was merely part of a 
larger overall plan that included having the Italians in Adalia, the 
French in Cilicia, the United States in Armenia, and an international 
zone at Constantinople.72 This was hardly the case. Although several 
plans had been proposed, at the time the decision was made the 
United States opposed French control of Cilicia, and the only matters 
the Big Three were agreed on regarding Anatolia was that Greece 
should have a zone around Smyrna and that ideally they would 
like to keep Italy completely out of Asia Minor. The second argument 
is that at the time of the landing opinion in Paris had shifted in 
favor of leaving the Turks in Constantinople, that there was therefore 
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a good possibility that Greece might not obtain eastern Thrace, and 
that this would necessitate compensation elsewhere.73 This is not 
correct. The idea of leaving the sultan as resident, though not sov­
ereign, in Constantinople was first broached by Lloyd George on 
May 14, and was not considered seriously until well after the Greek 
landing had taken place. Moreover, in the Greek Committee, the 
United States, France, and Britain had all agreed in principle to 
the cession of eastern Thrace to Greece. Although the United States 
maintained that no final decision could be taken until the fate of 
Constantinople was definitely decided, there is no indication that 
it ever questioned the basic recommendation of the committee until 
the summer of 1919. The subject of Thrace was never discussed 
either in the Council of Ten or the Council of Four.74 
The decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna followed logically 
from the aims, attitudes, and prejudices of the Big Three. The over­
whelmingly favorable impression that Venizelos made on them, plus 
their fear that his government might fall if he did not get what he 
had promised his people, undoubtedly helped to determine their 
stand. Other interests also played a part. Lloyd George, quite apart 
from his strong, emotional philhellenism, envisioned Greece as 
Britain's future agent in exerting control over the Aegean.75 Clemen­
ceau wanted British and American cooperation on European issues; 
he also had no desire to see Italy strengthened. More important, 
France had no major interest in the area involved. Here Clemenceau 
could afford to be accommodating; on Syrian affairs he could not. 
Wilson consistently took an anti-Turkish attitude; moreover, he ap­
parently felt that Greek ethnological claims were justified in Smyrna. 
Yet in agreeing to this action (in fact, being the first to suggest the 
immediate landing of troops), Wilson was accepting an occupation 
and administration of new (and enemy) territory by a nation that 
claimed it as its own. This was to be done totally outside of the 
authority and control of the League of Nations and before any final 
decision as to ultimate disposal of the area had been reached. It 
was obvious that such an occupation would be taken by the Greeks 
as implicit recognition of their claims; in accepting it Wilson was 
in effect agreeing to the type of partition outside of League auspices 
that he hitherto had opposed. 
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Important as all of these factors may have been, it is clear that 
none of them constitutes the chief reason for the Big Three's decision 
to support a Greek occupation of Smyrna. That they did so was 
due primarily to their annoyance with Italy over its claims in the 
Adriatic. This anti-Italian feeling reached such a pitch when the 
Italians left the Peace Conference that it became, particularly for 
Wilson, an obsession. Over and above all other issues, far over­
shadowing any consideration of Turkish or Greek rights or concern 
over possible massacres, was the single consideration that Italy must 
not be allowed to gain control of Smyrna. The alternative to Italian 
control was Greek occupation. 
On balance, it would seem that in order to prevent one outcome, 
the powers sanctioned another that was equally unjustified. By this 
action they greatly intensified a problem that had been difficult from 
the start. The Greeks assumed that this action meant that all of 
Turkey would be divided, with shares for everyone, and that they 
had merely been granted immediate control of one part of their 
eventual share.76 In this conclusion they were justified, for in spite 
of assurances to Italy that the issue was not prejudged, it is evident 
that from that time on Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson 
assumed that Smyrna, plus an additional undefined region, would 
be annexed by Greece.77 Turkish resistance to this decision would 
ultimately thwart many of the Allied plans in Anatolia. 
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V « ANATOLIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE:

THE QUESTION OF MANDATES

i,
_N THE PERIOD between the 
signing of the armistice at Mudros and the end of the first phase 
of the Paris Peace Conference in June, 1919, conditions in Turkey 
were far from static. Despite the resignation and flight of the leaders 
of the Young Turk party and the formation of a cabinet from which 
its members were excluded, the party itself (known as the Committee 
of Union and Progress, or C.U.P.), which had governed Turkey before 
and during the war, had in no sense been destroyed. A Times corre­
spondent reported that the C.U.P. existed "almost intact and . .  . is 
the only efficient thing Turkey has produced," ' while American 
Commissioner Heck warned Ambassador Sharp in Paris that the 
cabinet had "no real hold on the country, the great majority of officials 
being still members of the C.U.P. organization." 2 
The Constantinople Government and the C.U.P. 
In an effort to break the hold of the party, Sultan Mehmed VI 
dissolved the C.U.P.-dominated legislature on December 21, 1918. 
Although the Turkish constitution required new elections within three 
months, the sultan announced that, owing to the turmoil of 
the times, elections would not be held again until four months after 
the signing of the peace treaty.3 This attempt to silence the C.U.P. 
merely forced the organization to go underground. A new Turkish 
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National Defense Committee appeared and was generally conceded 
to be an offshoot of the C.U.P. Its aims were the retention of as 
much Turkish territory as possible and the freeing of C.U.P. leaders 
who were under arrest. This new organization constituted a serious 
threat to the Allies and the existing government, and led to an 
intensified Allied campaign of arrests and court martials of C.U.P. 
members.4 
Although the British and French were agreed on the policy fol­
lowed toward the C.U.P., it was at this time that their rivalry over 
dominance in the Near East became publicly evident. The arrival 
in Constantinople of the new Allied commander in chief of European 
Turkey, French General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, was the signal 
for an increase in Anglo-French tension. British diplomats, at least 
those at the Peace Conference, suddenly became much more willing 
to accept anything that the Armenians and Greeks said as true, while 
the French in Constantinople became increasingly open in their 
support of the established Turkish regime, which they regarded as 
both cooperative and docile.5 
The Turkish government watched eagerly for signs of such antago­
nism. Since it was apparent that the Ottoman Empire had been 
written off by those powers whose policy, until then, had been to 
preserve it, it seemed Turkey's only hope was to pursue the time-
honored practice of exploiting differences between the victors. Thus 
the Turks approached representatives of Britain, the United States, 
France, and Italy, in each case suggesting a clear preference for 
guidance by that representative's nation. In both the British and 
American cases, these advances met with a clear rebuff; the French 
and Italian reaction was a good bit warmer. The Italian government, 
embittered by the decision to land Greek troops at Smyrna, instructed 
its emissaries that "the Italian government has held and will hold 
itself completely free to deal directly with Turkey on any questions 
not involving directly the political or other interests of the Allied 
Powers." 6 Even more important, the Turkish government came to 
believe that if the Franco-British alignment could be disrupted, 
Turkey would be likely to retain the support of France because of 
the large French commercial investments in the Ottoman Empire 
and the threat that a disruption of Turkish political and economic 
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stability would pose to the security of Ottoman Debt bonds, the 
majority of which were in French hands. While quite willing to join 
with the Allies in punitive measures against the C.U.P., the Constan­
tinople government did not hesitate to encourage as best it could 
any incipient discord within the victorious coalition.7 
The Turkish Delegation to the Peace Conference 
Despite the fact that a draft peace treaty had not yet been for­
mulated, a Turkish delegation was granted permission to come before 
the Council of Ten on June 17, 1919. The delegation was headed 
by the sultan's brother-in-law Damad Ferid Pasha who had been 
appointed grand vizier on March 4. In a prepared statement that 
was aggressive rather than humble in tone, Damad Ferid maintained 
that the Turkish people had not been responsible for Turkey's en­
trance into the war or for atrocities committed against the Armenians 
and Greeks; in fact, the Turkish people had always been pro-British 
and pro-French, and heartily deplored the persecutions. Nor was 
the sultan at fault. The whole blame rested squarely on the few 
leaders of the C.U.P., who, through their alliance with Germany 
and their control of the army, had terrorized the rest of Turkey 
into submission. Not only had Christians been persecuted, but three 
million Moslems had felt the terror of the C.U.P. as well. Basing 
his claim on the common religion of the majority, he asked that 
all of the Ottoman Empire be kept together, for any disruption of 
this "compact bloc. . . . would be detrimental to the peace and 
tranquility of the East." 8 He promised that a written memorandum 
of specific proposals would follow. 
This memorandum turned out to be even more belligerent in tone 
than Damad Ferid's statement to the Council of Ten. Stating bluntly 
that the Ottoman government would not accept "the dismemberment 
of the Empire or its division under different mandates," 9 the memo­
randum went on to enumerate what the government would be willing 
to accept. In Thrace, in order to protect Adrianople, a return to 
the boundaries of the 1878 Congress of Berlin was necessary. The 
coastal islands and all territory extending to the Russian and Persian 
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borders, including Mosul, must belong to Turkey. If the Allies recog­
nized the existing Russian Armenian state, the Turks would be willing 
to negotiate with it regarding their common frontier. The various 
Arab provinces must remain under the religious control of the ca­
liphate at Constantinople. Although they would be granted a consid­
erable degree of local autonomy, all governors must be appointed 
by the sultan, with the exception of the Hedjaz, which could organize 
its own form of administration. Finally, Turkey would be willing 
to negotiate with Britain on both the Egyptian and Cyprus questions.10 
The reaction of the Council of Ten was one of incredulous amaze­
ment. Wilson commented that he had "never seen anything more 
stupid," while Lloyd George called the delegation and its memoran­
dum "good jokes" and commented that such a showing was "the 
best proof of the political incapacity of the Turks." " Rejecting the 
concept of the nonresponsibility of the Turkish people, the council 
stated in a written reply that "a nation must be judged by the 
Government which rules it." 12 Refusing equally to accept an appeal 
that Turkey should be judged not by the recent past but by the 
beneficent treatment of minorities exhibited in earlier Turkish his­
tory, the council commented: 
History tells us of many Turkish successes and many Turkish defeats. 
. . . Yet in all these changes there is no case to be found, either in Europe 
or Asia or Africa, in which the establishment of Turkish rule in any country 
has not been followed by a diminution of material prosperity and a fall 
in the level of culture; nor is there any case to be found in which the 
withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been followed by a growth in material 
prosperity and a rise in the level of culture. Neither among the Christians 
of Europe, nor among the Moslems of Syria, Arabia, and Africa, has the 
Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered; never has he 
shown himself able to develop in peace what he has won in war.13 
As to the question of religious unity, the council noted that during 
the war members of the Moslem faith had fought on both sides, 
and since the armistice 
nothing touching religion has been altered, except the security with which 
it may be practiced: and this, wherever Allied control exists, has certainly 
been altered for the better. . .  . To thinking Moslems throughout the world, 
the modern history of the Government enthroned at Constantinople can 
be no source of pleasure or pride.14 
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Finally, regarding the Turks' stated intention of bringing about 
"an intensive economic and intellectual culture," the council replied 
that "no change could be more startling or impressive; none could 
be more beneficial." l5 Certainly the Turkish delegation had hurt, 
rather than helped, Turkey's position at the Peace Conference. 
Decision to Partition Anatolia 
The question of Anatolia was not discussed to any extent by either 
the Council of Ten or the Council of Four until the beginning of 
May. This does not mean that no thought had been given to it or 
that no general agreements had been made.16 On March 7, Colonel 
House had promised Lloyd George and Clemenceau that America 
would assume mandates over Constantinople, the Straits and Ar­
menia, as well as some form of "general supervision over Anatolia." l7 
On April 1, as a result of Wilson's apparent disavowal of House's 
promise concerning Anatolia and the president's acceptance of the 
Greek Committee's proposal for a Greek zone in Asia Minor, the 
Council of Four agreed to a new set of general principles. It was 
decided that in the peace treaty Turkey would need to know only 
what territories it would not retain, and that the boundaries of the 
Greek zone would be "extended beyond strictly ethnographic limits, 
in order to open the ports of the western coast." 18 Turkey would 
be required to agree in advance to accept whatever arrangements 
the powers eventually decided upon for Anatolia. If it were not to 
be independent, it would be placed under a different mandate from 
that of Constantinople and the Straits. 
Nonetheless, the question of Italian claims made it virtually im­
possible to postpone indefinitely all decisions regarding the future 
of Asia Minor. No longer able to fall back on the alternative solution 
of an American mandate for Anatolia, Britain and France were faced 
with the task of fulfilling their pledges of equal compensation for 
Italy in any Near East settlement, a problem that was further compli­
cated by the situation in the Adriatic.19 
In the debates in Paris, much emphasis was being placed on the 
fact that Italian demands for Fiume were nowhere encompassed 
in the 1915 Treaty of London. This made it all the more difficult 
112 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
for Britain and France to go back on the territorial pledges that 
had been made in that treaty. Recognizing that some sort of Near 
East settlement that included Italy would have to be made, and 
anxious to find a solution to the Fiume imbroglio that would prevent 
the Italians from leaving the Peace Conference, Lloyd George sug­
gested to Wilson and Clemenceau on April 21 that perhaps Italy 
could be "induced to agree" to give up Fiume if, in addition to 
Adriatic concessions already offered, some sort of territorial adjust­
ment favorable to Italy were made in Asia Minor. Clemenceau, with 
whom Lloyd George had previously consulted, thereupon produced 
a map that allocated the southern half of Anatolia, less the Greek 
zone, to Italy as a mandate. A separate state would be constituted 
at the Straits. The remaining portion of Anatolia would be a French 
mandate. To Wilson's objection that Italy lacked colonial administra­
tive experience, Lloyd George observed that the Romans had been 
very good colonial governors. To this Wilson replied dryly, "Unfor­
tunately, the modern Italians are not the Romans." 20 He was also 
fearful of difficulties with Italy if America had a mandate next to 
an Italian one, presumably referring here to Armenia. 
However, when Lloyd George subsequently asked if he could, 
in an effort to placate the Italians, say to them that if Asia Minor 
were divided into spheres of economic influence Italy would get 
a large share, Wilson reluctantly agreed, as long as it was under 
a League mandate. He still believed that it was necessary for the 
Turks to have some sort of government, and "one ought not, from 
this point of view, to divide their territory." 21 The implication that 
perhaps an Italian mandate over all Anatolia would be politically 
preferable to partition was not lost on Lloyd George. He protested 
sharply that it would be quite a job to govern all Anatolia, whereupon 
Wilson remarked that partition "presented great difficulties," too.22 
Thus, the situation was more muddled than before. The one clear 
point was that Wilson, despite his acquiescence to Lloyd George's 
proposal, was averse to both the idea of partitioning the Turkish 
area of Anatolia and of dividing it into nonmandated economic 
spheres of influence. In any case, the plan came to naught, for the 
Italians steadfastly refused to consider any settlement that did not 
allow satisfaction of their annexationist claims to Fiume. 
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The departure of Orlando from the Peace Conference on April 
24 turned the other members of the Council totally against Italy, 
and it was in this atmosphere that the Big Three decided to send 
Greek troops to Smyrna. Yet it was the decision in favor of the 
Greek occupation that again brought the matter of Italian claims 
to the fore, for when the Italians returned to the conference on 
May 7, they became more insistent than ever upon a final decision 
regarding the territorial distribution in Asia Minor. As a result, Lloyd 
George returned again to his scheme for settling the Adriatic crisis 
by providing the Italians with suitable compensation elsewhere. To 
further this idea the British delegation met separately with Orlando 
and Sonnino on the morning of May 13. Nicolson's account of the 
meeting gives an insight into the methods by which the problems 
of the world were sometimes solved at Paris. 
I spread out my big map on the dinner table and they all gather round. 
LG, AJB, Milner, Henry Wilson, Mallet and myself. LG explains that 
Orlando and Sonnino are due in a few minutes and he wants to know 
what he can offer them. I suggest the Adalia Zone with the rest of Asia 
Minor to France. Milner, Mallet and H. Wilson oppose it: AJB neutral. 
We are still discussing when the flabby Orlando and the sturdy Sonnino 
are shown into the dining room. They all sit round the map. The appearance 
of a pie about to be distributed is thus enhanced. LG shows them what 
he suggests. They ask for Scala Nova as well. "Oh no," says LG, "you 
can't have that—it's full of Greeks!" He goes on to point out that there 
are further Greeks at Makri, and a whole wedge of them along the coast 
towards Alexandretta. "Oh no," I whisper to him, "there are not many 
Greeks there." "But yes," he answers, "don't you see it's coloured green?" 
I then realized that he mistakes my map for an ethnological map, and 
thinks the green means Greek instead of valleys, and the brown means 
Turks instead of mountains. LG takes this correction with great good 
humour. He is as quick as a king-fisher. Meanwhile Orlando and Sonnino 
chatter to themselves in Italian. They ask for the coal-mines at Eregli. 
LG, who really knows something about his subject by now, says, "But 
it's rotten coal, and not much of it in any case." Sonnino translates this 
remark to Orlando. "Si, Si," replies the latter, "Ma, Veffetto morale, sa!" 
Finally they appear ready to accept a mandate over the Adalia region, 
but it is not quite clear whether in return for this they will abandon Fiume 
and Rhodes. We get out the League Covenant regarding Mandates. We 
observe (I think it was Milner who observed) that this article provides 
for "the consent and wishes of the people concerned." They find that phrase 
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very amusing. How they all laugh! Orlando's white cheeks wobble with 
laughter and his puffy eyes fill with tears of mirth.23 
That afternoon, Lloyd George presented his plan to Clemenceau 
and Wilson.24 Admittedly anxious for an Adriatic settlement, he 
defended the Italian claims and proposed the creation of an Italian 
mandate for the southern half of Anatolia. The Italians had every 
right to be disgruntled, he maintained, for everyone except Italy 
had been asked to accept mandates, including the United States, 
which did not really want any. Clemenceau made no effort to conceal 
his dislike for the Italians, but agreed to accept Lloyd George's plan. 
His acceptance was undoubtedly helped by the fact that this plan 
was similar to the one proposed three weeks earlier, in that the 
northern half of Anatolia would be given to France as a mandate. 
In contrast, Wilson suddenly became the great defender of Greek 
claims. Not only should Greece be given full sovereignty over the 
territory recommended by the Greek Committee, but Venizelos's 
claim to a "mandate outside the purely Greek zone" should be 
accepted. He felt that Greece should be "taken into the family of 
nations," and if given this job the Greeks "would rise to the oc­
casion." 25 This stand by Wilson must have greatly pleased and se­
cretly amused Lloyd George, for the prime minister long had been 
a supporter of Venizelos's demands and had generally met with 
American opposition to any extension beyond purely Greek areas. 
He therefore readily accepted Wilson's suggestion and, in doing so, 
used this "concession" to bring Wilson around to his point of view 
on the rest of his plan. 
Nicolson was instructed to draw up resolutions incorporating these 
proposals, which he did with evident distaste. Although a confirmed 
supporter of Venizelos, he was moved to comment in his diary, "It 
is immoral and impracticable. . . . The Greeks are getting too 
much." 26 
These resolutions were accepted the next day, with only minor 
changes, as part of a comprehensive proposal to be made to Italy. 
Incorporated into the scheme was a formal resolution agreed to by 
all three statesmen to the effect that the United States, subject to 
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Senate approval, would accept mandates for Armenia, Constantino­
ple, and the Straits area.27 Yet the debate showed that the Big Three 
were far from agreement as to the nature of the mandates them­
selves.28 Wilson maintained that being a mandatory power gave no 
special economic rights of any kind, since any hint of a partition 
of spoils had, above all, to be avoided. Moreover, it would be impos­
sible for the Anatolian mandates to exist if they were not completely 
separated politically. Southern Anatolia should be "a self-governing 
unit, to elect its own Governor-General, with Konia as its capi­
tal. Otherwise, there would be the difficulty of a single capital in 
which the representatives of both Mandatories would live." 29 Thus, 
Wilson who previously had indicated preference for a single mandate 
over all of Anatolia, had adopted the opposite viewpoint and now 
supported a complete political division between the north and south.30 
In this he was supported by Clemenceau. Although the latter did 
not subscribe to Wilson's viewpoint regarding special economic 
rights, he recognized that any other political solution would lead 
to a great deal of Franco-Italian friction and rivalry. Clemenceau 
even went so far as to assert that he "would prefer that all of Anatolia 
should become an independent state rather than to see it become 
a source of perpetual quarrels between the Italians and us." 31 
Lloyd George was not at all happy with this suggestion. He openly 
admitted that he regarded the proposed mandates system as really 
a continuation of the type of economic control through foreign 
advisors that had existed in Turkey before the war. The mandate 
would entitle the nation assigned to it to have priority in naming 
these advisors. Complete political separation of the various mandates 
meant the destruction of Turkey altogether. This was something 
Lloyd George did not wish to see happen. Moreover, if the sultan 
were moved from Constantinople to Brusa as had been planned, 
he would come completely under French domination. Another possi­
ble solution was that the sultan should stay at Constantinople, outside 
the territorial boundaries of the new Turkish state. From there he 
could exercise nominal supervision over the whole of Turkey. 
"France would then overlook one part of Anatolia, Italy another 
part, Greece a third, while the United States overlooked the Sul­
tan." 32 
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No final decision was reached. However, at Wilson's suggestion, 
the Big Three did agree to the division of Turkish Anatolia into 
two separate political units, leaving the method of implementation 
"for further consideration." 33 
Decision Not to Partition Anatolia 
It seemed for a time as if a settlement of sorts had been obtained. 
Lloyd George, however, had overextended himself, and he shortly 
found himself the victim of a rising tide of opposition from within 
his own government. In April, Lloyd George and Clemenceau's 
original partition scheme had drawn strong protests from British 
experts, who branded the scheme "unworkable from the financial 
and economic point of view," and maintained that it "would cause 
such intense and justified indignation throughout the Moslem world 
that the British Empire could not afford to consent to it, even if 
it were militarily possible to carry it out." 34 The decision to send 
Greek troops to Smyrna met with equally great criticism in military 
and diplomatic circles. With the revival of the Anatolian partition 
plan following the landing, the British cabinet itself became agitated. 
Threats of resignation came from Montagu, Curzon, and even Bal­
four.35 Balfour in particular, though willing to accept Turkish expul­
sion from Constantinople, emphatically opposed any partitioning of 
Turkish Anatolia. In a memorandum that Lloyd George presented 
to the Council of Four on the morning of May 17, Balfour stated: 
We are all most anxious to avoid as far as possible placing reluctant 
populations under alien rule. . .  . Is it a greater crime to join together 
those who wish to be separated than to divide those who wish to be united? 
And if the Anatolian Turks say they desire to remain a single people under 
a single sovereign, to what principle are we going to make appeal when 
we refuse to grant their request? 36 
Balfour therefore proposed that Turkey should constitute a single, 
undivided state with no mandate, the capital to be at Brusa or Konia. 
This would be coupled with direct and indirect control of finances 
and police by the Allies, a system to which the Turks were well 
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accustomed. Recognizing that "the Italians must somehow be molli­
fied," 37 Balfour suggested that Italy should be given the right of 
first refusal on all economic concessions within the area around 
Adalia. Italy would not have a mandate, but would have a sphere 
of economic influence. 
This is designed to do two things; to maintain something resembling 
an independent Turkish Government, ruling over a homogeneous popula­
tion; the other is to find a position for the Italians within this Turkish 
state which will make a sufficient appeal to the ambitions of the Italian 
Government. From every other point of view the plan is, I admit, a bad 
one; but from this point of view—which is the one at the moment chiefly 
occupying our thoughts—I still think it worthy of serious consideration.38 
In other words, Balfour was returning to the traditional concept of 
spheres of influence that Lloyd George had favored earlier in the 
Council of Four debates. 
Strong oppositition to the separation of Constantinople from the 
Turkish state had also developed within the British government. On 
the afternoon of May 17 the Council of Four received a delegation 
of the Government of India.39 Headed by Edwin Montagu, M.P., 
secretary of state for India, the delegation asked for the retention 
of an independent Turkish state, which should include Asia Minor, 
Constantinople, and Thrace and which would be admitted to the 
League of Nations. Emphasizing the religious role of the sultan as 
caliph, they pointed out that there were seventy million Moslems 
in India, many of whom had fought in the Near East and all of 
whom desired to keep the caliph in Constantinople. In addition, 
the delegation appealed to historic British-French colonial ties with 
Islam and to the Fourteen Points.40 
Upon the delegation's withdrawal from the council chamber, Lloyd 
George announced that to him the problems of partitioning seemed 
too great. The unrest that would be caused in the Mohammedan 
world would be tremendous and would make it impossible for any 
Western nation successfully to administer a mandate in any Moslem 
area. Therefore, he was firmly in favor of finding a way to leave 
the sultan in Constantinople as the religious head of Islam. Of course, 
the Straits would be taken away, but some method would have to 
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be found to keep up the appearance that the sultan was being left 
in possession of the capital at Constantinople. A speech made on 
January 5, 1918, in which Lloyd George had said that the capital 
would be left with the Turks,41 suddenly became a sacred bond, and 
he earnestly argued that Britain was pledged to that statement. This 
was a sharp about-face for a man who four days before had declared, 
"The Turk when he has the least amount of power is a brute. What­
ever the difficulties which we shall encounter from the Moslems 
of India, it is necessary that we should finish with the Turkish re­
gime."42 Indeed, just two days earlier, Lloyd George had been the 
leading advocate of an Italian mandate in southern Anatolia. 
Why this sudden change? The answers are varied. There is no 
question but that Lloyd George was disturbed by the interpretation 
of political independence that Wilson and Clemenceau attached to 
the concept of the two mandates in Anatolia. Second, news of the 
unauthorized Italian landings at Scalanuova had just reached Paris. 
This upset all the Big Three, and particularly Wilson, who suggested 
that unless Orlando's explanations were satisfactory, all discussion 
of Italian claims should be suspended.43 Third, Lloyd George finally 
had become aware that he had agreed to things on which he did 
not have the backing of many members of his government. Mounting 
opposition at home to his partition scheme made Lloyd George's 
plan for arranging an Adriatic settlement impossible. He needed 
a way out. The combination of the Indian deposition and the general 
indignation at illegal Italian moves seemed tailor-made for the oc­
casion.44 Consequently, he maintained that "if the Italians continued 
on their present lines, it might be better to have only one mandate 
for Anatolia," to which Clemenceau replied that "for his part he 
did not want it." 45 
The next day, May 18, events took a dramatic turn. Orlando called 
on Lloyd George and asked him to support an Italian mandate over 
all of Anatolia.46 When Lloyd George refused point-blank, Orlando 
hinted that Asia Minor would be important only if Italy were refused 
Fiume. As Lloyd George recalled the conversation, "I asked him, 
'You prefer Fiume to a mandate in Asia Minor?' He answered, 'Yes.' 
'And you would abandon all claims to Asia Minor if you could 
have Fiume?' 'Eventually.' And then he indicated his willingness 
to have Italy build a new port for the Yugoslavs." 47 
ANATOLIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE: THE QUESTION OF MANDATES 119 
Lloyd George hastened to inform Wilson and Clemenceau of this 
conversation, and added: "Frankly he had changed his mind about 
dividing Anatolia. He thought that it would be a mistake to tear 
up this purely Turkish province." 48 Moreover, Turks and Moslems 
everywhere hated the Italians even though they respected the British, 
French, and Americans. An Italian mandate, consequently, would 
create difficulties for the other Allies in their mandates. A week 
ago he had advocated concessions in Asia Minor in order to obtain 
a settlement in the Adriatic. Now he had changed his mind. "If 
the Italians could be gotten out of Asia Minor altogether it would, 
in his opinion, be worth giving them something they were specially 
concerned in, even if it involved the Allies swallowing their words." 49 
He admitted that he was vacillating, but said this was the way he 
felt. 
Wilson immediately rejoined that "he did not in the least mind 
vacillating, provided the solution reached was the right one." 50 He 
had been much impressed by the representations of the Indian 
delegation. Both he and Lloyd George had forgotten that they had 
promised not to destroy Turkish sovereignty. He had promised it 
in the Fourteen Points, and these principles could not be violated. 
Therefore it might well be advisable to avoid any partitioning of 
Turkish Anatolia, though certainly the Turks could not retain control 
over Constantinople and the Straits. Perhaps the sultan could remain, 
if he wished, at Constantinople in circumstances similar to those 
of the pope in the Vatican. Although the sultan would have no 
sovereignty there, he would "be separated from his Kingdom merely 
by a narrow strip of water and territory." 5I As far as the new Turkish 
state was concerned, Wilson proposed that it should be required 
to accept the counsel and advice of a power such as France on certain 
specific issues, such as financial and economic matters. 
What he was suggesting was in effect to give a mandate to France without 
calling it a mandate. That is to say, France would not be responsible to 
the League of Nations, she would be in a similar position as an independent 
friendly country advising the Turkish Government under treaty stipu­
lations.52 
Both Clemenceau and Lloyd George readily agreed to the plan, 
although Lloyd George stated that "if France took a position of 
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this kind towards the whole of Asia Minor, which would be a very 
important trust, he would have to ask for a re-examination of the 
whole question of mandates in the Turkish Empire." 53 
As to the plan for buying off the Italians with Fiume, Wilson 
at first violently objected; but when Lloyd George explained his 
scheme for the building of a second port for Yugoslavia, Wilson 
agreed, subject to a plebiscite in which the people of Fiume indicated 
their desire to be united to Italy. This condition was in reality an 
insurmountable stumbling block, for the Italians were quite aware 
that they were unlikely to win a plebiscite in that area. Though 
concrete evidence is lacking, it is impossible to believe that Orlando 
ever seriously considered such a solution, especially when one notes 
that Wilson insisted that the plebiscite should be held after, not 
before, the Italians had invested large sums to build a second port 
for Yugoslavia.54 
Be that as it may, the Anatolian part of the scheme met its downfall 
from another source. Two days later Lloyd George was forced to 
disavow the plan for an unofficial French mandate in Anatolia. The 
reason soon became apparent. On May 18, members of the British 
cabinet had arrived in Paris for top-level discussions with the British 
peace delegation. Only Curzon and Balfour supported the taking 
of Constantinople from the Turks, and they joined the others in 
opposing a French sphere of influence in Anatolia. Lloyd George 
had no choice but to repudiate his previous agreement on this mat­
ter.55 
Meeting with Clemenceau and Wilson on May 21, Lloyd George 
presented a new comprehensive plan for settlement of the Near East 
question. This called for a "full" United States mandate over Con­
stantinople and the Straits, Armenia, and Cilicia, and a "light" 
mandate over all of Anatolia. If the United States refused this light 
mandate, there should be none at all. If America took the Anatolian 
mandate, the sultan would remain at Constantinople; otherwise, 
Lloyd George was of the opinion that he should leave. In any case, 
the Turkish state should be assured access to the Black Sea, the 
Mediterranean, and the Sea of Marmara. Greece would be allowed 
to annex the area proposed by the Greek Committee but should 
not have a mandate over any other territory. France would have 
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a provisional mandate over Syria, and Britain over Mesopotamia 
and Palestine, pending the report of the Commission of Inquiry. 
Arabia would be independent, the Moslems would retain control 
of their Holy Places, and the question of the location of the caliphate 
would be left to them.56 
In presenting this new plan to Clemenceau and Wilson, Lloyd 
George emphasized that after the removal of Armenia, Constan­
tinople, and Smyrna, the rest of Anatolia would be ninety-five percent 
Turkish. It was also necessary to remember the views of the seventy 
million Moslems in the British Empire, one million of whom had 
fought in the war, mostly on the Turkish front. "The more he thought 
the matter over, the less was he . .  . willing to agree to the partition 
of Asia Minor." 57 He stated that he had discussed this question for 
the past two days with the British cabinet and that a "formal deci­
sion" against it had been made.58 
Regarding a mandate for Anatolia as a whole, Lloyd George hoped 
America would take it, as the United States was the only nation 
for which the Turks had respect, chiefly because it had had no past 
dealings with the Moslems. The Turks hated both the British and 
the French. Lloyd George was particularly opposed to a French 
mandate over all Anatolia, because the Turks were "honestly afraid 
lest the Algerian experiment should be tried in Turkey, involving 
the complete subservience of Mohammedans to Christians." 59 Also, 
if France were given the mandate, Italy would have a right to demand 
compensation under the terms of the Treaty of London. Italy could 
not be allowed to have an Anatolian mandate, but to give it to France 
would "make the position of Italy impossible," especially since the 
basis of all Italian claims was fear "lest France should regard herself 
as the only Mediterranean Power." Here again, his views "had been 
prepared in consultation with his colleagues." 60 
Thus, Lloyd George maintained, if the United States would not 
take an Anatolian mandate, the Turks should be left alone. They 
would only be governing themselves rather than subject peoples, 
and could be kept under close indirect supervision through American 
pressure from Constantinople and Armenia, and French influence 
from Syria. By keeping control of the Ottoman Debt Council and 
retaining the public works concessions, the powers would also be 
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able to achieve effective financial control of the area. As to the loss 
of economic spheres of influence, none of the nations other than 
the United States had the capital available to invest heavily in Anatolia 
in any case. 
It was at this point that Wilson suddenly informed the council 
that he intended to send his commission delegates to Syria the 
following Monday. Clemenceau, as has been seen, refused to send 
his delegates and warned that he would never accept a settlement 
that was done "contre moi." 61 He claimed that France had made 
a series of concessions involving Mosul, Cilicia, and the British 
railroad rights from Mosul to the Mediterranean, and had received 
nothing but broken promises in return. Not only was he bitter at 
what he regarded as Britain's failure to live up to its promises in 
Syria but he was also extremely incensed at British attempts to 
deprive France of a mandate in Anatolia, a mandate that Lloyd 
George had suggested in one form and agreed to in another during 
the past week. Emotionally citing centuries of tradition, Clemenceau 
claimed that France had more of an interest in Turkey than had 
any other power. Although he would not leave the Peace Conference 
if matters were decided against French claims in the Near East, 
he might well have to leave the government, and he added, "Think 
what you are doing to us and think about it twice." 62 
Although this attitude was understandable, it should be remem­
bered that when a single Anatolian mandate had first been proposed 
on May 17, Clemenceau had stated categorically that he wanted 
no part of it. His attitude had changed only when Wilson proposed 
that the mandate be outside the control of the League of Nations. 
It would appear that it was this provision that made the project 
seem worthwhile to Clemenceau. 
For his part, Wilson was quick to assert categorically that the 
United States could not take an Anatolian mandate because of lack 
of American interest or investment in the area. Although he thought 
that the United States would take the Armenian mandate and per­
haps Constantinople, he was positive that he would be unable to 
persuade Congress to take a mandate over all Anatolia. However, 
he believed that if it were at all possible the sultan should be left 
in Constantinople. Wilson then reverted to his former suggestion 
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that France be given an unofficial mandate over all Anatolia. Since 
France already was the chief advisor to Turkey on matters relative 
to the Ottoman Debt, it could easily take over other functions such 
as commerce and the police.63 
Thus the powers seemed hopelessly deadlocked, and their relations 
had become so strained that discussion of the whole problem of 
Turkey was adjourned by tacit consent.64 
A month later one more attempt was made to reach a settlement 
before Wilson left Paris.65 The only notable change in position oc­
curred when Wilson indicated that he now was of the opinion that 
the sultan and his government should not be allowed to remain in 
Constantinople. "He had studied the question of the Turks in Europe 
for a long time, and every year confirmed his opinion that they 
ought to be cleared out." 66 In this he was seconded by Clemenceau, 
though Lloyd George, by now fully aware of the tremendous split 
within his government, refused to commit himself. Wilson again 
proposed that there should be no official mandate over Turkey, but 
that some power should be allowed a "firm hand" in the general 
overseeing of Turkish administration. Ultimately, Clemenceau sug­
gested that the council take no final action, because it had no availa­
ble means to enforce any decision relative to Anatolia or the Straits, 
and the participation of the United States could not begin until the 
Senate gave its consent. The others agreed, and the discussion ended. 
What had been accomplished? In the long run very little. Twice 
the Big Three had seemed on the verge of an agreement. Twice 
Lloyd George, under pressure from a cabinet that opposed the 
partition of Anatolia and any Italian or French predominance in 
it, had been forced to disavow his previous commitments. Anxious 
and willing to achieve a settlement in Anatolia, Lloyd George found 
himself at the mercy of a cabinet whose members, though opposing 
the desires of others, could not agree among themselves on the policy 
they wanted to follow in regard to the Turkish state.67 
Clemenceau, extremely passive in the earlier stages of the negotia­
tions, had become increasingly truculent as Britain refused to allow 
French occupation of Syria and made and withdrew offers of territory 
in Anatolia. Once the German treaty was finished and the Anglo­
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American commitment to aid France in the case of a German attack 
had been obtained, Clemenceau no longer had to soft-pedal French 
pretensions in the Near East in hopes of achieving a European 
settlement more favorable to France.68 
Orlando found himself in the unfortunate position of representing 
the one power whose Near Eastern claims Wilson, Lloyd George, 
and Clemenceau were unanimous in opposing. Excluded after the 
middle of April from the majority of the Near East negotiations, 
Orlando made demands in Asia Minor that remained consistent and 
generally in line with the provisions of the wartime secret agreements. 
Though at one point he did indicate privately a willingness to give 
up these claims, it was only in return for the guaranteed right to 
Fiume, something Wilson was unwilling to grant. Moreover, Sonnino, 
Orlando's foreign minister, was intensely anti-American and had 
developed a deep dislike for Wilson.69 He was convinced that by 
remaining firm Italy could obtain both Fiume and its share of Ana­
tolia. It is unlikely that Sonnino would have accepted any compro­
mise agreed to by Orlando, and his failure to do so would have 
in all likelihood created a major domestic political crisis for Orlando. 
One must therefore conclude that even if the British cabinet had 
supported Lloyd George's scheme, that Italians would not have 
accepted permanently any solution that denied them equal compen­
sation with the other powers in a Near East settlement. 
Wilson's role in the Anatolian debate was complex and contra­
dictory. The day before he left Paris, Wilson asserted in a press 
conference that he had made no mandate promises in Turkey "as 
I have no right to promise anything of that kind." 70 However, he 
stated that he thought the American people would accept an Ar­
menian mandate because of America's long interest there. "I have 
felt," he continued, "that there would be a certain advantage in 
our being at Constantinople, in that it would keep it out of European 
politics." 71 
It is true that Wilson technically had not promised that America 
would take mandates in Armenia and Constantinople, for the one 
formal commitment that Wilson had made to this effect had been 
part of a planned proposal to the Italians that was subsequently 
nullified by Lloyd George's renunciation of the scheme.72 But in 
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the discussions of the Council of Four he had expressed great con­
fidence that America would indeed become a mandatory power. 
All plans as to the allotment of mandates and the treatment of Turkey 
had been built on the assumption that the United States would accept 
the Armenian and Straits mandates, a premise that Wilson had done 
nothing to discourage and much to encourage. Whatever doubts 
Lloyd George and Clemenceau may have had, they publicly accepted 
the position that it would be worthwhile to postpone any further 
discussion of the Turkish treaty until approval for the assumption 
of mandates was voted by the United States Senate.73 
In the discussions themselves, Wilson evidenced a high degree 
of deviousness and indecision. Upholding shiny ideals on the one 
hand, he compromised to the point of reversing himself on the other. 
He did not seem to know his own mind on many issues, vacillating 
on the partitioning of Anatolia and the expulsion of the Turks from 
Constantinople without any of the justifiable reasons that Lloyd 
George had for doing so. Only on the question of the ultimate 
disposition of Smyrna was Wilson reasonably consistent. He always 
held, in opposition to many in his delegation, the belief that Smyrna 
should go to Greece for ethnic reasons. As the Peace Conference 
progressed, this was reinforced by his ever-increasing opposition to 
Italian claims. Although it was Lloyd George who suggested the 
dispatch of Greek troops to Smyrna, Wilson, far from being reluctant, 
was the one who suggested that they land immediately rather than 
remain, at least initially, on shipboard as Lloyd George originally 
had proposed. All in all, Wilson must bear the responsibility on 
an equal basis with Lloyd George for the Greek landing in Asia 
Minor. Later, Wilson deviated from his premise of ethnic justification 
when he became an advocate of a large Greek mandate "outside 
the purely Greek zone." 74 
Even more serious was the fanaticism with which Wilson opposed 
Italian claims, a backlash, at least partially, from the Fiume con­
troversy. His proposal, made not once but several times, that Anatolia 
be left as a single unit under the guidance of France, was prompted 
in great part by the fact that this solution would, as he himself 
observed, "leave the Italians out entirely." 75 This French guidance, 
moreover, would be similar to a mandate in terms of the influence 
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of the supervising power, but it would not be called one and would 
not be under the supervision of the League of Nations. There would 
be no need, therefore, of compensating anyone, because Turkey 
technically would be completely independent though bound by treaty 
to accept the supervision and advice of an outside power. 
The mandate principle was fundamental to Wilson's whole con­
ception of the League of Nations. He had fought long and bitterly 
at Paris to bring the mandate scheme into existence and to prevent 
any final apportionment of mandates outside League auspices. In 
his proposal for unsupervised French authority in Turkish Anatolia, 
Wilson violated this concept as well as the doctrine of League super­
vision over former enemy territory, and thus disregarded two of the 
basic premises upon which he earlier had sought to justify the very 
existence of the League of Nations. Here, then, was a betrayal of 
an institution that Wilson regarded as the most important achieve­
ment of the Peace Conference, and the establishment of which had 
served as the motivation for the majority of his actions at Paris. 
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VI * THE BRITISH EVACUATION

OF ARMENIA AND SYRIA

F,ROM July through November, 
1919, the Peace Conference put aside the problem of a peace treaty 
with the Ottoman Empire, for the European powers were agreed 
that little of a constructive nature could be achieved until America's 
position on the Armenian and Constantinople mandates was known. 
In this five-month period the efforts of the Peace Conference relative 
to Near Eastern affairs centered chiefly on three problems. These 
were the reallocation of occupying forces in Armenia and Syria, the 
delimitation of "provisional" zones of Italian and Greek occupation 
in Asia Minor, and the settlement of Bulgarian boundaries in Thrace. 
Only the discussion regarding Thrace resulted in a definite set­
tlement. All other action taken on these matters was of a provisional 
nature aimed at achieving some form of immediate, if temporary 
and precarious, stability. Yet in the long run the events of this period 
were highly influential in determining both the terms of the final 
treaty and its subsequent failure. 
Britain Withdraws from Armenia 
In the summer of 1919 there was growing danger of complete 
anarchy in Armenia and the Caucasus. Armenian troops were facing 
attacks by Kurdish and Tartar forces from the north, east, and south. 
A growing Turkish nationalist movement in the interior of Anatolia 
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posed an ever-increasing threat to the successful creation of any 
Armenian state. Although the Turkish government in Constantinople 
signified its willingness to accept an Armenian state on former Rus­
sian territory, it supported all groups that opposed the inclusion of 
Ottoman soil in such a state. As winter approached and hundreds 
of repatriated Armenians had nowhere to go, relief problems became 
1severe.
By the middle of the summer it had become clear that a great 
deal of opposition existed in the United States to American accept­
ance of the Armenian mandate. The feeling was widespread that 
expensive, miserable, and unprofitable mandates were being foisted 
on the United States while other nations obtained easy, lucrative 
ones. In the light of this criticism, Wilson decided on August 1 to 
send a separate American political commission to Armenia to study 
the problem of repatriation and the economic, military, and political 
problems that a mandatory nation would encounter. Despite a rec­
ommendation by the American delegation in Paris that ten thousand 
American troops be sent to Armenia immediately, it was evident 
that no American decision would be forthcoming for some time, 
and there was much to indicate that the ultimate answer would be 
negative.2 
This left Britain in an awkward position. Since January the British 
government had been anxious to withdraw its troops from the Cau­
casus region. For a time, plans for redistributing occupation forces 
in the Near East had called for Italy to take over this area as a 
possible alternative to occupation of southern Anatolia, and in private 
discussions with the British the Italians had indicated their willingness 
to replace British troops and ultimately to accept a Caucasus man­
date.3 The mandate per se would include Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
though we know today that the Italians secretly considered the possi­
bility of an Armenian mandate as well. However, when domestic 
issues precipitated a cabinet crisis leading to the fall of the Orlando-
Sonnino government in June, 1919, the new Nitti-Tittoni government 
quickly dispelled any notions that Italy might act in the Caucasus. 
The resurgence of anti-Bolshevik forces under General Denikin in 
the spring and summer of 1919 had led Italian experts to doubt 
the long-term efficacy of a Caucasus mandate, since Denikin openly 
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insisted on the eventual reincorporation of the new splinter states 
into Greater Russia. Disillusioned as well by Italy's failure to obtain 
any satisfaction for its claims in Anatolia, the new government wanted 
no part of any involvement in the Caucasus, for it was determined 
to accept nothing that might allow the other powers to assert that 
Italy had received enough compensation without a mandate over 
southern Anatolia. Conversely, this decision actually pleased all the 
Allies, even the British, for the unauthorized Italian occupation of 
the Adalia region had removed any justification for compensation 
in the Caucasus.4 
However, the Italian decision left the British without a replacement 
force. The withdrawal of troops under these circumstances might 
well lead to an outbreak of rioting and massacres. The British delega­
tion in Paris, many members of Parliament, and most newspapers 
therefore opposed withdrawal before some substitute occupation 
force was found. Popular support for an Armenian mandate was 
widespread in Britain; even the influential Times favored it, both 
for humanitarian reasons and because of Armenia's key position 
in relation to India and Russia.5 Nevertheless, although the scheduled 
evacuation date was postponed from June 15 to August 15, the British 
government persisted in its plan to get out of the Caucasus. 
At the same time Britain increased its pressure upon America 
to take some definite action. In response to American protests against 
the forthcoming British withdrawal, Curzon bluntly told United 
States Ambassador John Davis that the British would stay only if 
the United States indicated a willingness to take over eventually 
and agreed to pay the occupation costs until some decision was 
reached. Although the State Department was cordial to the idea, 
it could only refuse, for funds were not available unless Congress 
appropriated them. The political turmoil over the ratification of the 
German peace treaty was such that the State Department recognized 
that any request which seemed to suggest American acceptance of 
any foreign commitments would only infuriate many in the Senate 
and hinder the realization of the long-range program of the adminis­
tration. Ambassador Davis had to cootent himself with appeals to 
Britain's humanitarian spirit and former commitments to the Ar­
menians, along with warnings of the dangerous effect that anti-British 
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feeling in the United States, engendered by the withdrawal of British 
troops, would have on the ratification prospects of the German 
treaty.6 
Nevertheless, Britain stood firm, and the evacuation, which would 
take until October to complete, began as scheduled on August 15. 
The one concession was an announcement that Britain would study 
the possibility of leaving political missions in various key cities with 
a small guard of either British or native troops. Although this was 
better than nothing, all reports indicated that it was far from enough.7 
The evacuation greatly annoyed Clemenceau, who long had been 
anxious for a similar withdrawal from Syria. On August 25, he 
climaxed several days of anti-British jibing by stating: 
As to saving the Armenians he didn't know what could be done. There 
were no American troops. British troops were employed elsewhere. The 
French were not allowed by the British to play any part in Asia Minor. 
The Italians, it was true, had gone to Asia Minor in spite of the British, 
but they declined to replace the British in the Caucasus. As to the Turks, 
they were themselves powerless, as they could not control their own troops. 
He did not see from what quarter the Armenians could expect any assistance.8 
Balfour, seeing an opening, seized upon Clemenceau's statement 
that Britain would not allow France "to play any part in Asia Minor" 
and made it clear that Britain would have no objection whatsoever 
to France's sending troops to Armenia. Clemenceau agreed to consult 
with his military staff and four days later offered to send ten to 
twelve thousand men.9 
Both the British and the Americans regarded this offer with deep 
suspicion, believing that it was merely a French scheme to gain a 
foothold in the section of Asia Minor that had been promised to 
them in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. No one believed that it emanated 
from a genuine desire to assist the Armenians. Yet there was little 
to do but go along with the plan. No other nation was willing to 
take on the chore, and from the British point of view it was worth­
while to accept any proposed solution, however unpalatable, that 
would spare Britain the charge of having abandoned the Armenians.10 
That British and American scepticism was well founded became 
evident when Clemenceau refused to send French troops by the most 
 135 BRITISH EVACUATION OF ARMENIA AND SYRIA
obvious route via the Black Sea to Batum and thence by rail to 
Erivan. Instead, he insisted on an approach from the Mediterranean 
by way of Alexandretta and Mersina, which meant sending supplies 
and horses by a long circuitous route, partly by rail but much of 
the way over roads that the Americans and British considered im­
passable despite French assurances to the contrary. In terms of 
reaching the trouble spots quickly and easily, this route made little 
sense. However, it had the advantage to the French of necessitating 
a prior occupation of Cilicia and southern Armenia. This was all 
that really interested Clemenceau. A month later, when France 
received the right to occupy this territory as part of a general Syrian 
agreement, Clemenceau immediately gave up any pretense of send­
ing troops to the rest of Armenia." 
The final result was that France occupied only the southern area 
(where the threat of disturbances had never been great), while Britain, 
despite protests from all sides and the tearful plea of the Armenian 
prime minister, withdrew all its troops from the Caucasus by the 
end of September, with the exception of a garrison at Batum. The 
Armenian situation had reached its darkest point since the end of 
the war.12 
Why, in the face of tremendous opposition at home and abroad, 
did the British government persist in this policy?13 The cost of the 
occupation was a very important factor, although the reason given 
publicly was that Britain was doing the lion's share of work in the 
Near East and that the troops in the Caucasus were draftees long 
overdue for demobilization. Although the government could not. 
admit publicly that money was the chief concern, the actual unim­
portance of the draftees issue can be seen in that Lloyd George 
had originally planned to transfer them to Constantinople to augment 
the garrison there rather than bring them home.14 Equally significant 
was Curzon's stated willingness to keep the troops where they were 
if the United States paid the bill. 
Underneath the financial reasons, however, lay a deeper concern. 
The British had been in occupation of Armenian territory since the 
end of the war. The government was only too aware that an Armenian 
mandate would be costly in money and men, with little possibility 
of any significant compensation in return. They also realized that 
136 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
the presence of British troops in the area over a long-term period 
could result very easily in a de facto mandate, all protestations to 
the contrary. The ever increasing evidence in the summer and fall 
of 1919 that the United States might refuse the Armenian mandate 
made it imperative that the British withdraw, not so much to increase 
pressure on America to accept as to get Britain out of a bad position 
if it did not. If an American refusal should come when British troops 
were still in occupation, Britain would from then on be held responsi­
ble for any subsequent horrors that might occur. This would be true 
whether British troops remained or were withdrawn. This eventuality 
the British were determined to avoid.15 
French Occupation of Syria 
Syria was the most serious source of Anglo-French discord regard­
ing the Near East. The divergence of views during the first months 
of the Peace Conference had been so great that negotiations, even 
concerning the reallocation of temporary occupation forces, had 
completely broken down. Discussion on these matters were not of­
ficially reopened by the Supreme Council until the middle of Sep­
tember; even then it was only because the situation, far from remain­
ing static, had deteriorated to such a degree that some form of 
immediate settlement was imperative. 
The King-Crane Commission 
During the summer of 1919, the Syrian problem was complicated 
by the presence in the Near East of the American section of what 
had originally been planned as an inter-Allied commission of inquiry. 
This group, headed by Henry King and Charles Crane, arrived in 
the Levant in early June and remained until the end of July. Although 
their instructions called for a general investigation of the wishes of 
all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, they correctly understood 
that the chief area of their investigation was intended to be Syria 
and Palestine; and the majority of their time and effort was spent 
in this region. 
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The news that an international commission was being sent had 
been greeted joyously by Feisal, but his disillusionment and suspicion 
were equally great when he found out that only the American section 
was actually coming. This discovery, coupled with insistent rumors 
that Britain was going to evacuate Syria and turn it over to France, 
led Feisal to suspect the existence of an Anglo-French agreement. 
His suspicion was enhanced by French statements that the fate of 
Syria had been decided and that the investigating commission was 
nothing more than a front to keep the Arabs quiet until final Franco-
British arrangements could be made.16 
All of this led Feisal to adopt two new tactics. He publicly placed 
all his faith in whatever recommendations the King-Crane Commis­
sion might make, and he refused to accept blunt declarations by 
the British that under no circumstances would Britain accept a man­
date for the area. Nevertheless, his confidence was shaken enough 
for him to instruct his followers to opt first for an American mandate, 
and only secondly for a British one. Although not yet regarded as 
"perfidious," there is no doubt that "Albion" was suspect.17 
At the same time, Feisal gave tacit recognition to a growing move­
ment for total independence that had appeared in the area around 
Damascus during the summer of 1919. There is little to indicate 
that he took this movement seriously. Rather, he saw in it a useful 
weapon of threat and intimidation, for if this movement ever received 
his full support it would mean that an all-out war would have to 
be fought by whatever power finally accepted the Syrian mandate.18 
Upon its return to Paris, the King-Crane Commission reported 
that the great majority of the inhabitants opposed the separation 
of Syria and Palestine and the creation of a Zionist Jewish national 
home. It also stated that, with the exception of the Christian popula­
tion concentrated in Lebanon, the delegations interviewed and the 
petitions received overwhelmingly favored the United States as the 
mandatory power for the area, with Great Britain the second choice. 
The same majority was unalterably opposed to any form of French 
control, no matter how slight.19 
The report was never considered by the Supreme Council, and 
the text was not made public until December, 1922.20 Therefore, 
the King-Crane Commission and its report played no official role 
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in the formulation of the Turkish treaty, especially since it became 
clear soon afterward that the United States would not play an active 
role in administering, or even negotiating, the Turkish peace.21 Nev­
ertheless, the general outline, if not the specific details, of the report 
was well known to the press;22 and unofficially the influence of the 
commission was great, for by its very presence in the Near East 
it provoked a crisis in Anglo-French relations. 
French Grievances Increase 
During the course of the summer, the French press became highly 
critical of alleged methods by which the British, and the Arabs 
supported by the British, made sure that the commission heard only 
select witnesses and testimony. The French government did nothing 
to stop this newspaper attack, and the British ambassador came away 
from an interview with Pichon convinced that the Quai d'Orsay fully 
concurred with the charges of a rigged investigation. In fact, the 
French government even went so far as formally to accuse the British 
of arresting those who testified in favor of France before the King-
Crane Commission.23 The French attitude was that the Syrian ques­
tion had been settled in 1916 and all that remained was to implement 
agreed-on terms. Moreover, since Britain had declared its lack of 
interest in the Syrian mandate, the French could not understand 
why British nationals in the Near East were so active in opposing 
French claims to the territory.24 
How justified was this bitter attitude? First of all, in terms of 
the apportionment of mandates by the Peace Conference, the Com­
mission of Inquiry was nothing more than a false front, though its 
members did not recognize it as such. Britain had repeatedly stated 
it. would not take the mandate; Wilson admitted the United States 
could not; therefore, it made little difference what the people wanted, 
for France was going to be the mandatory power. However, many 
British officers in the Near East, naturally prejudiced in favor of 
the Arabs, refused to accept this fact. If it were true, they asked, 
why send the commission? And their doubts were transmitted, per­
haps unintentionally, to the Arabs, for whom they remained both 
a source of hope and discord.25 The government in London had hoped 
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that by announcing a policy of abstention in Syria the Arabs would 
be pushed into working out an agreement with the French. The 
presence of the King-Crane Commission in the Near East made 
this impossible. 
Second, there is little question that such things as the manipulation 
of witnesses and the organization of declarations to the commission 
did occur. The British in London, though denying it publicly, admit­
ted it privately.26 The French were not in a position to corral wit­
nesses, much as they might have wished to. At the same time it 
should be pointed out that the commission was well aware that this 
organized lobbying was taking place, and its members did their best 
to take this into account in formulating the final report.27 Certainly, 
with the exception of the Christian population, Arab hostility to the 
French had been well attested for many years from so many sources 
that it is impossible to question the commission's findings on that 
score. 
It is true that the commission raised all sorts of false hopes, pro­
moted intrigue everywhere in the Near East, aroused passions in 
France and Britain, and effectively hindered any possible Franco-
Arab reconciliation. In this sense the judgment of Gertrude Bell, 
in October, 1919, that the sending of the commission was a criminal 
deception was eminently justified.28 Yet to a great extent it was the 
increase in Anglo-French tension created by the work of the commis­
sion that forced each side, particularly the British, to begin anew 
efforts to reach a settlement on the occupation question. 
Britain Decides to Seek a Settlement 
Both the British government and public were genuinely shocked 
at the depth of French hostility to Britain evidenced in the French 
press. The immediate and widespread reaction was that Franco-
British friendship was all important. A solution must be reached, 
if necessary at the expense of the Arabs. Popular pressure, expressed 
through Parliament and the press, demanded a settlement.29 
Chief among those desiring a rapprochement was Balfour. The 
weariness and frustration brought on by working with a prime minis­
ter with whom he agreed less and less, and who rarely consulted 
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him or allowed him a free hand in the negotiations, was beginning 
to become unbearable.30 Moreover, his disgust with the moralistic 
tone of British policy appears to have increased daily. A man who 
sincerely believed that the Zionist aspirations were right, he was 
honest enough to admit that implementation of their program would 
be in complete opposition to all the principles of self-determination 
so often subscribed to by the Allies, and for which the Commission 
of Inquiry had been sent to the Levant. In a memorandum dated 
August 11, he stated: 
In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement 
of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, 
at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate.31 
The same criticism, Balfour admitted, could be made to a lesser 
degree of Britain's wartime policy of joining France in a partition 
of the Near East, while at the same time promising independence 
and self-determination to the Arabs. Any state, mandated or not, 
that was forced to accept the protection and advice of a specified 
foreign nation could not be truly independent. Since France was 
the only nation interested in Syria, that was what was going to 
happen, commission or no commission.32 
It was while the crisis over Syria was building that the issue of 
the British evacuation of the Caucasus came to the fore. Britain, 
as has been seen, regarded the offer by France to send troops into 
the area as a suspect but welcome gift, one that removed Britain 
from the horns of an awkward moral dilemma. This contemplated 
occupation, however, made it all the more imperative that a general 
solution should be reached. To allow French troops to occupy neigh­
boring Cilicia and Armenia but keep them out of Syria proper would 
create an extremely explosive situation. Moreover, the British fully 
realized that in offering to send troops to Armenia, the French had 
created an excellent weapon with which to blackmail Britain. The 
ever-present possibility of a French renunciation of its offer consti­
tuted an undeclared threat at a time when the British government 
was using this offer as a welcome cover for its own withdrawal. 
The French government, without saying a word, had greatly increased 
its pressure on the British for a settlement.33 
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All of this public and undercover agitation put Lloyd George in 
a position where there was nothing to do but yield. The problem 
was how to do it with as little loss of face as possible. Hopefully, 
a protective guarantee for the Arabs could be obtained along with 
fulfillment of most of the promises that had been made to them. 
But the basic necessity was to create a settlement. 
The September Agreement 
Thus, Lloyd George's decision to vacation at Deauville in northern 
France in early September was not a purely personal whim. Nor 
was the calling of Field Marshall Allenby from Cairo to meet with 
him a matter of routine report and consultation. After discussing 
the matter with Allenby and others (among whom were neither 
Balfour nor Curzon), an aide memoire on the Syrian question was 
drafted, and it was decided that Lloyd George should stop in Paris 
on the way home to meet with Clemenceau.34 
Upon his arrival in Paris, Lloyd George showed the memoire to 
the chief American delegate at the Peace Conference, Frank Polk. 
According to a British memorandum, Polk received it with no "ad­
verse comment." 35 Drawn up as a draft agreement, the memoire called 
for the withdrawal of British troops from Syria and Cilicia, beginning 
on November 1, 1919. The area east of the Sykes-Picot line would 
be turned over to the Arabs; the area to the west would go to the 
French. Until the final boundary between Palestine and Syria was 
determined, the British would continue to occupy outposts in accor­
dance with the boundary they claimed. Britain was ready to discuss 
the final boundaries at any time, and would readily "submit the 
question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wil­
son," should this be necessary. The French were to allow Britain 
to build a railroad and an oil pipeline from Haifa to Mesopotamia. 
Should Britain and France fail to agree on a route, the question 
would be submitted to arbitration. Finally, France would formally 
accept the duty of protecting the Armenian people, and would be 
given permission to send troops via Alexandretta to the Caucasus.36 
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This was what the British wanted. What did they get? Despite 
two private conversations between Lloyd George and Clemenceau, 
in the Supreme Council meeting on September 15, Clemenceau 
agreed only that French troops should replace British troops in the 
area defined, and did so specifically on condition that this should 
not be regarded as French acceptance of any of the other provisions 
of the aide memoire. He maintained that though he was willing 
to discuss these issues, they could not be agreed upon hastily. This 
was especially true because the question of Syrian boundaries could 
only be decided within the framework of the whole Turkish set­
tlement (i.e., possible Anatolian concessions). "When the question 
of Turkey was considered as a whole, it might be possible to grant 
what could not be granted when the question of Syria was considered 
in isolation." 37 As for Armenia, Clemenceau's enthusiasm for the 
venture suddenly waned. It would cost a lot of money and be a 
very grave responsibility. He had 
offered to send French troops to Armenia because the Armenians were 
threatened with massacre, in order to render a service to the Conference. 
This offer, however, could not constitute a provision of an agreement since 
France was not desirous of going to Armenia and it would involve an 
enormous burden.38 
Despite his disappointment at the rejection of most of his propos­
als, Lloyd George accepted the French conditions. At Clemenceau's 
insistence, he agreed to inform Feisal of the agreement, and also 
undertook to persuade Feisal to accept half his subsidy from France 
and to let token contingents of French troops stationed in Damascus 
remain. Much to Lloyd George's disappointment, Clemenceau re­
fused to meet with Feisal until this was accomplished.39 
Thus France had obtained the desired occupation of western Syria 
and Cilicia without fulfilling any of the conditions so adamantly 
insisted upon by the British four months before. In May the British 
had refused to withdraw their troops from any part of Syria unless 
the French accepted a permanent territorial revision that would place 
the proposed rail line from Mosul to the Mediterranean within the 
British Palestinian mandate. Now, not only had France obtained 
the right to occupy all but the disputed territory, but Britain had 
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formally recognized that the southern boundary was provisional and 
temporary for military occupation purposes only. Moreover, the 
British evacuation was to take place prior, not subsequent, to a formal 
agreement between France and the Arabs. This again was the op­
posite of what the British had demanded initially as the price for 
their military withdrawal from Syria. Although the evacuation of 
British troops from the Arab sector could conceivably open the way 
for the creation of a truly independent Arab state, it also would 
give the French the opportunity to extend their influence into this 
area. 
Britain did manage to save some face by retaining its forces in 
the disputed southern zone and by obtaining French agreement not 
to send troops into Arab territory east of the Sykes-Picot line. Yet 
in every sense of the term this was a substantial diplomatic victory 
for France, one that had not been achieved by accident. Conceding 
little or nothing in return, France had obtained the transfer of military 
and political dominance in Syria and Cilicia from British to French 
hands. The skillful manipulation of the Armenian and King-Crane 
Commission affairs, coupled with the use of the press to publicize 
French grievances, had forced Britain publicly to demonstrate its 
friendship for France, and to do so with no strings attached.40 
Attempts to Revoke the September Agreement 
The Yale Plan 
Although Polk had not objected to the provisions of the September 
Agreement, many Americans did. Among them was a member of 
the American delegation, Captain William Yale, who had been a 
member of the King-Crane Commission. In a report dated October 
21, he stated: 
The Arabs will not accept this agreement, there will be conflict with the 
French along the coast and the shadowy border between the Syrian Hin­
terland and the Syrian Littoral. There will be serious danger of a massacre 
of native Catholics of Damascus, Horns, Hameh and Aleppo. All competent 
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observers are agreed that this conflict would spread to Mesopotamia; it 
is believed that the Arabs would then throw in their lot with the Turkish 
rebels and that in a short time the entire Near East would be engaged 
in a conflict with the Allies.41 
On September 27, Yale went to London "on orders from the 
American Commissioners to learn what was happening." 42 At the 
same time he undertook, apparently on his own initiative, to act 
as a mediator in reaching a Near East settlement that would be 
acceptable to Feisal as well as to the British and French. At the 
suggestion of H. Wickham Steed, editor of the Times, Yale sent 
an anonymous letter containing a plan for a Syrian settlement to 
the Times, which printed it on October 8. This plan was based on 
the premise that it was politically impossible for any of the four 
interested parties in the Near East—British, French, Arab, or Zion­
ist—to put forward a compromise scheme in the general interest. 
Therefore, any solution would have to come from and be imposed 
on all by an outside force. 
The plan called for Mesopotamia to be divided into two sections, 
with the northern half an independent state under a supervisory 
British mandate and the southern half under a direct British mandate 
or administration, with a certain amount of autonomy allowed in 
local government. Syria would likewise be partitioned. Syria proper 
(the area of the four cities) would be independent under an advisory 
French mandate. Lebanon would be under direct French administra­
tion and control. Palestine would have a general British mandate, 
and the Zionists would be allowed to carry forward their plans.43 
It was suggested that the United States should be used in the negotia­
tion and promotion of this scheme. 
The plan had much to be said for it. Realizing that the French 
would accept no less a position in Syria than that held by Britain 
in Mesopotamia, Yale's proposition established a quid pro quo by 
which Britain's basic pledges to the Arabs could be fulfilled in return 
for certain British concessions in Mesopotamia. Moreover, though 
it was not mentioned, this plan implied the possibility of an eventual 
joining together of the two independent areas with the new kingdom 
of the Hedjaz. This would form the confederation of Arab states 
so dear to the hearts of the Arab nationalists. Thus the plan provided 
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a solution that would enable every group to achieve its major aim, 
yet without any loss of prestige because the compromises had been 
imposed by an outside force. 
What grounds did Yale have to hope that such a solution would 
meet with a favorable reception? Apparently he had been in touch 
with certain Frenchmen, of whom the most important was Philippe 
Berthelot, and had been led to believe some such solution might 
be possible.44 Yale reported that Robert de Caix, author of some 
extremely violent anti-British articles, had told him that "if the British 
would give up Mesopotamia, France would only be too glad to give 
up Syria, thus leaving intact the Ottoman Empire." 45 De Caix was 
a person of some importance. He had been the chief French negotia­
tor in the conversations with Feisal during the previous spring, and 
on October 9 he was appointed personal secretary to the new French 
high commissioner for Syria, General Henri Gouraud.46 What au­
thority he had to make this statement is unknown. In any case, 
perhaps because Yale had had similar assurances from other French 
officials, he based his whole scheme on the idea of the equal status 
of both the Mesopotamian and Syrian mandates. 
In London, Yale's plan was widely acclaimed by the press, and 
in Paris, "Pertinax" gave his approval. Yale discussed the plan with 
many persons and obtained the support of several top British officials 
including Allenby, Hogarth, McMahon, Lawrence, Cornwallis, and 
Stirling. Among the Arabs, Nuri Said and Rustum Haidor approved 
the scheme and Feisal, though officially opposing any compromise, 
told Yale that he would accept any solution imposed on him by 
the Americans.47 
Yale later claimed that the plan was accepted by the British cabi­
net, but it would appear that in fact such was not the case.48 He 
returned to Paris intending to present the scheme formally to the 
French, but never had a chance to do so. Yale had advanced his 
proposal on his own initiative, and now felt he must obtain the 
consent of his superiors, especially if the United States was to serve 
as the mediator and "proponent" of the plan. On October 27, the 
American commissioners forwarded Yale's plan to the State Depart­
ment, which refused permission for Yale to proceed.49 According 
to David Garnett, this was extremely unfortunate, because "all the 
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parties to a deadlock were prepared to agree to a solution which 
had been formulated—provided it was imposed on them from the 
outside." 50 The claim that "all parties" were agreed is a gross over­
statement. Even so, it is true that a proposal that had seemed to 
offer a solution that might be acceptable to all was never allowed 
serious consideration, due to American refusal to become involved 
in the dispute, even in the role of neutral arbiter.51 
Feisal 
Feisal had been summoned from the Near East by Lloyd George 
prior to the latter's meetings with Clemenceau. He arrived in London 
on September 18, and was informed of the new agreement the next 
day. As was expected, he protested bitterly. He even claimed that 
a formal treaty had been signed between the Arabs and the British. 
Although Curzon went to some lengths to prove this was untrue, 
British promises had been made often enough and clearly enough 
to provide a good deal of moral justification for the Arab contention. 
Feisal recognized that the September 15 pact in effect partitioned 
Syria in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and he strongly 
urged its cancellation. He asked that a final solution should be sought 
immediately by the Peace Conference.52 The tone of his protests gave 
eloquent witness to the fact that he saw his own doom in the proposed 
settlement. As leader of a revolt against his religious leader (the 
sultan-caliph in Constantinople), Feisal had put himself in a precari­
ous position, and he was well aware of what might be in store for 
him if he could not deliver the unified state he had promised.53 
Despite all his efforts, Feisal was unable to bring about the dis­
solution of the agreement. He then suggested the creation of an 
inter-Allied board that would negotiate the terms of the military oc­
cupation as well as the actual detailed boundary between the French 
and Arab zones of occupation. This proposal was acceptable to Lloyd 
George, but was refused by Clemenceau.54 As long as France had 
been excluded from Syria, Clemenceau had been reluctant to 
negotiate directly with Feisal.55 Now he took the position that this 
was a purely Franco-Arab issue. Moreover, he explicitly stated that 
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the September agreement in no way committed France to accept 
the independence of an Arab state. Rather, Clemenceau regarded 
the whole area as being within a single French sphere. He maintained 
that all the agreement implied was that France would be willing 
to accept Arab occupation and government in part of this area as 
long as law and order were preserved. France's right to intervene 
in the area was not open to question. As far as he was concerned, 
negotiations could only take place regarding the prerequisites for 
French intervention, and this would have to be settled with no British 
or American participation or interference of any type.56 
This stand provoked some bitter correspondence between Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau, each charging the other with bad faith. 
Eventually, however, the British gave in.57 Feisal had no choice but 
to go to Paris in late October, 1919, where he commenced protracted 
negotiations with Clemenceau that were to stretch into 1920 before 
an agreement was finally reached. 
Thus, by the end of November when the British finished the 
evacuation, Clemenceau had scored a complete victory for France's 
Syrian policy. Except for Mosul and some territory along the un­
settled Palestine-Syrian border, British troops had evacuated not only 
the zone of direct control that had been allotted to France in the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, but also the area in which France had been 
given exclusive rights of influence. Moreover, this had been done 
without securing either a guarantee from the French regarding per­
manent Arab rights in the area of the four cities or a final settlement 
of the Palestine-Syrian border issue. The British subsidy to Feisal 
had been cut in half (£75,000), and he had been told that if he wanted 
the rest he would have to get it from the French. Finally, France's 
right to deal directly with the Arabs in the area of the four cities, 
without any outside interference, had been recognized tacitly by 
the British. Though there would still be much talk, some violence, 
and a great deal more Franco-British hostility, by November, 1919, 
the territorial settlement in the Arab portion of the Ottoman Empire, 
marked by British abandonment of the Arabs in Syria, was to all 
intents and purposes complete. 
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VII * FRONTIERS IN THRACE AND

OCCUPATION ZONES IN ASIA MINOR

A,L L T H O U G H the Supreme 
Council had agreed to postpone discussion of the Turkish treaty 
until the American position on mandates was known, one issue could 
not be put aside. This was the southern frontier of Bulgaria, which 
had to be settled in order to complete the Bulgarian peace treaty. 
This in turn involved Allied agreement on the disposition of Thrace. 
Partial Solution in Thrace 
The Thracian question was discussed at length by the Central 
Territorial Committee during July, 1919. Whereas the attitude of 
Britain and France remained consistent with the earlier report of 
the Greek Committee,1 the viewpoint of the United States altered 
considerably. As a result, two diametrically opposed positions ap­
peared. 
The position taken by the French and British delegates was that 
Bulgaria was a defeated nation and must be shown that this was 
the case. They therefore supported Venizelos's claims to eastern and 
western Thrace. They maintained that any forced population shifts 
that had taken place after Bulgaria had gained control of western 
Thrace in 1913 should not be considered in determining national 
majorities.2 They also pointed out that the proposed internationaliza­
tion of the Straits would give Bulgaria an open and unrestricted 
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outlet to the sea, which along with a free port on the Aegean would 
satisfy all of Bulgaria's economic needs. Finally, they argued that 
the cession of western Thrace to Greece was necessary in order to 
link eastern Thrace, with its large Greek population, directly to 
Greece.3 
These arguments had led the American delegates on the Greek 
Committee to accept the British and French point of view in early 
March. However, it should be remembered that the American dele­
gate on the Central Territorial Committee, Sidney Mezes, had sub­
sequently added a reservation stipulating that the United States 
would neither support nor reject the recommendations of the Greek 
Committee, on the grounds that Greek claims could only be adjudicated 
in conjunction with decisions regarding the future of the Turkish 
state, a subject that the Council of Ten had reserved for itself.4 At 
the time he made this reservation the British and French assumed 
that it was designed to provide the necessary leeway for American 
acceptance of a Greek zone in Asia Minor, something the Americans 
on the Greek Committee had strenuously opposed. In this assumption 
they were undoubtedly correct, yet from a Wilsonian point of view 
the extension of this reservation to include Thrace made good sense. 
It was assumed that the United States would undertake the Constan­
tinople mandate, and therefore the Americans were particularly 
concerned that the territorial limits be such as to ensure the economic 
viability and easy administration of the mandate. Moreover, western 
Thrace had an overwhelmingly predominant Turkish population. 
Therefore, the very ethnic grounds that helped justify for Wilson 
his pro-Greek stand on Smyrna mitigated against Greek claims in 
this area. 
As a result of all these factors, in early July the United States 
delegates on the Central Territorial Committee specifically repu­
diated the agreement reached by the Greek Committee and refused 
to agree to the cession of western or eastern Thrace to Greece. Instead 
they insisted that the prewar boundaries should be retained (with 
the possible exception of territory given to the new international 
state at the Straits). The territory had many more Bulgarians than 
Greeks, they argued, and the purported preference of the predomi­
nantly Bulgarian-speaking Moslem population for Greek rather than 
Bulgarian rule was highly questionable. Moreover, Greece had vol­
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untarily concurred in the cession of the territory to Bulgaria in 1913. 
Direct Bulgarian access to the Mediterranean was an economic ne­
cessity, and a free port in Greek territory would not be the same 
thing. Bulgarian cession of this territory would create a basis for 
the renewal of Balkan strife in the future. Therefore, the American 
delegates maintained that "ethnographical, economic, and political 
arguments, as well as possession supported by valid claims, all favor 
the maintenance of the Bulgarian boundaries as they are at the 
present time."5 
President Wilson, however, when informed of the stand taken by 
his own delegation, did not agree. Although determined "that Greece 
should not be given Bulgarian Thrace," 6 he was equally convinced 
that Bulgaria had no real ethnic or other claim to the territory either. 
Therefore, on July 25 he sent a telegram to the American delegation 
in Paris urging that they insist that both eastern and western Thrace 
become part of the new international state at Constantinople. Bliss, 
White, and Polk were horrified. Although they were agreed that 
western Thrace should under no circumstances be given to Greece, 
they were also convinced that the inclusion of all the territory in 
the international state would be regarded as American greediness, 
since the United States was slated to undertake the mandate at 
Constantinople. Therefore, they agreed to seek a solution, if possible, 
that would allow at least western Thrace to remain in Bulgaria.7 
Events in Asia Minor undoubtedly had much to do with the 
strengthened American determination not to give in on the subject 
of western Thrace. It is evident that the Americans felt both guilt 
and embarrassment at the violence that the Smyrna landings had 
produced. Bliss noted in his diary: "We all believe that to give 
Western Thrace to Greece will result in even worse conditions than 
have resulted by giving Smyrna to Greece." 8 Polk commented in 
a similar vein before the Supreme Council on August 7.9 
Italy, in line with its long-standing opposition to Greek claims, 
continued its opposition to Greek ambitions in Thrace. Nonetheless, 
during the first part of July, Tittoni, with the consent of the others, 
met with Venizelos in an effort to obtain Greek consent to a compro­
mise. On July 21, he reported to the Supreme Council that Venizelos 
refused to withdraw or reduce his claims to all of western and eastern 
Thrace. Thus it was obvious that a settlement would have to be 
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imposed on both Greeks and Bulgarians, a settlement that neither 
would accept voluntarily.10 
When the problem finally came before the Supreme Council on 
July 31, the American and Italian delegates offered proposals that 
differed from the position taken by their nations in the sessions of 
the Central Territorial Committee. Henry White, in accordance with 
Wilson's instructions, suggested that all of Bulgarian Thrace be trans­
ferred to the Constantinople international state and that a clause 
signifying this intention be inserted in the Bulgarian treaty. Tittoni, 
in turn, proposed that eastern Thrace be divided along strictly eth­
nological lines between Bulgaria and Greece, a policy that would 
clearly favor Greek claims. This considerable softening of Italy's 
previous hard-line position was taken by the others as an indication 
that Greece and Italy had worked out their differences privately, 
a possibility that Wilson, for one, found very irritating to contemplate, 
for it would leave the United States isolated in its policy conflict 
with the other powers." 
However, it was soon discovered that Tittoni's suggestion was 
unworkable, for it failed to provide for Bulgarian access to the 
Aegean. The same objection was made to a Greek proposal that 
Thrace be an autonomous state under Greek sovereignty. The Amer­
ican proposal that the whole territory be given to the new interna­
tional state, albeit with guarantees allowing Bulgaria access to the 
Aegean, was opposed, particularly by Clemenceau, who maintained 
that it would be impossible to agree on a mandatory power for 
Constantinople if the territory of the state were so greatly increased. 
As a compromise solution, Andre Tardieu proposed that while sover­
eignty over eastern and western Thrace should be granted to Greece, 
the port of Dedeagatch on the Aegean should be made a free city. 
It, along with railroad connections to Bulgaria, should be adminis­
tered by an international commission.12 
Polk refused to accept this solution. "His instructions from Pres­
ident Wilson were very clear that a large Bulgarian population was 
not to be handed over to Greece." 13 However, adopting the basic 
French concept, Polk proposed that an international state be created 
that would include not only Dedeagatch and the railroad, but 
Adrianople and the Bulgarian area of western Thrace as well. The 
rest of eastern Thrace and a small section of western Thrace then 
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could be given in full sovereignty to Greece. Although both the 
British and French were willing to accept this, the French continued 
to protest that their solution gave guarantees enough to Bulgaria 
and was far more workable than having two international states with 
a segment of Greece in the middle. Venizelos accepted both plans, 
although expressing a decided preference for Tardieu's.14 
Polk agreed to submit both plans to Wilson. Much to his distress, 
that very day he received a cable from Lansing stating Wilson's 
determination that either all Thrace should become part of the 
international state, or western Thrace should be returned to Bulgaria. 
Nevertheless, Polk submitted the new compromise schemes to Wash­
ington. In a telegram to Colonel House on August 20, he commented: 
We almost made a compromise on the Thracian situation after a hard 
fight against the whole "bunch" and were then told by Washington that 
they would not listen to any compromise whatever, but wanted Eastern 
and Western Thrace in an International State. That of course is out of 
the question, for as long as it is not known who is to have the mandate 
for Constantinople neither the British nor French would be willing to run 
the chance of the other getting all the territory along the Aegean. I have 
telegraphed again to Washington and am waiting anxiously to see whether 
I am going to get "spanked" or whether we can close up the Bulgarian 
treaty.15 
On August 28, Lansing reiterated Wilson's rejection of both the 
French scheme and Polk's own proposal. Therefore, on September 
1, when the matter finally came before the Supreme Council again, 
Polk was forced to revert to the original Wilsonian proposal that 
all Thrace should be incorporated into the Constantinople state. The 
one concession he was able to offer was that the small portion of 
western Thrace that had a predominantly Greek population should 
go to Greece. He met, as he obviously knew he would, complete 
hostility. The French refused even to consider this solution. Balfour 
did not express a final opinion but instead suggested that since no 
agreement was possible, the Bulgarian frontier should be delineated 
and Bulgaria directed to turn over all the area south of this line 
to the Allied and Associated Powers for eventual disposition. The 
territory would be occupied by Allied troops, with Greek forces being 
allowed to move into the area of western Thrace attributed to Greece 
by all the nations. Bulgaria would be assured eventual access to 
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an Aegean port in the treaty. This scheme appealed to the Americans 
who saw the occupation as a likely first step toward the plan for 
a single international state. As Polk told the American commissioners, 
"Eastern Thrace is tied up with Constantinople by the International 
body that is there. . . . We can make no objection to their sending 
in troops other than Greek troops into Western Thrace, if they offer 
to." '6 
By the following day the Central Territorial Committee had drawn 
the boundary line and the council accepted it unanimously.17 Thus, 
for the purposes of the Bulgarian treaty, the issue was solved, but 
with respect to a Turkish settlement, only one decision had been 
made. This was that Bulgaria would not be given a territorial outlet 
to the Aegean Sea. The permanent disposition of Thrace was far 
from decided. Again, this time due to Wilson's personal intransi­
gence, the council had failed in an attempt to reach a definitive 
settlement on at least one of the many Turkish problems facing it. 
Despite this display of seeming strength, the general American 
position relative to a Near Eastern settlement had been weakened. 
In accepting the final solution, Polk was forced to state that the 
United States could not participate in the occupation of the territory 
that had been taken over from Bulgaria by the Allies. This was despite 
the fact that America was slated to assume the Constantinople man­
date of which this territory would be a part if Wilson's own recom­
mendations were followed. Moreover, this decision came on the heels 
of a communique from Wilson stating that it would be a long time 
before America would be able to make any commitment regarding 
its participation in the Near East mandatory system. It had become 
all too clear that though the United States might insist on a continuing 
role in negotiating the Near East peace settlement, the likelihood 
of its participating actively in enforcing that settlement was dwindling 
fast.18 
Greek and Italian Zones of Occupation in Asia Minor 
Another problem with which the Supreme Council had to deal 
in the summer and fall of 1919 was that of the Italian and Greek 
forces in Asia Minor. Not only were both expanding the territory 
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under their control at a rapid rate, but the Italian action had been 
taken completely without the sanction of the Peace Conference. The 
Greeks had long since exceeded the limits of the zone of occupation 
prescribed for them in Paris. It appeared that Italian and Greek 
troops would soon meet, and there was great fear that this might 
in turn provoke armed hostilities between the two.19 
Attitude of the New Italian Government 
On June 19, 1919, under attack regarding foreign policy from the 
right and domestic policy from the left, the Orlando government 
was forced to resign. Orlando was succeeded as prime minister by 
Francesco Nitti, who selected as his foreign minister Tommaso Tit­
toni, a person regarded as much less nationalistic and imperialistic 
than his predecessor, Sidney Sonnino. The representatives of the 
new Italian government arrived in Paris on June 28 for the signing 
of the German treaty and were presented shortly thereafter with 
an Allied statement protesting the Italian intervention in Anatolia. 
The Italians were warned that there was little chance of Italian claims 
being discussed at Paris as long as the occupation continued. If Italy 
maintained this policy it would lose "all claim to assistance or aid 
from those who were once proud to be her associates." 20 
Instead of reacting in a hostile manner Tittoni did his best to 
reestablish cordial relations. Balfour recorded that in a private meet­
ing with Tittoni on July 1, the latter was "in the highest degree 
friendly and conciliatory, and he expressed in quite unmistakable 
language his earnest desire for a complete and friendly understanding 
with England and France." 21 Two days later, at an informal meeting 
of the representatives of the four powers, Tittoni "made it clear that 
he disapproved of the policy of his predecessors in sending troops 
to Asia Minor. . . . Coal and raw materials were Italy's real needs, 
not fresh territorial responsibilities." 22 However, although he was 
willing to recognize that the occupation did not prejudge the final 
territorial distribution and to pledge that no further advance would 
take place, he refused to withdraw the troops, on the grounds that 
this could not be done without jeopardizing his government's posi­
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tion, for it would be a public humiliation for Italy. In other words, 
although the new Nitti government showed signs of being more 
tactful and friendly, in reality little other than the atmosphere of 
the negotiations had changed. 
On July 7, in a formal reply to the note of June 28, Tittoni justified, 
as Orlando had before him, the Italian landings in Anatolia as having 
been necessary to maintain public order. He claimed that the Greek 
landings at Smyrna had created great popular unrest and had also 
menaced Italy's position in the area. Scalanuova was the only good 
port outside Smyrna, and Italy's right to occupy it was based on 
Article 9 of the Treaty of London. Moreover, he asserted that the 
Italian occupation had been peaceful, unlike the Greek, and that 
the people had actually welcomed them.23 
Although the other three powers refused to accept these arguments, 
it was clear that the Italian occupation had been mainly a reaction 
to the Greek landing at Smyrna and that the two issues would have 
to be treated and settled jointly. The Greek question, therefore, 
constituted a major topic of discussion in the Supreme Council during 
the summer months. 
The Greeks in Smyrna 
Ever since the Greek troops had landed at Smyrna, reports had 
been received that indicated considerable Turkish military resistance 
to the Greek occupation of territory outside the city. Unlike the 
Italians, the Greeks encountered heavy resistance from the Turks. 
This opposition continued to stiffen throughout June, and it was 
rumored that Turkish officers were leaving Constantinople for central 
Anatolia to organize further resistance to the Greeks. It appeared 
that, far from preventing disturbances, the presence of Greek troops 
was causing them.24 
The European community at Smyrna, with the exception of the 
Greeks, publicly voiced its opposition to the cession of the city to 
Greece, and a Times correspondent pointedly emphasized that 
Greeks constituted only 35 percent of the total population of the 
Aidin vilayet. In the House of Commons, Foreign Office spokesman 
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Cecil Harmsworth was forced on two occasions to admit that Greeks 
had massacred Turks in Smyrna and that this had occurred within 
sight of the Allied ships in the harbor. The correspondent for the 
Times recommended that the occupying forces should be put under 
British and French command.25 
The British representatives at Constantinople did not hesitate to 
lay the blame for the strife and the renewed Turkish resistance 
directly upon the Greeks. They criticized the Peace Conference for 
authorizing the landing of Greek troops and for failing to make 
a definite statement of the intent, purpose, and territorial limitations 
of the occupation. As Admiral Webb put it: "We do our best to 
create a situation which sets them at each other's throats . . .  . Up 
to the time of the Smyrna landing we were getting on quite 
well. . . . Now things are quite changed." 26 The British high com­
missioner, Admiral Calthorpe, made no attempt to hide his belief 
that the fault for the unrest lay chiefly with the Greeks: 
The cause [of the unrest] is indefiniteness which has characterized whole 
situation in Aidin Vilayet during and subsequent to occupation of Smyrna. 
The Turks as you are aware accepted fact of occupation with ill grace 
[but as a] fait accompli on condition that occupation was well defined in 
limits and conducted with some measure of decency. Information so far 
received appears to show that neither of these conditions have [sic] been 
fulfilled. . . . Territory at present occupied by Greeks is merely a prelude 
to further advance and events on the spot have fully borne out this conjec­
ture. This constant menace of invasion which Turks ascribe not to decisions 
of Paris Conference but to exorbitant ambitions of Athens politicians cou­
pled with contemplation of Greek behavior in areas occupied by them 
has roused the Turks of all classes from attitude of passive surliness to 
one of active hostility.27 
The senior Allied naval officer at Smyrna, British Commodore 
Fitzmaurice recommended that "the sole prospect of peace in Aidin 
Vila*yet is to withdraw Greek troops into Smyrna Sanjak." 28 Similarly, 
American High Commissioner Admiral Mark Bristol commented 
bitterly to Washington that "if allowed to have his way he [Venizelos] 
will utterly destroy possibility of decent settlement either in Balkans 
or in Asia Minor." 29 Time and time again, Bristol recommended 
that the Greeks not be allowed to stay in Smyrna. Both the British 
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and American authorities on the scene believed that if the Greeks 
were allowed to remain permanently in Asia Minor, the interior 
provinces would revolt against the authority of Constantinople, and 
a peaceful settlement would be impossible.30 
The fighting between the Greeks and the Turks centered in the 
town of Aidin, which was captured, lost, and recaptured by the 
Greeks, with the victors each time committing brutal atrocities against 
the civilians of the opposing nationality in the town. Though Aidin 
was well beyond the limits of the coastal zone the Allies had allotted 
to Greece, Venizelos maintained that the Greek advance had been 
necessary to halt the enemy and to prevent the concentration of 
Turkish troops. He admitted this had been done without consulting 
the Peace Conference, but he pleaded that there had been little 
choice, due to the slowness of communications between Smyrna and 
Paris. Yet, it soon became evident that the reoccupation of Aidin 
had taken place on explicit orders from Venizelos in Paris, and the 
Greek high commissioner in Smyrna openly acknowledged that the 
action should not have taken place without the permission of the 
Supreme Council.31 
Definition of an Italian-Greek Boundary 
On July 10, the long awaited clash between Italian and Greek 
troops took place. A dispatch from Smyrna reported that in defiance 
of the British commodore's orders, "Greek troops have crossed the 
river south of Aidin. . . . Shells fired by Greek artillery fell inside 
Italian lines." 32 The Italians protested the Greek action to the Su­
preme Council. In a message to Clemenceau, Tittoni asked for the 
creation of a buffer zone between the two forces, which would be 
occupied by French and British troops. Clemenceau reacted by 
scornfully asking in the council meeting how the Italians, who did 
not have permission to be in Asia Minor at all, could protest the 
action of those who did, at least, have the right to be there. He 
did not see how blame could be placed on the Greeks.33 
Venizelos, in turn, charged that the Turks were being encouraged 
by the Italians to resist and that the Italian zone was being used 
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as a base for Turkish operations against the Greeks.34 In an appear­
ance before the Supreme Council on July 16, he maintained that 
it was necessary to stop the Italian advance and that the sanjak of 
Smyrna alone could not be defended from the Turks because the 
railroads in the sanjak all had a center outside the territory. He 
asked that the council either give him a final definite line of demar­
cation or complete freedom of action. If a line of demarcation were 
established, he suggested that a small inter-Allied force be sent to 
occupy a zone between the Greeks and the Turks.35 
Balfour immediately took up the idea of a delineation of the zones 
of occupation, and suggested that Allenby's staff work out the bound­
aries. At the same time, he obtained the explicit recognition of both 
the Greeks and the Italians that the armed occupation would in 
no way prejudge the final territorial settlement.36 
The Italians were not at all happy about having Allenby's staff 
work out the boundaries of the Greek and Italian zones, for they 
regarded the British as being extremely pro-Greek. Although this 
was correct so far as Lloyd George was concerned, many within 
the British government and practically all of the British administra­
tion in Turkey opposed the Greek claims. The Italians, however, 
were not convinced that these groups could be effective, and so, 
in an effort to avoid a decision that they were certain would favor 
Greece, Tittoni suggested that Italy and Greece be given a chance 
to work out the problem directly.37 
Two days later Tittoni and Venizelos reported agreement on the 
boundary between the Greek and Italian zones. Control of the 
Aidin-Smyrna railroad was to be given to Greece, but the Meander 
(Menderes) River would remain in the hands of the Italians. The 
council approved this scheme and also decided that all Allied troops, 
British, Greek, or Italian, in the area would be placed under the 
command of the Allied commander in chief, Field Marshal Allenby. 
This was not done without a bitter comment from Clemenceau that 
Allenby was really "a British officer receiving orders from the British 
Government rather than . . . Allied Commander in Chief." 38 Bal­
four reacted sharply to this criticism, but pointed out that the actual 
person in charge would be General Milne, who would have the job 
of fixing the limits of the Greek and Italian advance against the 
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Turks. It was decided that Turkey should be informed of this decision 
and required to withdraw all its forces from the area immediately. 
At the same time, formal assurances would be given that the limiting 
lines would in no way affect any final territorial settlement. 
The crisis was suddenly over. Italy and Greece had worked out 
their joint boundary and had agreed to defer to the decision of an 
outsider in regard to the other limits of their zone of occupation. 
Balfour and Clemenceau were extremely relieved at this turn of 
events. Neither of them appeared, at least publicly, to be suspicious 
of the overnight change in attitude which the agreement reflected. 
Actually, the sudden settlement of this small, but thorny, boundary 
problem had occurred in the process of Italian-Greek negotiations 
leading to a much wider secret agreement on all points of discord 
between the two nations. 
The Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement 
On July 29, the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement was signed.39 In it 
the Italians promised to support Greek claims to southern Albania 
and Thrace in return for Greek support of Italy's desires for an 
Albanian mandate. Italy also agreed to cede to Greece all the Aegean 
islands save Rhodes. Provided its claims in Albania and Thrace were 
fulfilled, Greece promised to accept the provisional line between 
the two zones of military occupation in Asia Minor as the final 
territorial boundary. Italy would not develop Scalanuova, but rather 
would use Smyrna as a free port with no customs charges on Italian 
imports shipped out of the city by rail. Both nations reserved the 
right to "full freedom of action" if Italy did not obtain full satisfaction 
of its demands in Asia Minor or Greece did not realize its ambitions 
in Thrace and Albania. Any points on which the two nations were 
agreed that were not mentioned in the final peace treaty would be 
put into a special convention between the two powers. 
In the agreement it was emphasized that this was in no sense 
a treaty; rather it was a definition and recognition of each nation's 
aims and aspirations. This distinction was made in order to keep 
the agreement secret, and it enabled the two states legally to bypass 
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national regulations concerning ratification of treaties and the new 
League of Nations requirement that all treaties be made public. In 
actuality, Venizelos privately informed Clemenceau and Balfour of 
the negotiations on July 24. Subsequently, he consulted continually 
with the British, but apparently not with the French and Americans. 
As early as August 1, Balfour was able to inform London of the 
main provisions of the agreement, and Polk could report to Washing­
ton that Tittoni had admitted that a Greek-Italian agreement did 
exist.40 
The Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement was taken far more seriously by 
Venizelos than it was by the Italians, because for him it was the 
first concrete written recognition of his many claims.41 For Italy, it 
fulfilled its purpose when the boundary line between the Greek and 
Italian zones was recognized by the Supreme Council, for despite 
protests to the contrary, this in effect constituted a recognition by 
the Supreme Council of the Italian zone as a fait accompli.42 More­
over, since the boundary was based on a negotiated agreement with 
Greek forces, which were in Asia Minor under the direct mandate 
of the Peace Conference, an aura of legitimacy for the Italian position 
was created. 
Dispatch of a Commission of Inquiry to Smyrna 
On July 18, the same day the Supreme Council approved the 
Italian-Greek boundary settlement, it considered Turkish complaints 
that charged the Greeks with massacres and with driving more than 
150,000 Moslems from their homes. Clemenceau, supported by Tit­
toni, urged that a commission of inquiry should be sent to investigate 
the charges, for it was necessary to assure the Turks that the Allies 
had not sent the Greeks to Smyrna "merely to commit atrocities." 43 
Balfour was more reticent, doubting whether the commission would 
do any good, although he admitted that Venizelos had told him 
that Greek troops had been guilty of atrocities. Nevertheless, realizing 
that opposition to an inquiry could produce a real issue at home, 
for the British government was being severely questioned in the 
House of Commons on the matter of Greek atrocities, Balfour ac­
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quiesced; and a commission consisting of one delegate from each 
of the four great powers was sent to Smyrna. Though the Greeks 
and Turks were allowed to send observers, these men were not 
permitted to be present at the actual meetings of the commission.This 
restriction was imposed so that witnesses would not feel intimidated 
while testifying. Instead, the commission was instructed that "all 
necessary data" should be given the observers, presumably the record 
of the testimony minus the names of those testifying.44 
The reaction of the Turkish government both to the decision to 
limit the zones of occupation and to the sending of a commission 
of inquiry was favorable. Although maintaining that Greece and 
Italy had no rightful claim to any territory whatsoever, the grand 
vizier declared that the temporary stabilization of the situation would 
greatly increase the authority of his government, and an official 
Turkish communique stated: "Without doubt the humanitarian deci­
sion of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude." 45 
Thus, during the late summer and early fall of 1919, the Supreme 
Council had two authorized groups working to bring the Smyrna 
issue under control. The first of these was the commission under 
General Milne whose job was to determine the limits of the Italian 
and Greek zones of occupation. The second was the commission 
[of inquiry] that had been sent to investigate the reported Greek 
atrocities in Smyrna. 
Report of the Milne Commission 
On October 2, General Milne submitted a report to London con­
cerning the delimitation of the Turco-Greek frontier. No mention 
was made of the Italian zone. In the report he pointed out that 
the Greeks had occupied purely Turkish territory, and he also recog­
nized that the Turks would not be satisfied with a partial withdrawal. 
"Guerrilla warfare," he asserted, "will continue as long as Greek 
troops remain in [the] Sanjak, and any further advance will tend 
to create further difficulties." 46 Thus, Milne recommended that the 
best of a bad situation would be for the Greeks to stop where they 
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were, adopting the best tactical line available in any given area. 
The one exception to this recommendation concerned the line 
in the area of Aidin and the Menderes River valley. Milne noted 
that anti-Greek feeling was extremely high in the area and pointed 
out that if the current boundary were adhered to, it would mean 
the Greeks would have to defend Aidin on three sides against the 
Turks. He therefore presented two alternatives. Either the Greeks 
should be allowed to advance far enough to obtain a defensible 
frontier, or they should withdraw from the whole area and confine 
their occupation to the Smyrna sanjak, whereupon the abandoned 
territory would be occupied by an inter-Allied force. Milne advocated 
the latter solution: first, because any advance would be a further 
Greek intrusion into Turkish territory and would thus meet with 
fierce resistance; second, because the Greeks were in Aidin in de­
fiance of the expressed will of the Supreme Council.47 
The idea of an inter-Allied force at first met with a favorable 
reception. However, the British and Americans soon balked at Italian 
participation, on the familiar grounds that this could constitute a 
sanctioning of the Italian occupation in Asia Minor. Sir Eyre Crowe, 
who had replaced Lord Balfour as the British delegate to the Supreme 
Council, also stated that Venizelos was willing to accept the solution 
only if the inter-Allied force were composed of British, French, and 
Greek troops. To place both Italian and Greek troops in the same 
force, Crowe stated, would create "new difficulties." In the face of 
this opposition, Vittorio Scialoja, who had succeeded Tittoni at the 
conference table, decided to give in and reap whatever reward might 
be forthcoming from what Crowe praised as his "conciliatory atti­
tude." 48 
Even so, the proposed inter-Allied force never materialized, for 
the French eventually decided that they could not send troops. The 
British, who had agreed to participate despite serious War Office 
reservations, immediately followed suit, whereupon the Supreme 
Council voted on November 12 to void the previous resolution and 
allow the Greeks to continue in sole occupation of the territory. 
At the same time the council refused, despite British protests, to 
allow Greek troops to undertake the strategic advances that Milne 
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had felt were absolutely necessary if the Greeks were to remain 
in Aidin at all. Thus, the final solution was precisely the one that 
General Milne had stated should be avoided at all costs.49 
The reasons for the failure to organize an inter-Allied force were 
twofold. The French, in particular, were worried about what such 
an occupation might eventually involve. The report of the Smyrna 
Commission had just been received, and one of its recommendations 
was the replacement of all Greek troops in Asia Minor by an inter-
Allied military force. It was all too clear that participation in the 
small border force recommended by Milne might develop quickly 
into a commitment of a very different nature. The anti-Greek find­
ings of the Smyrna Commission undoubtedly influenced the sudden 
French decision that "they had no troops to spare." Clemenceau 
commented that an inter-Allied occupation force would find itself 
"protecting the Greeks from attacks which they had brought on 
themselves." 50 
Second, disagreement over the position of General Milne gen­
erated a great amount of ill will between Britain and France in 
the fall and winter of 1919-20. Milne was the official commander 
of the forces at Constantinople. The French maintained he could 
no longer keep this position since he had recently been appointed 
commander of Anatolian Turkey. They asserted that the commander 
in chief of Allied Forces in the Balkans and European Turkey, 
General Franchet d'Esperey, was free to appoint a new Constan­
tinople chief. Since the British did not want a Frenchman to make 
this appointment, they argued that Milne could designate one of 
his officers to "hold the fort" in Constantinople. Behind this con­
troversy lay the fact that in Asia Minor Milne was technically sub­
ordinate to Allenby, while in Constantinople he and his troops were 
under Franchet d'Esperey's command.51 
The French regarded both Allenby and Milne as British officers 
controlled by the British government rather than impartial Allied 
commanders. The British in turn made no secret of their dislike 
for Franchet d'Esperey and what they considered to be his pro-
French, pro-Turkish, and anti-Greek efforts in the area stretching 
from Albania to Constantinople. The result was an effort by each 
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side to have the other's general removed. Needless to say, neither 
Milne nor Franchet d'Esperey was replaced.52 
Report of the Smyrna Commission 
The report of the commission investigating the claims of Greek 
atrocities at Smyrna was completed on October 13 and presented 
to the Supreme Council on November 8.53 It proved to be a severe 
indictment, not only of Greek actions, but of the decision of the 
Council of Four to send troops to Smyrna in the first place: 
Fears of massacres of Christians were not justified. . . . The conditions 
of security in the Vilayet of Aidin and at Smyrna, in particular, did not 
at all justify the occupation of the Smyrna forts. . . . The internal situation 
in the Vilayet did not call for the landing of Allied troops at Smyrna. 
On the contrary, since the Greek landing, the situation is troubled because 
of the state of war existing between the Greek troops and the Turkish 
irregulars.54 
The commission placed most, if not all, of the blame for the 
disorders and atrocities on the Greek officers' failure to control either 
the Greek civilians or the behavior of their own men. It did recognize 
that action against some of the responsible parties had been taken 
after the fact. 
If the Peace Conference intended ultimately to cede the territory 
to the Greeks, the commission recommended that the latter should 
be given a free hand. The commission opposed this solution, however, 
because of the overwhelming Turkish popular majority in all the 
cities except Smyrna and Aivali. Instead, it recommended the re­
placement of Greek troops with a much smaller inter-Allied force, 
which might or might not have a Greek contingent. Even this force 
should be temporary, and the Turkish gendarmerie should be recon­
stituted under the command of Allied officers so that the inter-Allied 
force could be withdrawn as soon as possible. 
The Greek observer attached to the commission, Colonel Ma­
zarakis, took vehement exception to these recommendations. He 
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asserted that the occupation had been necessary due to the possibility 
of massacres, that all incidents had taken place only after Turkish 
attacks on Greek military personnel, that these attacks were unex­
pected since the Turks were supposed to have been disarmed by 
the terms of the armistice, and that within the zone occupied by 
the Greeks perfect order existed whereas "outside of this zone there 
is complete anarchy." 55 Moreover, he complained that despite the 
instruction of the Supreme Council, he had not been allowed to 
see the record of all testimony given to the commission.56 
When Venizelos was called before the Supreme Council to answer 
the charges formulated in the report, he was even more emphatic 
in denouncing the work of the commission. He protested that the 
Greek army had been condemned without being allowed to see the 
testimony or defend itself. Charging that the commission had refused 
to hear witnesses proposed by Colonel Mazarakis, he maintained 
that it had heard only one side of the story.57 
In the Supreme Council discussion the Greek position was cham­
pioned unreservedly by the British representative, Sir Eyre Crowe. 
Crowe deeply resented the fact that the commission technically had 
gone beyond the limits of its instructions and examined the justifica­
tion of the presence of troops in the Smyrna area.58 Here his col­
leagues were in agreement with him. One can sense in the minutes 
of these meetings an irritation at the commission for reviving an 
issue about which the powers had since come to have a good many 
doubts, and one that they would have preferred to bury as far as 
possible from the light of public display. What the commission had 
failed to take into account, perhaps because it was unaware of it, 
was that the chief reason for sending troops to Smyrna was the 
determination of Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George to prevent 
a threatened Italian occupation of the same area. Concern that the 
Greek population might be in danger had not been the real motivat­
ing factor; it had been, however, the official reason given to the 
Italians and announced to the world at large. The council hardly 
cared to have its public excuse exposed as a fake, especially when 
revealing the real reason would bring not only a charge of bad faith 
from the Italians but also cries of "power politics," "secret diplo­
macy," and "old-fashioned intrigue" from all advocates of the 
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vaunted Wilsonian "open diplomacy." Finally, knowledge of Wil­
son's part in such a decision would give his enemies in America 
valuable ammunition in their campaign to keep the United States 
from joining the League of Nations, a campaign that already showed 
signs of being successful. 
Crowe also was adamant in his insistence that had the commission 
heard the Greek side of the story the result would have been far 
different. He pointed out that the Greeks had admitted certain errors, 
were punishing those responsible, and that peace now reigned in 
the area, except for the front lines. "He felt that the Greeks had 
done their best and on the whole had succeeded rather well." 59 
The Supreme Council nevertheless accepted the conclusions of 
the commission regarding "the excesses and acts of violence commit­
ted by the Greek troops, although it apologized to Venizelos for 
some of the Commission's secret tactics." 60 In a note to the Greek 
prime minister, the council affirmed the commission's contention 
that the majority of blame for the disturbances rested with the Greek 
military authorities. The council did recognize that punitive action 
against some offenders had been taken. At the same time, permission 
was granted for Greece to remain in occupation of all the territory 
it had already taken, although the council specifically stated that 
this action must in no way be considered as prejudging a final 
settlement.61 
Venizelos chose to make no further protest against the commis­
sion's findings. Rather, he registered a specific reservation on another 
matter. Taking issue with the stipulation regarding the council's free 
hand in the disposition of Smyrna, Venizelos claimed that the fact 
that Greek troops had occupied the territory strengthened Greece's 
right to it. 
May I point out that, whatever be the reasons for the decision to send 
Greek troops to Smyrna, the Supreme Council could not be mistaken as 
to the interpretation given it, with good reasons, by the Greek Government 
and people. The Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighboring regions 
were not only well-known, but they had been officially formulated to the 
Conference, defended at length before the Supreme Council, and frankly 
approved by the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims. In occupying 
Smyrna, Greece knew that if she were not yet legally, she was at least 
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morally, entitled to it. She did not simply send her troops as executive 
instruments to a foreign country. . . . Therefore, although the occupation 
of Smyrna did not constitute, from a strictly juridical point of view, a new 
right to the benefit of Greece, in fact, it has created a new situation which 
should not be disregarded. It does not extend the rights which Greece 
previously had in Smyrna, and already recognized by the Committee on 
Greek Affairs, but at least it corroborates them and strengthens the legiti­
mate confidence of the Greek nation in the final decision of the Peace 
Conference.62 
In a private letter to Crowe, Venizelos was even more explicit: 
I do not, of course, infer that the occupation intrusted to Greece is equal 
to a definite recognition of her sovereignty over the occupied area. But 
I desire to state that when Greece was asked to proceed to this occupation, 
not only was there no mention made to me of its being temporary, but 
on the contrary, the very decision implied—though tacitly—that this occupa­
tion was the first step towards giving Greece part of western Asia Minor. 
Mr. Lloyd George can testify as to the correctness of my impression.63 
Why Venizelos chose to refer specifically to Lloyd George is not 
altogether clear. It is quite possible that Lloyd George had notified 
Venizelos unofficially of the Council of Four's sentiments when the 
decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna was made in May. Certainly, 
Venizelos knew that Lloyd George would adopt as strong a pro-Greek 
position as possible. In any case, Venizelos was right in his assertions. 
It was only when the Italians were informed of the landing that 
the provisional restriction was made for the first time, and Venizelos's 
claim that he personally was not made aware of this clause until 
after the occupation took place was thoroughly justified.64 Equally 
correct was Venizelos's impression that at the time of the landing 
the Allies were agreed that Greece should be given part of Asia 
Minor.65 
Britain Stands by Greece 
With the acceptance of the Smyrna Commission's report, the 
situation rested. The Greeks remained in total control of the occupied 
area, carrying on little more than skirmishes with the Turkish irregu­
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lars who opposed them. Within the zone they tightened their control 
of the administration to the point of setting up their own board 
of censorship. This and other actions prompted the Allied high 
commissioners at Constantinople to protest that the Greek high 
commissioner in Smyrna was acting in a completely arbitrary and 
unilateral fashion. This remonstrance elicited from Crowe the com­
ment that after all, those at Smyrna knew the situation much better 
than those at Constantinople. Britain was making it clear that it 
intended to back the Greeks to the hilt.66 
In doing this, Britain was leaving itself in a vulnerable position. 
It was evident by November, 1919, that it was most unlikely that 
the United States would accept the Constantinople mandate. This 
opened the possibility, at least, that the city might revert in one 
way or another to the Turkish state, for neither Britain nor France 
would permit the other to control it. If this happened, the position 
of favorite with the sultan would again be desirable. In committing 
itself to full-fledged support of Greek ambitions in Asia Minor, 
Britain was gambling that Greece would permanently supplant Tur­
key as the dominant local force in the eastern Mediterranean area. 
Ever more openly the British government was following what best 
can be described as a modified version of Catherine the Great's 
"Grand Scheme" of a re-created Byzantine Empire, a concept that, 
if unrealistic, had in Venizelos a spokesman whose power over others 
had been admitted by all who knew him. 
The British evacuation of Armenia and Syria, the question of 
Thrace, and the delimitation of zones of occupation in Asia Minor 
were the main issues relating to the Near East that confronted the 
Peace Conference between July 1 and the end of November, 1919. 
There were, of course, other developments of importance, but they 
did not reach a crisis point or generate much discussion among the 
powers. They may, therefore, safely be left for consideration in the 
next two chapters when an account of the Franco-British discussions 
in London during December, 1919 and January, 1920, will afford 
an opportunity for examination of the whole range of questions that 
still remained to be settled. 
With the opening of these London meetings, the months of stale­
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mate and stagnation would end, and the process of formulating a 
peace with Turkey would again be examined in earnest and with 
certain sense of desperation. Certainly, the situation had deteriorated 
greatly in the preceding twelve months. The failure of the United 
States to ratify the Versailles treaty indicated that ultimately the 
United States would probably have to renounce any active part in 
the administration of a Near East settlement.67 This opened a host 
of new problems for the other powers. In addition, Turkish opposition 
was rising in Anatolia, brought on by the Greek occupation of 
Smyrna. This was coupled with the powers' growing awareness of 
their own military weakness (especially in the face of domestic pres­
sures for demobilization and cuts in military expenditure).68 In No­
vember, 1919, enforcement of an eventual peace treaty seemed much 
more problematical than it had a year before, when a completely 
beaten and prostrate Turkey had signed the Armistice of Mudros. 
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VIII * ANGLO-FRENCH PRIVATE

NEGOTIATIONS

o,rN NOVEMBER 10, 1919, 
President Raymond Poincare of France, accompanied by his foreign 
minister, Stephen Pichon, paid a four-day visit to Britain. According 
to Curzon, "Within the hour of the arrival of the French Presiden­
tial party in London, M. Pichon attended, by appointment, to see 
me in the Foreign Office." ' Pichon proposed that private British-
French discussions should be initiated immediately regarding the 
Turkish peace settlement: 
America having disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement 
of the East, and all chance of an American mandate for any portion of 
the Turkish Empire having, in his opinion, vanished, there remained only 
two parties whose interests had seriously to be considered and reconciled, 
namely, Great Britain and France. . . . Conversations must take place, 
and an understanding must be arrived at, before the Peace Conference 
addressed itself to the Turkish question.2 
To all of this Curzon agreed "with gratification," 3 and it was decided 
to hold the discussions in London during December. 
Both the French and the English regarded Turkish affairs with 
increasing anxiety. Curzon expressed this sense of urgency when 
he told Pichon: 
By next spring, . . . there might very likely be no Turkish Government 
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to deal with at all. It was more than possible that there would be no one 
to accept the sort of treaty which the Allies would desire to impose. It 
was even conceivable that the defeated Turks, who would then be one 
of the few parties on the scene with a serious force available, would declare 
war upon the Allies, and dare them to enforce their terms. If this were 
the case, I did not see how we were to conquer Asia Minor, or who was 
to do it; and the ignominious result might be that the weakest and most 
abject of our foes would end by achieving triumph.4 
The evident deterioration of the authority of the government at 
Constantinople, and the rising power of resistance elements in Ana­
tolia, now known as the Nationalist movement, meant that the longer 
a peace treaty was delayed, the more difficult it would be to institute 
and enforce.5 
Anglo-French Tensions 
The Anglo-French conversations on the Near East settlement took 
place in an atmosphere of surface cordiality. In reality, at the time 
they began, on no other issue were the relations of the two allies 
so strained. Each suspected the other of entering into secret consulta­
tions and negotiations with the Turks. It was increasingly evident 
that the interests of the various European nations in Turkey were 
tending to create just the split among them for which the Turks 
had so long hoped.6 
Much of the difficulty stemmed from the pro-British manifesta­
tions of the Turkish government at Constantinople. Despite the fact 
that Turkey had suffered defeat mainly at the hands of British troops, 
and despite Britain's open and staunch support of Greek and Ar­
menian ambitions, the Turkish government remained eager to es­
tablish close relations with Britain. As early as March 30, 1919, the 
grand vizier told Admiral Calthorpe that Turkey would submit "to 
England, but to England alone." 7 At that time he proposed a rough 
draft for a treaty of alliance between the two nations. No response 
was made by the British. During the course of the summer, reports 
from British agents in Turkey continually stressed that the Turks 
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would "willingly accept" only a British mandate, or if that were 
impossible, an American one.8 
The Secret Anglo-Turk Treaty 
Much uncertainty has existed about Anglo-Turkish negotiations 
in the late summer of 1919. According to subsequent accounts, the 
Turkish advances were well received by the British. On September 
12, 1919, a three-man British delegation negotiated a secret treaty 
of alliance with the Turkish grand vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha. In 
it the British purportedly agreed to guarantee the territorial integrity 
of the new Turkey and to sustain its requests before the Peace 
Conference. Constantinople would remain in Turkish hands and 
would be the seat of the caliphate. Britain would furnish a strong 
military force to protect minorities and crush all revolutionary move­
ments. In return, Turkey supposedly agreed to the establishment 
of an independent Kurdistan and relinquished all rights in Egypt 
and Cyprus. The sultan would use the spiritual powers of the ca­
liphate to create acceptance of British authority in Syria, Mesopo­
tamia, and elsewhere. Finally, the Straits were to be under British 
surveillance.9 
In the past, credence has generally been given to accounts of 
this treaty; 10now it seems highly unlikely that it ever really was 
negotiated and signed. It is true that rumors were widespread in 
Constantinople in August, 1919, that the British were about to come 
to an agreement with the sultan." It is also clear that the Turkish 
government would have welcomed such an event. On September 
8, the grand vizier complained to Admiral Webb that failure to reach 
a peace settlement was creating great difficulties: 
. .  . the only way by which it seemed to him [the grand vizier] it might 
be possible to shorten it would be by coming to a secret understanding 
with Great Britain. I [Webb] at once replied that such an idea was quite 
out of the question, we would never dream of taking any step except in 
conjunction with our Allies, and what would they say if they found that 
His Majesty's Government had indulged in any conversation with the 
Turkish Government.12 
182 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
The British remained constant in this attitude, and official approval 
of this policy was given by Curzon on September 23.13 This would 
indicate that a secret agreement, though proposed by the Turks, was 
never considered seriously by the British. Since later accounts of 
the treaty all emanated from Turkish sources, it is possible that the 
Turkish government, while officially denying the existence of such 
a treaty, planted false information in an attempt to create a split 
between France and England. 
Both the American and French high commissioners in Constan­
tinople obtained summaries of the terms of the alleged agreement 
by December, 1919, and the French newspaper Eclair published 
the purported text on February 11, 1920. News of the agreement 
confounded the Foreign Office, which launched a full scale inves­
tigation during the latter part of January. This investigation disclosed 
that not only were no two accounts in agreement as to whom the 
British agents had been, but that no authorization had been granted 
by anyone for the conclusion of such an arrangement. The Foreign 
Office refused to credit the document as anything more than a forgery 
aimed at creating trouble between the British and the French.14 
Another factor puts the existence of this secret treaty in doubt. 
Historians have maintained that from September on the British were 
no longer anxious to expel the Turks from Constantinople and that 
therefore this treaty was in complete agreement with British foreign 
policy at that time.15 This is not the case. The Anglo-Turk agreement 
would have gone against all that the chief architects of British foreign 
policy were attempting to do. Throughout the latter half of 1919, 
Lloyd George and Curzon constantly advocated the expulsion of 
the Turks from Europe. In this they were so successful that the French 
were finally persuaded to agree in the December conversations. It 
was not until January 6, 1920, that Britain abandoned this policy 
of excluding Turkey from Europe and then only because of its defeat 
in a cabinet meeting despite the vehement support given it by Curzon 
and Lloyd George.16 It is impossible to believe that these men would 
have worked so hard to convince the French in December, thus 
opening themselves to such a thoroughly humiliating defeat at home, 
had they intended as far back as September to agree ultimately to 
leave the Turks in Constantinople. 
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The Picot-Kemal Conversations 
To the French, even before they became aware of the supposed 
existence of an Anglo-Turkish treaty, the pro-British attitude of the 
government in Constantinople was obvious. One can hardly blame 
the French for assuming that this was reciprocated by the British.17 
Partly for this reason, but also because of the exposed position of 
French forces occupying Cilicia, Georges Picot, who had just been 
relieved as high commissioner in Syria, returned to France by way 
of Sivas where he met with the leader of the Nationalist movement, 
Mustapha Kemal Pasha, on December 5 and 6.18 
In these discussions Kemal stated his willingness to accept a French 
economic mandate over all of Anatolia. He also reiterated statements 
previously made to the Harbord Commission indicating his readiness 
to accept American aid if it were available.19 He categorically refused 
to consider help from Britain, but made it clear that what he sought 
was the assistance of a single power, preferably France. With great 
delight Picot agreed that French advisors should be part of the 
Interior, Finance, and Justice Departments, that they might even 
be Turks chosen by the French, and that certainly they would be 
there not "to control, but to collaborate." 20 
However, when Picot brought up the subject of Cilicia, the discus­
sion was not nearly so amicable. Kemal refused to renounce his 
claim to it, describing Cilicia as a "piece of our body." 21 Picot then 
conceded France's willingness to withdraw its troops provided three 
conditions were fulfilled. These consisted of the right of supervision 
of local administration and protection of minorities, reorganization 
of the police under French supervision, and Franco-Turkish economic 
collaboration with a French monopoly of all economic concessions. 
Of these, Kemal agreed only to the police reorganization; as to 
administrative supervision, he would admit only that French consuls 
should have a special interest and influence in the area. Even for 
these concessions he demanded a unilateral French guarantee of 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against possible depredations 
by the British and Italians.22 
To this, of course, the French could not agree and the issue was 
dropped. Kemal probably had hoped that his conciliatory attitude 
184 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
regarding French preeminence in Anatolia would lead the French 
to reciprocate in Cilicia. The French, however, were not willing to 
concede something they had for something so tentative, especially 
when any Anatolian "mandate" would depend on the success of 
Kemal's movement and the consent of the other Allied powers. Until 
this came about, France would evacuate Cilicia only with guarantees 
of its future position there, which Kemal was quite unwilling to 
give.23 
Nevertheless, the conversations did ease tensions relative to Cilicia, 
and for over two months after these meetings Nationalist protests 
regarding French behavior in Cilicia, which until that time had been 
a regular occurrence, ceased.24 It is interesting to note that the last 
of these protests, sent a week before Kemal's meeting with Picot, 
was not read by the British Foreign Office until December 31, at 
which time it received the following notations: 
M. Picot's visit to Mustafa Kemal at Sivas, of which the W[ar] O[ffice] 
have now received sure confirmation, does not seem to have been very 
effective. 
We can well afford, I think, to encourage French penetration in Asia 
Minor. It is likely to keep their hands very full and may compel them 
to slacken their more objectionable activities elsewhere. 
G. Kidston, Dec. 31/19 
J.A.C. Tilley, 31/19 
They do not realize what they are in for.25 
C. 1/1 
It is not clear what the basis was for an interpretation that the 
Picot-Kemal conversations had failed. Certainly it could not be drawn 
from reading a document that had originated a week before the 
meeting took place. Evidence that the French felt very differently 
can be found in the record of the December negotiations. 
The December Discussions 
When the Anglo-French negotiations opened in December, it 
seemed as if an Anglo-French split had occurred. The British, well 
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aware that discussions of some sort between Kemal and Picot had 
taken place, tended to interpret it as evidence "that French policy 
in [the] Near East is now to win over Arabs and Turks with the 
view of throwing [the] combination against British influence and 
interests." 26 The French, in turn, were extremely suspicious of Bri­
tain's pro-Greek attitude, as well as of what they took to be signs 
of a rapprochement between Britain and the government at Constan­
tinople. The haste and urgency evidenced by the representatives of 
the two nations regarding a Near East settlement was due not so 
much to fears of Turkish collapse as to anxiety for the future of 
Anglo-French relations. It was imperative that the rupture be healed 
before it became incurable by becoming public. 21 
Clemenceau's brief visit to London had been brought about by 
a desire on the part of the two prime ministers to examine the general 
state of European affairs in the light of the American Senate's refusal 
to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.28 Therefore, only one of the meetings 
with Lloyd George had to do with the problems of the Near East. 
Almost without exception, the two leaders referred matters to Curzon 
and Philippe Berthelot, chief secretary of political and commercial 
affairs at the Quai d'Orsay.29 These two were instructed to "examine 
various questions connected with Turkey and prepare alternative 
drafts for consideration." 30 It was in their meetings that agreement 
on various topics was achieved. 
Anatolian Mandates 
Immediately after his arrival in London on the morning of De­
cember 11, Clemenceau met privately and informally with Lloyd 
George. Their discussion, covering a wide range of topics, was com­
municated by Lloyd George to a conference of British ministers 
held at 1:00 P.M.31 Thus, when the conversations officially opened 
at 3:00 P.M. that afternoon, agreement on certain issues was almost 
instantaneous. As soon as the meeting got underway, Clemenceau 
announced: 
To start with, the system of mandates should be renounced so far as 
Asia Minor is concerned. When he spoke of renouncing the system of 
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mandates for Turkey, he did not wish to include the Arab part of the 
former Turkish Empire. In discussing the question from a Turkish point 
of view, however, he felt that he ought not to include Cilicia as part of 
Syria, since the Turks did not admit that it was part of Syria. He, therefore, 
asked whether Mr. Lloyd George agreed with him in abandoning the system 
of mandates for Turkish Asia, excluding the portions inhabited by Arabs.32 
Lloyd George was only too happy to agree to this proposal, although 
it undoubtedly had come as a surprise, for as late as November 
24, Lloyd George had told Polk that "the French are anxious to 
keep Constantinople and Asia Minor intact, and rather hope for 
a mandate themselves." 33 
By making this seemingly casual agreement, the statesmen were 
taking a rather definite stand not only on the future of the Turkish 
state but also on the problem of Greek and Italian ambitions in 
Asia Minor. The reasons are apparent from Lloyd George's account 
of their private conversation that morning. Now that it was clear 
that the United States would not play an active role in carrying 
out either the European or Near Eastern peace treaties, neither 
Clemenceau nor Lloyd George had any compunctions about nego­
tiating a settlement that would be completely favorable to his nation. 
Both men were thoroughly out of patience with Italy, chiefly because 
of its intransigence over the Adriatic question. Lloyd George un­
doubtedly felt that French willingness to give up the "unofficial" 
French mandate scheme, which France had supported ever since 
Wilson had proposed it the previous spring, far outweighed the blow 
a renunciation of mandates would give to Venizelos's ambitions in 
Asia Minor. In any case, this decision did not preclude out-and-out 
annexation of territory by Greece, and an agreement that prevented 
extended Greek control in Asia Minor would be greeted enthusi­
astically by many within the British government who had long been 
critical of Lloyd George's support of Greek ambitions in Asia Minor. 
In addition, and this must have been very important to Lloyd George: 
"It further appeared that he [Clemenceau] did not really care whether 
the Sultan was allowed to remain in CONSTANTINOPLE or to 
be kept out of it: he would however prefer to have him there, with 
a joint Anglo-French control of the Turkish Empire."34 It was clear 
that Clemenceau had come to London in a conciliatory mood regard­
ing Constantinople. 
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Two factors probably had much to do with Clemenceau's coopera­
tive attitude. The first was his concern for British support in enforcing 
the European settlement, especially in the area of reparations, where 
the issue of proportionate national shares of German payments 
remained to be solved. The apparent failure by the United States 
to accept its role in previously negotiated guarantees of French 
territorial boundaries against German aggression had also released 
Britain from any obligations under this agreement. This was highly 
upsetting to Clemenceau, who was determined that the Anglo-French 
alliance should be preserved. Speaking to Lloyd George, he com­
mented that "he realized that, owing to America's defection, every­
thing now depended on Great Britain. He anticipated a revolution 
in Italy, as there was no one there with any authority at all . . . ; 
[he] thought that Italy would drop out of the Alliance." 35 
Second, until this time, the French had been making a rather 
unsuccessful effort to gain favor with the sultan. Now, however, Picot 
had just completed his meetings with Mustapha Kemal, in which 
a virtual French economic mandate in Anatolia had been promised. 
It would be logical to assume that this had much to do with Clemen­
ceau's change of mind. Also, the same explanation would account 
for his statement to Lloyd George regarding Cilicia. Although some­
what ambiguous, it appears that Clemenceau was renouncing a 
mandate over this area because the Turks claimed it as rightfully 
theirs. This seemingly incomprehensible position becomes more un­
derstandable, however, if it is looked at in the light of the Picot-
Kemal discussions concerning an Anatolian economic mandate and 
Cilicia. The French policy change during December and January 
was more than likely due, at least in part, to considerations unknown 
to the British. 
Greek, Italian, and French Claims to Asia Minor 
The decision to do away with mandates in Anatolia made it imper­
ative that France and Britain should agree on the disposition of 
Greek and Italian claims in that area. The report of the Smyrna 
Commission, plus Britain's support of Greek ambitions, had turned 
the French completely against the Greeks, and Clemenceau told 
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Lloyd George that he believed it had been a mistake to send Greek 
troops to Smyrna. The Greeks should be required to leave before 
they were driven out by the Turks. Suitable compensation could 
be arranged for in Thrace.36 Even the British, despite Crowe's impas­
sioned backing of Venizelos in the Supreme Council debates, were 
beginning to have second thoughts. A memorandum from the 
Foreign Office on December 12, stated that "the problem would 
no doubt have been simplified if the Greek occupation of the Smyrna 
area had not been sanctioned by the Supreme Council, at any rate 
at a date so long before the final Turkish settlement." 37 This view 
had long been held by Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill, who 
had opposed the Smyrna landings from the start. Therefore, in the 
December meetings the British suggested that Smyrna be returned 
to Turkish sovereignty, but with guarantees to ensure almost complete 
autonomy and self-government by the local Greek population. The 
governor of the area would have to be Greek. To this Berthelot 
readily agreed.38 
This move was a complete reversal of the original British position 
relative to Smyrna. Yet in no way did it signify a lessening of the 
pro-Greek attitude on the part of Britain. Hand in hand with this 
agreement went the condition that all Thrace up to the Enos-Midia 
line should be ceded to Greece. This would include Adrianople, 
where reverse guarantees similar to those at Smyrna would protect 
the Turkish population. Both Curzon and Berthelot felt that a com­
promise of this sort would be acceptable to Venizelos.39 
That this alternative solution was suggested and accepted is evi­
dence of British and French lack of concern for the position and 
desires of President Wilson. Wilson had been the chief opponent 
of Greek annexation in Thrace, and because of his protests the matter 
had been held in abeyance. Now it was evident that his opposition 
was no longer thought to be of any real significance. 
The two powers obviously recognized that it would be difficult 
to allow Greece either territorial annexations or a mandate in Asia 
Minor if similar privileges were to be denied to Italy. Yet, both 
Clemenceau and Lloyd George believed that Italy was not that 
anxious to maintain a physical presence in Anatolia. In fact, Clemen­
ceau stated, he thought "that the Italians were ready to clear out 
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of Asia Minor if the Greeks did the same." * Thus, by forcing a 
Greek withdrawal, all of Anatolia could be returned to at least the 
nominal control of the sultan. At the same time, in order to meet 
what both the British and French admitted were legitimate Italian 
claims in Asia Minor, the French accepted a British suggestion that 
Italy be accorded a sphere of economic priority in southern Anatolia. 
This would not prevent other nations from investing in the area, 
but would give the Italians first option on any economic investment 
proposed.41 
As to Cilicia, the French, while stating their intention of maintain­
ing control over the forts in the Taurus mountains, declared they 
would try to arrive at a plan whereby the French could remain in 
Cilicia under some form of nominal Turkish sovereignty.42 This 
corresponded directly with the stand taken by Picot in his conver­
sations with Kemal, and it is evident that the French regarded the 
issue as open to negotiation. These negotiations, moreover, would 
be with Kemal, for there is no indication that the French ever 
broached the matter to the government at Constantinople. 
Constantinople and the Straits 
The question of Constantinople and the Straits had purposely been 
held in abeyance during the preceding months while the European 
powers waited hopefully for the United States to take the mandate 
for the proposed international state. The European states had agreed 
to the American mandate chiefly because it seemed an easy way 
to solve a complicated problem. By December, 1919, when it had 
become obvious that American participation would not be forth­
coming, all the old religious, political, and commercial issues reap­
peared in a more intensified form. Constantinople had always been 
a bone of contention between the British and the French. Now that 
a third power could not be called in, it was necessary to face the 
issue. 
The central question was whether the Turks should be left in 
Constantinople or forced completely out of Europe, with the capital 
reestablished at Brusa. In June, both Clemenceau and Wilson had 
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supported the latter scheme on the assumption that America would 
undertake the Constantinople mandate. Lloyd George, though per­
sonally in agreement, was forced because of dissension within the 
British cabinet to take a noncommittal, if acquiescent, position.43 
However, with America's defection, attitudes changed. In December 
Clemenceau sought to leave the Turks in Constantinople while Lloyd 
George and Curzon were much more insistent that the Turkish 
government should wield no political power on the European side 
of the Straits. Fundamental to this clash was the fact that both the 
British and the French recognized that France would be the nation 
most likely to exert a preponderant influence in the new Turkish 
state because of its prewar monopoly of industrial and monetary 
investment within Turkey. Consequently, France sought to expand 
the scope of the Turkish state in order to strengthen it, whereas 
Britain wished to restrict its authority wherever possible.44 
The desire to push the Turks from Constantinople was consistent 
with Britain's pro-Greek policy. Any lessening of Turkish power 
would automatically increase Greek prestige and authority in the 
eastern Mediterranean. Britain, as the largest naval power, stood 
to have the greatest authority on any Straits commission. Should 
an international control commission ever cease to function, with the 
Turks out of the city it would be possible to turn the area over 
to Greece. Either way, Britain could continue to wield the inexpen­
sive, indirect control over the Straits that it had so long achieved 
through a similar policy with the Ottoman government. 
Why should Britain pursue this policy when the government at 
the Porte openly manifested its preference for British control and 
supervision? The answer would seem to be twofold. First, the British, 
already committed to their Greek scheme, realized that it would 
be impossible to pose as the principal friend of both Greece and 
Turkey for very long. Second, by December, 1919, the British com­
mand in Constantinople had very little use for the sultan or his 
regime. They recognized that the government was unable to control 
Anatolia and were convinced that it could not last. This opinion 
was conveyed to the Foreign Office and was reflected by Lord Curzon 
in his conversation with Pichon on November 10.45 To accept the 
proferred position of advisor would be to place a bet on a dying 
horse. 
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The British authorities in Constantinople, both military and politi­
cal, vehemently favored expelling the Turks from Constantinople. 
Calthorpe, de Robeck, Ryan, and Hohler all took this attitude.46 Many 
at home in Britain considered the Turk as no more than a barbarian, 
particularly because of Turkish treatment of the Armenians. This 
was the same attitude that had been expressed by the Liberals in 
Gladstone's day, and it still carried political overtones, with the 
Liberal and Labour groups generally favoring expulsion and the 
Conservatives tending to be more pro-Turkish in their attitude.47 
Mixed with this was the age-old religious antagonism toward the 
infidel. This attitude had found a specific cause in the demand for 
the return of Santa Sophia to the Greek Orthodox. A mounting 
campaign in the press, the formation of organizations, public rallies, 
and so forth testified to the popular emotional appeal of this issue. 
In general, public opinion seemed to favor the expulsion of the Turks 
from Constantinople.48 
On December 10, a conference of six ministers met with Lloyd 
George for the purpose of establishing the policy lines the prime 
minister should follow in his conversations with Clemenceau the 
following day. During the discussion Lloyd George, Curzon, and 
Balfour strongly supported Turkish expulsion from Constantinople. 
However, both Lloyd George and Curzon indicated a willingness 
to allow the sultan to remain in Constantinople in his position as 
caliph. The result would be to create a situation analogous to that 
of the pope at the Vatican in Rome. Montagu and Churchill who, 
in their roles as secretary of state for India and secretary of state 
for war and air respectively, had opposed forcing the Turk out of 
Constantinople, appeared somewhat mollified. Montagu indicated 
that he was willing to accept the internationalization of Constan­
tinople and the transferring of the Turkish government across the 
Straits to Brusa as long as the sultan would have the power to reside 
in Constantinople. Churchill, indicating that "it would be wise, in 
his opinion, to keep him [the sultan] in Constantinople, under our 
eye," added that "however, he was quite prepared to support any­
thing that was agreed upon by the Prime Minister and M. Clemen­
ceau." 49 
As a result of this conference, Lloyd George and Curzon clearly 
thought that a consensus had been reached that would enable them 
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to seek an agreement with Clemenceau based upon the abrogation 
of any Turkish political sovereignty and authority in the area of 
Constantinople and the Straits. In reality this was not the case, for, 
as Herbert Fisher, president of the Board of Education, pointed out 
just before the meeting adjourned, there remained "a difference of 
opinion as to the extent of the nominal power to be vested in the 
Sultan." 50 
In the meeting of the two prime ministers the next day, the future 
of the Straits and Constantinople was discussed thoroughly: 
M. CLEMENCEAU . .  . He would say at the outset . . . that in his view 
the Straits must be kept in the hands of an Allied force and taken altogether 
out of the hands of Turkey. Should the Straits include Constantinople? 
. . . His opinion was that it would be a mistake to take the Turks out 
of Constantinople. He would consider Constantinople as separate from the 
Straits. . .  . If the idea of cutting up Asia Minor was abandoned, it was 
our interest to leave a certain amount of prestige to the head of the State 
of Asia Minor. . .  . If the Sultan was to govern in our interest, the more 
responsibility we could give him the better. It would be easier to govern 
through the Sultan as an intermediary, and for this reason it would be 
better to leave him in Constantinople. . . . 
MR. LLOYD GEORGE . .  . The British Government felt that complete 
control of the Straits would not be assured unless Constantinople also was 
in the hands of some international force. . . . The Straits ought to be 
made self-supporting, but this could not be done without Constantinople. 
In the port and the city . .  . it should be possible to raise sufficient taxes 
and dues to pay for the troops. . . . The fact was he did not want to include 
a big sum in his budget for maintaining troops for the Straits. . .  . If 
the Sultan was in Constantinople, his Ministers and Administration would 
also be there, and there would be constant intrigues, etc. He would attempt 
to divide the Powers and play one off against the other. . .  . An alternative 
which had been suggested, he thought first by M. Venizelos, was that the 
Sultan should be established in a sort of Vatican at Constantinople. . . . 
LORD CURZON . . . Another point which had to be borne in mind was 
that the Turkish policy of the Future would be strongly nationalist. . . . 
If the Sultan at Constantinople was in control of such a party with all 
the memories and prestige of the past, and strongly nationalist in sentiment, 
there must inevitably be trouble which would react on the French in Tunis 
and Tripoli and Algeria no less than on the British in Egypt and India. 
The Mahometan would say that the Turk had never been beaten at all, 
and to prove it they would point to the fact that he was still in possession 
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of Constantinople and Adrianople, from which place he continued to exer­
cise his full powers as Khalif. . . . 
M. CLEMENCEAU . . . He, himself, was opposed to the creation of a 
new Pope in the East. It was quite bad enough to have one Pope in the 
West, and as to establishing a holy place in Constantinople, it must be 
recalled that the Mahometan already had Mecca. . .  . He admitted that 
if the Sultan was left at Constantinople there would be danger of the 
Mahometans saying that the Turks had never been beaten, and that the 
Allies had not dared to remove him from Constantinople. . . . The Turks 
had shown that they were not fit for self-government, and there must be 
some form of supervision and some form of control over their military 
organization over the Dardanelles and Bosphorus with a strip of territory 
behind. He preferred the system he had proposed, though he realized the 
objections to it. Nevertheless, he would range himself alongside of the British 
plan if some of the difficulties which he foresaw could be removed. The 
great necessity was to avoid Anglo-French friction. . .  . He realized that 
the logical solution was to join Constantinople to the Dardanelles and 
Bosphorus under single inter-allied European authority.51 
What had happened was that Lloyd George and Curzon, while 
mentioning the compromise solution arrived upon at the Conference 
of Ministers the day before, had in essence strongly urged the com­
plete expulsion of the Turk from Europe and had received Clemen­
ceau's assent. The next day, the French accepted the British plan 
with a minimum of protest. Berthelot, for one, was pleased. He noted 
in the memorandum that contained the French acceptance of the 
British scheme: 
From a moral and historical point of view, the eviction from Europe 
of a state based on the right of conquest and the oppression of different 
races and superior civilizations represents a triumph of Droit. The loss 
of Constantinople will mark the final eclipse of the mysterious powers over 
the Moslem population in areas under British and French jurisdiction 
[control] which its possession had conferred upon the descendants of Osman. 
The taking of Constantinople by the Turks marked the end of the middle 
ages. Their exodus will mark the beginning of a new period.52 
Thus the main British position was accepted. Given Clemenceau's 
vehement opposition to the so-called Vatican proposal, Curzon and 
Lloyd George, who had never really favored the scheme, were only 
too glad to omit any such provision in the final agreement.53 Constan­
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tinople and the Straits would be taken from the Turks and established 
as a separate political and territorial entity governed by an interna­
tional commission. The sultan and his government would have to 
relocate in Asia Minor. Therefore, subsequent discussion between 
Curzon and Berthelot centered on the technical problems of organi­
zation, administration, and control of the new Constantinople state 
as well as its future relations to the Turkish state in Anatolia. Agree­
ment was reached on almost all major points, though questions 
involving the transfer of authority and sources of revenue for the 
new state were deferred for examination by the expert committees 
of the Peace Conference at Paris.54 
Control of the Anatolian Turkish State 
Once decisions were made concerning European mandates in Asia 
Minor and the future of Constantinople and the Straits, the remaining 
problem was that of the formation and administration of the Turkish 
state in Asia Minor. Here the primary question was the type and 
extent of control that the Allies would hold over the Turkish govern­
ment. It was agreed that the best way, both of protecting European 
financial investments and of controlling the actions and policies of 
the Turkish government, would be to work through supervision of 
government finances. This matter had been thoroughly discussed 
by British and French financial experts, and all were agreed that 
any organizational structure involved should be arranged so as to 
be totally separate from the groups administering the Constantinople 
state. Therefore, while the prewar Ottoman Debt Council would 
continue to exist in a revised form and for the time being would 
work out of Constantinople, a new Financial Commission made up 
only of the great powers would be constituted upon establishment 
of the new Anatolian state. The staff and machinery of the old Debt 
Council that had been "all over the Turkish Empire . . . could now 
be put, with all its experience and efficiency at the disposal of the 
Financial Commission. All the new machinery would not therefore 
have to be created afresh and the Turkish Government were already 
used to this large measure of European interference and control." 55 
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Lord Curzon expressed great fear that world public opinion would 
react unfavorably to this system, "if, as he understood, the Financial 
Commission were practically to impose every year a budget which 
the Legislative Assembly would have to accept." 56 He was particu­
larly concerned that the Moslem world would charge the Allies with 
preventing the development of democratic self-government, "how­
ever unlikely such a development might be in practice." 57 He there­
fore proposed a specific statement that such control would end with 
the repayment of the prewar Ottoman debt, after which the question 
would be submitted to the League of Nations. To this everyone 
readily assented, as well they might, for it was hardly likely that 
the Turkish government would be able to do any more than meet 
the interest payments, irrespective of repaying the principal, in the 
foreseeable future.58 
The decision to exclude Turkey from Constantinople constituted 
a complete victory for the policies of Lloyd George and Curzon. 
In accepting this scheme, Clemenceau in effect abandoned his posi­
tion of supporting the sultan's regime, for as he himself had pointed 
out, if the powers really intended to rule through the sultan, it was 
imperative that the sultan be made as strong as possible.59 Clemen­
ceau's acceptance of the British viewpoint indicated that the French, 
like the British, were beginning to regard the Constantinople govern­
ment as collapsing and incapable of survival. Under these conditions, 
both British and French interests dictated that they should gain firm 
control of Constantinople and the Straits. 
The mere fact that the French sent Picot to see Kemal is indicative 
of their loss of confidence in the Constantinople regime. Kemal's 
expressed preference for French advice and economic assistance in 
Anatolia cannot but have had its effect on the Quai d'Orsay. Just 
as Britain had sought and found a new force to champion in Greece, 
so now it would seem the French were beginning to regard Kemal 
as the man of the hour and were considering the possibility of 
working with him. 
It may be argued that the extensive French and British planning 
regarding Allied financial control in Anatolia hardly indicated an 
intention on the part of either power to abandon the sultan's govern­
196 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
ment. Actually, other considerations were involved. Through this 
plan, the commercial, industrial, and investment interests of the 
Allies could be preserved, either in the faint possibility that the old 
government could survive and regain authority and control, or 
be transferred subsequently to a new Anatolian regime if that were 
possible. There is little to indicate that either France or Britain 
entertained much hope for the sultan's government or were in any 
way prepared to defend it. Had either power been truly concerned 
about maintaining a strong Turkish government, it would have in­
sisted on the retention of Constantinople by the royal regime. The 
new plan for Anatolia would cost the Allies nothing and require 
few men. If the sultan's regime did survive, the British and French 
would dominate most of Asia Minor; if not, they would still control 
that area which counted most, Constantinople and the Straits. 
One final note of interest remains. During the course of the discus­
sions, Berthelot pointedly stated: 
The French Government had originally not favored the policy of expelling 
the Turks from Europe, . . . but they had deferred to the superior arguments 
of the British Government. They presumed, therefore, that the British 
Government were determined to carry through this policy and would not 
go back on it or them.60 
To this Curzon replied that though he, Lloyd George, and Balfour 
all favored this policy, it had not come before the full cabinet, and 
all decisions were "subject to revision or confirmation by both the 
British and French Governments." 6I 
It was almost as if Berthelot had a premonition of impending 
trouble. Nevertheless, it appeared that the thorniest of the Turkish 
peace problems had been swiftly, completely, and amicably solved. 
1. Br. Doc, 4:878, Curzon memorandum, 11/12/19. Curzon had replaced Balfour as 
Foreign Secretary on October 24, 1919. 
2. Ibid., p. 879. The British had been convinced for some time that no United States 
action regarding mandates was likely. This was confirmed on November 23 by Viscount Grey 
who was in Washington at the time. Grey advised immediate resumption of negotiations. 
See Foreign Office, F.O. 608/111/385-1-11/17992, Balfour to Curzon, 8/18/19; Balfour Papers, 
MSS 49734, Curzon to Balfour, 10/13/19; Cabinet Papers, Cab. 23/12, W.C. 617, 618, Cabinet 
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IX * FURTHER ANGLO-FRENCH

DISCUSSIONS

I,
_N THE COURSE of the De­
cember Anglo-French meetings a variety of questions relating to 
the non-Turkish peoples and areas of the former Ottoman Empire 
were discussed. Agreement, at least in general terms, was reached 
on almost all the topics involved. 
Armenia 
The Armenian question was dealt with in a surprisingly summary 
fashion. Britain and France had eagerly sought an American man­
date, and were distressed at the apparent unwillingness of the United 
States to take this troubled area off their hands.1 Both governments 
realized that Armenian claims for a large state stretching from Trebi­
zond to Cilicia were impractical and unrealistic. Instead, at Curzon's 
suggestion, a much smaller, completely landlocked area was decided 
on, extending westward just far enough to include the town of Er­
zerum. This territory, which had formerly been in Turkey, w6uld 
be joined to the existing Republic of Armenia that had been in 
existence since the collapse of Tzarist Russia. A commercial outlet 
to the Black Sea would be provided through the free port of Batum.2 
It was recognized that the Armenians would constitute a distinct 
minority even in this smaller state and that the hardest problem 
would be that of enforcing order. The Armenians had been request­
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ing arms, ammunition, and officers from the Allies since the previous 
September.3 A complicating factor was the Allies' general distrust 
of the Armenians; as George Kidston of the British Foreign Office 
put it, "I fear that there is not the slightest doubt that the Armenian 
is at least as good a hand at massacring as his Moslem neighbor." 4 
Consequently, there was no agreement as to the number or type 
of troops that would be required to pacify the area. Estimates ranged 
from a French figure of 20,000 European troops down to a few 
officers in an advisory capacity, which some British seemed to think 
would be enough.5 
Further complicating the question of enforcement, though no one 
would admit it directly, was the growing conviction on the part of 
all the powers that Bolshevik forces would shortly triumph in the 
civil war then being waged in Russia. In fact, on December 12, the 
British cabinet decided that Britain would not enter into any more 
commitments to aid the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, though it 
would continue to sell them military goods if they wished to buy.6 
The decision was presented to representatives of the other major 
powers on December 13 and was immediately accepted by Clemen­
ceau, while the American, Italian, and Japanese representatives 
greeted it sympathetically. In addition, the powers agreed to a British 
suggestion that "as regards the border communities with non-Russian 
populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-govern­
ment, the Allies will give them such assistance in defending their 
liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each 
case as it arises." 7 The implications that this statement held for the 
future of the new Armenian state could hardly have been worse. 
What it all ultimately came down to was the fact that Britain 
and France were fully committed to support the creation of an 
Armenian state, yet neither had the will, men, or money actively 
to promulgate the solution. Kidston put the British dilemma clearly: 
With regard to the Eastern Vilayets, I do not believe there is any possibility 
of any sort of mandate, international or otherwise, or of dividing the country 
up into Kurdish or Armenian zones without a military force sufficiently 
strong to keep the Turk and C.U.P. influence out and to impose respect 
of the divergent internal elements. And this, I venture to suggest, is the 
crux of the difficulty, not only here but everywhere and the C.U.P. knows 
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it. The War Office contemplates having to hand over the Anatolian Railway 
to the Turks from sheer lack of a sufficiency of men to hold it. In Mesopo­
tamia, Egypt, Palestine, Asia Minor, not to speak of India, our forces are 
necessarily being demobilized, and from all these places there is a constant 
shout for more men and fresh drafts which are not forthcoming. Nor is 
there money to pay for more.8 
Clemenceau expressed similar views in his conversation with Lloyd 
George on December 11: 
. . . The Armenians were a dangerous people to get mixed up with. They 
required a great deal of money and gave very little satisfaction. He was 
in favor of letting them have a republic, or whatever else they wanted. 
France was unwilling to spend any money in Armenia.9 
No agreement on the enforcement question was reached, and the 
matter was referred for further consideration to the Allied Military 
Mission in Paris. At the same time, Berthelot agreed that a "British 
suggestion as to confiding to the Council of the League of Nations 
the task of helping Armenia with men and money might well be 
adopted, if the French, British, and Italian Governments found later, 
after examination by experts, that they could not supply the necessary 
resources alone." 10 
Kurdistan 
"The term Kurdistan," wrote Sir Arnold Wilson, "is a loose term 
without any generally accepted geographical significance." " Living 
in valleys lying between vast mountain ranges in the area where 
the present day Syrian, Turkish, and Iraqian borders meet, the Kurds 
possessed little sense of unity or loyalty other than to the particular 
tribe to which they belonged. It was estimated that about half of 
the population of the Mosul vilayet was Kurdish, with elements also 
to the north and east.12 In the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of this 
area had been confided to France. The cession of Mosul to Britain 
had altered this, and British forces had been in nominal occupation 
of the territory since the close of the war. The Kurds were violently 
anti-Arab and for centuries had carried on a vendetta with the 
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Armenians. They had little liking for the Turkish government at 
Constantinople. The British maintained that what the Kurds really 
wanted was a British protectorate over the whole region, and they 
evolved a tentative plan for the establishment of an "Arab province 
of Mosul fringed by autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish 
Chiefs who will be advised by British Political Officers."13 None of 
this was particularly pleasing to the French.14 
During the summer of 1919 the British dispatched Major Edward 
Noel on a fact-finding mission to Kurdistan in an effort to establish 
how qualified the people were to receive the privilege of self-deter­
mination. This expedition was undertaken enthusiastically by Noel 
who was described by a British political advisor at Constantinople 
as a "fanatic" and "an out and out Kurd." His views on Kurdistan 
reflected this bias.15 The mission generated a great deal of hostility 
between the Turkish government and the British, for the Turks 
claimed that the Kurdistan question was an internal affair and ac­
cused Noel of fomenting separatist feeling among the Kurds.16 
Attempts at creating the proposed federation of tribes under Sheikh 
Mahmud ended in an abortive rebellion against British authority 
by the sheikh himself.17 During the spring, summer, and fall of 1919, 
several British military and civilian agents in Kurdistan were am­
bushed and murdered. Three distinct uprisings occurred, all of which 
necessitated large-scale retaliatory action by British Indian forces. 
These campaigns, however successful from the military standpoint, 
brought only partial political success. Although British administration 
was securely established in central and southern Kurdistan, by De­
cember, 1919, their administrative control over the mountainous 
borders of northern Kurdistan had ended. Considering that British 
control was so tenuous and that three separate revolts had occurred 
in the space of eight months, the British were hardly justified in 
maintaining that the Kurds desired British supervision and control.18 
Undoubtedly reacting to these problems, the British Foreign Office 
indicated to the French in December a new conviction that it could 
not undertake direction of the area outside the Mosul vilayet. The 
problem was to prevent this area from coming under French juris­
diction as had been called for originally in the Sykes-Picot Agree­
ment. To return it unconditionally to the Turks was deemed impossi­
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ble, for that would create a "tongue" of Turkish land stretching 
down from Asia Minor that would separate the proposed Armenian 
state from Syria and Mesopotamia and would serve as a perfect 
outlet for Turkish intrigue in all three areas. Neither the British 
nor the French wanted this. Therefore, Berthelot proposed that the 
Kurdish territory should indeed be returned to Turkish sovereignty, 
but given a great deal of local autonomy under joint Anglo-French 
supervision and control. To this Curzon countered with the suggestion 
that the area should be separated from Turkey and left entirely on 
its own, guaranteed against Turkish aggression but without any "for­
mally appointed advisors, whether British or French." l9 
One must infer from this that the British (and the French as well, 
for Berthelot accepted this scheme) sought to wash their hands of 
the problem by ignoring it. It was assumed that the Kurds would 
be unable to interfere outside their mountain valleys and that there­
fore the best solution would be to leave them to their own tribal 
rivalries. This attitude was strengthened by news of a Kurdish-
Armenian agreement in which each recognized the other's claims 
and both asked for the creation of two separate states under a single 
mandate. This show of amicability between the two traditionally 
antagonistic groups eased the situation considerably and made it 
easier for Curzon and Berthelot to agree that the Kurd should be 
left to his own devices.20 
Mosul 
Although Curzon and Berthelot had agreed on the general terms 
of a Kurdish settlement, delineation of the geographical limits of 
the Kurdish state had to await a decision on the Mosul vilayet 
boundaries, for this vilayet was to remain under British direction 
and control. 
Mosul had been awarded to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
because of Lord Kitchener's aversion to having territory controlled 
by Britain bounded by land allotted to Russia.21 Under the original 
plans for Turkish partition, this would have been the case had Britain 
held Mosul. This cession to France had been a serious mistake, for 
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the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which Great Britain held the 
controlling interest, had obtained a concession to all oil exploitation 
in the Mosul vilayet just prior to the outbreak of the war. To cover 
this, the French had agreed that any British concessions obtained 
before the war from the Turks would not be prejudiced even if they 
fell within the French sphere of influence. However, to have any 
territory under British economic development and French political 
control would create a highly volatile situation, and both governments 
realized this. When Clemenceau visited London in December, 1918, 
Lloyd George immediately broached this subject, and received Cle­
menceau's consent to the attachment of Mosul to the British sphere 
in Mesopotamia.22 
The French subsequently asserted that Clemenceau had agreed 
to the Mosul cession only on the condition that France would have 
a share in developing the oil resources, that Britain would support 
the remaining provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the face 
of American opposition, and that France would receive mandates 
to all the territory assigned to it in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
including the four interior cities.23 The British maintained, however, 
that no promises other than a broad one that Syria should be in 
the French sphere had been made and that any concession regarding 
a French share in the exploitation of Mosul oil would be granted 
only in return for additional British rail and pipeline rights.24 
The truth on the question of promises is not easily ascertainable. 
Both sides were agreed that Britain should have Mosul. It is hard 
to believe that the British, with their pro-Arab policy, would have 
consented in December, 1918, to French conditions that so 
thoroughly limited Arab claims. Yet it is even more inconceivable 
that Clemenceau would have made such a gift without obtaining 
concessions of some sort in return. Certainly, beginning in January, 
1919, the French contended otherwise. Later, Clemenceau stated: 
"I cannot admit that I consented without an equivalent to the exten­
sion of the British mandate to Mosul and Palestine. It would have 
been unprecedented that such concessions should have been made 
without any precise definition on paper, all the advantage being 
on the one side." 25 Or, as Berthelot put it in February, 1920: "M. 
Clemenceau in London had, no doubt, made certain general state­
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ments out of the generosity of his heart; but he at present only had 
a very vague recollection of any promises which he may have made, 
and those promises did not constitute any sound basis for claiming 
concessions." 26 This sums up the question nicely. Regardless of what 
was said in December, 1918, the agreement was purely verbal. No 
written memorandum of the conversation had been made, and, 
therefore, the question for all intents and purposes remained as open 
as before.27 
Oil Rights 
In December, 1918, the French started pressing for an Anglo-
French agreement regarding the division of oil resources in the Near 
East and Mediterranean regions. Although the British Petroleum 
Executive was eager to open negotiations out of fear that refusal 
would lead to a Franco-American agreement to which Britain would 
be forced to subscribe, the Foreign Office, led by Lord Curzon, 
objected to any such undertaking. Curzon consistently maintained 
that no discussions should be held until a territorial settlement had 
been decided on by the Peace Conference. It was decided, never­
theless, that the British government should indicate its willingness 
to cooperate with the French and to grant them some share in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, but that "no scheme could be agreed 
to in detail until after the Peace Conference." 28 Despite this stand, 
at an interdepartmental conference held in Paris on February 1, 
it was decided that France should be offered a 25 percent share 
in the Turkish Petroleum Company. A memorandum to this effect 
was sent Balfour asking for his approval, which was subsequently 
received. Sir John Cadman of the Petroleum Executive was entrusted 
with the negotiations, with a maximum of 30 percent set as the highest 
allowable French share.29 
Meanwhile Lord Curzon had become aware of what was happen­
ing in Paris and had sent a disapproving dispatch asking for informa­
tion.30 This request was never answered. Sir Louis Mallet, Balfour's 
private secretary, noted that Cadman had taken to London the docu­
ment initialed by Balfour approving the specific proposals because 
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"he wanted to have this to show to Lord Curzon, so that I hardly 
think this requires an answer."31 Curzon, however, was not satisfied 
by Cadman's explanations and again wrote Balfour asking if he had 
indeed consented to negotiations then underway in London. On 
March 17, Balfour, unaware of the specific course the negotiations 
were taking, replied that although it was imperative that the French 
understand that Britain accepted their participation in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, it would be better not to negotiate on details 
until the territorial settlement had been decided on by the Peace 
Conference.32 Thus, while the Petroleum Executive believed it was 
proceeding with Balfour's approval, to the Foreign Office this hardly 
seemed to be the case. 
Cadman, in the meantime, had negotiated an agreement with 
Senator Henry Berenger, the French commissioner general of petro­
leum products, who had come to London specifically for this purpose. 
A draft was submitted to various British departmental offices on 
March 13.33 This document, which became known as the Long-
Berenger Agreement, spelled out in detail the terms of a settlement 
governing the distribution of oil rights in the Near East. France and 
Britain agreed to split evenly all rights obtained by either nation 
in Russia, Rumania, and Galicia. France would obtain 34 percent 
of all "disposable" oil in the British Crown colonies; Britain would 
receive the same concession from France. France would obtain the 
25 percent share in the Turkish Petroleum Company previously held 
by Germany, but would have to reserve 5 percent of this holding 
for native government investment should this be desired. Finally, 
Britain would have the right to build two pipelines across territory 
mandated to France from Mosul to the Mediterranean.34 
Despite the fact that Curzon remained dubious as to the authori­
zation behind the scheme, the British government approved the 
agreement, contingent upon the successful conclusion of negotiations 
that would give the British government control of the Royal Dutch 
Shell Combine and thus a 75 percent interest in the Turkish Petro­
leum Company. This was achieved and approved on May 8, and 
the way was cleared for the formal British confirmation of the Long-
Berenger Agreement on May 16, 1919.35 
The most interesting fact concerning the Long-Berenger negotia­
tions, however, was that until May 21 apparently neither Lloyd 
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George nor Clemenceau knew that they had taken place or that 
an agreement existed. Information regarding the agreement reached 
them at the worst possible moment, for it was on May 21 and 22 
that the crisis over Clemenceau's refusal to send delegates with the 
investigatory commission to Syria reached its peak.36 Neither Cle­
menceau nor Lloyd George professed to know anything about the 
agreement, nor was either in a mood to recognize any sort of cooper­
ation between their two nations. The result was that on May 21, 
Lloyd George angrily wrote Clemenceau canceling all arrangements 
regarding pipe and railroad lines from Mosul to the Mediterranean.37 
Although it is not at all clear that his original intent also involved 
the abrogation of the Long-Berenger arrangements concerning oil, 
the next day the discussion in the Council of Four became so acri­
monious that Lloyd George indicated that he regarded his letter 
as applying to that agreement as well. To this Clemenceau curtly 
assented.38 
In the aftermath of these events, Lloyd George set out to find 
out who was responsible for the Cadman-Berenger negotiations. 
From this investigation two interesting facts emerged. The first was 
that neither Long nor Cadman, nor anyone in the Petroleum Execu­
tive, was aware of Lloyd George's conversation about Mosul with 
Clemenceau the previous December. Nor did the political and eco­
nomic sections of the Foreign Office have any record of it.39 The 
second was the interesting position taken by the prime minister 
regarding the general question of an agreement regarding oil rights. 
In a memorandum dated July 10, 1919 he noted: 
I knew nothing about this Oil agreement until it was casually mentioned 
to me, by someone not connected with the Foreign Office, in the course 
of a conversation in Paris. I heard of it with great surprise. As the negotia­
tions with the French government on the Syrian question were in my hands, 
I certainly thought I ought to have been informed of an agreement which 
had been negotiated which directly affected the position. On merits I am 
against entering into any arrangement about oil with the French until we 
have first of all determined the boundaries. The proposed agreement seemed 
to me to place us entirely in the hands of the French and unless we have 
direct access to the Mediterranean that will always be the case. That is, 
therefore, the first question to determine and until it is decided these 
negotiations ought not to be proceeded with. 
I have another objection to these negotiations. I feel strongly that the 
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discussions between France and ourselves on important questions of policy 
ought not to be mixed up with arrangements about oil in which private 
companies are involved.40 
This attitude reflected traditional concepts regarding the separation 
of business and politics, the corollary of which was the wartime slogan 
"business as usual." The British, free traders by nature, clung to 
this concept long after it had been abandoned by others. True, the 
principles had often been violated during the war, but that had been 
a matter of necessity not of right. Also, since the British occupied 
the area in question, they held the upper hand and clearly saw no 
reason to commit themselves until the territorial issue was definitely 
settled. In any case, the British position prevailed, and during the 
summer of 1919 was reiterated time and again. American requests 
for information regarding the agreement brought only the reply that 
the matter was being held in abeyance.41 
All requests by representatives of private companies to undertake 
work on previous concessions or to reconnoiter the territory for 
possible new ones were refused. Two Zionist geologists were allowed 
to scout in Palestine; on one other occasion a private company agent 
did slip into Mesopotamia, much to the dismay of the British Foreign 
Office. The only sanctioned exploration in areas occupied by British 
troops was by British government agents. This policy was defended 
by the contention that these were agents of the government and 
not of private companies. Considering the British government's inter­
est in both the Anglo-Persian and the Royal Dutch Shell companies, 
this hardly served as much of a reassurance to the Americans and 
French. To make matters worse, Curzon bluntly told the American 
ambassador that "this is an investigation on behalf of H. M. Govern­
ment whose intentions for the present are to take all necessary 
measures to utilize oil products discovered in occupied territory to 
their own advantage."42 It is obvious that the British stand was not 
taken purely on the high moral grounds of separation of business 
and politics that Lloyd George so assiduously professed.43 
From August 12, when the final correspondence concerning the 
abrogation of the Long-Berenger Agreement took place,44 until the 
Lloyd George-Clemenceau conversations of December 11, no discus­
sion concerning oil occurred between the British and the French 
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on any level. Nor was there any public concern about the problem. 
During the fall of 1919 a great debate raged in the pages of the 
Times as to whether Mesopotamia was worth retaining, even as a 
mandate. Yet in the whole discussion no mention was made of oil, 
even by those favoring its retention. In the same way, Sir Arnold 
Wilson gives no impression that oil was considered a particularly 
vital factor. Later, in 1924, Curzon was to assert in a letter to the 
Times: "During my tenure in the Foreign Office . .  . oil had not 
the remotest connexion with my attitude or with that of His Majesty's 
government on the Mosul question, or the Iraq question, or the 
Eastern question in any aspect." 45 This statement, though overdrawn, 
may describe the general attitude of the Foreign Office and the prime 
minister, but it hardly reflects the position of all concerned. Certainly 
there was growing anxiety within certain government offices that 
failure to renegotiate the agreement might result in the breaking 
down of the Royal Dutch Shell Agreement which, as Sir Hamar 
Greenwood, the new minister of petroleum affairs, pointed out, was 
"closely connected with satisfactory arrangements being arrived at 
with the French." 46 Considerable fear existed also that France might 
associate with Standard Oil instead of becoming a junior partner 
with British oil interests.47 
Lloyd George, upon the advice of the cabinet, agreed to "bear 
in mind" the unanimous recommendation of the departments in 
favor of the agreement when he met with Clemenceau on December 
11. "If the conversations took a turn justifying him in resuscitating 
the Agreement, he would not neglect to do so."48 However, when 
the meeting took place Lloyd George was given no opportunity to 
discuss the issue. Instead, Berthelot handed Lord Curzon a memo­
randum concerning the French position on oil. The British were 
charged with attempting to create an oil monopoly "from Egypt to 
Burma and from Circassia to the Persian Gulf."49 French partici­
pation in the development of oil concessions everywhere in the Near 
East, including Persia, was demanded. In a subsequent memoran­
dum, Berthelot defined the issue even more clearly: 
The Mosul concession in so far as France is concerned entails, as an essential 
compensation demanded alike by industry and by the French Parliament, 
strict equality in the exploitation of petroleum in Mesopotamia and Kurde­
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stan. This point carries great importance, by reason of the absolute lack 
of petroleum in France and her needs. Like iron and coal, petroleum has 
assumed a vital part in the independence and "self-defense" of all the 
nations of the world. The willingness of France and England to arrive 
at an agreement, in order to ensure peace, must be clearly manifested 
in the industrial as well as in other spheres. The principle once admitted, 
the conditions regarding the passage and freedom of the pipelines will 
be easy to regulate.50 
The contention that France should be given a share in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company or that the oil reserves of Mosul and Kurdistan 
should be shared equally was rejected out of hand by the British. 
Berthelot and Berenger accepted this refusal calmly, for both were 
convinced that the 25 percent which had been allotted in the Long-
Berenger Agreement was equitable.. They had told this to Clemen­
ceau, but had been instructed to ask for an even division, and they 
had done so without enthusiasm or conviction.51 
Therefore, when Sir John Cadman met with Senator Berenger 
and concluded a new agreement regarding oil resources, it followed 
almost exactly the terms of the Long-Berenger pact. In addition, 
France agreed to a provision calling for two railways to the Mediter­
ranean paralleling the pipelines previously agreed upon.52 This 
agreement was accepted by Curzon and Berthelot as a basis of 
settlement in a meeting on December 23, 1919. Curzon stated that 
he believed Lloyd George had already signified his approval, but 
Berthelot was careful to qualify French acceptance as being depen­
dent on approval by Clemenceau. Once this question was settled, 
Curzon and Berthelot found little difficulty in reaching an agreement 
on the Syria-Mosul boundary line.53 
Here matters rested. The two powers were almost exactly where 
they had been the previous April regarding Mosul and the question 
of oil. The British, however, had succeeded in their policy of putting 
wraps on the whole question until the political and territorial set­
tlement in the Near East had become more clearly defined. Nor 
was the question raised again until the Peace Conference reconvened 
in London in the middle of February, 1920. It is clear that during 
1919 and the first month of 1920, the terms of an oil settlement 
per se caused minimal friction. Moreover, the petroleum question 
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in general was considered far less important than other matters by 
the statesmen primarily responsible for the making of peace with 
Turkey.54 
Syria and Palestine 
The replacement of British by French troops in Syria, which was 
completed by December 10, left two major problems still unsolved. 
The first was the question of the relationship between the French 
and the Arabs; the second involved the Anglo-French dispute over 
the Syrian-Palestine border. 
France and the Arabs 
In accordance with the September agreement, the British turned 
over control of Damascus, Horns, Hama, Aleppo, and the surround­
ing territory to the Arabs, while the western portion of Syria was 
occupied by the French. The exact boundary between the French 
and Arab controlled zones was left open for negotiation between 
Feisal and Clemenceau, and the British went to great lengths to 
persuade Feisal that an agreement with Clemenceau was needed.55 
In late November a temporary arrangement was agreed upon by 
Feisal and Clemenceau. France would not occupy the contested area 
of occupation for three months while negotiations between the two 
leaders continued. In turn, the Arabs withdrew their troops, and 
control of the area was vested in a six-man Arab-French commission 
headed by the French military commander in Syria, General Henri 
Gouraud. This solution hardly served to pacify the area, for during 
the next few months repeated Arab-French skirmishes took place 
and rumors of French intentions to march into the territory circulated 
widely.56 
On January 7, 1920, Feisal left Paris for Syria. He took with him 
an unsigned agreement with Clemenceau, for which he maintained 
he needed to gain support at home before making it official. This 
draft agreement called for Arab recognition of a French mandate 
over all of Syria and Lebanon. In return, France would recognize 
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an Arab state in the area of the four cities, which would be ruled 
by Feisal with the assistance of French political, economic, and 
military advisors. French troops would be concentrated on the Cili­
cian border and would only be called into the Syrian interior upon 
the joint request of the Arab head of state and the French high 
commissioner. The boundary line between this state and a separate 
Lebanon was left for future decision. Thus, although a long-range 
settlement seemed to have been reached, a no-man's-land continued 
to exist, which could and did provide fuel for an ever-increasing 
hostility between the two groups.57 
The Syrian-Palestine Frontier 
The question of the Palestine-Syrian border was one of the issues 
on which not even a tentative agreement was reached in the Anglo-
French December meetings. Here the French based their position 
on the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Berthelot stated that Clemenceau 
believed he had conceded enough in agreeing to a British, rather 
than an international, mandate for Palestine. France would be willing 
to guarantee 33 percent of the waters flowing from Syrian mountain 
ranges into Palestine for the use of the Zionists, but it would not 
accept any boundary revisions. The British demanded with equal 
vigor the extension northward of the Palestine frontier so as to include 
a part of the Litani River valley and the streams flowing south from 
Mount Hermon into the Jordan River. At the same time the British 
indicated that they were willing to drop their insistence that territory 
should be given Britain in order to allow a Mosul-Mediterranean 
railway to pass through British territory. They announced that they 
were studying the feasibility of including the railway within the 
territory originally allotted to Britain in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 
If this proved impossible, the French guarantees given in the Green­
wood-Berenger Agreement would suffice.58 
The discussion, therefore, was carried on solely in terms of Zionist 
needs. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain would have the Palestine 
mandate and France the Syrian helped to stiffen resistance on each 
side. For the British, there was the feeling that Clemenceau was 
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holding out only in order to receive compensation elsewhere. It was 
widely rumored that France wanted British consent to a French 
attempt to obtain Spanish Tangier through direct negotiation with 
Spain. The British, however, had no intention of conceding anything. 
The French Foreign Office, in turn, was disgruntled over previous 
French concessions without a quid pro quo and was determined 
to have no more of it. The upshot was that Curzon and Berthelot 
agreed to disagree and referred the whole matter back to their re­
spective prime ministers.59 
New Anglo-French Complications Appear 
Despite failure to agree on the Palestine and Syrian border ques­
tions and the problem of military aid to Armenia, the Franco-British 
conversations had brought general concurrence on solutions for most 
of the other problems connected with the formulation of a Turkish 
peace treaty. The Anglo-French alliance seemed to have met the 
test in the Middle East and emerged stronger than ever. It appeared 
that little remained to be done, other than to hold formal drafting 
sessions and to "inform" the Italians of the decisions that had been 
made. Yet by the time the Peace Conference did reconvene in 
London in February of 1920, much of the December work had been 
completely undone and relations between the French and British 
had reached a state of high tension. This was due to three develop­
ments: the refusal of the British Cabinet to sanction the Constan­
tinople policy agreed upon in December; the defeat of Clemenceau 
in his candidacy for the French presidency and the creation of a 
new French government headed by Alexandre Millerand; and 
French reluctance to hold formal peace discussions anywhere but 
in Paris. 
British Repudiation of the Constantinople Agreement 
Once the December discussions were concluded, it was necessary 
to present the arrangements to the British and French cabinets for 
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approval. No sooner were they brought before the full British cabinet 
than one of the key issues on which many other agreements were 
based was completely repudiated. On January 6, the plan to exclude 
Turkey from Europe was rejected "by a considerable majority," 
despite its having the support of Lloyd George and Curzon.60 Al­
though the written conclusions of this meeting avoid linking depart­
ments or individuals to the arguments presented, it would appear 
that the Foreign Office stood almost alone in support of the scheme. 
Winston Churchill has described the conflict as follows: 
In these controversies Lord Curzon, mounted upon the Foreign Office, 
rode full tilt against Mr. Edwin Montagu, whose chariot was drawn by 
the public opinion of India, the sensibilities of the Mohammedan world, 
the pro-Turkish propensities of the Conservative Party, and the voluminous 
memoranda of the India Office.61 
Certainly, the India Office, led by the secretary of state for India, 
Edwin Montagu, vehemently opposed the taking of Constantinople 
from the Turks. Montagu regarded the results of the Anglo-French 
conversations as a betrayal of the conclusions reached at the Confer­
ence of Ministers on December 11, which he thought had accepted 
the concept of nominal Turkish sovereignty, if not governmental 
authority, over Constantinople and the Straits.62 Numerous letters 
to British newspapers and personal telegrams to the prime minister 
from Moslem sources sought to buttress Montagu's stand regarding 
Constantinople. Much of this came from an organized lobby known 
as the Central Islamic Society, which had its headquarters in Great 
Britain. Support was also forthcoming from several members of 
Parliament.63 
Not only were Moslems within the British Empire keenly con­
cerned about the possible loss of the holy city of Constantinople, 
the traditional seat of the caliphate, but the Hindu Swarajists, led 
by Mohandas Gandhi, joined with them in this cause. On November 
23, a pan-Indian conference comprising both groups called for the 
preservation of the Ottoman Empire, the maintenance of the cali­
phate at Constantinople, and the assurance that the control of the 
Holy Places in the Hedjaz would be under Arab jurisdiction. The 
Hindu concern was not religious but political. The Moslems in India 
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constituted the single strongest group that supported the British and 
opposed independence. By supporting the Moslem cause, the Hindu 
nationalists sought not only to increase the immediate Anglo-Moslem 
rift but to set themselves up as defenders of Moslem rights in the 
hopes of ultimately obtaining cooperation in the drive for indepen­
dence. If, despite their efforts, the last great city of the Moslem 
world was lost, the resulting Moslem-British rift would serve equally 
well to encourage Moslem support of the nationalist cause.64 
One of the issues that greatly concerned the British cabinet, but 
on which there was no agreement, was the long-term danger of 
Russian ambitions to control Constantinople and the Straits. Though 
in the discussions in the cabinet meetings and ministerial conferences 
the term "bolshevism" was often used, it was always clear that this 
was regarded as being synonymous with the Russian national state. 
Should the Bolsheviks triumph in the Russian civil war, as the British 
and French were agreed was now likely, it would mean a hostile 
rather than friendly government permanently established in power. 
In any case, the British cabinet assumed that General Denikin's 
forces in southern Russia would be destroyed shortly and that Russian 
Bolshevik forces would soon control at least all territory up to the 
newly established independent Caucasus states. The incentives for 
subsequent joint Russian-Turkish action in the Caucasus were obvi­
ous. Those members of the cabinet who favored retaining the Turk 
in Constantinople argued that to expel him would be to invite an 
alliance between the sultan's government and Russia. On the other 
hand supporters of the Curzon-Berthelot agreement argued that "a 
victorious Bolshevist Russia would be infinitely more powerful with 
the Turk at Constantinople," 65 for the Turks would then be able 
to close the Straits in case of war between Russia and Britain. Thus 
it would be far better to have them out of the area completely, for 
a Russo-Turkish alliance would be far less of a threat if Turkish 
sovereignty were limited to Asia Minor.66 
In the cabinet decision, however, none of these factors was as 
important as the opposition of the War Office to the expulsion of 
the Turks from Europe.67 This opposition was not based on any 
ethical, emotional, political, or religious grounds, but rather on the 
issue of practical expediency. As Churchill later put it, "We had 
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not got any soldiers and how could you drive and keep the Turks 
out of Constantinople without soldiers? . .  . As long as the Dar­
danelles could be kept open for the free passage of ships . .  . we 
were content."68 This could be done, the War Office believed, far 
more economically by leaving the Turks in political control. A small 
international force under the direction of a supervisory commission 
could concern itself solely with the running of the Straits. Thus, 
the government, administration, policing, and defense of an interna­
tional state, a state whose inhabitants opposed its very existence, 
would be avoided. An independent state would require a defense 
system and garrison capable of beating back any Turkish attempt 
to regain control. This would be extremely costly both in men and 
materials, particularly because both sides of the Straits would have 
to be defended. It was also maintained that if any Allied supervision 
in Anatolia were contemplated, it could be achieved far more easily 
through control over the sultan and his government at Constantinople 
than by having separate systems of authority for Constantinople and 
Asia Minor. These arguments, touching particularly on the critical 
problem of size and financing of the armed services, must have had 
a tremendous impact on the other members of the cabinet, consider­
ing the antimilitaristic attitude of the general populace and the 
admittedly strained economic conditions that had been partially 
responsible for British withdrawal from the Caucasus.69 
Finally, there was the fact that the vast majority of British troops 
in Near Eastern areas other than Palestine were Indian, many of 
them Moslem.70 If the home draftees were withdrawn their replace­
ments would likely be Indian, and certainly any additional strength 
would have to be. This brought the issue full circle and put the 
religious question in a new light, for it would be difficult to ask 
Indian soldiers to enforce a solution to which so many were com­
pletely opposed.71 
Curzon was extremely bitter about the cabinet defeat, regarding 
it as almost a personal insult, and he vigorously protested the deci­
sion. He was convinced that the Turks could not be managed simply 
by allowing them to remain in Constantinople and then indirectly 
controlling that city. The powers would ultimately be forced to bring 
the Turkish state under relatively close international supervision; 
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the Allies were letting themselves in for a system that "when pro­
duced, . . . may cause some surprise." 72 
This does not mean that Curzon opposed financial and administra­
tive supervision of the Turkish government. Far from it. He had 
willingly assented to French schemes on this matter. But by separat­
ing all European territory from the Turkish state it would always 
be possible, if necessary, to sever all connections with Turkey and 
still retain what was most important, control of Constantinople and 
the Straits. By returning Constantinople, the Allies were binding 
themselves inextricably to involvement in Turkish affairs anywhere, 
at any time, and in any form. This is what Curzon most wished 
to avoid and constituted a danger that the supporters of a Turkish 
Constantinople failed to see. 
In an obvious effort to pin the blame for an unpopular decision 
upon the British (where it rightfully belonged), the French had let 
the press know at the end of December that Constantinople would 
be taken from the Turks, although no official announcement had 
been made.73 The French action complicated matters, for it made 
it much harder to reverse positions. Nonetheless, the move had to 
be made. On January 8, Lloyd George and Curzon journeyed to 
Paris for the closing sessions of the Supreme Council. Although no 
discussion of the Constantinople problem took place in the council 
meetings, it is probable that Lloyd George and Curzon informed 
the French of the change in Britain's attitude as soon as they arrived 
in Paris.74 
On January 11, Berthelot submitted a memorandum to the British 
in which the arguments for both Constantinople solutions were sum­
marized and a plan of organization for each was included.75 This 
memorandum caused a crisis of its own within the British govern­
ment. Montagu and the Foreign Office each prepared draft replies; 
neither was accepted by the full cabinet, which regarded the former 
as too lenient and the latter too severe.76 Lloyd George took the 
highly irregular step of showing Montagu's draft to Venizelos and 
asking for his comments. Venizelos, as might be expected, protested 
against allowing the Turks to cross the Straits and supported a 
boundary at the Chataljah lines. He further argued that this conces­
sion should ensure the outright cession of Smyrna to Greece, a 
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concept that Montagu, of course, did not at all accept. The pro-Greek 
commitment on the part of Lloyd George was never more clearly 
indicated. Recognizing that Venizelos's recommendations could only 
bolster the minority position, Lloyd George sought to bring an out­
side influence to bear on what was essentially an internal split on 
policy questions within the British cabinet.77 
A third draft, based on reluctant consultations between Montagu 
and Curzon, was ultimately prepared. It called for acceptance of 
the Chataljah lines as the western boundary, but at the same time 
waived claims for reparations and limited Allied control over Turkish 
finances specifically to sources of revenue needed to meet military 
occupation expenses, along with service and payments on the prewar 
debt. Smyrna would be returned to Turkish suzerainty with provi­
sions for Greek control of the local government; in Adrianople the 
reverse situation would exist. This draft was circulated to members 
of the cabinet, much to Curzon's displeasure; for as he told Lloyd 
George, "Once the principle (retention or expulsion) is decided I 
think it is the business of the Foreign Office and no other office 
to draw up the scheme." 78 Though Curzon asked for authorization 
to give a copy of the draft to Berthelot, it is not clear whether this 
permission was granted. What is evident is that even after the decision 
on Constantinople there was still a great amount of dissension within 
the British cabinet as to the implementation of the major policy 
decisions that had been taken.79 
The Defeat of Clemenceau 
The confusion within the British cabinet on Turkish policy was 
more than matched by that arising within France by the defeat of 
Clemenceau in the presidential election in January, 1920. Parlia­
mentary elections had been held in November, 1919, under a new 
electoral law that allowed proportional representation in a given 
district only if no party received an absolute majority of the vote. 
This system in turn had led to the election of a right-of-center 
parliament, nationalistic and imperialistic in outlook, more than 50 
percent of whose members were practicing Catholics. 
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In general, the election results indicated popular support for Cle­
menceau's hard-line policy regarding a stern peace with Germany, 
and constituted a repudiation of the more moderate Wilsonian posi­
tion taken by left-of-center groups. However, though there was little 
question of Clemenceau's personal popularity in the nation at large, 
this was not reflected in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies where 
Clemenceau, with his barbed tongue, vehement anticlericalism, 
and rough-and-ready parliamentary tactics had alienated to a greater 
or lesser degree a majority of the legislators. There was also the 
realization that Clemenceau hardly would be willing to play the 
role of public figurehead that was traditional for a French president. 
Clemenceau later confirmed this when he told Jean Martet in June, 
1928: 
I shouldn't have remained in office three months. What they wanted was 
someone who would let them alone. I shouldn't have waited a week before 
going off the deep end. You must realize that if I had agreed to take 
over that job, it wouldn't have been for the purpose of opening Horticultural 
Exhibitions. I should have done or tried to do something.80 
Even so, had Clemenceau actively campaigned or sought the posi­
tion, the legislators would probably never have dared to flaunt public 
opinion. Instead, he allowed his name to be placed on the ballot 
by friends, without ever announcing his candidacy. This vagueness 
left the door open for his enemies to coalesce and unite behind 
former Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Paul Deschanel. When 
a preliminary straw vote on January 16, indicated that in all proba­
bility he would be defeated, Clemenceau withdrew his name and 
two days later submitted his resignation as premier.81 Perhaps the 
soundest comment on his defeat was made by Paul Cambon: 
I do not say that Clemenceau would have made a good President, but 
his designation would have been the fulfillment of the last elections, the 
condemnation of the socialists and radicals, an act of recognition for the 
man who saved the war. From this viewpoint, his defeat has a serious 
portent.82 
Clemenceau was succeeded as premier by Alexandre Millerand, 
who at that time was serving as commissioner general of Strasbourg 
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in charge of the administration of Alsace and Lorraine. A man with 
long parliamentary experience, he had started as a member of the 
Radical Socialist group, but had become increasingly conservative 
since the turn of the century. He had held various portfolios in the 
government and was a veteran of parliamentary affairs. Although 
his cabinet was approved, it was a dubious confirmation and one 
that many thought would last only until the shifting of presidents 
on February 18.83 Millerand took the Foreign Affairs portfolio him­
self; Berthelot, who would be named permanent secretary-general 
of the Quai d'Orsay in September, 1920, became for all intents and 
purposes his second in command and closest advisor. 
Location of the Peace Conference 
The change in French governments brought about a new crisis 
that for a time threatened to stall all negotiations on the Turkish 
settlement. The issue itself was so trivial as to be both amusing and 
ridiculous. The French balked at any suggestion that any of the 
formal work of the Peace Conference, including drafting of the 
Turkish treaty, should be done in London. Instead they envisaged 
the forthcoming London conference scheduled for February as an­
other general discussion of principles. The British, however, refused 
to continue negotiations on the ministerial level in Paris, which meant 
that although some of the expert commissions might remain there, 
the main drafting of the treaty would have to be done in London. 
After much acrimonious discussion, it was agreed that the receiving 
of Turkish delegations and the signing and ratification of the treaty 
should take place in Paris, but that any other discussions which 
necessitated the presence of British ministers would take place in 
London. The French interpreted this to mean Lloyd George alone; 
the British extended it to include all those of ministerial rank. As 
it turned out, once the conference began the French never raised 
the issue in other than a theoretical sense, and the Conference of 
London met and worked with no dissension over this particular 
issue.84 
Thus the stage was finally set for the Peace Conference to begin 
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serious discussion of the Turkish peace terms. Although agreement 
on a wide variety of issues had tentatively been reached between 
the French and British, others remained to be settled. The reversal 
of British policy regarding the Turkish evacuation of Constantinople 
had not been completely worked out within the ranks of the British 
cabinet; moreover, this had an unsettling effect on many other areas 
of agreement. The Italians, of course, had to be informed of the 
decisions that had been made, and in such a manner as to avoid 
too severe an injury to Italian pride.85 
The terms of agreement, though sketched in broad outlines in 
the Anglo-French discussions, remained muddled and lacking in 
precise definition. Two things, however, were apparent from the 
December-January meetings. Both Britain and France were becom­
ing increasingly concerned about the Turkish settlement, and they 
were determined that the solution should be worked out in accor­
dance with their own wishes. Italy was regarded as a necessary 
nuisance, while neither Britain nor France any longer felt obliged 
to consider seriously the wishes of the United States. At the same 
time, there was a growing realization of the ever-declining strength, 
not only of the sultan's government, but of the British and French 
position in the Near East. This was partly due to domestic, economic 
and military conditions, but it was also the result of the growing 
strength of the new Nationalist movement under Mustapha Kemal, 
a factor the European governments were only then beginning to 
recognize. It is to a brief examination of the influence that this 
movement had on the peace negotiations up to the opening of the 
London conference in February, 1920, that we now turn. 
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X * THE TURKISH NATIONALISTS AND

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

T,HE Nationalist movement, 
which first appeared in May, 1919, was founded by Mustapha Kemal 
Pasha, later to be known as Ataturk.1 A general on the Syrian front 
at the end of the war, Mustapha Kemal had distinguished himself 
as commander of the successful defense against the British in the 
Gallipoli campaign. An ardent nationalist, he long had opposed the, 
leadership of Enver Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress 
(C.U.P.). The Nationalist movement was independent of the Young 
Turks in its origins, and subsequent Allied charges that the Nation­
alists were merely a continuation of the old C.U.P. were without 
foundation. 
Program of the Nationalists 
Arriving at Samsun on May 19, 1919, where he had been sent 
by the Constantinople government as inspector general of the Third 
Army, Kemal immediately made contact with resistance leaders. 
Slowly an organization grew that had definite nationalistic aims based 
upon concepts of Turkish national identity, popular sovereignty, and 
cultural and social secularization. Kemal realistically confined his 
territorial ambitions to the preservation of an independent Turkish 
state in that area where Turks constituted the majority of the popula­
tion.2 
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A series of conferences with various important leaders and dele­
gates culminated in September with the Congress of Sivas, at which 
elected delegates from all regions in Anatolia were present. The 
congress adopted a series of resolutions that outlined the basic foreign 
policy to be followed by the Nationalists. These indicated a willing­
ness to accept the frontier outlined in the Armistice of Mudros as 
the boundary of the future Turkish state. At the same time, the 
congress pledged open and forceful resistance to any attempt to create 
an independent Armenia out of this territory or an autonomous 
Greek state at Smyrna. Although completely rejecting any imple­
mentation of the old system of foreign preferential judicial and 
economic rights known as the Capitulations, the resolutions stated 
that Turkey would accept "with pleasure the scientific, industrial, 
and economic assistance of every state which will not set forth impe­
rialistic tendencies with respect to our country and which will respect 
the principles of nationality." 3 The congress, which called itself "The 
Assembly to Defend the Rights and the Interests of the Provinces 
of Anatolia and Roumelia," called upon the government in Constan­
tinople to convoke immediately a National Assembly and submit 
all decisions to it.4 
Kemal, as chairman of the Representative Committee of the As­
sembly, headed the Nationalist organization. Heavy pressure was 
exerted upon the Damad Ferid government in Constantinople in 
an effort to force its resignation. This was done by means of telegrams 
to the Ottoman Parliament demanding the formation of a new cabinet 
favorable to the Nationalists and by the rupture of all com­
munications between Constantinople and Anatolia (which effectively 
proved Kemal's control of the area). When the Damad Ferid cabinet 
fell on October 2, the new grand vizier, Ali Riza Pasha, immediately 
sent his naval minister, Salih Pasha, to confer with Kemal. The two 
men reached an agreement known as the Amasya Protocol, which 
theoretically constituted government recognition of -the aims and 
ambitions of the Nationalist movement. Actually, although Salih 
Pasha signed this document, the government in Constantinople never 
paid any particular attention to it. This was probably due as much 
to Allied pressure as to any basic unwillingness on the part of the 
government to work with the Kemalist organization.5 
232 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
Despite a specific prohibition against it in the Amasya Protocol, 
the government insisted that Parliament should convene in Constan­
tinople. Elections in October returned a strong Nationalist majority. 
Kemal immediately held a series of caucases at Ankara with most 
of the delegates, out of which emerged the National Pact that was 
officially adopted by the Parliament in Constantinople on January 
28, 1920. Based on the principles of the Sivas Declaration, this 
document in addition demanded a plebiscite in Thrace and the 
disputed areas of Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. The necessity of main­
taining the government, the sultan, and the caliphate at Constan­
tinople was vigorously stated, although a conciliatory clause was 
included relative to a possible international agreement on the ad­
ministration of the Straits. The pact reiterated the renunciation of 
the capitulations evident in the Sivas Declaration and the Amasya 
Protocol, and added a clearly worded clause prohibiting any outside 
interference in "political, financial, and other matters." Finally, a 
willingness to conclude minorities agreements similar to those under­
taken by other nations was expressed.6 
With the acceptance of the Nationalist doctrine by the sultan's 
government, the two factions appeared to be united in a single foreign 
policy. In effect, the Allies had been officially notified on the eve 
of the Conference of London as to the kind of peace that the Turks 
considered "the maximum of sacrifice" they could undertake.7 
The Allies and the Nationalists 
All this suggests correctly enough a movement of considerable 
size and significance. But what was the reaction of the Allies .o 
the Kemalist movement as it appeared and rapidly grew stronger 
during 1919 and early 1920? How well informed were the negotiators 
in Paris and London concerning the Nationalist movement, and what 
effect did it have on their own negotiations and plans for peace 
in the Near East? 
It is clear that Kemal's program, his activities, and his plans were 
all well known. In fact, he did his best to publicize them. During 
the spring, summer, and early fall of 1919, Kemal managed to 
 233 TURKISH NATIONALISTS AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
establish contact with several Allied groups and agents. To all he 
expressed the same nationalistic ambitions. In a long meeting with 
General Harbord, head of the American investigating committee 
that had been sent to Armenia, he hinted that American commercial 
and administrative help would be welcomed and left Harbord with 
the impression that the Nationalists would come out publicly in favor 
of an American mandate. From time to time Kemal also met with 
various British and French agents, one of whom even saw Curzon 
personally in the early fall and warned him of the Nationalist danger.8 
In September, 1919, Kemal notified the Supreme Council that 
the Turkish delegation headed by Damad Ferid was not repre­
sentative of the will of the people and served notice that subsequent 
Turkish delegations must be recruited from Nationalist forces. He 
also issued specific protests against the French occupation of Cilicia 
and the Greek invasion of Smyrna.9 
The outward attitude of both the Turkish regime in Constantinople 
and the Allied governments was one of relative unconcern. Dis­
patches to the Times and to the European press in general tended 
to write off the movement as having at best an harrassment poten­
tial.10 However, British and American agents in Turkey were watching 
and worrying about the Kemalist movement from the middle of 
June, and it is evident that the French were equally concerned, for 
both Calthorpe's and Robeck's reports indicate that they were in 
close consultation on this matter with the French high commissioner, 
Albert DeFrance." Although the Turkish government at Constan­
tinople testified to the contrary, the high commissioners persisted 
in regarding the Kemalist movement as a revival of the C.U.P. in 
different plumage. They compelled a reluctant Turkish government 
to order Kemal's recall (Kemal refused and instead resigned from 
the army) and called for the arrest and outlawing of all the Nationalist 
leaders.12 
Actually, Allied policy was far less anti-Nationalist than it seemed. 
As early as July both Admiral Calthorpe and his second-in-command, 
Admiral Webb, had become extremely concerned over the obvious 
weakening of the Constantinople regime. The majority of the reports 
sent to London were increasingly pessimistic about the future of 
the Constantinople government, the ability of the Allies to dictate 
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a peace treaty, or the possibility of a collapse of the Nationalist 
movement. The British and French high commissioners decided that 
Britain and France would take no part in political matters, but would 
support legally constituted sources of authority (the sultan), and 
would oppose any kind of revolution.13 Calthorpe, however, did not 
at first regard a Nationalist takeover as hazardous to Allied plans; 
in fact he commented that there would be "more satisfaction, even 
if there should be more difficulty, in exacting hard terms from the 
Unionists rather than those who, one has reason to believe, are 
fundamentally well intentioned and friendly." 14 He remained con­
fident that the Allies could easily control a Nationalist government 
if it were retained at Constantinople.15 
Despite this yearning for "satisfaction," the British in Constan­
tinople became alarmed when plans for parliamentary elections were 
announced. When they suddenly realized that a Nationalist parlia­
mentary majority was an actual possibility, the idea no longer seemed 
so satisfying. The result was a combined Franco-British decision to 
depart from their political neutrality and encourage the sultan to 
oppose the Nationalist organization more vigorously. This policy of 
support was only verbal, and was limited by very explicit instructions 
from Curzon that it "should on no account be extended to cover 
use of force to prevent accession to power of Committee of Union 
and Progress, nor against individual supporters of Committee as 
such." l6 In other words, in a physical sense the "hands off' policy 
remained in force.17 
The Sivas Conference in September had a profound effect, not 
only on the Turkish government, but on the British and French as 
well. In private conversations, Damad Ferid admitted a total lack 
of control and asked for an Allied military expedition or at least 
permission to send Turkish troops to the interior. British agents in 
the Near East became openly doubtful about controlling the Nation­
alist movement, and for the first time conceded that the organization 
might not be just a revival of the C.U.P. By the middle of September, 
the British and the French high commissioners had decided that 
the Allies "were powerless to apply or give any effective support 
to [the] present Government." 18 The fact that Turkey had two gov­
ernments of at least equal strength was tacitly admitted, and it is 
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evident that the high commissioners held little real hope for rees­
tablishment of authority by the Constantinople government. Both 
commissioners pleaded for a speedy peace treaty and the complete 
withdrawal of Italian and Greek troops from Anatolia, for they were 
agreed that this was the one possible way to prevent a Nationalist 
takeover.19 
By the end of September, Nationalist forces were virtually in 
control of all of Anatolia except for territory occupied by Allied 
troops. All telegraphic communication with Constantinople had been 
stopped, and rail lines were being continually harassed. The grand 
vizier desperately pleaded for permission to send Turkish troops to 
the interior. The British, French, and Italian high commissioners 
sought the opinion of the commander of the Allied forces in Anatolia, 
General Milne, and after much consultation, his advice was unani­
mously accepted. 
We therefore decided to tell the Grand Vizier (1) that despatch of 2,000 
men would be altogether insufficient to re-establish order; . .  . (2) that 
despatch of a larger force would throw country into civil war; (3) that 
to anticipate such an event Allied Military Authorities think that they would 
have to withdraw their troops on Anatolian line at least to Gulf of Ismid; 
(4) that result of this would be to deliver immediately to insurgents the 
railway thus cutting off capital from all connection with Interior and render­
ing revictualing of population impossible; (5) that therefore under Article 
V of Armistice High Commissioners felt unable to authorize proposed 
despatch and disposition of troops.20 
This report, when read in London, was minuted by Lord Hardinge, 
"I must say that we do not really give Damad Ferid a chance, but 
we ought to encourage him if possible," 2I to which Curzon added 
his initials. 
Unable to act, and faced with increasing pressure from the Nation­
alists, Damad Ferid resigned on October 2. Allied responsibility for 
this was extensive. Thomas Hohler summed up the situation well: 
Ferid . . . was always anxious up to the last minute to go in person 
with a force or at least to send a force and we prevented him from doing 
this. The result was that we really helped Mustafa, whose freedom of action 
we could not check, whilst we could, and did check that of Ferid, i.e., 
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the "constituted Government," but on the whole we were undoubtedly 
right for if a force had gone against Mustafa, one of two things would 
have happened. The most probable that the force would have gone over 
to Mustafa's side; the second that a civil war would have been let loose 
on the country, the burden of which in all probability would have fallen 
on the Christians. . .  . I never contemplated that the Allies would reduce 
their military forces so thoroughly before they had made peace and imposed 
their conditions. We have acted on the reverse principle of the Japanese, 
whose old proverb is, that the end of the fight is the right time to tie 
on your helmet.22 
So pessimistic had the British command at Constantinople become 
that a memorandum by Webb, which was sent with de Robeck's 
approval on October 10, stated: 
I cannot too strongly repeat and emphasize that the time has gone by 
when it was possible to assume that any Turkish Government must accept 
any peace which the Allies might choose to offer, and when it was legitimate 
to prefer, if anything, that the reins of power here should be in the hands 
of the Committee of Union and Progress for the sake of the moral effect 
of poetic justice of making those who ruined Turkey subscribe to her death 
warrant. Every day the Armistice is prolonged sees the Turk recovering 
more and more from the overwhelming sense of disaster which General 
Allenby's victorious advances, followed by crushing Armistice terms, in­
stilled into him. . . . The possibility (which every week's delay tends more 
and more to transform into probability) that Turkey will reject the proposals 
of the Allies, must therefore be taken into serious consideration, necessitating 
a review of what means the Allies will, in the event, be prepared to employ, 
in order to secure the execution of the Peace terms they mean to impose.23 
This communication definitely impressed Curzon, for he had it 
sent for examination to British ambassadors at all major capitals.24 
It may have been this that led him to remark to Pichon on November 
12, that unless the peace was made quickly it might not be made 
at all, for there might shortly be no Turkish government with which 
to negotiate. It would have been more accurate had he said that 
a future Turkish government might well be one with which it would 
be impossible to deal.25 
Not only the Foreign Office was impressed by Kemalist strength 
in the fall of 1919. The British War Office was concerned over the 
possible inability of British troops stationed along the Anatolian 
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railway to protect the railway and the British civilians operating it. 
In fact the War Office proposed to evacuate all civilians and perhaps 
even the military detachments should Nationalist pressure become 
too strong.26 
Although Curzon concurred and authorization was granted, the 
decision was greeted with bitter protests from all sides. Robeck 
complained that this retreat would destroy what little British prestige 
remained after previous withdrawals from the Caucasus and Samsun. 
Moreover, a British withdrawal would mean in all probability that 
the French would move in and all Anatolia would come under 
French influence. Robeck strongly opposed giving up the railroad 
"unless it is policy of His Majesty's Government to disinterest them­
selves totally in the future of Turkey." 27 However, the British high 
command in Constantinople urged an end to any form of Turkish 
authority over Constantinople and the Straits. Similar protests came 
from Sir Eyre Crowe and General Milne. The result was that al­
though the authority to withdraw from Anatolia was not rescinded, 
the plan was not immediately put into effect.28 
Effect of the Nationalist Movement on the

Anglo-French December Conversations

There is conclusive evidence that the seriousness of the situation 
was recognized and reported by British agents in the Near East. 
That the French representatives were equally aware of the danger 
is also clear, and it may be assumed that reports similar to those 
sent to the British Foreign Office also reached the Quai d'Orsay.29 
By the end of the year the press of both nations were expressing 
fear and apprehension regarding the Nationalist movement.30 Yet, 
from a first examination of the Anglo-French negotiations that took 
place during December and January, one would hardly guess that 
anyone had ever heard of Mustapha Kemal or the Nationalist move­
ment. The only reference made to Kemal was a brief comment by 
Curzon that "it would be disastrous to dictate a peace which the 
Allies had not the military strength to enforce," to which Berthelot 
replied that he "thought the Nationalist movement . . . was largely 
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bluff, and that a show of force from the points where the Allies 
had troops would be sufficient to show this." 3I Curzon, although 
stating that he was less optimistic, agreed that a way certainly could 
be found to impose peace conditions if the Allies acted in concert. 
Other than this brief discussion, the Nationalist movement was 
not mentioned. Nevertheless, the results of the Anglo-French De­
cember conversations seem to indicate a far greater concern with 
the Nationalist movement than appears on the surface. The decision 
to separate Constantinople and the Straits from Turkey may well 
have reflected a realization of the strength of the Nationalists. Cer­
tainly, in the British cabinet meetings the Nationalist threat was 
discussed.32 It will be remembered that one of Curzon's main reasons 
for wanting the Turks out of Constantinople and the Straits was 
his desire to separate the area completely from the authority and 
control of the weak and unstable regime of the sultan, a regime 
that he realized might well be overthrown by the Nationalists. A 
similar concern over the possibility of a Nationalist takeover in 
Anatolia may help to explain both the Picot-Kemal conversations 
and the French willingness to accept Curzon's arguments relative 
to the Straits area. 
The peace treaty, as outlined in the December Anglo-French 
discussions, was a two-part affair. If all the plans for the control 
of Turkey could be achieved, fine; if not, Anatolia could be released 
and discarded easily, with no loose ties or connections with the 
important areas of the Arab world or with Constantinople and the 
Straits. Only Smyrna remained to hinder the separation. Here Curzon 
had long opposed the Greek military action, and he agreed with 
Berthelot that Turkish sovereignty should be restored. Thus it would 
seem that the scheme as envisaged by the negotiators in December 
was a combination of "what we would like" and "what we must 
have," with great care taken to keep the two from becoming inex­
tricably entangled. The refusal of the British cabinet to accept this 
program on January 6, 1920, immediately mixed the necessary and 
the merely desired completely together. What the cabinet, and par­
ticularly the War Office, apparently failed to realize was that even 
if Allied forces were withdrawn from Anatolia, as long as Constan­
tinople remained the capital of Turkey and under foreign occupation, 
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Allied responsibility for events in Asia Minor was unavoidable. As 
a result, from that time on the negotiation of the Treaty of Sevres 
proceeded on the premise of Allied involvement in all of Turkey, 
and Curzon's efforts to maintain carefully drawn and clearly denned 
distinctions between the essential and the nonessential went for 
naught. 
Therefore, it would seem that the December conversations showed 
evidence of an unmentioned, but great, underlying concern about 
the Nationalist threat and the limitations on the peace treaty that 
it might well impose. Had the final peace treaty been formulated 
along the lines drawn up at that time, it might have had a chance 
at long-range success. This is not to say that Curzon's wish to deprive 
the Turks of their capital was "right" in any moral or ethical sense, 
but it was practical, and had both the advantage of being reasonably 
attainable and of giving the Allies control of the Straits without 
involving them in Anatolian-Turkish affairs. But by the time the 
Conference of London opened in February, all this had gone by 
the boards. The decision to ignore reality had been made. It would 
be all or nothing in the best traditions of nineteenth-century control 
and the establishment of spheres of influence. 
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XI * THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON:

THE TURKISH STATE

T,HE Conference of London 
convened on February 12, 1920, and continued to meet until April 
10. Progress was slow because Premier Millerand was only able to 
take part in discussions for the first three days of the conference 
and again from February 23 to February 25.' His absence proved 
quite irritating to Lloyd George, who had spent so much time in 
Paris during the previous year. 
During the first two weeks of the conference, the Supreme Council 
considered the whole range of topics relating to the Turkish peace 
treaty. In most cases, the questions were then referred to special 
commissions for further study. The commissions were requested to 
submit their recommendations in the form of draft articles, and their 
reports were eventually considered by the Committee of Foreign 
Ministers and Ambassadors. 
This committee, which was created on February 27 at Lloyd 
George's suggestion, deserves a word of explanation and comment. 
It was established for a number of reasons. By delegating the drafting 
of the treaty to this subordinate group, the Supreme Council was 
able to discuss other business such as the problem of high prices 
and the exchange of currency in Europe, which was a major concern 
during March and early April. In addition, with Millerand gone 
most of the time and Nitti absent after March 4, Lloyd George was 
freed from attending many meetings from which his Italian and 
French counterparts were absent. By absenting himself, he, like 
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Millerand and Nitti, was able to maintain the position of reserving 
final assent on issues decided by the committee. With this one major 
restriction, the Committee of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors 
was empowered to draft and approve clauses of the final treaty, 
and between February 27 and April 10 it was able to reach a final 
settlement on many difficult problems.2 
Constantinople 
Constantinople provided very little difference of opinion among 
the powers. At no time in the discussions was the slightest reference 
made to the events and decisions of the past two months. Aware 
that Lloyd George's hands were tied by the cabinet decision of 
January 6, Millerand strongly supported keeping the Turks in Con­
stantinople. He argued that conditions had altered considerably since 
1918 and that the expense of forcing the Turks out was more than 
France could undertake. Nitti was even more blunt: "We must not 
antagonize the populations of Turkey; we must be liberal, and we 
must pursue economical advantage . . . rather than political 
changes." 3 
How this must have infuriated Lloyd George and Curzon! Lloyd 
George could not refrain from listing reasons for Turkish expulsion. 
He emphasized that in his own personal view "we might now really 
be missing a great opportunity of ridding Europe once and for all 
of this pest and potential source of trouble." 4 But ultimately, bound 
as he was by the cabinet decision, there was nothing for him to 
do but give in. 
This decision appeared almost immediately in the French press. 
In Britain the general reaction was hostile. The government was 
bitterly attacked in most of the newspapers and periodicals, and 
the announcement touched off a lengthy debate and questioning 
of Lloyd George in the House of Commons. In contrast, the French 
and Italians greeted the news enthusiastically, the Italian press mis­
takenly ascribing the decision to a firm Italian-French stand that 
had forced the British to give in. In Constantinople, a delighted 
Turkish government tended to credit a combination of Mustapha 
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Kemal and the French for reversing the British position, while in 
the United States demonstrations opposing the decision occurred.5 
The Straits 
The question of the administration, control, and extent of the 
Straits zone was far more difficult to resolve. It was necessary to 
determine whether any of the land in the Straits area should be 
placed under international control, and how much, if any, should 
be left to Turkey. Moreover, since Constantinople would be a part 
of Turkey, the issue of control of the Straits was inextricably entwined 
with the problem of the degree and kind of authority that the Allies 
would wield over the Turkish nation. This involvement was exactly 
what Curzon had desperately sought to avoid, and it must have been 
a bitter man who found himself the chief architect of a treaty much 
of which he personally opposed.6 
All of these questions were referred to various commissions, whose 
reports were eventually considered either by the Supreme Council 
or the Committee of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. After much 
discussion and redrafting, an agreement was eventually reached. The 
draft called for the creation of a Straits Commission made up of 
representatives of France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Ru­
mania. The four great powers were each to have two votes, the others 
only one. Provision was made for the eventual participation of the 
United States, Russia, and Bulgaria. The commission would be com­
pletely separate from all organizations having anything to do with 
the government of Turkey and would have its loans secured "as 
far as possible" 7 by the tolls levied on ships passing through the 
Straits. 
Although the commission was to have no sovereignty over any 
territory it would have the right to occupy militarily a demilitarized 
zone on both sides of the Straits and the Sea of Marmara. The Straits 
themselves were to be open in times of war and peace to ships of 
all nations that belonged to the League, had received the approval 
of the League of Nations, or were members of the Allied and As­
sociated powers. Should Turkey become a belligerent, but not an 
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aggressor nation, materials or ships of war belonging to its enemies 
would not be allowed to pass through the Straits. The commission 
would regulate everything relating to the passage of ships through 
the Straits or to shipping in the port of Constantinople. Therefore, 
matters such as sanitation, control of quarantine, and loading and 
unloading of goods would come within its purview. Moreover, the 
commission would have control over any judicial questions that arose 
in connection with the administration of the Straits and the passage 
of ships through the area, or with men attached to such ships.8 
In the negotiations that led to the final framing of these articles, 
only the admission of Japan as a two-vote member of the commission 
presented a problem worthy of note. Rarely voicing an opinion or 
taking part in the discussion, the Japanese delegates were often 
overlooked by the other powers, who forgot that Japan was there 
as a full-fledged equal of the other nations. Thus, the Western 
delegates were completely taken aback when Japan insisted on its 
right to membership on the Straits Commission. The Japanese argued 
that since the Straits were to be opened to the world as an interna­
tional waterway, Japan, as one of the major Allies, should have a 
place on the governing commission. It was intolerable and unjust 
that Japan should be left out when provision was made for the 
eventual membership of Russia and the United States.9 
The other powers were so thoroughly surprised that they agreed 
at first, but soon Britain and France began to object.10 Their position 
centered on Japan's lack of commercial interest in the Mediterranean 
and the fact that it was not a Mediterranean power, but their ar­
guments were weak and lacking in conviction." What really bothered 
Britain and France was that Japan would have to be admitted as 
a two-vote member and would, therefore, expect to take a regular 
turn as chairman. Whereas Russian and American membership was 
unlikely in the near future, Japanese membership would be immedi­
ate and would provide a threat to the closed group administration 
of the Straits that Britain and France had in mind. Instead of control­
ling half of the votes on the commission, France and Britain would 
be in a minority. From the beginning the Italians, who technically 
supported their Western allies, made it clear that should Japan insist 
Italy would not oppose Japanese membership on the Straits Commis­
sion.12 
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Eventually the powers agreed, with a total lack of grace, to Japan's 
admission. Lord Curzon could not resist asking whether Japan was 
willing to undertake military responsibility in the Straits, to which 
Viscount Chinda smoothly replied that this would depend on the 
share that Japan was granted in the actual administration of the 
13 area.
Financial Control of the Turkish State 
Closely tied in with the questions involving the Straits Commission 
were those of financial control of the whole Turkish state. The task 
of formulating specific provisions was delegated to a special subcom­
mission, which was instructed that no large-scale indemnity was to 
be demanded from Turkey. At the same time, all occupation costs, 
damages to foreign or Turkish Christian refugees, and the Turkish 
share of the prewar Ottoman Debt were to be safeguarded.14 
Eventually, financial clauses were drawn up, examined by the 
Supreme Council and the Committee of Foreign Ministers and Am­
bassadors, and revised several times. Agreements were reached, 
broken, re-argued, and reached again. In time all disputes but two 
were resolved, and by the time the London conference adjourned 
a series of draft articles had been approved.15 
Financial Clauses 
The provisions for financial control called for the formation of 
a three-power Financial Commission that would oversee the workings 
and personnel of the Turkish financial system through a network 
of Turkish supervisors. The Financial Commission would have to 
approve the government's budget before it was submitted to the 
Turkish Parliament, and no amendment would be allowed that did 
not meet with the approval of the commission. The commission 
would have a hand in the regulation of the currency and would 
retain a veto over the contracting of internal or external government 
loans.16 
Formal reparations were specifically renounced, although it was 
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decided that in lieu of reparations the territories that were being 
separated from the Turkish state would not have to pay for property 
formerly owned by the Ottoman government. The Turks were to 
be held responsible for obligations pertaining to occupation costs 
and damages to foreign nationals, though no provision was made 
for the claims of displaced Turkish Christians. To meet these obliga­
tions, "all resources of the Turkish government," with the exception 
of those pledged to the Ottoman Debt, were to be "placed at the 
disposal of the Financial Commission." 17 
The priority scale for the dispersal of these revenues became the 
source of much animated Anglo-French discussion. Although all the 
Allies agreed that revenues that had previously been pledged to cover 
the service of the Ottoman Debt should continue to be at the disposal 
of the Debt Council, the French were fearful that these revenues 
would not be enough to meet the Debt service allotted to the new 
Turkish state. Therefore, they demanded that the Financial Commis­
sion use its funds first and foremost to cover any such deficiency 
should it arise. The British were far less concerned about the Debt, 
for only 11 percent of the bonds were held by British shareholders 
compared to 60 percent by French. Instead, they insisted that the 
primary charge on the commission, after its own expenses and current 
occupation costs were taken care of, should be for Allied occupation 
costs incurred since the armistice in areas that remained part of 
the Turkish state.18 
The dispute was eventually bypassed, if not solved, by giving 
priority to occupation expenses, both past and present, and then 
inserting a provision that the Financial Commission should arrange 
to meet these expenses in such a manner as to enable it to cover 
any deficiency in the Debt service that might appear. Although all 
were agreed that no charge should be made for occupation costs 
in areas detached from Turkey and retained as mandates by the 
Allies, the British maintained that someone should pay the cost of 
the British occupation of Syria. The logical power was France. The 
matter was referred to Paris and apparently met with a refusal, for 
the financial clauses as finally formulated called for Turkish payment 
of the expenses of occupation forces in territory "ceded . .  . to a 
Power other than the Power which had borne the expenses of occupa­
tion." 19 
248 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
One other issue caused some difficulty. The British, French, and 
Italians sought to insert a clause granting the Financial Commission 
sole power to raise or lower customs rates from the flat 11 percent 
that had been in effect on all items before the war. The Japanese, 
who were not to be represented on the Financial Commission, op­
posed this clause because they felt that higher tariffs on a specific 
type of goods might hurt one country more than another. To meet 
this criticism, the others reluctantly agreed to let the initiative for 
tariff changes come from the Turkish government, with the commis­
sion only retaining the right of approval. Although the ultimate 
decision still remained with the Financial Commission, this meant 
that all customs changes would have to be requested by the Turkish 
regime instead of being imposed directly by the commission, and 
therefore the commission's ability to impose swift and arbitrary tariff 
alterations was greatly reduced.20 
Ottoman Debt 
The question of the Ottoman Debt was also the source of dif­
ferences between the Allies. The British sought the abolishment of 
the old Ottoman Debt Council and the merging of its functions with 
that of the new Financial Commission. From an administrative point 
of view such a solution made great sense, yet it was vigorously 
opposed by the French. Ottoman Debt bondholders in France consti­
tuted a vociferous and powerful lobby, so much so that the French 
government would agree to nothing that might displease them. 
Therefore, Berthelot and Cambon steadfastly maintained that since 
the Debt Council was the organization that had been agreed upon 
at the time the loans were negotiated, no alteration in its structure 
could be made without the bondholders' consent.21 
A tentative settlement was finally reached when the British gave 
up their insistence on a firm commitment regarding the ending of 
the Debt Council and accepted a milder statement that the consent 
of the bondholders would be necessary for the unification of the 
two bodies. This consent would be sought "as soon as possible, with 
a view to the fusion of the two bodies taking place not later than 
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the expiry of the present term of the Council" (1923).22 Even this 
solution was not approved by the French, and the clause was left 
in the draft articles subject to the receipt of new French instructions 
from Paris and a final decision by the Supreme Council.23 
A second question concerning the Debt Council involved the 
dispersal of funds. Some £5,000,000 in gold had been deposited in 
German banks, either by the Ottoman Debt Council or the German 
government as security against wartime issues of Turkish currency. 
The French and Italians wanted this money pledged to the Financial 
Commission for the restoration and stabilization of Turkish currency. 
The British, concerned with recouping the cost of their heavy military 
expenditure in the Near East, wanted no such restriction. Eventually, 
a compromise was reached. The funds that had been deposited by 
the German government were to be given to the Financial Commis­
sion with no strings attached. The smaller amount that had been 
loaned by the Ottoman Debt Council to the Ottoman government 
was to be returned to the council.24 
A decision was also reached on an apportionment formula by 
which the various shares of the Ottoman Debt would be divided 
among the territories of the old empire: 
The amount shall bear the same ratio to the total required for the service 
of the debt as the average revenue of the ceded territory bore to the average 
revenue of the whole Empire (including in each case the yield of the customs 
surtax imposed in the year 1907) over the three financial years 1909-10, 
1910-11, 1911-12.25 
Economic Clauses 
The economic clauses, which dealt with property and commercial 
affairs, never provoked much high-level disagreement or, for that 
matter, even discussion. They provided for the restoration of all 
concessions, agreements, and property rights involving Allied na­
tionals on the basis of their status before August 1, 1914. In areas 
in which a power had a mandate it would have to buy out concessions 
belonging to other nations or their nationals. All German, Hungarian, 
or Bulgarian interests would have to be liquidated. If necessary, the 
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price would be arbitrated by a three-man committee, one from each 
side and a third either agreed on by the nations concerned or ap­
pointed by the League of Nations. 
All concessions granted after the signing of the armistice were 
declared null and void; the same held true for concessions granted 
to enemy nations since the outbreak of the war. Disposition of 
concessions granted to Allied nationals during the war years was 
to be left to the discretion of the Allies. The right to transfer conces­
sionary rights from one Allied company to another was recognized.26 
Capitulations 
The question of the capitulations, covering as it did a wide variety 
of problems, could not be settled in London. For some time the 
European powers had advocated abandoning most of the intricate 
system of economic and judicial rights and privileges that had ac­
crued over the years to the various foreign nations and their nationals 
residing in Turkey. Yet there was great disagreement as to the speed 
and means required to obtain this end. The French pressed for a 
quick settlement by a commission that would sit in either London 
or Paris. The British were in far less of a hurry and argued that 
the committee should sit in Constantinople where it could consult 
those affected by the capitulations, that is, the British, French, and 
Italian residents of Turkey. The outcome was generalization and 
postponement. The draft provision called for the establishment of 
a four-power commission after the ratification of the treaty, but no 
mention was made of either its location or its method of procedure. 
Turkey was to agree in advance to accept whatever reform system 
was eventually worked out. Until such time, the old capitulatory 
system would be continued.27 
An examination of the financial and economic provisions drawn 
up in London and eventually incorporated into the Treaty of Sevres 
leads to the conclusion that the powers had no intention of leaving 
any real authority or control in these matters to the Turks. Although 
all the provisions were supposedly undertaken solely for Turkey's 
benefit, the conclusion reached by Donald Blaisdell best sums up 
the actual situation: 
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Not a single item of the economic order in Turkey as forecast by the 
Sevres Treaty would have remained within the sole jurisdiction of the 
Turkish Government. . . . By this ring of economic servitudes, Turkey would 
have become effectively shackled to the Allied powers. Such, it seems, is 
the only rational interpretation to be placed upon their phrase "to afford 
some measure of relief and assistance to Turkey."28 
Spheres of Influence in Turkey 
Perhaps the thorniest issue that confronted the powers during the 
initial stage of the London conference was that of zones or spheres 
of influence within the proposed Turkish state. This was necessitated 
by French interests in Cilicia and Italian claims for compensation 
for British and French mandates in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and 
Syria. Even though the validity of the Saint Jean de Maurienne 
Agreement was denied by Britain and France, they realized that 
some sort of adjustment for Italy would have to be made. Indeed, 
Article 9 of the Treaty of London specifically stated that compensa­
tion would be arranged. Therefore, in the December discussions 
Berthelot and Curzon had agreed that an Italian economic sphere 
of some sort in Turkey might serve the purpose.29 
Extent of Allied Control 
This problem, however, was only part of the larger question of 
the extent and type of control the Allies would wield over Turkey. 
All were agreed that whatever forms such control took, it must be 
indirect. All were of the opinion that a close control of financial 
affairs was essential. The real issue was whether this control should 
extend into other areas. Both Italy and France advocated a great 
deal of Allied administrative as well as financial authority in Ana­
tolia. As Cambon put it: "The power [of] controlling the purse would 
really mean control of the whole Government."30 Cambon readily 
admitted that in his view the plans for financial supervision called 
for governing the country, albeit indirectly. The Turks liked having 
someone tell them what to do. Besides, "if the Powers did not govern 
the country, who would? . .  . If the Powers did not seize this oppor­
tunity to intervene and to control the administration of Turkey, the 
Turks would merely relax into their old corrupt ways." 3I 
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This went far beyond anything the British wanted, and Lloyd 
George immediately placed himself in opposition. "If Turkey desired 
to govern herself in her own way, he did not see how we could 
resist her [in] this demand. After all, Turkey was no more incompe­
tent than Persia." 32 Moreover, he was afraid that any joint Allied 
administration of the country would result in endless antagonisms 
and quarrels among the powers. Finally, he broached the important 
question of enforcement. The more administrative control that was 
undertaken, the more committed the Allied powers would be to insist 
upon enactment of governmental provisions even if it necessitated 
military action. 
This was exactly what Lloyd George and Curzon had most wanted 
to avoid with their scheme for separating Constantinople from Tur­
key. As long as Constantinople was to be kept apart, Britain had 
been willing to accede to France's views regarding control of the 
Turkish state since their success or failure would not affect the 
administration of the Straits zone. However, now that Constantinople 
and the Straits were to be part of that state, the powers would be 
obliged to exercise fully any administrative authority they undertook 
within the Turkish state. Therefore, from the British viewpoint, it 
seemed imperative that control should be held to an enforceable 
minimum, aimed only at "measures to ensure the liquidation of the 
Turkish debt." 33 
The Italian-French position was motivated by hopes of achieving 
spheres of influence within the Turkish state. In this the French 
took the lead due to their heavy involvement in Cilicia, but they 
received strong support from the Italians, for Italy recognized that 
the status of France in Cilicia would basically determine Italy's 
position in whatever zone of influence it eventually received. 
In Cilicia, the French found themselves in an increasingly uncom­
fortable position. Opposition in Cilicia had pointed up the difficulty 
of maintaining authority against the wishes of the population. By 
the beginning of February, this opposition had turned into a full-scale 
revolt in which the local inhabitants were assisted by Nationalist 
troops. The French had recruited many Armenians into their army, 
in fact the vast majority of the occupying troops were Armenians 
or black-African colonials. The Turks especially resented this, and 
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the revolt brought forth a general massacre of the Armenians in 
Cilicia, particularly in the area around Marash. It was apparent that 
military measures on a considerable scale would be necessary to 
maintain order.34 
All of this led Berthelot to announce on February 16 that "the 
French Government did not intend permanently to occupy Cilicia, 
they intended eventually to withdraw, merely maintaining a certain 
control, probably similar to the financial control which had been 
proposed by the French to be applied to Turkey." 35 The withdrawal 
would, of course, "depend on the intentions of Italy in Asia Minor." 36 
This brought the issue out in the open. The French advocacy of 
supervisory authority over Turkey was based on the desire to with­
draw troops, yet maintain administrative and financial control over 
Cilicia, which would be part of the Turkish state. Not only did the 
French envisage having economic priority in Cilicia, but they wanted 
"French officers . . . appointed to supervise the gendarmerie and 
French advisors or councillors to control the finances and other 
branches of administration." 37 This, they asserted, would be no 
different from what was done for all of Turkey except that the 
instructors and advisors in Cilicia would all be French.38 
Lloyd George vehemently opposed any such solution. He objected 
to the extension of control from the financial into the police and 
judicial fields. Moreover, Lloyd George claimed that the French 
plan meant a virtual mandate, plus the right of economic priority 
in industrial development, which was not part of a normal mandate. 
The appointment of only French, British, or Italian advisors in any 
one area would constitute in effect the partitioning of Turkey. This 
would be in direct opposition to the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and would arouse the wrath of other nations, particularly 
the United States.39 
Berthelot in turn argued that the United States had forfeited its 
right to impose its views on the conference or to be the "arbiter 
of the affairs of all the world." 40 However, instead of requiring the 
Turks to accept military and political advisors, the Allies might offer 
to supply them if the Turks so wished. This would meet Lloyd 
George's objection that neither British nor world opinion would allow 
them to force advisors on the Turks. "If the Turks asked for them, 
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we could hardly refuse to supply them." 4I As to Cilicia, he was will­
ing to waive the right of France to choose all advisors, as long as 
in practice the vast majority would be French. 
At this point Curzon came up with a suggestion that proved to 
be the foundation of the ultimate solution to the problem: 
[This] led to the following general conclusion, to which he believed they 
all subscribed. Whatever arrangements we might make regarding the em­
ployment of instructors or the granting of economic concessions could not 
be put down in black and white in the treaty, but must be a matter of 
mutual arrangement between the Powers. If in the treaty we made it appear 
that Turkey was to be partitioned into spheres, Turkey would never accept 
these conditions, the United States would reject them, and the sentiments 
of the civilized world would be offended. He urged, therefore, that nothing 
about partitioning should appear in the treaty. If, however, Turkey should 
ask for the assistance of instructors, the Powers could arrange among 
themselves for their provision. As regards spheres of influence, he suggested 
that the Allies should work on the lines of what was known in England 
as a 'self-denying ordinance'; that is to say, that they should mutually 
arrange that Great Britain would not interfere in the areas allotted to France 
and to Italy, and would, moreover, actually support those countries in their 
administration of such areas, and vice versa. Lastly, he would urge that, 
whatever arrangement of this character might be made by the Powers, 
it should be widely published, and not kept secret, as nothing else would 
satisfy the feelings of the civilized world.42 
To this suggestion both Lloyd George and Berthelot readily agreed. 
All that would be necessary would be to insert a clause in the treaty 
indicating the willingness of the Allies to supply advisors and instruc­
tors if asked. To prevent the Turks from turning to an outside power 
for aid, they would be required to obtain the consent of the Allies 
regarding all advisors. It did not seem to occur to any of the negotia­
tors that the Turks might not ask for help. As Berthelot put it: 
The Turks were all in favour of having a sound administration. They 
favoured financial and administrative organizations which were controlled 
by Europeans and which gave themselves good openings, as they liked 
handsome salaries, regularly paid, which they did not get under their own 
Government.43 
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Moreover, the British high commissioner had reported from Con­
stantinople on January 8, 1920, that the Ottoman government had 
formally signified its willingness to undertake a program of judicial, 
financial, and police reform with the assistance of one power. A 
foreign inspection corps, a council of justice with some foreigners, 
and a foreign administration at the top of the police system had 
been suggested. The negotiators in London were agreed that there 
should be little trouble in substituting a group of two or three powers 
for a single one.44 
The Tripartite Pact 
The idea of a self-denying agreement solved the problem of conflict 
with the League Convenant. It enabled the three powers to make 
a tripartite arrangement that defined areas of priority and the rights 
each power would have in its sphere. But because it would be a 
self-denying agreement, it would have no effect on other nations. 
It did not, as Nitti put it, "protect the Allies against outside Powers." 45 
This was recognized as a serious defect, but Lloyd George argued 
cogently that there was little alternative: 
If they insisted upon inserting in the treaty their demand for preferential 
rights, the first thing that would happen would be that they would receive 
a note from the United States saying that this action was contrary to the 
terms of the covenant. The Turks would be well aware that the United 
States was taking this line, and they would consequently refuse to sign 
the treaty. In his opinion, it would be much better for the Allies to generalize 
in the treaty and to come to certain mutually amicable arrangements in 
regard to concessions and priorities. The other course was, in his view, 
much too dangerous for them to adopt. He thought the council would 
be much wiser to accept Lord Curzon's suggestion, although it did not 
give them all they wanted.46 
The self-denying ordinance had a further advantage. The League 
Covenant allowed no rights of economic priority in mandated areas. 
The British in particular were concerned about this, for the whole 
of their sphere of influence would consist of mandated territory, 
rather than zones of priority in Anatolia. Thus the British sternly 
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insisted that any rights recognized in the French and Italian areas 
must be reciprocated in the areas under a British mandate. The 
technique of a self-denying ordinance allowed for this, because it 
did not specifically prohibit any nation from economic investment 
anywhere. Rather, such an agreement would be a voluntary commit­
ment on the part of the three Allies not to compete with each other 
and to recognize and support the economic priority of the designated 
nation in each area. This pleased the French as well as the British, 
for France was anxious to have all rights given in Cilicia extended 
to Syria.47 
Much time was spent between February 17 and March 3 on 
discussion of the form the Tripartite Pact should take. In the process 
several other issues relating to boundaries, railroads, and minorities 
were provisionally settled so that the pact grew considerably. What 
had originally been envisaged as a simple two- or three-part statement 
became a rather lengthy document of more than a dozen articles.48 
It called for a self-denying ordinance by which each nation would 
not only refuse to compete for rights of economic investment and 
development in an area allotted to another nation but would also 
support the aspirations of the favored nation in negotiations with 
the Turkish government. At British insistence, trade and commerce 
were excluded from this provision and were to remain totally unhin­
dered. Each nation assumed responsibility for the protection of mi­
norities in its sphere of economic interest. The right of the interested 
nation to appoint political, judicial, and military advisors should 
the Turks request them was also accorded. French and Italian troops 
would be withdrawn from areas within the Turkish state as soon 
as the treaty was successfully executed. Instead of requiring the Turks 
to sign the pact, a clause signifying Allied willingness to provide 
advisors would be included in the draft articles of the peace treaty. 
The terms of the Tripartite Pact, it was agreed, would be made public 
at the time of the formal signing of the peace treaty, so that its 
consistency with the letter of the League Covenant would be evident. 
The zones of influence were tentatively set as those of the 1916 
Sykes-Picot and the 1917 Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreements. The 
Italian zone was modified by loss of the Smyrna area, while the 
British zone was not fully determined because of the somewhat 
 257 CONFERENCE OF LONDON: THE TURKISH STATE
unsettled status of Mosul and Kurdistan. Both the French and Italians 
advanced claims for the territorial extension of their spheres of 
influence, and reserved the right to reopen this matter later. 
On one question no agreement could be reached. This was the 
disposition of German property in Turkey. Although all agreed that 
it should be confiscated, the French and Italians supported a proposal 
that the property found in each zone should be allotted to the favored 
power. This the British bitterly opposed, undoubtedly because there 
were few German holdings in Mesopotamia, whereas France and 
Italy stood to gain considerably in their zones from such an arrange­
ment. The British were particularly opposed to a splintering of control 
over the railway lines that constituted most of the German holdings. 
Instead, Britain sought common control of the railroads with a pro­
portional split of the total revenues. The French and Italians admitted 
that the British were probably correct, and the matter was referred 
to a commission for further study.49 
Thus, although final discussion and ratification of the Tripartite 
Pact awaited the signing of the Turkish treaty, the basic terms had 
been formulated by early March. The settling of this difficult question 
of economic and administrative priorities in turn contributed much 
to easing the process of drafting the rest of the Turkish treaty. 
Military Provisions 
A treaty of the type envisaged by the Allied Powers necessitated 
complete subjugation and control of the Turkish military establish­
ment, yet the military clauses provided little difficulty.50 The provi­
sions for demilitarization in terms of equipment followed much the 
same pattern as in the peace treaties with other nations. The draft 
terms stipulated that Turkey should have no long-range artillery (with 
the exception of mountain guns), no tanks or other motorized equip­
ment, no air force, and a navy only large enough to permit patrolling 
of the coastline. The number of rifles, machine guns, and revolvers, 
as well as rounds of ammunition, was to be closely regulated.51 
The ultimate size of the Turkish military force provoked a good 
deal of discussion. The initial recommendation of the military experts 
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called for an army of 50,000-60,000 men. In the discussions at London 
the delegates, with the notable exception of Churchill, all thought 
that this was far too large, especially when considered against the 
100,000 allotted to Germany. Churchill alone believed that trans­
portation problems necessitated a larger force because it would have 
quite limited mobility. He was overruled, and eventually it was 
decided that a force of 50,000 should include the gendarmerie, with 
the regular army limited to 15,000 men. Between 10 and 15 percent 
of the officers in both units were to be from either Allied or neutral 
nations. In addition, the sultan would be allowed a small personal 
bodyguard, which would be the only regular army force allowed 
within the Straits zone.52 
One other question assumed major proportions in relation to the 
military clauses. All the peace treaties contained a clause stating 
that the Allies would not enlist or employ any citizen of the defeated 
nation in any of its military forces. In every treaty a proviso had 
been added exempting the French Foreign Legion from these condi­
tions. This reservation had always been accepted without argument 
by the other powers. At London, however, Curzon suddenly raised 
a strong protest against the inclusion of a similar provision in the 
Turkish treaty. He saw this as an opportunity for the Turks to train 
hundreds of extra men and for the French to enroll Turks in their 
forces in Syria, while Britain would not be able to do the same 
in Mesopotamia. He protested: 
The recruitment of large Asiatic and African armies by the European Powers 
was highly objectionable. The present troubles which the French Govern­
ment were experiencing in Cilicia were due to a large extent to the presence 
of Senagalese and Armenian troops in French uniforms. The peace of the 
world would be seriously threatened unless the European powers agreed 
to limit their recruitment of Asiatic and African troops.53 
This from the foreign secretary of a nation that had employed and 
was still employing thousands of Indian troops in Mesopotamia! 
The French were totally taken aback by this sudden attack. While 
stating a willingness to refrain from recruiting amongst the Turks, 
the French refused to concede the time-honored Legion tradition 
of accepting all physically qualified enlistees without asking questions 
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concerning nationality or past. The question was reserved, at Curzon's 
insistence, for consideration by the Supreme Council.54 
Why did the British suddenly object to this rather routine provi­
sion? Part of the reason probably lay in a genuine concern that 
Turkish battalions might well be employed in France's Syrian man­
date, a prospect that would not at all be to the liking of Britain's 
Arab allies. But behind this one suspects a general British distrust 
of Franco-Turkish relations. During most of 1919, the French had 
shown a rather conciliatory attitude toward the Constantinople gov­
ernment, only to shift late in 1919 to negotiations with Kemal. This 
they had coupled with a sudden decision to withdraw eventually 
from Cilicia. It is quite conceivable that Curzon feared that France 
would use the special privileges accorded to the Foreign Legion as 
a means for obtaining Turkish favor by secretly agreeing to train 
a good-sized Turkish contingent. Such an eventuality would never 
have occurred to the British in considering the possible course of 
future French relations with any of the other defeated nations.55 
Minorities 
The problem of protecting the various minorities in Anatolia was 
one of great concern to the Allied powers. The special provisions 
for a percentage of foreign officers in the gendarmerie and local 
police forces, as well as a requirement that these units reflect in 
their ranks and officer corps the ethnic proportion of the given area, 
resulted from specific requests by a special minorities commission 
that had been entrusted with the task of drafting the minorities 
clauses of the Turkish peace treaty. The Minorities Commission also 
suggested that Turkey be told that a continuation of Turkish sover­
eignty over Constantinople would be made contingent upon fulfill­
ment of the minority regulations. All of these suggestions were ap­
proved for incorporation in the final treaty. In the same way, the 
Tripartite Pact specifically stated that each power would be responsi­
ble for enforcing the minority provisions of the treaty in its sphere 
of influence.56 
The minorities provisions themselves were similar to those which 
had been included in other treaties. Complete religious, civil, politi­
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cal, and economic freedom was guaranteed. Restoration of property 
and land belonging to minority elements that had been confiscated 
during the war was called for. Minority languages were to be recog­
nized in the courts, and private ethnic or religious educational systems 
were to be allowed.57 
One clause in particular differed from those found in the other 
treaties. During the war, many non-Moslems had been forced upon 
pain of death to convert to Islam. Many of these had been women 
and children who had been forced against their will to become part 
of a Turkish family. The women had often been required to take 
the veil and follow the custom of female seclusion. Therefore, all 
conversions to Islam after August 1, 1914, were declared null and 
void unless the ceremonies were now performed again. Provision 
was made for the searching of private institutions or homes, should 
this be necessary, to find individuals who were sought by their 
families, or, if they had none, by their former religious or ethnic 
community.58 
This provision provoked considerable discussion in the Committee 
of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. Both the Italians and the 
French warned of the tremendous tensions and antagonisms that 
would be created by any male invasion of the women's quarters 
in a Turkish home. Nevertheless, it was decided that the clause must 
be maintained, with the provision that any search should be carried 
on jointly by a representative of the Turkish government, a member 
of the minority community involved, and a representative of the 
Allied powers.59 
The question of the role of the League of Nations in the protection 
of minorities in Turkey was not settled in London. All previous 
minority conventions had included a clause placing the provisions 
under the guarantee of the League and granting the League Council 
sole power to modify them. The League generally was given the 
right to hear, investigate, and adjudicate individual complaints of 
violations of the convention. In the case of Turkey, the Minorities 
Commission had also recommended the appointment of a resident 
representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople who would 
investigate immediately all infringement of the minorities clauses.60 
This plan ran into heavy opposition from the Italian and French 
delegates in London. They questioned having two sources of author­
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ity at Constantinople, the League representative and the Allied com­
missions. They argued that either the League delegate would serve 
no purpose or he would become very powerful, interfering in the 
Allied administration and serving as an avenue for endless Turkish 
appeals against the decisions of the Allied commissions. However, 
when the Committee of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors turned 
to the League for advice, it found that not only did the League 
Council have grave reservations about the advisability of stationing 
a League representative at Constantinople but that it was dubious 
about giving any guarantee at all to the minorities convention in 
a state as unorganized as Turkey. The League Council asked for 
more information and promised a definite answer after its next 
session on April 25.61 
This created a problem, for the powers had planned to present 
the draft articles to the Turks before then. They therefore decided 
to omit all reference to the League in the minorities provision, 
including the traditional League guarantee. Instead they substituted 
a suspensory clause that bound the Turks to accept all decisions 
subsequently taken concerning "what measures were necessary to 
guarantee the execution of the clauses."62 
The settlement of the minorities question brought to a close the 
discussion of treaty terms relating directly to the Turkish state. What 
emerged was a treaty drafted by powers that seemed supremely 
confident of their ability to partition and control Turkey as they 
saw fit. Coupled with the separate Tripartite Pact, the provisions 
ensured sweeping Allied control, directly or indirectly, of every aspect 
of Turkish fiscal, economic, political, and military administration. 
Under the treaty's terms, Turkey as a truly independent nation would 
cease to exist. 
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XII * THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON:

NON-TURKISH TERRITORIES AND

TREATY ENFORCEMENT

D,URING its sessions, the Con­
ference of London dealt with a wide variety of non-Turkish problems 
ranging from Greek claims in Thrace to the elimination of the last 
ties between the old Ottoman Empire and its North African terri­
tories. Of these, the Greek and Armenian questions also particularly 
affected the formation of the new Turkish state. 
Greek Claims 
The disposition of Greek claims in Thrace involved the determi­
nation of the boundaries of Turkey in Europe, and the question 
of Smyrna necessitated a decision as to whether or not Anatolia 
should belong completely to Turkey. In both cases it was necessary 
to deal with not only a difference in views among the powers at 
the conference, but also the powerful influence and strong Greek 
nationalism of the Greek prime minister, Eleutherios Venrzelos. 
Thrace 
After the powers had delineated the southern frontier of Bulgaria 
in the summer of 1919, Allied troops were sent into that part of 
Thrace which had been taken from Bulgaria. Greek troops were 
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allowed to occupy only the small area in western Thrace that all 
the Allies, including the United States, agreed should go to Greece. 
Failure to reach a final settlement had been due entirely to American 
opposition to Greek annexation of all Thrace. However, at the Lon­
don conference, objections of the United States no longer carried 
any great weight. Now that it was evident that the United States 
could not be expected to take part in the enforcement and adminis­
tration of the Eastern settlement, the British and French made no 
effort to conceal their annoyance at American interference in both 
the Eastern and Adriatic questions.1 
With the need to consider American desires removed, the Thracian 
problem was greatly simplified. All were agreed that eastern and 
western Thrace should go to Greece. Only the question of whether 
Greece should receive territory to the Enos-Midia or the Chataljah 
line remained. Neither Britain nor France was anxious to see the 
Turkish state extended far beyond Constantinople. Venizelos, as 
would be expected, strongly supported the Chataljah boundary, and 
he readily assented to the suggestion that Adrianople, with its Turkish 
majority and many Moslem mosques and shrines, should be granted 
a local form of administration that would be Turkish in nature. This 
settlement was provisionally accepted by the conference on February 
18, 1920. As to the question of Bulgarian access to the Aegean through 
the port of Dedeagatch, it was decided that because Turkey would 
possess no rights in the area, no mention of this need be made in 
the treaty.2 
Smyrna 
In December, the British and French had decided that Smyrna 
should remain in Turkish hands, with guarantees regarding Greek 
local administration similar to those granted the Turks in Adrianople. 
At London this basic decision was outwardly adhered to, although 
Lloyd George and Millerand put up a violent anti-Turkish smoke­
screen for the benefit of the Italians and the Japanese. Yet Millerand, 
after inveighing against the Turks, stated that "it was a bitter conclu­
sion to arrive at, but . .  . he thought the Greeks must leave 
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Smyrna." 3 Lloyd George, who personally supported the Greek posi­
tion, spent much time presenting the case for Greek retention; then, 
almost as an afterthought, he commented that "he would like to 
add that if any arrangement could be come to of giving nominal 
sovereignty to the Turks in order to save their face, by allowing 
them to show the Turkish flag at Smyrna, it might be a solution 
of the difficulty." 4 
The Italians, always antagonistic to Greek claims, readily accepted 
this decision. Only Venizelos was opposed, asserting that Greece 
had every right to the area and that it could easily handle without 
outside assistance the challenge of the Nationalist movement. Never­
theless, the decision stood.5 
There remained questions involving the degree of Turkish sover­
eignty (or "suzerainty," as Lloyd George insisted on calling it), the 
amount of local autonomy and connection with Athens that the area 
would be allowed, and the ultimate delineation of the boundaries 
of this privileged zone. Of these, the territorial question proved the 
easiest to settle. Although not as large as that recommended by the 
British and French delegations on the Greek Committee in March, 
1919, the final territory was somewhat greater than that recom­
mended by General Milne in September, 1919. However, it did 
provide for Greek withdrawal from the region around Aidin back 
to the southern boundary of the sanjak of Smyrna.6 
The form of government and the degree of Turkish suzerainty 
were not taken care of so easily. Lloyd George was determined to 
allow the Anatolian Greeks not only local autonomy but also many 
ties with Greece itself. Already bitter over the Constantinople deci­
sion and the recognition of any Turkish authority in Smyrna, he 
was adamant in insisting that Turkish sovereignty should be of the 
most nominal variety. He argued that the Greek government should 
be accorded the right to choose the administration of Smyrna, that 
the district should be represented in the Greek parliament, and that 
Greece should be allowed to enlist recruits for its army from Smyrna.7 
Acceptance of this plan would have meant that for all intents 
and purposes Smyrna would be administered as an integral part 
of Greece. This was a far cry from the agreement reached in De­
cember by Berthelot and Curzon which, although calling for a per­
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manent Greek governor, had made no mention of the nomination 
coming from Athens or of sending deputies and drafting soldiers. 
Both Nitti and Millerand refused to consider the idea of repre­
sentatives from Smyrna sitting in the Greek parliament. Even Veni­
zelos felt sure that "such a proposal would naturally be refused by 
the Turks as infringing on their sovereign rights." 8 
Faced with this opposition, Lloyd George reverted to his preferred 
policy of outright Greek annexation. This was completely rejected 
by the others. In the course of lengthy discussion it became evident 
that the chief concern of both France and Italy was to find a solution 
that would prevent too great a loss of Turkish "face." Some formula 
that would allow a slow adjustment to the situation seemed to be 
in order.9 
It was Curzon who came forward with a five-point proposal that 
outlined just such a scheme. It called for the retention of the Turkish 
flag as "sole evidence of Turkish suzerainty." 10 The area would have 
a Greek garrison and a Greek administration. There would be a 
local parliament representing both the Greek and Turkish popula­
tion, which, after two years, would have the right to apply to the 
League of Nations for incorporation of the territory into Greece. 
If such a request were made, the League would have the right to 
insist on a plebiscite if it thought one necessary. 
Venizelos, who had sought outright annexation, reluctantly ac­
cepted this solution. He requested that the Turkish flag be flown 
on a fort outside, rather than within, the city; this was quickly 
granted. It was decided that Smyrna should be constituted as a free 
port, with the commercial rights of all nations carefully protected. 
The draft articles were eventually approved by the Committee of 
Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors on March 16.11 
News of the Supreme Council's decision was greeted with dismay 
by the British, French, and Italian high commissioners in Constan­
tinople, who immediately drafted an identic telegram to their gov­
ernments protesting the decision and warning of the problems of 
enforcement that would ensue.12 De Robeck was even more specific 
in a personal letter to Curzon. Pointing out that both the Thrace 
and Smyrna decisions violated every principle of self-determination, 
he warned: 
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It is unthinkable, as the Foreign Office has consistently been informed 
by us here, that the Mussulmans in those areas will peacefully accept Greek 
annexation, especially after the sample of Greek methods which they have 
had since the Greek occupation of Smyrna. . . . 
The terms are such that no Turk, Committee of Union and Progress 
or pro-Entente can very well accept. The Supreme Council, thus, are pre­
pared for a resumption of general warfare; they are prepared to do violence 
to their own declared and cherished principles; they are prepared to perpet­
uate bloodshed indefinitely in the Near East; and for what? To maintain 
M. Venizelos in power in Greece for what cannot in the nature of things 
be more than a few years at the outside. I cannot help wondering if the 
game is worth the candle. . . . M. Venizelos's deserts vis-a-vis the Entente 
are great; but is it wise to run the almost certain risk of plunging Asia 
in blood in order to reward Greece according to the deserts of M. Venizelos, 
which are very different from the deserts of Greece? l3 
Curzon, who fully agreed with these views, circulated the letter 
to the members of the British cabinet but to no avail.14 The Smyrna 
issue was finally settled. All in all, the decision constituted a distinct 
victory for Lloyd George and Venizelos. To all intents and purposes, 
Smyrna had been turned over to Greece, for Article 4 of the draft 
articles called specifically for Turkey to recognize Greece's right to 
"all acts of sovereignty" in the area.15 The one restriction was the 
right of Turkey to fly a flag over a single fort in technical recognition 
of its suzerainty, and even this right could be rescinded after two 
years. 
Armenia 
At London, the attitude of the negotiators was one of reluctant 
resignation to the concept of an independent Armenia.16 There was 
little, if any, enthusiasm for Armenia or the Armenians. Since it 
was obvious that the United States was unlikely to assume the Ar­
menian mandate, the conference faced the problem of finding some 
other protector. Whereas in the summer of 1919 the forces of General 
Denikin had seemingly posed a threat to an independent Armenia, 
in March, 1920, the apparent imminent victory of the Bolshevik forces 
in the Caucasus constituted an even more serious one. None of the 
powers at the conference was willing to undertake the mandate or 
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to commit itself to any long-range support. It was decided, therefore, 
that Armenia should be independent and placed under the guarantee 
of the League of Nations, which would finance and recruit a volun­
tary military force to maintain Armenian security. However, when 
this solution was referred to the League Council, it met with a cool 
reception. Pointing out that it had no forces at its command, the 
League Council asked for more information concerning what might 
be involved in terms of men and expenses and agreed to reconsider 
the question when this information was received. Since this precluded 
any final decision by the London conference, the question was held 
over for consideration by the Supreme Council when it met at San 
Remo in April.17 
Regarding the definition of boundaries, the powers quickly decided 
in favor of a small and, they hoped, more viable state than the one 
envisaged in the grandiose claims originally put forward by the 
Armenians and supported by Woodrow Wilson. It was decided to 
exclude Trebizond and Erzinjan; Mush, Bitlis, Van, and Erzerum 
would be included, although the latter was put in reluctantly and 
only because it seemed geographically and strategically necessary. 
Despite the growing strength of the Kemalist movement, the negotia­
tors evidenced no apparent concern regarding the physical imple­
mentation of a boundary that would detach a considerable portion 
of Anatolia from the Turkish state. The Armenian boundary with 
Azerbaijan was to be negotiated directly by the two states, with the 
Allies committed to intervene if no agreement were reached within 
six months after the signing of the treaty.18 
Batum 
Other than Trebizond, Batum constituted the only decent port 
along the southeastern Black Sea littoral. It was therefore of prime 
importance not only to Armenia, but to Georgia, Azerbaijan, the 
northern part of Persia, and the Caspian area of Russia as well. 
It provided a major commercial terminus, not only for trade in cotton, 
timber, and wool in the Caucasus and northern Persia, but also for 
rail and pipeline connections with the rich oil fields around Baku. 
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Although there was little doubt that the city belonged ethnically 
and geographically to Georgia, the Allies placed no trust in Georgian 
promises of equal trading rights and privileges in Batum for all 
nations. Moreover, it was becoming all too evident that Georgia 
might well fall to the advancing Russian Bolshevik forces.19 
Batum had been occupied by British forces since the end of the 
war. Originally it was scheduled to be evacuated at the time of the 
general British withdrawal from the Causasus in the late summer 
and early fall of 1919. However, because of the considerations men­
tioned above, the cabinet at the last moment had decided to retain 
a small garrison in Batum. Again, in early February, 1920, the cabinet 
decided to proceed with the evacuation, only to reverse itself a few 
days later as a result of stringent protests from Curzon and British 
diplomatic, commercial, and military representatives in the area. 
Instead it was decided to postpone the evacuation until the Supreme 
Council completed its deliberations on the future status of the city.20 
To the Supreme Council, the League of Nations again seemed 
to provide the ideal solution. It was decided to ask the League 
Council for its opinion regarding the creation of a free port with 
an autonomous hinterland. Batum would become a free and inde­
pendent state under the protection of the League of Nations with 
an administrative high commissioner appointed by the League. An 
inter-Allied military garrison would be provided until such time as 
the League assumed control. The tentative boundaries for this city-
state were drawn up in detail and included in the draft articles 
concerning Armenia.21 
However, the League Council's response regarding the protection 
of Armenia made this solution impossible. If the League had no 
forces to protect and administer the new Armenian state, it would 
be even less likely to have them for Batum. It seemed there was 
no choice but to grant to Georgia territorial sovereignty over the 
city, and the powers reluctantly acceded to that fact. It was decided, 
however, to approach the League again to see if it would undertake 
to garrison the city with inter-Allied voluntary forces in order to 
enforce its status as a free port. Should the League refuse, as was 
thought likely, the Allies themselves would then consider whether 
they would undertake to finance and supply such a garrison. In the 
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meantime a contingent of three battalions, British, French, and 
Italian, would be kept in the city in order to prevent a complete 
Georgian takeover before these issues were resolved.22 
Lazistan 
The territory known as Lazistan fronted on the Black Sea and 
constituted the eastern half of the vilayet of Trebizond. Georgian 
in character and Moslem in religion, the inhabitants were a mountain 
people who, as Lord Curzon put it, "would brook no interference." 23 
If they inclined toward any outside authority, it was toward Turkey. 
The Allies, however, did not want Turkey to control the area, for 
this might endanger Armenian independence and encourage Turkish 
pretensions toward recovering Batum. Therefore it was provisionally 
decided to grant Lazistan virtual autonomy, while technically placing 
it under nominal Armenian sovereignty. This decision was subse­
quently repudiated when it became necessary to find something with 
which to compensate Armenia for the commitment of Batum to 
Georgia. It was decided that Lazistan should be included in the 
Armenian state without restrictions. The traditional minorities con­
vention that Armenia would be required to sign would adequately 
protect the rights of this ethnic minority in Armenia.24 
By the time the London conference closed, the problems involving 
Armenia that still remained unsettled concerned long-range protec­
tion, financial aid, and the status of Batum. The boundaries of the 
proposed state had been clearly defined, at least as well as they 
could be until a team of engineers and experts could delineate them 
on the spot. The territorial question, at least, seemed solved. 
Syria and Palestine 
During the first two weeks of the Conference of London, the British 
and French finally reached an agreement on the long-standing ques­
tion of the Syrian-Palestine border. In December, the British had 
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indicated that they would no longer insist that the planned Mesopo­
tamia-Mediterranean railway run through Palestine. However, a new 
issue involving water rights, so precious in that semidesert area, had 
emerged. Now, in a compromise settlement, the French agreed to 
the inclusion within Palestine of the headwaters of the Jordan, while 
the British in turn dropped all pretensions to water supplies located 
further north, including a claim to the Litani River area. The French 
promised to work out an arrangement with the Zionists guaranteeing 
an adequate supply of water to those areas that would be dependent 
on streams originating in Syria. At the same time, the British acceded 
to a French request that defined the northern Syrian boundary in 
such a way as to include the Bagdad Railroad line within Syria. 
Both of these agreements were reached with a minimum of debate 
and quibbling and remained the same in the final Treaty of Sevres.25 
Although settlement of these issues removed the last major area 
of Syrian-Palestine disagreement between the British and French, 
the relationship of the two states with Feisal and the other Arab 
leaders was rapidly deteriorating. During the spring of 1920, native 
unrest in Syria, and to a lesser extent in Mesopotamia, increased 
considerably. In Syria, Feisal found no support for his proposed 
agreement with the French and instead threw in his lot with the 
extreme nationalists. A congress of Syrian notables in Damascus in 
early March proclaimed the formation of an independent Syrian 
state with Feisal as its ruler. Subsequently, Feisal's brother, Abdullah, 
was declared ruler of an independent Mesopotamia.26 
Both Britain and France refused to recognize the existence of the 
Syrian Congress or its right to deal in any way with matters relating 
to the future of territories that had been taken from Turkey by the 
Allied armies. Such decisions, they stated in warnings to Feisal, could 
only be made at the Peace Conference by all the Allied powers. 
At the same time they invited Feisal to come to San Remo in April 
for the final sessions of the Peace Conference in order to discuss 
these matters. Feisal, however, refused unless he received private 
assurances from the British that they recognized the independence 
of these states. This the British could not provide, and as a result 
Feisal remained in the Near East.27 
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Oil Rights 
The question of oil was discussed in only the briefest way during 
the London conference. The French, eager for a definite settlement, 
referred to the terms of the Greenwood-Berenger Agreement that 
had been formulated during the previous December. Lloyd George 
would have none of it: 
He hesitated to accept the agreement because of the rights thereby conferred 
on certain companies. The administration of Mesopotamia would cost an 
enormous sum of money, and whatever benefits could be obtained would 
have to go towards the cost of that administration. The cost of administration 
was going to be far heavier than the revenue; it was now costing eight 
times as much as Turkey ever screwed out of the country. It was not at 
all certain whether it would be worth Great Britain's while to administer 
the country at all, but whatever happened, the profits derived from the 
working of the oil-fields should not go to private companies. He personally 
recognized no rights in any Turkish petroleum concession, since all these 
agreements were worthless and could not be enforced in any court of law. 
He would only be prepared to recognize an agreement whereby France 
would obtain her share of the oil; but he must refuse to have any dealings 
with private companies.28 
This apparent reversal of Lloyd George's December willingness 
to formalize a petroleum agreement was the result of a policy decision 
taken by a British conference of ministers on January 23. At that 
time they agreed as a matter of principle that oil revenues should 
benefit the state rather than joint stock companies.29 The reasons 
behind this decision were twofold. There remained the aversion 
Lloyd George had expressed the previous July when he wrote: "I 
feel strongly that the discussion between France and ourselves on 
important questions of policy ought not to be mixed up with arrange­
ments about oil in which private companies are involved." 30 But 
there was also the realization, which had not been the case in the 
previous summer, that the Mesopotamian fields were "so extensive 
that sufficient revenue should be forthcoming from them to pay for 
the whole administration of the country, and that for that reason 
private exploitation should be prevented." 31 The British ministers 
had agreed that the War Office could continue with its program 
of prospecting, but only for the ultimate benefit of the state. 
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Since the Greenwood-Berenger Agreement called for the awarding 
of concessions to various private companies, it was therefore unac­
ceptable. Because of the British position, the Supreme Council in­
structed Berthelot and Greenwood to meet again in an effort to draft 
a new arrangement for consideration by the two governments.32 The 
oil question was effectively tabled, and Lloyd George had again 
succeeded in keeping political issues and private business interests 
separate. However, Britain's reasons for doing so were somewhat 
different from what they had been nine months earlier. Originally, 
oil had been regarded as a subject of minor import in comparison 
to territorial, administrative, and other economic questions that faced 
the Peace Conference.33 Now it loomed as an important element 
of national concern, with the result that the exclusion of private 
companies to the benefit of the national governments had become 
a major element in British policy formulation. 
North Africa 
It was during the Conference of London that the Allies finally 
got around to discussing the African territories that, although long 
since dominated by European powers, technically remained under 
Turkish sovereignty. Clauses stipulating Turkish renunciation of all 
rights to Libya, Tunis, Morocco, and the Sudan were quickly agreed 
upon by the Committee of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors.34 
However, a British memorandum proposing a series of clauses rela­
tive to Egypt hit a snag of major proportions in the form of French 
objections. 
The French did not object to provisions requiring Turkey's renun­
ciation of its Egyptian claims and recognition of the British protec­
torate there. Rather they protested a clause transferring to the British 
all rights concerned with the navigation of the Suez Canal. This 
involved certain rights of intervention in cases of outside agression. 
The French government, much to Berthelot's obvious discomfort, 
maintained that granting these rights to Britain alone would involve 
a concession on the part of France, inasmuch as France had signed 
the original canal convention and many of the Suez Canal bonds 
were held by French investors. The British were able to demolish 
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this argument by pointing out that Turkey could not cede anything 
beyond its own rights, and, since Britain held the Egyptian protec­
torate, it was only reasonable that authority concerning the canal 
should be accorded it as well.35 
The real reason for French concern came out in a much more 
serious and determined French resistance to a British-sponsored 
clause calling for the dissolution of the international Commission 
of the Egyptian Public Debt. The British government indicated its 
willingness to "relieve Turkey of all liability in respect of the Turkish 
loans secured on Egyptian tribute." 36 Since Britain would, in effect, 
guarantee the Egyptian Public Debt, the Debt commission was no 
longer needed to protect the stockholders. The French government 
protested bitterly, arguing that since the commission was European 
in composition, its dissolution did not involve Turkey and therefore 
need not be mentioned in the treaty. Moreover, France could only 
accept such a provision "in exchange for correlating advantages in 
Morocco." 37 
Here was the crux of the matter. The 1904 Anglo-French Conven­
tion had called for recognition of reciprocal advantages in Egypt 
and Morocco. In the period since the end of the war the two powers 
had negotiated a convention in which France agreed to a renunciation 
of its Suez Canal rights and the abrogation of the Egyptian Debt 
commission. In return, Britain was to renounce all its rights and 
interests in the State Bank of Morocco. The convention had never 
been signed, however, for France sought and Britain refused to give 
prior consent to any arrangements France might be able to work 
out subsequently with Spain for French acquisition of Spanish Tan­
gier.38 
The French regarded the inclusion of the canal and Egyptian Debt 
provisions in the Turkish treaty as an unbalancing of the carefully 
worked out details of the Anglo-French Convention, for the peace 
treaty would probably be signed and ratified by the powers without 
reference to the Moroccan bank issue. In relation to the canal clause 
this argument had little validity, because Turkey was to renounce 
only its own rights, not those of France. But in case of the Debt 
commission, the French were on much more solid ground. At the 
close of the London conference the question remained undecided. 
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Berthelot did agree to consult Paris again; Curzon, in turn, threatened 
the withdrawal of all British guarantees of the Egyptian Debt should 
France fail to agree to the ending of the Debt commission.39 
The Occupation of Constantinople 
During the course of the London conference, the threat of the 
Turkish Nationalist movement became increasingly severe. Although 
this did not affect the negotiators in their formulation of the treaty 
terms, the conference did discuss possible means of enforcing the 
will of the Allies on a dissident Turkish population. This question 
became particularly acute because massacres of Armenians had taken 
place in Cilicia as a result of Turkish uprisings there. The actual 
extent of the massacres was unknown, but it was estimated that the 
number of Armenians who had lost their lives might well be in 
the thousands. These atrocities constituted a great embarrassment 
to the French, whose troops had so recently replaced the British 
in the area, and who had now been compelled by the Nationalists 
to withdraw from the town of Marash. The British did not hesitate 
to point out that complete peace and quiet had prevailed while they 
were in occupation. Although correct, the inference was hardly fair, 
for the strength of the Nationalist movement had increased many 
times over since September.40 More justified was British criticism 
of the French practice of local recruiting. Close to one-third of the 
French forces in occupation were Armenians native to the area. The 
sight of the hated Armenian in the uniform of the conqueror under­
standably irritated the Turkish population, and they turned against 
the Armenians as soon as the uprisings began.41 
There was little question that the uprisings, though primarily local 
in nature, were Nationalist sponsored. Nationalist units had even 
taken part in some places. Moreover, since January, 1920, the Na­
tionalists had been in control of the government in Constantinople. 
The National Assembly had approved the National Pact and the 
sultan and his regime showed every sign of being dependent on 
the Nationalist movement. In fact, Kemal had officially made peace 
with the Constantinople regime and had recently been appointed 
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governor of Erzerum (which was slated by the Allies to become 
part of the new Armenian state).42 
The Allied statesmen were therefore convinced that the Turkish 
government at Constantinople must be held responsible for the 
Cilician massacres. It seemed imperative that some punitive action 
should be taken. Lloyd George made the point clearly: 
Were the Allies to do nothing? It was not enough to warn the Turks. 
We had done that again and again. . .  . It was no use the Allies proceeding 
with the terms of a Peace Treaty until they could once more restore 
order. . .  . It was all very well to insert in the treaty provisions about 
"powers of patrolling," "spheres of influence," and so on, but not the 
slightest attention would be paid to these by the Turks, and the stipulations 
that would be made mutually in regard to the protection of minorities—well, 
he doubted whether these had the slightest value. The fact was that, on 
the eve of making peace with Turkey, the Powers found themselves prac­
tically impotent to deal with a situation of extreme gravity. . . . The time 
had now arrived to take strong action and to do something dramatic.43 
What this action might be Lloyd George went on to reveal. If 
the information concerning the massacres were true, "they should 
take charge of the Turkish government; . . . they should arrest the 
Grand Vizier and his War Ministers [Minister], along with other 
Ministers, if necessary, and either imprison them on the other side 
of the Straits or place them in custody on one of the Allied ships 
till steps had been taken by the Government to remedy the situa­
tion." u Curzon put the finishing touches on the argument: 
Why had the Supreme Council decided to retain the Sultan in Constan­
tinople? It was in order that he should be at their mercy in the event 
of any trouble arising in Turkey in the future. The case had now 
arisen . . . now was the moment to show to the world, and to the Turk 
in particular what our policy was worth. By what the Powers decided to 
do now their Turkish policy would be judged.45 
To this the French agreed, and the Italians, with some foot-drag­
ging, also concurred. Since the French were so involved in the 
Cicilian problem, there was little they could say in opposition to 
the proposals of Lloyd George and Curzon. However, both Berthelot 
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and Cambon expressed reservations as to the ability of the Constan­
tinople government to influence and control Kemal. Nitti also ex­
pressed similar reservations and questioned whether the general 
effect would not be to lessen rather than increase the authority of 
the Constantinople government over the Anatolian interior. He sug­
gested that if the Allies sought to maintain the authority of the sultan, 
perhaps some attention should be paid to encouraging him to resist 
the Nationalists.46 
Within the British delegation, the chief opposition to an Allied 
occupation of Constantinople and a crackdown on the Constantinople 
government came from the secretary of state for war, Winston Chur­
chill. Britain was scheduled to end conscription on March 31, the 
first of the Allies to do so, and all conscripts had the right to be 
released from military service by the end of April. Having only the 
previous week defended the proposed military budget before a criti­
cal House of Commons, Churchill strenuously opposed any further 
extension of British military obligations and argued that an occupa­
tion of Constantinople would serve no purpose, be extremely costly, 
and needlessly irritate the Turks. 
He agreed that the power of the Allies, as represented by their fleet and 
armies, over Constantinople and the Turkish administration was unlimited. 
Any action could be taken under the menace of the guns of the ships, 
and Great Britain alone could do all that was necessary in Constantinople. 
But the fact must not be overlooked that the real difficulties would have 
to be faced in districts remote from Constantinople and from the sea. It 
would be in these far off districts that sullen resistance to the terms of 
the Peace Treaty would arise, and in those districts the Allies at present 
possessed no power or forces sufficient to exercise any satisfactory control. 
He agreed that the Turkish armies in Asia could not be compared in 
efficiency to the trained forces employed by Turkey during the war, but 
they would be quite good enough to inflict heavy losses on any small force [s] 
sent against them. Consequently, military operations must be comtemplated 
if the conference desired to enforce its decisions. It must be fully realized 
that the Turkish armies in Asia would not be controlled by any decision 
of violence extorted from the Turkish Government in Constantinople, the 
same would never result in compliance by Turkey as a whole and, further­
more, the Allies did not possess sufficient forces to take the necessary action 
outside Constantinople.47 
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In answer to Churchill's criticism, Lloyd George argued that there 
were 160,000 Allied troops (of which 90,000 were Greek) in European 
and Anatolian Turkey. The Turkish forces of Kemal were estimated 
at 80,000. "He could not help thinking that if two soldiers—French, 
British, Italian or Greek—could not defeat one Turk, the Allies ought 
to start their conference anew and ask the Turk upon what terms 
he would condescend to make peace." 48 
When the views of the Allied high commissioners in Constan­
tinople were sought, they proved to be quite similar to those of 
Churchill. The general opinion was that no action taken in Constan­
tinople could in any way alter or retrieve the situation in Cilicia. 
As Admiral de Robeck put it, "What we have to face and what 
we have to adjust our action to is the wider issue raised by [the] 
Nationalists to resist drastic peace and [the] apparent intention of 
[the] Peace Conference to impose one." 49 As an alternative to the 
hard-line approach, the high commissioners offered what Curzon 
described as the bloc method of handling Turkey. This consisted 
of a policy of support for the sultan, the treatment of him as an 
ally, and the taking of steps that would strengthen his position and 
better enable him to ward off the challenge of the Nationalists. These 
steps would consist of very lenient peace terms, including the "main­
tenance of Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and Eastern Thrace 
including Adrianople," as well as suzerainty over the territory 
planned for the Armenian state.50 
In reply, the Supreme Council telegraphed an outline of the pro­
posed peace terms with a request for an estimate of what the Turkish 
reaction would be.51 The answer was hardly encouraging: 
[The High Commissioners] regard it as incumbent upon them once more 
to express their unanimous opinion on the consequences of presenting a 
treaty as severe as that now proposed. In their view the said consequences 
may be: First, a refusal by Turkey to sign the treaty or to ratify it if it 
is signed or to execute it if it is ratified. Second, creation of a new Govern­
ment in Asia, the flight of Parliament to Anatolia, the rising of the whole 
of the Turkish elements and widespread massacre of Christians in Asia 
Minor and Thrace. As soon as the stipulations become known there is 
danger that these consequences and in particular the massacres, will at 
once ensue. Third, attempts in Europe which may be continued indefinitely 
to secure any action against the Greeks between the Bulgarians and the 
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Turks. Fourth, the possibility of combined action in the future in Asia 
between the Bolsheviks, the Arabs, and the Turks.52 
Despite such clearcut warnings, the Supreme Council never con­
sidered the possibility of formulating a more lenient set of peace 
terms. As Curzon put it, this "would involve an absolute reversal 
of the policy the Allies had decided to adopt." 53 The terms to be 
imposed "were so drastic as to exclude the bloc policy, and . .  . it 
was evident that they must be imposed by force of arms." 54 Whether 
this could effectively be done was not discussed; only the questions 
of when and with what strength were considered. Both Lloyd George 
and Curzon argued that sooner was better than later and that only 
action, not threats, would have any chance of showing any real effect. 
It was necessary to seize and hold territory that could be used as 
a hostage for better Turkish behavior in the future. If necessary, 
Britain would occupy Constantinople alone. Parliament had been 
promised that Constantinople would be held as a hostage to protect 
the Armenians, and this must at all costs be carried out.55 
Faced with such an adamant stand, the other powers could do 
little but agree, especially because they all recognized the need for 
some action and could offer no alternative plan. It was decided that 
Allied sentries should be stationed at various municipal buildings, 
that the War Office should be seized, and that Allied censorship 
should be imposed on all orders issued by the Turkish War Depart­
ment. The post and telegraph systems would also be brought under 
Allied control as well as the administration of the police. The policy 
of arrest and deportation of leading Nationalists was specifically 
sanctioned. 
Other punitive measures involving the dissolution of the Turkish 
parliament, the taking over of civil government, or the arrest of the 
grand vizier and other political figures in Constantinople were con­
sidered and discarded. With the center of power in Anatolia, such 
action could do little good, especially since the Supreme Council 
seemed to be agreed on the impossibility of any extensive military 
operations in Anatolia. The problem of what further military action 
could be taken to enforce the treaty was referred to the Allied military 
experts at Versailles and became one of the main topics of discussion 
at the San Remo conference in April.56 
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Despite this growing concern with treaty enforcement, the general 
attitude of the London conference was still one of easy optimism, 
best summed up in Lloyd George's remark about two Allied soldiers 
being easily able to handle one Turk. Although the powers no longer 
had any doubts that the Kemalists were the dominant political force 
in Turkey, they still did not see in the Nationalist movement a serious 
threat to eventual enactment of any peace treaty they might wish 
to impose upon the Turkish state.57 
The occupation of Constantinople was carried out on March 16 
by a contingent of British, French, and Italian forces. Proclaiming 
that the occupation was provisional, the Allies officially declared 
that they had no intention of destroying the authority of the sultan 
but instead sought to strengthen it. Although asserting that the Allies 
still intended to leave Constantinople with Turkey, a warning was 
issued that "if, God forbid, widespread disturbances or massacres 
should occur, this decision would probably be altered." 58 
This was what Lloyd George and Curzon had meant when they 
stated that territory should be held as a hostage for Turkish good 
behavior. Yet it is hard to believe that Curzon and Lloyd George 
really believed that the occupation of Constantinople would restrain 
the Nationalists, when from all sides they had been warned that 
this would not be the case. Their original intention of driving the 
Turks out of Constantinople may have helped to blind their eyes 
to the true situation. It is quite possible that, apart from any beneficial 
effect the occupation of Constantinople might have on the Anatolian 
situation, Curzon and Lloyd George welcomed the excuse to separate 
Constantinople even temporarily from Turkey and would not have 
been upset if the separation ultimately had become permanent. 
One old issue reappeared as a result of the decision to intervene 
in Constantinople. This was the question of the command in Con­
stantinople and the status of British General Milne and French 
General Franchet d'Esperey. The French were quite willing to accede 
to British requests that Franchet d'Esperey be removed, for they 
conceded that the general had shown "an almost complete lack of 
tact and judgment." 59 However, they would not accept the British 
contention that General Milne, who was in charge of the Constan­
tinople garrison, should be freed from the supervisory command 
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of a French commander-in-chief of European Turkey. To further 
complicate the situation the Supreme Council compromised by de­
ciding that in the city of Constantinople there should be "complete 
equality between the Allied generals . . . ,who should meet together 
and decide on the steps to be taken by the commanders of each 
of the Allied forces." 60 As a result of this stalemate, Franchet 
d'Esperey remained, and Milne, who had direct command of the 
occupying forces, in turn refused to work with him. The situation 
was clearly untenable, and the French, unwilling to concede the 
principle, solved the problem by placing Franchet d'Esperey on 
extended leave. The result was that the British assumed sole military 
command in fact, if not in theory, of not only Constantinople but 
the Straits zone as well.61 
The Conference of London and the United States 
Before bringing discussion of the London conference to a close, 
a comment on the role of the United States is in order. The attitude 
of the European Allies toward America during the conference is 
best exemplified in Lloyd George's proposal that America should 
be asked to take part in the occupation of Constantinople. 
We had received endless telegrams from the United States asking why 
nothing was done to help Armenia, and the American press had strongly 
criticized our alleged impotence to stop the massacres. An American school 
had been attacked in Cilicia, and several American citizens had been 
murdered. Moreover, the Armenians were the special proteges of the Amer­
icans. He thought we might tell the United States Government that the 
Allies intended now to take strong action, and to ask if the Americans 
were prepared to join. The Americans had always taken a very exalted 
position and had lectured us severely on our inaction. They appeared to 
assume responsibility for the sole guardianship of the Ten Commandments 
and for the Sermon on the Mount; yet when it came to a practical question 
of assistance and responsibility, they absolutely refused to accept these. 
He suggested, therefore, that a telegram should be sent to Washington 
pointing out that massacres of Armenians had taken place; that the Ar­
menians were the special proteges of the Americans; and that American 
citizens had also been murdered, and asking whether the United States 
were prepared to join the Allies in the strong action they proposed to 
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take. . .  . He was quite certain the Americans would do nothing, but their 
refusal to assist would make it easier for us in the future to deal with 
them.62 
The Supreme Council readily agreed with Lloyd George's pro­
posal. The next day Curzon met with Ambassador Davis and in­
formed him of the council's decision and the proposed action. Al­
though he made no specific request for American participation, he 
made it clear that it would be welcomed. As it turned out, no reply 
was ever forthcoming from Washington.63 
Throughout the Conference of London, the American government, 
though refusing to participate in the proceedings, requested that it 
be kept apprised of the work being done.64 On March 12, the French 
ambassador to America, Jules Jusserand, informed Acting Secretary 
of State Frank Polk of the tentative outline of the Turkish settlement. 
This elicited a long reply in which Wilson personally protested 
the granting of Constantinople to the Turks, expressed reservations 
concerning spheres of economic priority, insisted on a greater Ar­
menia that would include Trebizond, and bitterly opposed the 
cession of the northern part of eastern Thrace to Greece.65 
The reaction of the conference was basically one of impatience. 
President Wilson's physical collapse in September 1919 had rendered 
him a shadow president. Isolated by the understandably protective 
screening provided by his wife, he remained invisible and inacces­
sible to all but a few chosen aides. It was obvious to the powers 
in London that the president's influence on American politics had 
declined greatly. Popular attitude in America concerning mandates 
was generally one of indifference, while the Senate, fresh from its 
bitter battle over the Versailles treaty, evidenced open hostility to 
the idea of American participation in any such scheme. The powers 
therefore saw little reason to consider protests from a country that 
had refused both a seat at the London conference and an active 
part in cooperative action in the Near East. Generally, the Supreme 
Council's position remained the same as it had been throughout 
the conference: that even though the United States had not declared 
war on the Ottoman Empire and had refused to participate in the 
Conference of London, it should be given the opportunity to com­
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ment on, and even sign, the final treaty if it wished. However, the 
Allies would in no respect be bound to consider or adopt any Ameri­
can-sponsored revisions. In other words, America was welcome to 
participate, but only on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.66 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the Conference 
of London. At the beginning of the conference, the Turkish set­
tlement had consisted of a series of general principles and broad 
policy decisions. During February and March, the conference imple­
mented most of the basic decisions made by the French and English 
during December and January, and initiated new decisions relating 
to Smyrna, financial control, and economic spheres of priority. By 
the time the conference closed, a draft treaty had been pretty 
thoroughly hammered out, and only a series of specific decisions 
on particular clauses, plus final overall approval, awaited the Su­
preme Council at San Remo. 
Not everyone was happy with the results. The Italians complained 
that they were receiving very little and believed that Italy was not 
being accorded its fair share.67 Nor were the French particularly 
happy. Paul Cambon, one of the chief negotiators on the Committee 
of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, commented that France had 
given away much, obtained little, and had played directly into British 
hands. By allowing the occupation of Constantinople and the virtual 
domination of Smyrna by Greece, France had alienated the Turks 
while gaining no support elsewhere. Believing that the Turks were 
only waiting "to throw themselves into our arms," Cambon com­
plained that as a result of these actions, "Turkey will detest us the 
more, since she had had more hope of our support." 68 
For the British, the treaty was a tribute to their negotiating ability 
if not their foresight. They had succeeded in minimizing both French 
and Italian influence in the Near East. At the same time, Greek 
interests had been protected and the Greeks had virtually obtained 
Smyrna as well as Thrace. The occupation of Constantinople by 
a predominantly British military force commanded by General Milne 
gave Britain general control of Constantinople and the Straits. All 
in all, in terms of British aims, the London conference must be 
regarded as a triumph for British diplomacy. 
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Yet it was a triumph that could lead only to disaster, and none 
realized it better than Paul Cambon: 
The Turks will accept all the rest but Smyrna It is probable that 
this council [military experts] will recognize that to quell the Turks, almost 
certainly several hundred thousand men will be needed. The Italians have 
declared that they cannot send anyone, we are in the same position. Thus 
the English must assume all the load. Lloyd George will recoil before this 
prospect and Venizelos with 80,000 men will find himself alone, facing 
an aroused country and an organized guerilla force. Then we will be forced 
to revise the Treaty. That is how I see things.69 
Few statements have been more prophetic. 
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XIII & THE CONFERENCE AT SAN REMO

B>Y THE TIME the Supreme 
Council reconvened at San Remo on April 18, 1920, most of the 
basic decisions regarding the Turkish peace treaty had long since 
been made, and a nearly complete draft of the treaty was in existence. 
What remained for the Allied representatives to settle was, on the 
whole, a series of relatively minor and specific issues that the various 
expert commissions and the Committee of Foreign Ministers and 
Ambassadors had failed to resolve during the Conference of London. 
In general, this was accomplished rapidly and amicably; what tension 
existed at the conference was engendered by European questions, 
particularly the enforcement and fulfillment of the reparations provi­
sions of the German peace treaty. 
The Turkish State 
When the statesmen at San Remo reviewed systematically all the 
agreements reached during the London conference, they found little 
to alter. The provisions relating to Turkey's European frontier, the 
Straits Commission, and financial control of Turkish Anatolia were 
approved with only a few minor changes. In the same way, the French 
reluctantly accepted what had basically been the British position 
regarding the probable dissolution of the Ottoman Debt Council 
when its term expired in 1923.' 
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Smyrna 
The draft provisions regarding the boundaries of the Smyrna area 
were approved without discussion, and only one significant change 
was made in the political clauses governing the administration of 
the territory. At the insistence of Curzon and the French, the waiting 
period prior to application for a League plebiscite, which might lead 
to Greek annexation of the territory, was extended from two to five 
years. This decision was the only real rebuff suffered by Venizelos 
during the entire Peace Conference, for he had sought to have the 
waiting clause removed entirely. However, Venizelos accepted the 
decision calmly, and three days later wrote Lloyd George thanking 
him effusively for all he had done to further Greek aims, the achieve­
ment of which Venizelos recognized was due primarily to Lloyd 
George's "powerful and effective support." 2 Rarely had such praise 
been more richly deserved. 
Heraclea Coal Fields 
Only one question regarding the spoils envisaged by the powers 
in the separate, "self-denying" Tripartite Pact provoked any discord 
at San Remo. In addition to a sphere of economic priority in Anatolia, 
the draft of the Tripartite Pact gave Italy the right to exploit the 
coal resources in the vicinity of Heraclea. For the previous twenty-five 
years, a French company had been developing a concession there 
of some sixty-five square kilometers, which it had received from 
the Turkish government. By the draft terms of the Tripartite Pact, 
the company was to keep its original concession, but was denied 
any rights of further expansion.3 
At San Remo, Millerand vehemently protested this provision. 
Instead he asked that France be accorded all concessions granted 
or asked for by the French up to the time of the signing of the 
treaty and that the remaining area should be developed equally by 
France and Italy. This, of course, was unacceptable to Nitti, and 
after some intense bargaining a compromise was reached. Conces­
sions held or asked for by France were to be allowed, but the terminal 
date was to be that of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros. Italy 
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would be allowed unrestricted development of the remaining area 
until its rate of production equalled that of the other foreign conces­
sions on January 1, 1920. When this occurred, the French would 
be allotted a one-fourth share of the remaining concessions and 
interests. This agreement was embodied in the Tripartite Pact.4 
The Tripartite Pact was signed by France and Italy on May 11, 
1920. Though the British had indicated they would sign as well, 
Curzon changed his mind at the last moment on the ground that 
there was no point in signing in advance a pact that could neither 
take effect nor be published until the Turkish peace treaty was signed. 
It was always possible, Curzon maintained, that significant modifi­
cation of the treaty might be considered in the final negotiations 
with the Turks, particularly given the unstable political situation in 
Turkey. If this did happen, the Tripartite Pact would have to be 
altered as well. Although the Italians were not happy with Curzon's 
decision, there was little they could do about it; in contrast, Mil­
lerand, Derby reported, "was, I think, much relieved at our not 
signing." 5 
Non-Turkish Territories 
In contrast to questions relating directly to the Turkish state, issues 
involving territories that were to be separated from Turkey provoked 
some controversy at San Remo. Yet even here, there was little that 
approached crisis proportions, and, in general, all problems were 
resolved swiftly and amicably. 
A rmenia 
At London, the powers had decided to place Armenia under the 
protection of the League of Nations and had hopefully asked the 
League what measures it was prepared to take to assist the new 
state militarily and financially. The reply of the League Council, 
which was received just before the opening of the San Remo confer­
ence, pointed out that League protection meant little, that a mandate 
was necessary, and that the League possessed no military means 
294 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
of assisting the Armenians. Although the League might appeal to 
its members to subscribe to and guarantee a loan for Armenia, this 
would take time. The council inquired whether the Allies could 
provide the necessary credits during the interim period.6 
This reply did not please the heads of state at San Remo, for 
it effectively tossed the Armenian question back to the Supreme 
Council. Neither the French nor the Italians were prepared to supply 
military or financial assistance; in fact the Italians stated emphatically 
that aside from fulfilling obligations in the Straits zone, Italy would 
not undertake military action to uphold the treaty provisions in any 
part of Asia Minor.7 The British likewise were unwilling to send 
troops to Armenia, but thought that the Allies could undertake to 
supply equipment and officers.8 As to a loan, Lloyd George became 
rather vehement: 
He was told that Armenia would require about £10,000,000. Who was 
prepared to advance such a sum? America, he was told, could easily find 
it. Why did the League of Nations not appeal to America? Why did they 
refer their difficulties to the Supreme Council, which was already overbur­
dened by its own tasks? The League of Nations did not discharge its whole 
duty by making pious speeches. He believed an appeal from the League 
of Nations to America would be successful. At least it might have the 
effect of stopping President Wilson from addressing any further notes to 
the Supreme Council. He thought the League of Nations was quite able 
to negotiate a loan and to find a mandatory.9 
To this Lord Curzon rather testily replied that he "deprecated ridicule 
of the League of Nations, seeing that the Council, whenever it found 
itself in a perplexity, referred its difficulties to the League of Na­
tions."10 
The conference thus found itself squarely faced with the problem 
of Armenian protection and finance. Though the French agreed to 
the proposal to send officers and equipment, this assent still did 
not solve the problem of providing funds to keep the new state going. 
In desperation, the statesmen again turned their thoughts toward 
the United States. Lloyd George in particular sought to create a 
situation that would force America to take a stand on the Armenian 
situation. It was decided to ask the United States to provide the 
necessary financial aid for Armenia." 
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Ensuring the enforcement of the Armenian settlement was the 
most difficult problem of all. An Armenian army as such still re­
mained to be equipped and organized, and it was estimated by the 
British that the Turks "might well be able to concentrate a force 
of close on 40,000 men in this area." 12 Much of the territory allotted 
to Armenia at the London conference was in Turkish hands and 
had a predominantly Moslem population. Both Curzon and Marshal 
Foch, the head of the inter-Allied Committee of Military and Naval 
Experts, were doubtful as to whether acceptance of the proposed 
boundaries could be enforced. Moreover, it was evident that available 
Allied forces were so limited that any attempts to enforce the Turkish 
treaty provisions in the rest of Anatolia would preclude the sending 
of Allied contingents to Armenia, and vice versa.13 
In a special report to the conference, the committee of military 
experts stated that in order to enforce the treaty provisions a total 
of nineteen divisions would be needed for the occupation of Thrace, 
Smyrna, Armenia, the Straits, northern Syria, and Mesopotamia, 
while an additional eight would be necessary to enforce the general 
disarmament and minority provisions.14 If, however, protection and 
guarantees to Armenia were excluded, the total number of divisions 
could be reduced from twenty-seven to twenty-three. The Allies had 
nineteen divisions available for duty in the Near East, and Venizelos 
promised that he could provide three more. The powers therefore 
decided that they could readily enforce the treaty provisions in the 
occupied territories and withstand any attack by Kemalist forces so 
long as no attempt was made to advance into the interior. Turkey 
could be "strangled" by seizing her "vital parts, . . . her capital 
and . . . her ports on the seacoast. . . . If they could cut off . .  . 
the source of revenue which Turkey had received from Smyrna and 
elsewhere, Turkey could not hold out very long. Her main arteries 
would be cut and she would be compelled to give in." 15 
In this way the Conference of San Remo blithely disposed of the 
enforcement and Turkish Nationalist problems in one easy decision, 
but did so at Armenia's expense. None of the European states had 
ever intended to become heavily involved in Armenia, despite all 
their pious pronouncements. Now, finally faced with the necessity 
of making a decision, they coldly and ruthlessly pushed aside the 
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Armenians and their newborn state. At the same time they attempted 
to salve their consciences by agreeing to officer and equip an Ar­
menian military force, which supposedly would be able to defend 
Armenia by itself.16 
The decision was realistic. The powers had long since recognized, 
as Nitti put it, that "it would not be necessary . .  . to declare war 
on Turkey to have the treaty executed [in Armenia], but in effect 
it would be necessary to wage it." 17 By forgetting Armenia, the 
enforcement problem was greatly simplified. All the other territories 
to be taken from Turkey were already in Allied hands and could 
easily be reached. Aside from the Armenians, the large minority 
elements in Turkey all lived near the seacoast, where their rights 
could be protected relatively easily. Therefore, once Armenia was 
excluded from plans for the disposition of Allied forces, problems 
of disarmament of the interior and guarantees for minorities became 
less important. 
In the light of the decision not to send Allied troops to Armenia, 
Nitti suggested that it might be wise to reconsider the proposed 
Armenian-Turkish boundary. He pointed out that "Erzerum was at 
present the centre of the Turkish nationalists. Someone would have 
to drive the Turks out. If this were done there would be a massacre 
of Armenians." l8 Lloyd George immediately came to Nitti's support: 
Before the war, and before any massacres took place, the population was 
emphatically Mussulman. Consequently, by no principle which had been 
laid down by the Allied Powers could they defend surrendering the place, 
which had a preponderant majority of Mussulmans, to the Armenians. 
. .  . He strongly deprecated encouraging illusive hopes in the breasts of 
poor creatures who had been persecuted for centuries, when the Allied 
Powers were perfectly well aware that they could not justify those hopes. 
It was quite possible that the cession of Erzerum might not be the one 
thing which would prevent the Turks from signing the treaty, but the Turks 
might think and say that "the other parts of our Empire which you have 
taken away are regions of which you are already in possession, but we 
know that Erzerum is a place where you cannot touch us." He would not, 
however, put his case on that ground but would put it to the Supreme 
Council that it was not honorable to the Armenians to cede Erzerum on 
false pretensions, as the Allied Powers had no intention to do anything 
except to write letters to President Wilson, or to assemble conferences, 
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or to address appeals to the League of Nations. He could say this: that 
no one in Great Britain would take the responsibility of asking for even 
£1,000,000 in order to send troops to conquer Erzerum. The Armenians 
could not conquer it themselves, and its cession to Armenia would be a 
purely provocative measure. . .  . It was not fair to the Armenians to give 
them on paper a territory which we had no intention of assisting them 
to secure.19 
In opposition to this point of view, Curzon, Millerand, and Berthe­
lot argued that Erzerum was so located geographically as to make 
its inclusion within the Armenian state a necessity, not only for 
military reasons but as the terminus of the railway from Erivan and 
the center of Armenia's road system. Moreover, the Armenians had 
been told that they could have Erzerum, and the Allies could not 
honourably go back on their word. It was very important "to consti­
tute a frontier up to which Armenia could work in the future." 20 
Retaining Erzerum would not make the Turks any more willing to 
sign the treaty, since it would hardly make up for the loss of Smyrna.21 
In an effort to resolve this deadlock, the Armenian delegates to 
the Peace Conference22 were questioned regarding Armenia's ability 
to fend for itself. They appeared extremely confident that Armenia 
could raise an army that not only could defend the territory it held, 
but that would be able to establish itself in Erzerum as well. All 
that would be needed was equipment and Allied officers.23 
The Armenian attitude only served to increase the boundary dis­
pute within the conference. The French maintained that the question 
must be decided in the treaty and that the best way out of a bad 
situation was to adhere to the decision of the Conference of London.24 
Moreover, it was all important that Armenia be given legal title 
to Erzerum, for "the law had some force of realization in its very 
nature." 25 This argument Lloyd George refused to accept: 
The real danger in conferences was that they lived in a world of illusions 
and did not face facts. Conferences were inclined to think when they had 
framed resolutions and adopted clauses they had solved difficulties. M. 
Berthelot seemed to think that the ownership of Erzerum could be decided 
in the conference. It could not. If six representatives round the table ordered 
the Drafting Committee to declare Erzerum Armenian, would this be giving 
Erzerum to Armenia in M. Berthelot's sense? Erzerum would have to be 
298 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
taken by force, and blood spilt in the taking. . . . The Allied Powers had 
decided that they could not send troops to take the place. . . . Could the 
Armenian republic take Erzerum unaided? Marshal Foch's report and that 
of all the military experts gave an unhesitating answer in the negative.26 
As an alternative, Lloyd George proposed that the United States 
should be asked to assume the responsibility for expelling the Turkish 
Nationalists from the larger Armenian state denned in the draft terms 
of the treaty. If it refused, a smaller Armenia should be constituted. 
This proposal was accepted by Millerand who suggested that it be 
extended to include a definite request for an American mandate. 
If America declined, Wilson should be asked to arbitrate the question 
of Erzerum. To this Lloyd George readily assented.27 
Ultimately, despite the protests of Curzon that the frontiers of 
Armenia should be at least hypothetically defined in the treaty, it 
was decided that the treaty should provide for Turkish, Armenian, 
and Allied acceptance of whatever boundary President Wilson might 
draw in the vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis.28 This 
was going far beyond the original proposition, which had concerned 
only Erzerum and its immediate vicinity. To give Wilson the author­
ity to decide the whole Turkish-Armenian frontier meant reopening 
questions involving the Lake Van area and the towns of Erzinjan 
and Trebizond. 
It may be asked why Lloyd George so readily supported Mil­
lerand's arbitration proposal, especially when it must have been 
obvious to all that Wilson was almost certain to grant Armenia more, 
rather than less, territory than had been provided for in the draft 
treaty framed in London. It may be that Lloyd George, opposed 
by his own foreign minister and the entire French delegation, saw 
a way of backing down without a great loss of face. But it is also 
true that the proposal provided several benefits that were pleasing 
to Lloyd George. First, even if the United States refused to take 
the mandate, it would become involved in Armenia, and this had 
been a long-time goal for Lloyd George. Second, American arbitra­
tion would remove from the Allies the unpleasant task of creating 
a boundary that inevitably would please neither side. Third, British 
and French responsibility for enforcing a territorial division that they 
had not created would be far less than if they had drawn it them­
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selves. As a result, blame for the probable future failure of Armenia 
to obtain any Turkish territory would be diverted at least partly 
from Great Britain and, more directly, from Lloyd George himself.29 
A special message was dispatched to Wilson asking the United 
States to accept the mandate as denned by the London conference. 
Whether or not America took the mandate, Wilson was invited to 
redefine the Armenian-Turkish boundary as he saw fit. As expected, 
the United States Senate refused the mandate, but Wilson undertook 
to draw the boundary, which he eventually did in late November, 
1920. Although the southern line corresponded roughly with that 
drawn by the Allies at London, in the center and north Wilson's 
boundary gave both Erzinjan and Trebizond, as well as Erzerum, 
to Armenia. But by that time events in Turkey and the Caucasus 
had made the problem an academic one.30 
Batum 
Directly connected with the Armenian question and the problem 
of enforcing the treaty was the future of the city of Batum. At the 
Conference of London it had been decided that Batum should go 
to Georgia, with the proviso that it would be a free port under either 
League or Allied guarantee, and that a garrison of three battal­
ions—British, French, and Italian—would be kept in the city at least 
temporarily to enforce these provisions.31 
By the time the San Remo conference convened, matters had taken 
a turn for the worse. Russian Bolshevik forces had decisively defeated 
the White Russian troops under General Denikin and were advanc­
ing rapidly along the Black Sea littoral toward Batum. Instead of 
enforcing free port requirements on the Georgians, it appeared more 
probable that an Allied garrison at Batum would find itself defending 
the city against the Russian Bolshevik army. The Allies so far had 
avoided any direct military contact with the Bolsheviks; Batum was 
hardly the ideal spot for such a conflict to begin. Not only could 
the Georgian national army not be relied on, but Bolshevik sympathy 
ran high in the city itself. Any defense would have to be undertaken 
by the Allies alone.32 Yet the abandonment of Batum would probably 
mean the end of Allied influence and control in the Caucasus. This 
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not only would hurt Armenia but it would affect oil-pipeline and 
railroad connections with Baku, the capital of the newly constituted 
state of Azerbaijan. 
No final decision was reached at San Remo. Instead, the Allies 
asked the British high commissioner, Admiral de Robeck, who was 
in Batum, to report on the situation. De Robeck's reply was highly 
pessimistic. Stating that Georgia itself could not be held, he asserted 
that it would require at least two divisions to prevent Batum from 
falling into Bolshevik hands. Since the British were loath to maintain 
their single battalion that was already there, and the French and 
Italian contingents had not yet arrived, defending the city seemed 
out of the question.33 
On April 27, the Bolshevik party in Azerbaijan executed a coup 
d'etat, well coordinated with an almost simultaneous invasion of 
Azerbaijan by Russian Bolshevik forces. In two days the affair was 
over. Although the state remained officially independent, it was 
completely subservient to the wishes of the Russian Bolsheviks. The 
fall of Baku completely changed the situation regarding the Baku-
Batum rail and pipeline communications. The basis of self-interest 
that had done much to hold the Allies in Batum was gone. As a 
result, the Italian battalion never was sent, and on July 7 the British 
and French officially turned the city over to the Georgian government 
and evacuated their troops. Although the Georgians accepted the 
provision of maintaining Batum as a free port for Armenia, Azer­
baijan, and Persia, the lack of any outside supervision and the sub­
sequent Russian takeover of Georgia and Russian Armenia soon 
made this provision meaningless.34 
Kurdistan 
In December, Berthelot had agreed to a British suggestion for 
the creation of an independent state or federation of tribes in Kurdis­
tan that would not officially be under the supervision of any power. 
However, since the British had taken charge of what had been done 
since the war in that area, there was little question of whose influence 
would predominate. In fact, during the negotiations of the Tripartite 
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Pact in London, the British proposed that the French and Italians 
should agree not to compete with the British for special concessions 
in the area of Kurdistan outside of the territory originally granted 
outright to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Moreover, as Cur­
zon admitted, the Indian government was interested in Kurdistan, 
for Indian troops had been in service there. Realizing that under 
these circumstances an independent Kurdistan meant British control, 
at London the French had reverted to their former advocacy of 
Turkish sovereignty over Kurdistan. Having already given up much 
in Mosul, they were not anxious to see British control expanded 
further. The issue had remained unresolved throughout the course 
of the Conference of London.35 
The solution ultimately reached at San Remo constituted a French 
diplomatic victory. Britain forsook its long-standing advocacy of an 
independent state with no mandate, and accepted the French plan 
calling for Turkish retention of the area subject to provisions guaran­
teeing a degree of local autonomy. The exact terms that would 
implement this decision were to be formulated by a joint French-Bri­
tish-Italian commission within six months of the signing of the treaty. 
The Kurds would have the right to appeal within a year to the League 
of Nations for full independent status. The responsibility for deciding 
whether or not to grant this, and the problem of aiding and protecting 
the new state would thus devolve upon the League and not directly 
on the Allies. The British renounced all claim to areas outside the 
Mosul vilayet and specifically excluded such territory from their 
sphere of economic priority in the tripartite agreement.36 
This settlement reflected a basic change in British policy, which 
now took the position that Britain should in no way become involved 
in Kurdish affairs. The rebellious attitude of the various tribes and 
their opposition to any outside authority undoubtedly had much to 
do with this.37 Lloyd George summed up the situation when he said: 
He himself had tried to find out what the feelings of the Kurds were. 
After inquiries in Constantinople, Bagdad and elsewhere, he had found it 
impossible to discover any representative Kurd. No Kurd appeared to 
represent anything more than his own particular clan. . . . On the other 
hand, it would seem that the Kurds felt that they could not maintain their 
existence without the backing of a great Power. . . . But if neither France 
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nor Great Britain undertook the task—and he hoped neither would—they 
appeared to think it might be better to leave them under the protection 
of the Turks. The country had grown accustomed to Turkish rule, and 
it was difficult to separate it from Turkey unless some alternative protector 
could be discovered.38 
Lloyd George thus abandoned a position he had held since the 
beginning of the Peace Conference. 
Syria and Mesopotamia 
The negotiators at San Remo formally approved the allocation 
of mandates in Syria and Lebanon to France and in Mesopotamia 
and Palestine to Britain. No pretense was made of consulting with, 
or working through, the League. The boundary between the French 
and British areas as it had previously been agreed upon was routinely 
confirmed. It was evident that each nation was free to carry out, 
without restriction, any policy it wished in the mandated territories.39 
That this would be the case had been evident for some time, and 
as a consequence Arab unrest in Syria, and to a lesser extent in 
Mesopotamia, increased considerably. In Syria, reaction to the an­
nouncement of the French mandate was bitter. Arab-French clashes 
in the no-man's-land between territory held by the Arabs and that 
occupied by the French continued with unabated intensity. It was 
obvious that a military showdown between the Arabs and the French 
was only a matter of time. Nevertheless, these problems could have 
been nonexistent for all the consideration they received at San 
Remo.40 
Palestine 
In the discussion of the clauses concerning the administration of 
Palestine, one major difficulty arose. The French government had 
long been recognized as the protector of Roman Catholicism in the 
Near East, and as such was under considerable pressure from the 
Roman Church and from many French legislators not only to assert 
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this right but to undertake a mandate in Palestine. The French 
government had no intention of doing the latter. It was obvious, 
moreover, that to preserve French control over Roman Catholic 
affairs in a British mandate would be an insult to the British and 
would constitute an obstacle to the successful administration of the 
mandate.41 
Palestine was an area in which Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Mos­
lems, and Orthodox Christians all had an interest. To meet this 
situation, Nitti suggested that establishment of regulations for the 
Holy Places and methods of adjudicating disputes between the 
various sects should be handled by a special commission of all faiths, 
headed by a president chosen by the League of Nations. He recom­
mended that all previous privileges and prerogatives held by the 
various religious communities, or by other nations in relation to them, 
should be rescinded.42 
Lloyd George immediately agreed to this proposal. "Great Britain 
would prefer not to have to decide this question herself. . . . Great 
Britain would infinitely sooner have these questions referred to an 
authoritative and impartial body whose decisions Great Britain would 
scrupulously carry out." 43 For Millerand, however, the solution was 
not so simple. Although he was perfectly willing to agree to Nitti's 
scheme in practice, and secretly to commit himself to the renunciation 
of the French religious protectorate, a public renunciation would 
be political dynamite, and he firmly refused to incorporate such 
a declaration in the formal treaty. A solution was reached through 
agreement to excise any reference to the religious protectorate from 
the treaty. Instead, a formal resolution was incorporated in the secret 
minutes of the conference as a corollary to Allied acceptance of 
the rest of the treaty clauses. The resolution read as follows: 
To accept the terms of the mandates article . . . with reference to Pales­
tine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the proces-verbal an 
undertaking by the mandatory Power that this would not involve the 
surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious 
protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous 
afternoon by the undertaking given by the French government that they 
recognized this protectorate as being at an end.44 
304 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
North Africa 
The only other outstanding issue dealt with at San Remo was 
the Franco-British conflict over the Egyptian clauses. The French 
objection was not to the clauses as such, but rather to their inclusion 
in the treaty, for they feared that such action would upset the balance 
of the unsigned Franco-British convention relative to Morocco and 
Egypt, which had been pending for some time.45 The British, in turn, 
refused to sign the convention because of French insistence that 
it be revised to include prior British consent to any future Franco-
Spanish agreement on French claims to Spanish Tangier. 
At San Remo, the issue was quickly settled when Millerand in­
dicated willingness to resume negotiations on the Egypt-Morocco 
convention, which had almost been signed in Paris, and to do so 
without extending them beyond issues involving Egypt and Morocco. 
Having received this assurance, the British in turn agreed to withdraw 
the offending Egyptian articles from the Turkish treaty, with the 
proviso that if the convention were signed before the treaty was 
given to the Turks, they should again be included. However, this 
did not occur, and the final treaty did not include the controversial 
clauses.46 
Oil Rights 
The question of the distribution of oil resources did not provoke 
any time-consuming negotiations or serious misunderstandings at San 
Remo. Millerand did make a feeble effort to claim the 50 percent 
participation that Clemenceau had sought in December, 1919. Meet­
ing a solid wall of opposition, he quickly dropped the demand, and 
the revised agreement brought forward by by the experts was quickly 
approved.47 
In its final form, the San Remo Oil Agreement was basically the 
same as the earlier Long-Berenger and Greenwood-Berenger Agree­
ments.48 A comparison indicates only a minor amount of editorial 
revision, mainly in an effort to meet British objections to the mention 
of private individuals or companies. Though the provision that 
France should receive 25 percent of the stock in any private oil 
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company in Mesopotamia was retained, the April agreement also 
provided an alternative that called for the sale to France of 25 percent 
of all crude oil produced in the Mesopotamian oil fields "in the 
event of their being developed by Government action." 49 Thus the 
contingency of either private or public development was covered. 
The only completely new provision in the San Remo agreement 
was an additional clause giving the French government the right 
to purchase up to 25 percent of any oil produced by the Anglo-Persian 
Company and piped from Persia to the Mediterranean through 
pipelines that went across French mandated territory. 
This settlement was officially approved on April 24, 1920, by the 
prime ministers of France and England. Its acceptance by the British, 
where similar proposals had previously been rejected, stemmed from 
two major considerations. The first was that, as Greenwood put it, 
"The leading feature of our petroleum policy for a number of years 
has been the endeavor to secure British control of the Royal Dutch 
Shell group." 50 The bait for the Shell group was the granting of 
the Mesopotamia concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company 
in which Shell held a 25 percent interest. This in turn necessitated 
the signing of the Anglo-French accord, since its major provision 
called for France's receiving a 25 percent share in the Turkish Petro­
leum Company. Without the Anglo-French agreement, it was evident 
that British control of Shell would not be achieved, and France would 
most likely ally itself with the American firm of Standard Oil.51 
Even more important, was the fact that agreement had now been 
reached on other political and territorial issues such as France's role 
in Syria, the boundary between Syria and Palestine, the fate of 
Constantinople, and the disposition of Anatolia, Armenia, and Kur­
distan. Therefore, the British at last were willing formally to approve 
the pact. 
With the San Remo accord, which was essentially a confirmation 
of previous Anglo-French agreements, negotiations concerning oil 
rights were at an end. Instead of dominating the Near East settlement, 
the question of oil and oil resources had played a surprisingly minor 
role in the negotiation of a Turkish peace treaty, taking a very definite 
back seat to other political and territorial issues.52 Never had its terms 
provoked any lengthy or serious disagreement. Although formal 
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ratification of the settlement, originally drawn up in February and 
March, 1919, was postponed for over a year, the pact was among 
the earliest and most easily attained of all the agreements centering 
on the Near East, and from the beginning was solely a Franco-British 
affair in which neither the Italians nor the Americans played a role 
of any import.53 
The San Remo Conference and the United States 
At San Remo, as in London, the United States played no official 
role, although the American ambassador in Rome was authorized 
to attend the Supreme Council sessions during the latter half of 
the conference.54 The attitude of the negotiators toward the United 
States, however, was anything but amicable. On April 26, the Allied 
Powers approved a reply to President Wilson's critical note to the 
Conference of London.55 In it they pointed out that they had sought 
United States participation, had waited for it, and had been inconven­
ienced by the waiting. Politely but firmly, the United States was 
told that the treaty was none of its business, and that as a nonsignatory 
America could not ask that guarantees regarding American interests 
should be inserted in the treaty.56 
This attitude of irritation was even more apparent in the debates 
preceding the dispatch of the note. Berthelot remarked that "it was 
impossible that the Allies should waste time explaining to the United 
States why they took this action or proceeded on such-and-such lines. 
. . . The treaty could not be subordinated to the whims of the 
American President." 57 In this Lloyd George concurred. "He thought 
it was intolerable that the Allies should continue to conduct corre­
spondence with the United States on the subject." 58 
The powers were obviously disgusted with what they considered 
to be unjustified and unwarranted interference by a nation that 
refused to take part in the negotiations and to assume responsibilities 
in the Near East.59 Even the appeal by the Allies to America for 
help in Armenia brought forth a caustic comment from Lloyd 
George: 
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He could not see that there was any harm in making an appeal of this 
nature. If America refused to assist, the Allies would be no worse off, 
and, in one respect, they would be better off. President Wilson could 
continue to lecture the Allies about the way they were handling the Turkish 
question, but if the Allies could retort that they had asked America to 
come in and assist, and that America had refused, the United States could 
not continue to complain of the inability of the Allies to protect Armenia.60 
Thus by the time the negotiations of the Turkish peace treaty 
were concluded, the influence of the United States on the powers 
was nonexistent, and in the final analysis it must be said that the 
treaty as drafted manifested little or no evidence of American atti­
tudes or aims regarding a Near East Settlement. 
The San Remo Conference and the Turkish Nationalists 
The role played by the Nationalist threat in the final formulation 
of the treaty is harder to ascertain. Certainly the Allies were con­
cerned about the Kemalists in a military sense. They were obviously 
skeptical about Allied ability to enforce the treaty terms in the interior 
of Anatolia. Without question, the decisions taken at San Remo 
regarding Armenia were due to anxieties about the strength of the 
Nationalist movement. 
However, regarding the coastal regions there was little concern. 
The Allied military experts were agreed that all territories except 
Armenia which were to be separated from Turkey or occupied by 
the Allies could easily be held. The Allied occupation of Constan­
tinople on March 16, 1920, had brought the Straits area totally under 
Allied control. This had been followed by the arrest and deportation 
of some forty members of the Turkish parliament, which was dis­
solved by the sultan at the insistence of the Allies on April 11. On 
the same day, Damad Ferid, who was once again grand vizier, 
proclaimed the Nationalists as rebels, and a fetva was issued in the 
name of the sultan as caliph, stating that it was religiously permissible 
to kill all those supporting the Nationalist cause.61 
For Mustapha Kemal, the occupation of Constantinople served 
as a signal for a total break with the Constantinople regime. On 
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the day of the occupation, he sent a message to all civil and military 
authorities urging them to remain calm and promising that action 
would be forthcoming shortly. At the same time, he addressed a 
sharply worded protest to the diplomatic representatives of the Allied 
powers and the United States in Constantinople, the foreign ministers 
of neutral nations, and the legislatures of Britain, France, and Italy. 
Three days later he issued a manifesto calling for the election of 
delegates to a new "Extra-Ordinary" Assembly and inviting members 
of the old parliament to attend.62 
The Grand National Assembly, as it called itself, convened on 
April 22 in Ankara with the express purpose of "securing the inde­
pendence of the country and the deliverance of the seat of the 
Caliphate and Sultanate from the hands of our enemies." 63 Within 
a matter of hours it adopted the following resolution: 
1. The founding of a government is absolutely necessary. 
2. It is not permissible to recognize a provisional chief of state nor to 
establish a regency. 
3. It is fundamental to recognize that the real authority in the country 
is the national will as represented by the Assembly. There is no power 
superior to the Grand National Assembly. 
4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey embraces both the Executive 
and the Legislative functions. A council of state, chosen from the mem­
bership of the Assembly and responsible to it, conducts the affairs of the 
state. The president of the Assembly is ex officio president of the Council. 
Note: The Sultan-Kalif as soon as he is free from the coercion to which 
he submits shall take place within the constitutional system in the manner 
to be determined by the Assembly.64 
This was nothing less than a declaration of political revolution and 
independence. The next day the Assembly elected Mustapha Kemal 
as its president and created an executive commission and a parlia­
mentary commission. On April 30, the Allied Powers were officially 
notified of the creation of the new government and its claim to 
represent the will of the people.65 
By that time the Conference of San Remo had closed. Yet during 
the conference the powers must have been aware that the Grand 
National Assembly was meeting in Ankara, and they undoubtedly 
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recognized the purpose and intent of Kemal in convening the assem­
bly.66 Kemal later maintained that even by the time of the occupation 
of Constantinople, he was receiving "private assurances from French 
and Italian officials that British policy was not theirs—that Millerand 
and Nitti did not agree with Lloyd George." 67 If this were the case, 
it was hardly evident in the talk and actions of Millerand and Berthe­
lot at San Remo. Nitti, it is true, was more cautious than the others, 
and several times spoke of the necessity of drafting a treaty that 
the Turks would accept and that could then be enforced.68 But at 
no time during the whole course of the conference was any mention 
made of the political action then taking place at Ankara. Aside from 
recognizing the Nationalist forces as a military annoyance, the nego­
tiators at San Remo seemed unconcerned about the Kemalist move­
ment and totally indifferent to Kemalism as a political force.69 In­
stead, a delegation from the Constantinople government was in­
structed to come to Paris. On May 11, 1920, the treaty was presented 
to the members of this delegation, and they were given a month 
in which to formulate a reply.70 
Until quite recently, historians regarded the San Remo conference 
as the time when the major negotiations and drafting of the Turkish 
peace treaty took place. In retrospect, it is now evident that such 
was not the case. Aside from the decision taken in January, 1919, 
to create mandates in the Arab portion of the old Ottoman Empire, 
the general principles on which the treaty was based (with the excep­
tion of the Armenian issue) were agreed upon during and shortly 
after the bilateral Anglo-French discussions in December, 1919. On 
the basis of these principles a draft treaty was hammered out in 
conjunction with the Italians at the meetings in London during 
February and March, 1920. In addition, many policy decisions relat­
ing to specific problems were arrived at in London. As far as the 
Turkish peace is concerned, the Conference of San Remo, apart 
from the decision regarding Allied noninvolvement in Armenia, dealt 
almost, if not entirely, with routine matters involving final approval 
and minor revisions of clauses already drafted during the Conference 
of London. 
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XIV * THE TREATY OF SEVRES

w,ITH THE conclusion of the 
San Remo conference, the work pertaining to the formulation of 
the Turkish treaty was complete. When the treaty was presented 
to the Turkish delegation on May 11, a general summary of the 
terms was given to the press.1 Although lacking in detail, it clearly 
stated the main provisions of the treaty. 
Press Reaction to the Treaty 
Reaction of the press 2 in Great Britain was basically favorable. 
It was generally agreed that the terms were harsh, yet most publica­
tions took the position that the treaty was no more than what the 
Turks should have expected, or than they deserved. Only a handful 
opposed the treaty. The Manchester Guardian regarded the peace 
terms as impossible; the Westminster Gazette called it an "oratorical 
formula, destined to mask the problems which the Allies have not 
been able to resolve." The Observer bluntly called it "artificial," 
"precarious" and "transitory," while Outlook disliked seeing the 
League used as a "dustbin" for all the problems the Supreme Council 
could not handle.3 
Yet, even among the majority that regarded the treaty as just, 
there ran a strong current of uneasiness and doubt as to the ability 
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of the powers to enforce the terms of the treaty. The Times, Daily 
Telegraph, Morning Post, and New Statesman all voiced concern over 
this issue. The press was unanimous, however, in regarding the treaty 
as a triumph for Venizelos and Greece.4 
The French and Italian press saw the treaty as a tremendous 
victory, not so much for Greece as for Great Britain. The Italian 
press bitterly condemned the treaty. Newspaper editorials particu­
larly castigated the French, whom the Italians regarded as having 
sold out to the British in the Near East in return for British support 
for some of their continental policies. So great was Italian hostility 
to the treaty that Nitti was obliged to state publicly that Italy would 
play no role in any "fatal war" that might ensue. Nevertheless, the 
Italians did take some comfort from the sphere of economic influence 
allotted to them and saw in it good opportunities for economic and 
commercial development.5 
Nor was there any enthusiasm in France for the treaty, where 
the Italian interpretation of the French role in the negotiations met 
with general acceptance.6 Tardieu used this argument in defending 
the government's policy in the Chamber of Deputies and Le Temps 
commented that the treaty had been negotiated at a time when Britain 
had France at a disadvantage, for France was completely absorbed 
in German affairs. The newspaper went so far as to discuss the 
position of the unfortunate Turkish delegates and to express the 
sympathy of France for them.7 
Turkish reaction was one of shock, dismay, and indignation, but 
hardly resignation. Upon receiving the terms on May 11, Tewfik 
Pasha telegraphed home that there was no hope of getting the Greeks 
out of Asia Minor and that the treaty terms were "incompatible 
with the principles of independence." 8 When knowledge of the terms 
reached Constantinople the press unanimously rejected them, saying 
that they cast a "sentence of death" upon Turkey, and the grand 
vizier told de Robeck that it would be almost "impossible" to impose 
the treaty on the Nationalists.9 Mustapha Kemal immediately called 
on all to resist, and the next few weeks witnessed a large-scale Turkish 
exodus from Constantinople to Asia Minor and a great increase in 
the number of recruits rallying to the Kemalist cause.10 
316 FROM PARIS TO SEVRES 
The Nationalist-French Cease-Fire Agreement 
Suddenly it became apparent that the treaty might not be signed. 
A Nationalist attack was launched toward Constantinople, and by 
the middle of June, Kemalist forces controlled Brusa and Panderma, 
dominating all but the immediate coastline on the Asiatic side of 
the Sea of Marmara. Moreover, they were in direct contact with 
British troops garrisoning a line across the Ismid peninsula." During 
this same period the French, hard pressed by a series of incidents 
in Syria and by continued fighting in Cilicia, sent Robert de Caix, 
General Gouraud's right-hand man, to negotiate a truce in Cilicia 
with Mustapha Kemal in order that France might effect a partial 
withdrawal of its troops. In this he was successful and a twenty-day 
cease-fire went into effect on May 30. De Caix was hopeful that 
this was only the first step toward better relations with Kemal, and 
commented that a "complete and general entente of the nationalists 
with France appeared very possible to him." 12 In these hopes he 
was far too sanguine, for the truce was broken by the Kemalists 
even before the twenty-day period was over.13 
Nevertheless, the signing of the cease-fire was of real significance. 
The very fact that a great power had made an agreement with the 
Nationalists was a victory for Kemal and constituted a type of unan­
nounced de facto recognition. Certainly it was viewed in this light 
not only by the Nationalists but by many in the Constantinople 
government. Tewfik Pasha, who headed the Turkish delegation at 
Paris, saw in the cease-fire a sign of possible Franco-British dis­
agreement, and he consequently sought to prolong the negotiations 
with the Allies as much as possible. It was this tactic that led to 
his replacement in Paris on June 25 by the grand vizier, Damad 
Ferid Pasha.14 
Greek Intervention 
By the middle of June it was obvious to all concerned that the 
treaty could never be put into force in the circumstances then prevail­
ing. Two alternatives remained: either a thorough revision of the 
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treaty or decisive military action against the Nationalists. Both the 
Italians and French leaned toward the former solution and made 
it clear that they would take no part in any military action.15 To 
prevent the possibility of revision, Lloyd George decided to take 
the initiative. He knew that Britain could not undertake any extensive 
military action.16 However, influenced by his admiration for Veni­
zelos, and oblivious to all but his vision of a Greek empire doing 
Britain's work in the eastern Mediterranean, Lloyd George fully 
believed that Greece could undertake a limited campaign that would 
humble the Kemalists and force the government at Constantinople 
to sign the treaty. His determination in this matter was such that 
he rode roughshod over the protests of Churchill and Field Marshal 
Sir Henry Wilson, both of whom were thoroughly opposed to such 
action and saw little hope of its success. He dismissed all opposition 
from within the British government as merely political and of Tory 
origin, for at this time the ties that held the coalition government 
together were becoming quite strained, especially over the question 
of Irish home rule.17 
Even the military, however, had to admit that there was no other 
possible solution if enforcement of the treaty were desired. At a 
conference of ministers held on June 18 Field Marshal Wilson 
conceded that assistance was desperately needed; he reluctantly 
concluded that Greece was the only available source from which 
such help could come. But he added that "his own opinion was 
that the operations would continue for several years and although 
it would be a great help to get the Greeks to come to our assistance 
now he did not think that such a move would really solve the prob­
lem." 18 In his personal diary Wilson was even more emphatic: "All 
this means war with Turkey and Russia, and will end in our being 
kicked out of Constantinople." l9 Wilson was convinced the Greek 
campaign would fail, and "then we shall be in the soup." 20 
Venizelos, however, was in London at the time and was invited 
to meet with the British ministers. He expressed a readiness, even 
eagerness, to undertake a Greek campaign, stating, as he had many 
times in the past, that Greek troops could easily take care of the 
Nationalists without any outside aid except in the form of trans­
portation and materiel.21 The conference of ministers, which had 
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already agreed that a withdrawal from Constantinople before a 
"bandit like Mustapha Kemal" would constitute an intolerable blow 
to British prestige and that it therefore would be in Britain's best 
interest "definitely to support the Greeks," welcomed Venizelos's 
assurances and authorized Field Marshal Wilson to meet with Veni­
zelos to plan the campaign.22 
It was now necessary to gain the concurrence of the other powers 
(or, as the minutes of the conference of ministers more bluntly put 
it, "to notify" them). The prime ministers were scheduled to meet 
at Boulogne on June 21. Lloyd George arranged to meet privately 
with Millerand at Hythe the day before. In a series of informal talks, 
the French agreed to the scheme, and orders were dispatched to 
the Greek commander approving the immediate start of the cam­
paign. As usual, the Italians were informed after the fact the next 
day at Boulogne, with many apologies and explanations that there 
had not been time to consult with them.23 
This decision for Greek military action taken by the political 
leaders against the express advice of their top military advisors can 
be understood only in terms of the status of the peace treaty in 
June, 1920. That the plan had its dangers was admitted even by 
Lloyd George, who stated that there was no question but that "if 
this venture should fail . . . then a new situation would arise" that 
would have to be "squarely faced . . .  . The next three or four weeks 
would determine this." 24 There was little the Italians or the French 
could do but grant Lloyd George his way, for this was the only 
action that could possibly bring about acceptance and enforcement 
of a treaty that had been so painfully hammered out between the 
Allies. To have refused to allow the Greeks to go ahead would have 
been tantamount to open admission that the treaty needed total 
revision. Instead, the powers decided to refuse all requests for revision 
of the treaty; and the Turks, who had already been granted one 
time extension in which to formulate their reply regarding the terms, 
were refused another. When the reply was received, the only alter­
ation of any import that was conceded was the addition of Turkey 
to the list of nations that would be granted representation on the 
Straits Commission. Otherwise, any and all protests of the Turks 
were dismissed without discussion.25 
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Much to the surprise of everyone except the Greeks and Lloyd 
George, the Greek campaigns were successful. Thrace was occupied 
in five days against only token opposition, and by the middle of 
July, Greek forces in Asia Minor had all but cleared the Nationalists 
from the Straits area. Brusa and Mudania were retaken, and pressure 
on the British garrison at Ismid was relieved. So swift was the Greek 
advance that on July 13, Greek army headquarters in Asia Minor 
announced that the campaign was at an end, although mopping up 
action did continue through August.26 
No alternative remained to the government at Constantinople but 
to sign the treaty. On July 22, a council of eighty prominent Turks 
(hastily called together since there was no parliament available) 
authorized, at Damad Ferid's request, the signing of the treaty. A 
Turkish delegation left for Paris the next day.27 
Cancellation of the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement 
With the success of the Greek military offensive, the last obstacle 
to the signing of the treaty seemed to have been removed. However, 
at the last moment a new snag appeared. The advent of the Giolitti 
government in Italy in June had brought to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Count Carlo Sforza, who had previously been Italian high 
commissioner in Constantinople. Sforza had long been suspected 
of extreme pro-Turkish sympathies, and his memoirs leave no doubt 
as to the extent of his opposition to the policy that the Allies had 
followed in relation to Turkey. It is hardly surprising that on July 
18, he informed Venizelos that he intended to annul the Tittoni-
Venizelos agreement, nor is it surprising that this step was taken 
formally a few days later.28 Sforza later bluntly stated his reasons 
for doing so. 
I absolutely failed to see how it could be of any use to Italy. With no 
undue breach of modesty, I considered that it was really not for a Great 
Power like Italy to have written agreements to the effect that Greece should 
"support" any essential point of Italian interests at the Conference. . . . 
But when the Foreign Minister of a great power, like Tittoni, goes so far 
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at the Paris Conference as to consider it an important asset to have Veni­
zelos' support, one cannot deny that Venizelos must have had, in the eyes 
of all . .  . the sort of legendary power of a charmer, of a siren.29 
The cancellation, which was entirely within Italy's right under the 
terms of the arrangement, had one very serious effect in relation 
to the signing of the treaty. The Greek-Italian agreement had pro­
vided that the Dodecanese should be turned over to Greece once 
the Italians had received clear title to them from Turkey. With the 
renunciation of the agreement, this provision went by the boards, 
and on July 26, Venizelos notified Millerand that he would be unable 
to sign the treaty with Turkey until this matter had been rectified.30 
Italy immediately found itself under a good deal of pressure to 
reach a new agreement with Greece. Although Millerand indicated 
that France would sign the treaty in any case, the British at first 
threatened not to sign either the treaty or the Tripartite Pact, which 
Britain, unlike France and Italy, had not signed in May. Although 
the British ultimately reversed their position regarding the main 
treaty, they remained firm on the issue of the Tripartite Pact. This 
threat was a real one for Italy, for it was this separate agreement 
that gave Italy the sphere of preeminent influence in Anatolia that 
constituted its total share in the Turkish plunder. Under these cir­
cumstances the Italians capitulated, and a separate agreement was 
drawn up in which Italy again promised to cede to Greece all of 
the Dodecanese except Rhodes. That island would be returned only 
when the British returned Cyprus to Greece, and only if a plebiscite 
taken at that time indicated a popular preference for Greek annexa­
tion. Should Britain not cede Cyprus, a plebiscite would be held 
in Rhodes after fifteen years.31 
Signing of the Treaty 
On August 10, 1920, in one of the exhibition rooms of the famous 
china factory at Sevres, the Turkish treaty and five other separate 
treaties or agreements were signed.32 Two, relative to minorities and 
Thrace, were between the Allied powers and Greece; a third consti­
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tuted a similar minorities arrangement with Armenia. In addition, 
signatures were affixed to the Tripartite Pact and the Italian-Greek 
agreement relative to the Aegean Islands.33 
The long struggle to create a Turkish peace treaty was at an end; 
turning it into a Turkish peace was a task that the powers soon 
found they could not achieve. The Greek offensive failed in its 
long-term objective of eradicating Nationalist resistance, and in time 
Kemalist forces regained the offensive. By the spring of 1922, the 
Allies were voluntarily seeking to revise the treaty in favor of the 
Turks, and a total Nationalist military victory in the summer of 1922 
resulted in the negotiation of a virtually new treaty at Lausanne 
in 1923. This later treaty, though retaining the portions of the Sevres 
settlement that dealt with Arab mandated territories, constituted an 
overwhelming diplomatic victory for the Nationalist movement of 
Mustapha Kemal in all matters relating to the Turkish state. The 
Treaty of Lausanne was the only World War I peace treaty that 
was truly negotiated between victor and vanquished, although by 
that time such designations had been pretty well obliterated by the 
turn of events. 
Evaluation 
Thus the mighty labors of a year and a half brought forth a stillborn 
treaty. The Sevres treaty constituted the final resolution of the Eastern 
Question as it had been interpreted by the European powers during 
the nineteenth century. It was a nineteenth-century imperialistic 
solution to a nineteenth-century imperial problem, a problem that 
had the misfortune of culminating in a new twentieth-century envi­
ronment, the full ramifications of which were not fully understood 
by any of the statesmen involved. 
Frederick Schuman, in his book War and Diplomacy in the French 
Republic, comments that all the World War I settlements were "like 
every dictated peace, . . . designed to consolidate the victory, to 
perpetuate its result, to realize the aspirations of the victors at the 
expense of the vanquished, to reduce the defeated States to a position 
of impotence, and to insure the military and political preponderance 
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of the triumphant Powers in future world politics." 34 Certainly his 
judgment is correct if one is considering the Turkish treaty. At no 
time did the statesmen involved evidence real concern or under­
standing of new forces at work both at home and in the Near East. 
Although all gave lip service to the concept of an informed public 
and a government and foreign policy based upon the will of the 
people, none really understood what this meant or thought to take 
it into real account. This was as true for the apostle of the new 
diplomacy, President Wilson, as it was for anyone else. Wilson had 
had the most to do with creating the new atmosphere of diplomacy, 
yet he failed to recognize and work with the problem of isolationist 
sentiment in the United States. 
Not that the people of Europe were sympathetic to Turkey; their 
vindictiveness and desire for national gain was both great and vocal 
and seemed to provide a secure basis for popular acceptance of a 
treaty such as that signed at Sevres.35 This the statesmen saw and 
understood. What they could not see for sometime, and what they 
could not really comprehend when they finally did see it, was the 
war weariness of the populace and its implacable opposition to any 
action of a military nature. This opposition was expressed both in 
the demands for immediate demobilization of all conscript troops 
and in the persistent loud demand in the press and legislative 
chambers for a drastic cut in military expenditures. Only the men 
connected with the military, Churchill, Wilson, Foch, and others, 
recognized the existence of the problem and tried futilely to get 
the statesmen to place their ambitions in line with actual national 
capabilities. Churchill put the matter most clearly while defending 
the military budget before the House of Commons in February, 1920: 
"I trust that, having dispersed our Armies, we shall not now take 
steps which will drive the Turkish people to despair, or undertake 
any new obligations, because our resources are not equal to their 
discharge." 36 
Again, the negotiators failed to recognize that the force of public 
opinion had finally come to the masses of the Near East and that 
a phrase such as "self-determination of nations" was one more likely 
to conflict than coincide with the interests of the European powers. 
Moreover, failing to recognize their own military limitations, they 
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consistently refused to believe in the increased military capabilities 
of the Near Eastern peoples. Nationalism, a force of which they were 
well aware in European problems, seemed to them to have little 
real bearing on the Near East question. With the exception of Pres­
ident Wilson, who, at least initially, did have a personal, emotional 
commitment to the concept of national and political self-determina­
tion, the chief negotiators' references to national feelings constituted 
no more than pious mouthings of the popular slogans of the day. 
Here again, the statesmen were mistaken. The Turkish Nationalist 
movement, which was scoffed at for close to a year, could in the 
end be dealt with only by the military. The French had to climax 
their opposition to Arab and Syrian nationalism by overthrowing 
the Feisal government by force in July of 1920, while the British 
found themselves face-to-face with a summer-long, bloody revolt 
in Mesopotamia.37 
It can be said with certainty that such things as local nationalism, 
wishes of the people, and self-determination played no role in the 
Sevres settlement. The concept of the mandate was regarded as so 
much window dressing by the French, and with almost as much 
amusement by the British. The choosing of the mandatory powers 
for the various areas was done through hard negotiation according 
to the practices of power politics, with no consideration whatsoever 
for the inhabitants of the area.38 When a territory provided economic 
opportunities or was needed because of strategic considerations, a 
settlement along imperialistic lines was forthcoming. Britain and 
France never questioned that the men and materiel to control such 
areas could be found. Yet, when no national, commercial, or imperial 
interest could be served, solemn promises suddenly became worth­
less. 
The classic example of this was the fate to which the powers 
assigned the Armenians when it was decided that the Allies could 
furnish no financial or military support to an Armenian state. Yet 
no people had received so many or so definite assurances of aid 
and support as had this unfortunate group. Before the commitments 
that had been made to the Armenian, those given to Arab, Greek 
or Jew paled in significance.39 
One point, already emphasized in Chapters 9, 11, and 13, bears 
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repeating. This is the fact that the question of oil and oil resources 
played a surprisingly minor role in the negotiation of the Near East 
settlement. Never did it provoke any lengthy or serious disagreement. 
The final document approved at San Remo closely paralleled the 
original agreement drafted a year previously by Messrs. Long and 
Berenger, which had been put to one side until knottier and seem­
ingly more serious matters could be settled. 
Policies and Governments 
For Great Britain, the Sevres treaty was an imperialistic settlement 
following the best traditions of nineteenth-century imperialism. The 
British sought to protect the main routes to India, and therefore 
made sure they received Mesopotamia and Palestine. Whatever the 
reasons for the initial issuance of the Balfour Declaration, there is 
little doubt that in 1919 and 1920 eagerness to fulfill a commitment 
to the Zionists was not a factor in Britain's insistence that it be given 
a sole mandate for Palestine. 
In addition, the British sought to continue their policy of indirect 
control of the eastern Mediterranean. Before the war the agent of 
this control had been the Ottoman Empire. Now Greece was to 
take over that role. The choice was natural, for Greece was a maritime 
nation like Britain, it possessed many long-standing commercial and 
diplomatic ties with Great Britain, it was a Christian nation, and, 
most important of all, it had as its representative at the Peace Confer­
ence a man who exercised an almost hypnotic influence over all 
the negotiators, Eleutherios Venizelos.40 
Lloyd George in particular was swayed by his admiration for 
Venizelos, and the most interesting aspect of his personal Grecophile 
attitude was the degree to which it influenced his attitude toward 
policy decisions. Certainly it is clear that he was almost alone within 
the British government in the extent to which he wished to carry 
support of Greek ambitions. His success came chiefly from the 
failure of others effectively to oppose him because of disagreements 
on other aspects of British policy. Churchill and Montagu wanted 
the Turks to remain in Constantinople (for different reasons); both 
were unfavorably inclined toward Greek claims in Asia Minor. Cur­
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zon, agreeing with them on this latter issue, vehemently opposed 
the retention of Constantinople by the Turks. Even on the question 
of Thrace, the British military at home and in Constantinople op­
posed the final territorial settlement, while the Foreign Office sup­
ported it.41 
Another part of the explanation for Britain's backing of Greek 
claims may be found in the 1917 collapse of Tsarist Russia and 
that nation's subsequent withdrawal from the war. As long as Russia 
remained in the war. Britain had been willing to grant it a large 
share of postwar control in the Near East. With Russia's capitulation, 
a totally new situation arose. In 1919 and 1920, British policy was 
guided by a determination to avoid letting the vacuum created by 
the Russian withdrawal be filled by either France or Italy. At first 
it was thought that the United States might plug the gap by taking 
over those areas originally allotted to Russia. When this plan fell 
through, the British assured themselves of a preponderant influence 
in the Straits area through an international commission, which they 
would dominate as the strongest naval power. Backing this up would 
be an expanded Greek state, embracing both the European and 
Asiatic coastline of the Aegean Sea, which would serve British inter­
ests well. 
In all of the negotiations of the Treaty of Sevres, fear of Bolshevism 
does not appear to have been a primary issue despite the rapidly 
deteriorating situation in the Caucasus. At times the British cabinet 
did evidence some general concern regarding the extension of Bol­
shevik influence in Turkey. In the spring of 1920 many people 
believed that Kemal and the Bolsheviks had signed a military aid 
convention; certainly Lloyd George was convinced that Kemal was 
receiving Bolshevik aid.42 Subsequent investigation has revealed no 
proof that this was the case, and recent scholarship has placed both 
the signing of a Soviet-Nationalist military convention and the begin­
ning of'Bolshevik aid to the Nationalists well after the signing of 
the Treaty of Sevres on August 10, 1920, though contact between 
the two governments had been established earlier.43 In any case, in 
the actual inter-Allied negotiating sessions of the Turkish treaty, 
Bolshevism was generally not raised as an important issue in any 
way. 
The French found themselves in the unenviable position of being 
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dependent upon Great Britain for support on such questions as 
German disarmament, the Rhineland, and reparations. The situation 
in Europe forbade any split with the British government, and there­
fore the French could not afford to oppose too strenuously British 
ambitions in the Near East. As a result, with the exception of Syrian 
matters, France generally acceded to British wishes, prime examples 
being the Smyrna and Constantinople questions. However, long-
standing French commercial and financial interests in Asia Minor 
made the existence of a strong Turkish state desirable, and by the 
summer of 1920 the French found themselves faced with a policy 
dilemma. The situation in Anatolia called for conciliation and sup­
port of the Nationalist regime, but such a policy would entail oppos­
ing Greek aspirations in Smyrna. To do this would mean a break 
with Great Britain. Moreover, it would constitute an open renuncia­
tion of previous French policy, for France had concurred in the 
original occupation of Smyrna and many, if not all, of the difficulties 
in Asia Minor could be attributed to that event. 
Thus the French found themselves trapped both by previous policy 
decisions and by the absolute necessity of preserving British friend­
ship. They therefore had no choice but to follow Britain's lead in 
officially supporting Greek military action in Anatolia in June, 1920, 
although they tried at the same time to assure Kemal that France 
really wanted to be his friend. These obviously conflicting policies 
were only resolved by the Nationalist victory over the Greeks in 
1922. 
The Italians emerged from the negotiations with the cleanest 
hands. This was not so much due to greater morality on the part 
of the Italian government as to the fact that it had no other choice. 
One of the central themes of the year and a half of negotiations 
was a constant attempt on the part of the United States, Britain, 
and France, and later Britain and France alone, to exclude Italy 
from any basic decision-making and to throw the Italians as few 
crumbs as possible. This was true regarding the takeover of Smyrna, 
the status of Constantinople, the spheres of influence, and the Greek 
intervention in June, 1920. In fact, if one takes into account the 
secret British-French discussions of December-January, the whole 
treaty was basically decided by two allies who purposely excluded 
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the third. It was only natural that the Italians subsequently sought 
to disassociate themselves as much as possible from a treaty whose 
provisions did not come close to meeting their claims, and in the 
negotiation of which they had played a distinctly secondary role.44 
The one concession Italy did receive was the recognition of a sphere 
of influence that was to be entirely within the new Turkish state. 
Therefore, it was imperative that Italy be on good terms with what­
ever Turkish authority controlled the area. On August 9, 1920, Count 
Sforza told the Italian Chamber of Deputies that Turkey must grow 
and progress rapidly, and offered "cordial and loyal collaboration 
of an economic and moral nature, leaving Turkish sovereignty unim­
paired." 45 Although stating that this position showed Italy's high 
moral principles, he was honest enough to admit that such a policy 
would "correspond to our best interests materially in the long run." 46 
The Negotiators 
From a study of the negotiations, no villain emerges. Yet there 
is, alas, much to criticize and unfortunately little to praise. 
The United States was never at war with Turkey, refused to take 
part in the actual formulation of the treaty, and did not sign the 
final document. Its president, Woodrow Wilson, ended his official 
role in the Near East negotiations in June, 1919. Yet a severe judg­
ment must be passed upon the man whose betrayal of his own ideals 
in supporting and abetting the Greek landing at Smyrna and in 
proposing a virtual French mandate for Anatolia outside of League 
of Nations supervision has been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. It 
is precisely because the United States had no axe to grind, no mate­
rial, strategic, or imperial interest in the area, that this action seems 
so reprehensible. At least the other nations had reasons and motives 
connected with what they took to be national interest; Wilson had 
only his blind personal dislike of the Italians, a result of the Fiume 
crisis.47 
At the same time, Wilson (or better the United States) must be 
absolved from a charge that both then and since has often been 
brought forward. European leaders, particularly Lloyd George and 
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Curzon, were fond of blaming American indecision regarding man­
dates for the delay in formulating a treaty, arguing in particular 
that had the treaty been presented to the Turks six months earlier 
it could easily have been enforced.48 Such an assertion is totally 
groundless for two reasons. First, the real turning point in the saga 
of the Turkish peace treaty was the decision on the part of all the 
powers to send Greek troops into Smyrna in May, 1919. It was in 
reaction to this that the Nationalist resistance movement appeared 
and grew, and it was this movement, and not the failure to present 
a treaty to the Turks in November, 1919, that precluded any effective 
enforcement of the kind of treaty the Allies sought to impose upon 
Turkey. Second, within a month after Wilson's return to the United 
States it became patent that the Versailles treaty was in for a rough 
time at the hands of the Senate. That this would be the case had 
been evident to many in Europe as early as March, 1919. Reports 
from the French and British ambassadors, along with those of foreign 
press correspondents in Washington, left little doubt that the United 
States would not assume any mandates, especially over territories 
that had belonged to a nation with which America had never been 
at war. The November repudiation of the treaty by the Senate was 
not needed to make it clear to European statesmen that America 
was unlikely to assume mandatory responsibilities in the Near East.49 
Rather, blame for the delay in negotiations must be laid squarely 
on Anglo-French acrimony over Syria during the spring and summer 
of 1919.50 The British, caught between their Arab commitments and 
the claims of their French ally, found themselves face-to-face with 
an aroused Clemenceau, who felt that the considerable French con­
cessions relating to Palestine and Mosul made it imperative that 
French occupation and control of Syria should be obtained before 
any further discussion of Near Eastern affairs took place. Once this 
issue was resolved in mid-September and the French occupation 
of Syria was completed in November, the British and French wasted 
little time in making arrangements to meet in the second week of 
December for private and detailed discussions of the terms of the 
Turkish treaty. Thus, once the Syrian stalemate was broken, negotia­
tions were quickly initiated, and it is hard to believe that any different 
position or attitude taken by the United States in the summer and 
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fall of 1919 would have made an iota of difference in the speed 
with which the negotiations progressed. 
If Wilson receives a harsh judgment, Lloyd George must run a 
close second. His Greek policy, at first based on what might be 
considered to be legitimate British interests, outran all bounds as 
his admiration for Venizelos increased.51 He continually overem­
phasized Greek strength and minimized Turkish resistance. He ap­
peared to be equally convinced of the barbarity of the Turk and 
of the totally civilized characteristics of the Asian Greek. Willing 
to relinquish his support for Armenian and Arab claims, he was 
at least consistent in supporting Greek ambitions to the end. 
For both Clemenceau and Millerand, the Near East constituted 
a secondary front. Therefore they had the intelligence to insist upon 
and grasp firmly the basic component of their claims, Syria, while 
being willing to use other areas in the Near East as concessions 
to enable France to retain good relations with Britain. The coopera­
tion of Britain in European affairs was of the utmost import to 
France. Thus, although their Near East interests might have called 
for greater opposition to British ambitions, the French leaders were 
willing to take Syria and for the time being remain as quiet as possible 
on other matters, although Millerand had the habit of making great 
issues out of minor details in the drafting. 
Venizelos stands out as a highly persuasive and talented diplomat 
who knew exactly what he wanted and who was able to achieve 
almost all his aims at the Peace Conference. Extremely nationalistic 
and patriotic, he demonstrated a greed for territory and a belief 
in Greek capabilities that knew no bounds. Events subsequent to 
the signing of the Treaty of Sevres were to show that he vastly 
overestimated the extent of his popular support at home and the 
capabilities of the Greek military machine. Yet the treaty itself must 
be considered in many ways as a triumph for Venizelos and a monu­
ment to his personal influence at the Peace Conference. 
If one man stands out in a particularly favorable light, it is Lord 
Curzon. Temperamental, often peevish, given to tears and emotional 
outbursts, harsh and often rude to his subordinates, pompous, ex­
tremely egotistical, and quick to suspect a personal slight in any 
remark, Curzon, nevertheless, had a cool, dispassionate, and highly 
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realistic view of what could or could not be accomplished in Turkey 
with the forces available.52 An avid British nationalist and imperialist, 
he at all times thought and spoke from the British point of view, 
and as a negotiator proved an extremely able and aggressive defender 
of British interests. At the same time, he alone was able to separate 
the essential from the nonessential in the Turkish problem. Although 
both the War Office and the Foreign Office were concerned about 
creating an effective peace, Curzon's solution was the only one 
presented during the Peace Conference that held out any hope of 
being enforceable with a minimum of effort on the part of the Allies. 
His scheme for the detachment of Constantinople and European 
Turkey from a new Turkish state in Anatolia, coupled with the return 
of Smyrna to Turkey, was a plan that would have excised the Greek 
irritant that was primarily responsible for the growth of the Kemalist 
movement. Equally important, it would have removed the necessity 
of Allied enforcement of the treaty in Anatolia, should it subse­
quently appear that it was not feasible to do so. Whether or not 
Kemal in the future gained control of Asia Minor, Constantinople 
and the Straits would have been in Allied hands, separate from the 
Turkish state, and the powers never would have found themselves 
faced with the necessity of negotiating a totally new treaty on much 
less favorable terms with the victorious Nationalists. Although Cur­
zon's plan to oust the Turks from Constantinople can be severely 
(and rightly) criticized from many points of view, it had the sustaining 
virtue of being enforceable, and of securing for Britain what was 
considered to be essential to its Near Eastern and Mediterranean 
policy, without committing the British to any potentially large-scale 
expenditure or military action in Asia Minor. 
The Peace Treaty in Perspective 
The negotiation of the Turkish treaty can shed some interesting 
light also upon the whole question of the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Versailles. Criticism has often been leveled at the Allied powers 
for negotiating the German peace so rapidly. The argument has been 
that had the powers approached the problem more slowly, allowing 
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the passions of war to subside, the resulting treaty would have been 
less vindictive, more dispassionate, and more fully attuned to the 
furtherance of peace in the world than was the treaty signed in June, 
1919. The terms of the Sevres treaty would seem to indicate that 
this would hardly have been the case. 
Can it be claimed that the Turkish treaty was the better and more 
realistic for having been worked out during a much more lengthy 
period of time than the Versailles treaty, or that the negotiators 
showed more wisdom, vision, and tolerance in the terms they created? 
The answer must emphatically be in the negative. The peoples of 
the nations of Europe were no less vindictive in their attitudes in 
August, 1920, than they had been in January, 1919. Moreover, nearly 
two years after the war, this bitterness was beginning to be turned 
against the governments at home as well as against the enemy abroad. 
This was a result of the heightened disillusionment that usually 
follows a major military conflict, and it was augmented by the eco­
nomic problems each nation faced in converting its industries from 
wartime to peacetime purposes while absorbing hundreds of thou­
sands of returning veterans. In effect, the home governments, no 
longer able to ride on the swell of popularity brought on by military 
victory, were more susceptible to such pressures than they had been 
immediately following the war.53 
At the same time there was war weariness, a desire to be rid of 
all things military—a condition that was far greater in 1920 than 
in 1919. Although this war weariness was incompatible with popular 
vindictiveness toward the former enemy, it was natural, it was there, 
and it made the negotiation of an effective and enforceable peace 
treaty with Turkey in 1920 an extremely difficult, indeed an almost 
impossible, task. There seems little reason to doubt that a similar 
set of conflicting attitudes and circumstances would have met the 
Allies in even greater form had they been attempting to formulate 
the German treaty in the winter and spring of 1920. 
The history of the negotiations leading to the formulation of the 
Treaty of Sevres can give rise to two contrasting, but not actually 
contradictory, final conclusions. First, the treaty was negotiated to 
settle the prewar Eastern question by men who saw the problem 
only as it had existed before the war. As such, the delay of close 
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to two years was fatal, for it allowed a whole new set of problems 
and circumstances to develop in the Near East. Second, the Treaty 
of Sevres was drawn up too soon for the negotiators to be able fully 
to assess the meaning of these new forces; the treaty failed to come 
to grips with the problems existing at the time it was signed. The 
developments of 1919-20 created such a turmoil in the Near East 
that it is questionable whether any treaty drawn up in the winter 
and spring of 1919-20 could have brought anything approaching 
long-range stability and peace to the Near East. Given the traditional 
policy attitudes of the Allies and their seeming inability or unwilling­
ness to take these new developments realistically into account, the 
possibility of a stable peace virtually disappeared. 
The only chance an imperialistic treaty such as that signed at Sevres 
might have had for even short-term success would have been in 
its immediate imposition on a thoroughly defeated and prostrate 
Turkey. The rivalry of the European powers, complicated by Wilson's 
vociferous, if nonactive, participation, made this impossible. By the 
time the powers succeeded in formulating the treaty, its provisions 
no longer applied to the situation at hand. Not only had the Turkish 
horse escaped out the barn door, but having fed on a fodder com­
posed of a mixture of nationalism, anti-Greek hatred and the doctrine 
of self-determination of nations, it was preparing to kick down the 
imperialistic fences so laboriously constructed by the negotiators of 
the Treaty of Sevres. 
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APPENDIX A 
ARMISTICE WITH TURKEY * 
Signed 30 October 1918 
I.—Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus and secure access to the Black Sea. Allied 
occupation of Dardanelles, and Bosphorus forts. 
II.—Positions of all minefields, torpedo-tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to 
be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required. 
III.—All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated. 
IV.—All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected 
in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies. 
V.—Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except for such troops as are required 
for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. (Number of 
effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with 
the Turkish Government.) 
VI.—Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey; these 
ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small 
vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters. 
VII.—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation 
arising which threatens the security of the Allies. 
VIII.—Free use by the Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation 
and denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping 
in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army. 
IX.—Use of all ship-repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals. 
X.—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system. 
XI.—Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Northwest Persia to behind the 
pre-war frontier has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasia 
has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops; the remainder is to be evacuated 
if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there. 
XII.—Wireless telegraphy and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Govern­
ment messages excepted. 
XIII.—Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material. 
XIV.—Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal and oil fuel, and naval material from 
Turkish sources after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above 
material to be exported. 
XV.—Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the 
Trans-Caucasian Railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the 
free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the 
* Temperley, Peace Conference, 1: 495-97. 
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needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey will 
raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies. 
XVI.—Surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the 
nearest Allied Commander; and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those necessary 
to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause V. 
XVII.—Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian 
garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they 
do not obey the order to surrender. 
XVIII.—Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, 
to the nearest Allied garrison. 
XIX.—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to be evacuated within 
one month from the Turkish dominions: those in remote districts to be evacuated as soon 
after as may be possible. 
XX.—The compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, 
arms, and ammunition, including transport, of that portion of the Turkish Army which is 
demobilized under Clause V. 
XXI.—An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order 
to safeguard Allied interests. This representative is to be furnished with all information necessary 
for this purpose. 
XXII.—Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of 
Turkish civilian prisoners over military age to be considered. 
XXIII.—Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers. 
XXIV.—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to themselves 
the right to occupy any part of them. 
XXV.—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on 
Thursday, 31st October, 1918. 
Signed in duplicate on board His Britannic Majesty's Ship Agamemnon, at Port Mudros, 
Lemnos, the 30th October, 1918. 
(Signed) ARTHUR CALTHORPE 
HUSSEIN RAOUF 
RECHAD HIKMET 
SAADULLAH 
APPENDIX B 
THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT * 
Letter from Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon 
(Secret.) 
FOREIGN OFFICE, May 16, 1916 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, 
stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation 
of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with certain 
conditions attached thereto, such as they result from recent discussions in London and Petrograd 
on the subject. 
I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole 
project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, 
since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies 
entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready 
to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is 
secured, and that the Arabs fulfill the conditions and obtain the towns of Horns, Hama, 
Damascus, and Aleppo. 
It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments— 
1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent 
Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed 
map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great 
Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, 
and in area (B) Great Britain shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request 
of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. 
2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to 
establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may 
think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. 
3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the 
form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in 
consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca. 
4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a 
given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's 
Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for 
the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Govern­
ment. 
* Br. Doc, 4: 245-47. 
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5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and 
that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping 
and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta 
and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate 
in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or 
indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port 
serving the areas mentioned. 
That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protec­
torates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French 
shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through 
Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended 
for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area (B), and there shall be no discrimination, 
direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships 
at any port serving the areas mentioned. 
6. That in area (A) the Bagdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, 
and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Bagdad with Aleppo 
via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the 
two Governments. 
7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway 
connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along 
such a line at all times. 
It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion 
of Bagdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties 
and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project 
unfeasible, that the French Government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question 
may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhad Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching 
area (B). 
8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force 
throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no 
increase in the rates of duty or conversion from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made 
except by agreement between the two powers. 
There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. 
The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port 
of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of designation. 
9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any negotiations 
for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third 
Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous agreement 
of His Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French 
Government regarding the red area. 
10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree 
that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial 
possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base 
either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent 
such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish 
aggression. 
11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation 
of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the 
two Powers. 
12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories 
will be considered by the two Governments. 
I have further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His 
Majesty's Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous 
to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency's Government on the 26th April last. 
Copies of these notes will be communicated to our Excellency as soon as exchanged. 
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I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement 
raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition 
or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th 
April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies. 
His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be in­
formed of the arrangements now concluded. 
I have, &c. 
E. GREY 
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(Continued from front flap) 
European rivalries, imperialist ambitions, and 
national prejudices, compounded by private 
antagonisms and personal conflicts among 
the negotiants, were permitted to shape finally 
and permanently the substance of the treaty 
that was signed. In the end, Dr. Helmreich 
demonstrates conclusively, the Treaty of Sevres 
suffered the tragic misfortune of being a 
nineteenth-century solution to a nineteenth-
century problem that occurred—fatefully, it 
turns out —in the novel and misunderstood 
environment of the twentieth. 
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